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GOVERNOR. I have called you together, gentlemen, to tell 
you an unpleasant piece of news. An Inspector-General is 
coming.  
AMMOS FIOD. What, an Inspector-General?  
ARTEMY FIL. What, an Inspector-General?  
GOVERNOR. Yes, an Inspector from St . Petersburg, 
incognito. And with secret instructions, too.  
AMMOS. A pretty how-do-you-do!  
ARTEMY. As if we hadn't enough trouble without an 
Inspector! 
Nikolai GOGOL – The Inspector General (1842) 
 
As in Gogol’s quote, the arrival of a government inspector is still something that elicits instant reactions of fear 
and worry in a number of countries – including Russia, and most countries that used to be part of the Former 
Soviet Union. Most of these inspectors nowadays, by contrast with Gogol’s, come to inspect and control not 
State institutions, but private ones, particularly businesses. “Inspectors” and “inspections” come under 
different names – “control”, “surveillance”, “supervision” – so speaking about “inspections” will not draw 
instant reactions in some countries, and these will only come when the notion is explained, “translated” into 
the appropriate words. The reality, however, in most parts of the world, is that inspections (under whichever 
name) are one of the most frequent and important ways in which businesses experience their relations with 
state authorities. While scholars and governments often look at “regulations” in a more abstract way, 
businesses will typically relate more to the actual experience they have of regulations, which is through 
procedures such as permits and licenses, and through inspections – particularly if the latter are frequent, 
burdensome, or otherwise problematic. 
Certainly, this situation is not unique to regulations affecting business activity, and to inspections that control 
compliance with them. For most citizens, “laws” likewise are often distant abstractions, and the way they are 
experienced is primarily through concrete processes: obtaining documents, marrying or inheriting, and of 
course: dealing with the police. The comparison with the police is apt: to some, the police is an indispensable 
defense wall against crime, and a good (and strong) police one of the main elements that separate civilization 
from barbarism. To others, the police is a fiend, an enemy, a body that seeks to oppress them regardless of 
what they have done – and, as recent events in the United States once again show, such feelings are definitely 
not confined to actual criminals. 
 
What this highlights is the essential ambiguity of inspections and control: absolutely necessary for some, 
oppressive and hostile for others. Just as many – from environmental defenders to trade unions through anti-
corruption groups – will clamour for more inspections and control, others – businesses, “better regulation” 
bodies, libertarians – will tend to argue for less. Again, the same ideological and interest-based divisions can 
be seen as for law enforcement by the police – some asking for more, others pointing out its downsides, limits, 
unintended consequences etc. What is striking is that much of these discussions, at least in the particular case 
of inspections, take place with a considerable lack of investigation and understanding of what inspections 
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actually are, how they function in practice, and what impacts they have. Pre-conceptions abound, analysis is 
scarce. 
There are many questions that deserve to be asked. What are inspections exactly, and are they just a form of 
“law enforcement”, or something different? What is their place in a broader range of actions aiming at 
implementation of regulations? How are they organized, planned, conducted in practice? And what is their 
impact on compliance, public welfare, economic growth? These are all fundamental issues, and without at 
least some level of response on these, trying to decide the question of “more or less” inspections is 
meaningless.  
The past decade has seen a growing interest in the question of inspections (and, more broadly, of enforcement 
and “regulatory delivery”, i.e. all activities and tools that can be used to make regulations better complied 
with and implemented). Major steps in this emergence of the question were the 2005 Hampton Review in the 
United Kingdom, and the publication of the OECD’s Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Enforcement and 
Inspections in 2015. Going further east, interest in the question started earlier, with various post-Soviet and 
post-Communist governments initiating reforms of government inspections from the late 1990s. Much of this 
work was (and still is) supported by the World Bank Group. 
The significance of the issue stems from its relevance for economic development, for achieving public welfare 
goals, and for strengthening the rule of law. From an economic perspective, even though the real importance 
of the “burden” created by regulations and their enforcement is disputed, there is some consensus that the 
broad complex of “institutions” (which include rules and their enforcement) is crucial to economic 
development (Rodrik 2003), and that reforming (making more efficient and flexible, etc.) regulations (in 
particular for product markets) has important benefits for productivity and long-term growth (Bourlès et al. 
2010, OECD 2015 a, IMF 2015 etc.). As we will discuss, regulations and inspections also have important effects 
on integration in international trade (see Rodrik 2003 for the interaction between “trade” and “institutions”). 
For public welfare, the evidence of regulatory effects is mixed, but there is generally a strong “social demand” 
for regulatory protection against risks, solid economic (Ogus 1994) as well as non-economic (Feintuck 2010) 
justifications for regulations in a number of areas, and ensuring that they reach their stated purposes more 
effectively, and at lower cost, is important. Finally, just as effective practices in enforcement and inspections 
are an important element to foster legal compliance (Kagan 1994, Ayres and Braithwaite 1992, Tyler 203), bad 
inspection and enforcement practices can lead to breakdowns in legitimacy, regulatory capture, corruption 
(Djankov et al. 2001). Thus, “good” inspections contribute to a range of public benefits (economic growth, 
protection against risks, consolidation of a sound legal order), whereas “bad” ones can endanger all these 
simultaneously. While the magnitude of such effects is still very difficult to assess, they are nonetheless real 
and make the object well worthy of investigation. 
 
1.1. Research question – do risk-based inspections lead to better outcomes at reduced costs? 
Nonetheless, answering conclusively all questions regarding nature, methods and effects of inspections would 
be a very tall order, far beyond the scope of this research, and maybe beyond reach in any case, at least based 
on the data currently available. What this research aims at achieving is somewhat more modest, and will draw 
on two sets of sources. The first is existing research on regulatory enforcement and compliance (spanning over 
40 years of work in a variety of fields). The second is “practical experience” as constituted where possible by 
hard (quantitative) data, but also by the specifics (qualitatively described) of inspection structures, practices, 
visions and first-hand accounts of practitioners and stakeholders.  
The interconnected questions this research will try to answer (or for which it will at least attempt to see if an 
answer could be found given additional data) are the following: are inspections really a specific “object”, what 
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are some of the main aspects and variations of practices in inspections, and are there methods that can allow 
inspections to achieve better outcomes both from the public welfare and safety perspective, and from the 
economic growth one?1  
The central question is clearly the last one: what are these methods that could allow for a “win-win” result, 
whereby the goals of inspections are better achieved (assuming, of course, some clarity on the said goals2) – 
and the entities and people subject to inspections (mainly: businesses) experience less burden from these 
inspections (and possibly even some support, that helps rather than hinders growth)?  
The proposition we will try and put to the test in this research is the following: do risk-based approaches to 
inspection allow for better outcomes (in terms of safety, health, public welfare), or at least constant outcomes, 
while doing so at a lower cost for the state budget and/or for the economy? Or, if testing this statement 
conclusively should prove elusive at this stage, are there sufficient indications that this may be the case, and 
does it appear possible in principle to test it further, if additional data were to be collected? 
In other words, this research will look at so-called “risk-based” and “smart” approaches to inspections and 
enforcement and try to identify what they entail, how they differ from other practices, and see whether they 
achieve their stated goal of reconciling improved outcomes in terms of health, safety and other public goods, 
and reduced economic burden or barriers. 
Emerging through the research, we will also see the importance of the question of trust – between economic 
and social actors, and trust by citizens in the state, regulations and their enforcement. We will try and 
understand better how the need to restore or consolidate trust is a fundamental driver of the development 
of inspection systems – and whether (and in what ways) “risk-based inspections” can help strengthen this trust 
(or whether they threaten, as some claim, to undermine it). 
 
a. Risk-based inspections and “Smart Regulation” 
This question squarely puts this work in the perspective of the “smart regulation” research and policies that 
have developed over the past couple of decades and which, following the sub-title to Ayres and Braithwaite’s 
1992 Responsive Regulation, attempt to be “transcending the deregulation debate”. Referring to “smart 
regulation” is, however, more a way of signalling the complexity and contentiousness of the issue. Indeed, 
“smart regulation” is an expression that has been given a number of definitions, and the basic tenets of which 
are far from being undisputed – and its current usage is quite far from the specific meaning that Neil 
Gunningham, who coined the term, originally gave it.  
Different definitions include references to “responsiveness” and “cooperation” and to “protecting” and 
“enabling” – but also to the “usual” meaning of “smart” in management jargon, i.e. “specific, measurable, 
achievable, realistic and timely”3. At its core, “smart regulation” is based on the idea that regulation can be 
                                                           
1 As we shall see, there are significant limitations in terms of data in order to reach any conclusive answer to this question, both on the 
economic and on the effectiveness sides. As a proxy for economic impact, we will mostly consider the administrative burden created 
by inspections (excessive burden being generally to some extent a drag on growth), the availability of clear guidance to businesses and 
the coherence and predictability of inspections and enforcement (both counting as positive). In terms of effectiveness, we will focus 
on inspection functions where at least some key outcome data is available and reasonably reliable (e.g. occupational safety), but will 
not look into questions of attribution, which would go vastly beyond this research. Rather, we will limit ourselves to comparative cases. 
2 A number of inspection agencies have mandates that tend to be defined purely in terms of implementing legislation, without 
consideration of what public welfare interests they should aim at supporting. Assessing (and improving) their effectiveness is, without 
redefining their goals, very difficult (if not impossible), as we will discuss further. 
3 See definition in External Advisory Committee on Smart Regulation (Government of Canada) 2004, available at 
http://publications.gc.ca/collections/Collection/CP22-78-2004E.pdf - and for an alternate definition, e.g. here: 
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simultaneously more effective and more flexible, more efficient, more friendly to growth and innovation. 
Reforms to make inspections more risk-based have clearly been designed with the same aim: “more effect, 
less burden”, as per the Dutch motto, or “prosperity and protection”, as per the English one.4  
What these mottos really mean, and how they translate into practice, is the first question. The second one is 
even more important: does “smart regulation” actually delivers on its promises? Many groups and authors 
have challenged this claim, and still do5. Through this research, we will try and bring our modest contribution 
to this debate and to the construction of knowledge on regulation and its effects, by attempting to investigate 
in details what the “enforcement” side of “smart regulation” really consists of, what different practices exist, 
and with which results.  
 
b. Main elements of the research - hypotheses 
Having defined broadly the central problem this work seeks to investigate and the question it will try to 
respond to, going further requires to break down further the research questions into a series of fundamental 
constitutive parts: 
- The “inspections object”: do regulatory inspections constitute a specific “object”, distinct from the 
regulations they are aim at controlling (and enforcing) compliance with6? what do they entail, and 
how they are organised, conducted etc.? What is supposed to be the goal of these inspections and of 
the associated measures and activities? Is there consensus on these questions, or not – and, if there 
is dissent, what basis can be adopted for this research? 
- “Risk-based inspections”: what are the different meanings put behind these words? Is there some kind 
of “professional consensus” on what this entails7? What claims are made about these practices? How 
do “real” risk-based inspections look like, and how much do they differ from non risk-based ones (to 
the extent that such a group can be defined)? And what are the results of the introduction of risk-
based methods? 
- Measuring outcomes: what are the challenges involved, the limitations of existing data and methods 
to assess effectiveness and other aspects? To what extent can these be corrected for to make existing 
data more useful? To which extent do apparently conflicting results also reflect improperly formulated 
questions and/or incorrect understanding of what is being assessed? And what would be needed to 
have more significant results in the future? 
In respect to these three main groups of issues, we make the following hypotheses: 
                                                           
https://www.ec.gc.ca/esee-eem/default.asp?lang=En&n=1F37FC50-1&offset=2&toc=show (used by Environment Canada). For the 
academic definition as per Gunningham, see further in the section on “Antecedents and sources”. 
4 The two mottos can be found (a) for the Dutch one, in the documents presenting the inspections reform programme (Vernieuwing 
Toezicht), e.g. here: http://www.inspectieloket.nl/english/ - (b) for the English one, in BRDO publications, e.g. here: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/local-regulation-ensuring-prosperity-and-protection  
5 Just to give a couple of examples of stakeholders groups criticizing so-called “Smart Regulation”, see: 
http://www.cela.ca/collections/justice/public-good-regulation-smarter-smart-regulation (in response to the Canadian report 
referenced above) and a recent criticism by EU Trade Unions of the European Commission’s “Better Regulation” programme: 
http://www.euractiv.com/sections/health-consumers/european-commissions-better-regulation-has-killed-150000-says-etuc-314030  
6 While there is a significant amount of publications focusing on inspections and enforcement, this does not ipso facto answer the 
question. First, many consider more the volume than the methods. Second, there remains far more discussion of and research on 
“regulation” than on inspections, controls, etc. Third, there continues to be a frequent assumption that what matters most is how rules 
are formulated, and that this determines the subsequent inspections and enforcement measures. For these reasons, it still makes 
sense to ask the question of inspections as a separate research object. 
7 Again, this question is not necessarily obvious to answer, and there remain important disagreements both on the relevance of risk-
based approaches, and on their meanings. See e.g. Rothstein, Borraz and Huber 2013. 
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- “Inspections” are a distinct object, with their own, specific range of effects, which are distinct from 
those of the underlying regulations they are supposed to help implement. Their goal is to promote 
social welfare along the lines of the regulations they cover, in particular by helping to decrease or 
mitigate specific risks. Under the word “inspections” are also understood a number of compliance-
promoting tools. It is legitimate to organize inspection (and related) activities in ways that help achieve 
better results in terms of overall goals (safety, public welfare etc.), even if this has to be done at the 
expense of other values or legal principles (e.g. strict equality of treatment). Thus, effective 
inspections entail a fundamental element of discretion, and how to structure and limit this discretion 
is an important issue. 
- “Risk” is a fundamental way to define what inspections are aiming at preventing or mitigating, to 
prioritize resources, and to select the most appropriate activities and instruments for interventions. 
To be effective as a criterion based on which to organize inspection activities, risk needs to be properly 
defined as the combination of the likelihood of a hazard actually resulting in adverse effects, and of 
the potential magnitude of these effects (taking into account both their scope and severity). 
Understandings of risk which are partial (looking only at magnitude of hazards, or at likelihood of 
accidents, or focusing on violations of rules rather than on actual effects) result in sub-optimal 
outcomes in comparison. In order to be effectively used, risk-based approaches require adequate, as-
comprehensive-as-possible, up-to-date data.  
- “Outcomes” of inspections should be reduced/mitigated risks, resulting in higher public welfare for 
the population, in a variety of ways (better health, reduced deaths and injuries from preventable 
accidents, protected environment, but also higher state revenue allowing for better funding of public 
priorities etc.). Inspections can also have negative outcomes: reduced business activity, higher prices 
and lower choice on the market, etc. – particularly when practices are poor. In many cases, attributing 
outcomes to inspections is very problematic, and thus attributing evolution in outcomes to changes 
in practices is similarly difficult. This is both because the phenomena observed are complex and multi-
causal, and because of limitations in available data. Nonetheless existing data, in particular when 
looking at cross-country comparisons, allows to lend support to the central thesis of this research, i.e. 
that risk-based inspection approaches result, all else being equal, in better outcomes and/or lower 
costs. Furthermore, it is possible to conceive of ways through which better data could be produced, 
and hypotheses further tested in the future. 
 
1.2. Antecedents and sources for the research 
Research on inspections is not new, even though it has not necessarily always (or even frequently) been 
formulated as the object being studied. The earliest works considered in our research date back to the 1960s, 
and considerable work was done in the last four decades – thus, way before government or international 
programmes targeting “inspections reform” started to take hold.  
The justification for this research lies therein that very little of the existing (and considerable) research has 
looked precisely at this combination of issues, and that none (to our knowledge) has done so in a way that 
seeks to overcome the limitations and difficulties in getting highly precise and reliable data by going broader, 
i.e. through a comparative investigation that reaches across regulatory functions and countries. The closest 
possibly (and a major source of inspiration we readily acknowledge) may be Responsive Regulation by Ayres 
and Braithwaite (1992), a seminal work on the topic but that looked less specifically at methods, and did not 
use “risk” as a central concept (focusing rather on “responsiveness” or “tit-for-tat”). Recent, important work 
like Malcom Sparrow’s Character of Harms looks across functions and countries, and does consider risk (or 
“harm”), but with a stronger focus on operational, problem-solving questions, and not on overall goals and 
effectiveness of the system. Very significant work has been done on risk and regulation, including considering 
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the issue across jurisdictions and regulatory functions (Wiener 2003, 2006 - Bouder and Löfstedt 2014 etc.) – 
but this work only considers inspections and enforcement incidentally, and looks at risk more in terms of 
defining it and understanding its different aspects, than of using it as a guiding principle for regulatory 
activities. Finally, very interesting work is being done that looks specifically at how inspectorates work, how 
they use risk and other methods (e.g. “responsiveness”, proportionality etc.) to target their actions and 
promote compliance, and with which results (e.g. Tilindyte 2012, Yan, van Rooij and van der Heijden 2015 etc.) 
– but such work has so far mostly been done on a relatively limited range of countries and issues, and from a 
perspective that emphasized the testing of models rather than a more “practice based”, “bottoms up” 
approach.  
 
a. Drawing on research findings – literature review 
What we aim at doing here is to try and connect more strongly theory and practice, and to look at inspection 
methods, risk, and effectiveness in combination. Thus, while we will draw strongly on a wealth of excellent, 
prior research work, we hope the way the ingredients are combined will be sufficiently novel to produce new 
and useful results. From this perspective, several strands of research are relevant to this work on inspections, 
risk-based methods and effectiveness8:  
- Drivers of compliance: a key aspect of understanding better what inspections should aim at, how they 
produce results, and how to make them more effective, is the investigation of what produces 
compliance. While the “deterrence” model formulated by Gary Becker (Becker 1968) still is used 
widely, there is ample evidence that it explains (at best) a limited part of compliance variations 
(Kirchler 2007). Later studies have sought to develop more complex and comprehensive models of 
compliance, looking at social, cultural, psychological as well as economic drivers. This is particularly 
relevant to our study, and scholars of “voluntary compliance” (e.g. Scholz 1984) and of “procedural 
justice” (in particular Lind and Tyler 1988, Tyler 1990) have put forward an understanding of the 
complexity of compliance drivers, of the potential for counter-productive effects of (perceived) 
“unfair” enforcement, and of the complementarity (and varying strengths and weaknesses) of 
different approaches that is particularly fruitful for practitioners and students of inspections and 
enforcement. Works that present a typology of compliance profiles, and of the effects of enforcement 
actions on each profile, are also very useful (e.g. Elffers and Hessing 1997, Voermans 2014). Overall, 
this research is greatly indebted to the typology of compliance drivers and their interaction set forth 
by Tyler in Why people obey the law. 
- Studies of institutions and methods: whether conducted from a sociological, economic or regulatory 
studies perspective, starting from the 1980s, there have been a number of works studying how 
inspecting institutions are organized and conduct their work (monographies and comparative studies 
of a couple of inspecting institutions, as well as broader studies looking at range of institutions and 
their practices). Some of the most relevant for our research include in depth investigations of how 
specific agencies work (e.g. Grabosky and Braithwaite 1986 – Hawkins 2002 on the UK’s Health and 
Safety Executive – HSE), comparisons of “regulatory styles” across countries (Vogel 1986 on 
environmental regulation in Britain and the US), but also (and most significantly) broader, thematic 
and problems-based reviews of practices (in particular Pressman and Wildavsky 1973, Sparrow 2008, 
Mertens 2011 – or with a narrower focus Robben 2010). Also important in this category are analytical 
                                                           
8 Assigning works to these different categories only purports to make it easier to follow the different aspects of research that we have 
tried to combine. Many books and articles span across several topics, and us listing them in one category only means that from our 
perspective this is their dominant contribution, not that they are not relevant to other issues. 
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works commissioned by regulatory agencies themselves, in particular the UK’s HSE, which has a long 
and distinguished research tradition (e.g. Centre for Corporate Accountability 2007). 
- Regulations and enforcement: studies considering the interface between rules and enforcement, and 
how to make enforcement more effective, are is a central “pillar” of the literature used for this 
research. The most central reference in this category is Ayres and Braithwaite’s Responsive Regulation 
(1992) which, over 20 years after publication, continues to be a significant inspiration not only for 
researchers but for practitioners. Along with the “procedural justice” vision of compliance drivers, 
“responsive regulation” clearly is one of the models that have had the most influence on our own 
research. Author authors have, around the same time as Ayres and Braithwaite, developed related 
visions of how regulatory enforcement can be conducted in ways that are more effective to promote 
and achieve optimal compliance levels. This includes Kagan and Scholz (both 1994), but important 
insights can also be found in works that focus on specific functions but attempt to draw broader 
lessons from case studies (Hawkins 1984). Following on the “responsive regulation” model, 
Gunningham (1999, 2003 – and 1998 with Grabosky) has been one of the main proponents of a 
broader approach to enforcement and compliance promotion that they named “smart regulation9”. 
All these works have major relevance for this research and can be said to form part of its foundations..  
- Risk and regulation: the growing category of “risk studies” is so large and rich that some clarification 
is needed as to which ones are most relevant for this research. While “fundamental” considerations 
of the role of risk in the society (and of understandings of and reactions to risk from a sociological and 
psychological perspective) are to some extent relevant, they are mostly useful for inspecting 
institutions themselves, in order to better understand how to communicate about risks and what 
reactions to expect from the public. In this first group are pioneering works like Slovic’s on risk 
perception (1987) and Beck’s on the “risk society” (1986). The most relevant for this research, because 
of its significance for inspecting institutions’ understanding of how to work with the public, is Slovic’s. 
Following on these early works, a number of authors have looked at how risk is managed in a public 
policy context, both from a normative and from a descriptive viewpoint. A number of institutions and 
projects (International Risk Governance Council, Duke University “Rethinking Regulation”, UK Risk and 
Regulation Advisory Council, Dutch Risk and Responsibility Programme) are or have been involved in 
this field, leading to a large amount of fruitful work (e.g. Renn 2005 – Balleisen, Bennear, Krawiec and 
Wiener, in press – Bouder 2009 - van Tol, Helsloot and Mertens 2011, Helsloot 2012). Equally 
significant are authors trying to show and understand the diversity of regulatory responses to risk, and 
how these are influenced by a number of political, institutional, social factors (e.g. Hood, Rothstein 
and Baldwin 2001, Carrigan and Coglianese 2012). While all these streams of research are extremely 
useful to build a better understanding of what “risk” can mean, what policy (in particular regulatory) 
responses exist, and of what factors drive specific responses, only few of the published works fully 
correspond to our research focus, which is the way in which risk can be (and is) used as a tool to select 
instruments and approaches, and to focus resources. We will see that most work from this perspective 
is to be found mainly not in academic writing (though there are of course some important 
contributions on this, e.g. Black 2005, Black and Baldwin 2010 and 2012 etc.), but in documents 
developed by inspecting institutions, governmental and intergovernmental bodies. 
- Studies of regulation and regulatory instruments: while it would add little to reference them at each 
and every step, it bears repeating the obvious, which is that such research could not have been done 
without the underlying “infrastructure” provided by many years of research on what regulations are 
                                                           
9 Gunningham defines “smart regulation” as a “form of regulatory pluralism that embraces flexible (…) forms of social control which 
seek to harness not just governments but also businesses and third parties” and relies on “the use of multiple rather than single policy 
instruments and a broader range of regulatory actors” (Gunningham 2010, p.131). While fully compatible with the definitions used by 
governments or the EC, it is different in its emphasis. We will come back to this issue in the theoretical part of this research. 
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(and should be) used for, how rules work, what the downsides and upsides of different types of 
regulation are – even when such studies did not specifically focus on (or cover) inspections and 
enforcement issues. Particularly useful for our research have been works by Ogus (1995, 2004), Black 
(1997), Diver (1983) and Baldwin (1990, 1995).  
- Finally, one more area of relevance is the field of legal studies on executive and administrative 
discretion. Unfortunately, this is an area where most research and writing tends to be country specific 
(focusing on each country’s administrative law and legal tradition), and where the scope of this 
research did not allow us to fully engage. The relevance of the issue to risk-based inspections and 
enforcement is clear: if discretion is somehow illegitimate or severely constrained, responsive 
regulation, risk-based targeting and proportionate enforcement will all be impossible or highly 
difficult. The challenge was that considering seriously and thoroughly the literature on this topic would 
have required a major time investment, given that this is mostly not treated as an independent topic, 
but will be found as part of broader studies of administrative law, the executive branch, administrative 
bodies. We thus cannot in any way claim to have done a comprehensive review on this side, and have 
relied on more cursory research. We did nonetheless look through a variety of works on this issue, 
over a variety of legal systems (mostly French, British and American, for language reasons), in order 
to back up our analysis (e.g. Treves 1947, Williams 1994, Shapiro 1994, Solum 2002, Endicott 2011, 
Tifine 2012) This has been sufficient to show that a significant number of legal scholars and legal 
doctrines support the vision of discretion that is put forward and used in this study, but clearly a more 
thorough investigation of this issue would be an important area for future research. In addition, during 
the course of the preparation of this research, we participated in organizing an international seminar 
on regulatory discretion (held in December 2013 in The Hague), which allowed to discuss, enrich and 
validate many of the ideas put forward here on this topic10. 
 
b. Drawing from the practice – experiences from inspecting agencies and reformers  
The review and consideration of existing research and literature is one of the key elements of its study, but its 
deeper foundation is in the consolidation and analysis of inspection practices across a wide range of functions 
and countries, as well as of the practical work undertaken to reform and improve them, including the research 
and guidance produced by international institutions (World Bank Group and OECD) and national ones (e.g. the 
United Kingdom’s Better Regulation Delivery Office – BRDO) in order to support “better practices” in 
inspections. In order to better understand how this “practical perspective” was captured, and how we have 
used it, breaking it down a bit is required – considering the types of sources, the relevance of the practices, 
and the use we put them to. 
First, there are several ways to approach the practice, different categories of sources:  
- Reviewing documents (guidelines for inspectors, guidance for businesses, reports, etc.) produced by 
inspecting institutions and (to use a short name) “reform promoters” 
- Analysing available data (official data produced by inspecting institutions as well as representative 
surveys) 
- Conducting interviews, focus groups, seminars etc. directly with inspectors, inspection institutions 
management, businesses, reform promoters etc. 
                                                           




In preparing this research, we have made extensive use of our experience leading or supporting reform work 
on inspections for the past 11 years in a number of countries. Through this work, we have had the chance to 
have frequent, in depth discussions with “inspections practitioners” in close to 30 countries. While this work 
also draws strongly on publicly available data and documents (including some that were prepared in 
connection with the reform work in which we were involved), these first-hand discussions are what brings it 
the strongest connection with practical experience. Annex 1 includes a summary of the countries covered, and 
of the types of interactions, persons interviewed and consulted, etc. 
The second relevant differentiation is based on what can be learned from these different sources: 
- Actual practices – what inspecting institutions are doing “on the ground”, how inspectors conduct 
their work, but also how it is planned, how resources are allocated, how often different kinds of 
establishments are visited etc. 
- Goals and visions – what inspecting institutions are expected to achieve by the governments they 
report to, and how they themselves conceive of their mission, but also at a deeper level of detail how 
they understand and conceive “risk”, “compliance” and other key organizing elements of their work 
- Impacts and outcomes – how effective are inspecting institutions’ activities in terms of reaching their 
stated goals, and in terms of reducing and mitigating risks, increasing social welfare etc. – and, looking 
at intermediary outcomes that are sometimes easier to assess, what are the effects of their activities 
in terms of compliance, trust, legitimacy etc. 
A third perspective is the value (example or counter-example) given to the cases and practices considered – 
i.e. the extent to which they correspond to a risk-based practice, or the opposite: 
- Many countries and institutions exhibit a mix of both risk-based practices, of techniques intending to 
promote compliance in “smart ways”, and aspects of their work which are decidedly more 
“traditional”, which contradict or limit their intent to work in a risk-focused and risk-proportional way 
– looking at these limitations and contradictions can help understand the challenges involved in 
introducing these approaches, and also why results can at times appear unclear 
- A few institutions (or at least some elements of their practices) can be seen as strong examples of 
what risk-based approaches purport to be – these examples will be used to show in greater detail 
what the actual practice of risk-based inspections is, and to look at the impacts and results to the 
extent that they can be measured 
- Many countries and institutions will, on the contrary, provide examples of “non-risk based” practices. 
This can mean that there is no active effort to target resources and visits, that no difference is made 
between types of violations, that punishment is the main indicator rather than improving compliance, 
etc. Looking at these examples (and their variations) allows to understand what is the alternative to 
risk-based approaches (and what is the most common prevailing practice) 
- In a number of cases, countries or institutions will be considered that still exhibit to a considerable 
extent traits of “non-risk based” practices but have started reforms in the direction of “smarter”, risk-
based approaches. Through these, we will try and see what can be found in terms of the conditions of 
possibility for such reforms, their key elements, and whether any results can be assessed (and if so, 
which ones). 
 
1.3. Structure of the research 
A final point to consider is how we will structure and use these findings from the practice. Arguably, an optimal 
way would have been to present clear case studies and to make direct comparisons between inspecting 
institutions with contrasting approaches, but otherwise similar characteristics. There are several reasons why 
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we in fact have not chosen this path. First, there are no “pure” examples of practice, one way or the other, so 
the findings may not, in fact, be so illuminating. Second, publicly available data is incomplete for most 
institutions and most countries, and gaps can only be partially bridged through more qualitative information 
(guidance documents, interviews etc.), and they do not offer the same level of evidence. Given that these gaps 
in data for the most part cannot be addressed without considerable time and resources (e.g. conducting 
representative surveys), most such “case studies” would have been incomplete, and not fully comparable. 
Third, considering the problematic character of much of the data, the difficulties in attributing changes in 
outcomes to specific factors (i.e. disaggregating multi-factor effects), and the fragilities of purported causality 
models in social sciences, we are not fully convinced that a case-study approach would have, in fact, yielded 
stronger results, even assuming data gaps had been mostly filled. Rather, then, that to chase an improbably 
chimera of certainty, we have chosen to embrace the incompleteness and uncertainty inherent to our field of 
research, and instead try and find whether we can find data and evidence that are rich enough to provide real 
insights on practices, and to support (or disprove) the likelihood (and not the certainty) that certain practices 
may have certain effects. 
As a result of this, this research will not be structured around case studies, but will use different aspects and 
elements from different institutions and countries where relevant, i.e. where their practices and available data 
best allow to help understand a specific aspect of the issue. The structure we will follow goes from definitions 
and key theoretical underpinnings, through findings from the practice, to the evidence provided by available 
data, and its limitations: 
- In a first part, we will first provide an overview of the historical origins of the current systems of 
regulatory inspections and of what the word covers in terms of variety of institutions, fields and 
practice. Due to the vast scope of this question, we will limit ourselves to a couple of functions, 
selected for their importance in modern inspection systems and because they were generally the first 
to be developed in the 19th century: occupational safety and health, and food safety. We will try and 
see to what extent this historical investigation, however limited, can help us shed some light on the 
relationships between inspection systems and risks (real and perceived), and trust.  
- The second part will cover the theoretical perspectives relevant to our research. We will start by 
looking into the research on drivers of compliance, and into other key theoretical underpinnings (in 
particular on regulatory discretion, and on the purpose of regulation. This will be followed by a cursory 
review of existing research on risk and regulation, to better understand the meaning and relevance of 
the term. ).Finally, we will consider the relevance of the issue for economic growth, as it is one of the 
justifications for policy reforms affecting regulatory inspections. 
- The third part will then consider what the actual practice of inspecting institutions looks like, and 
confront the theoretical perspective with these elements of practice. First, we will discuss theoretical 
and actual limitations of available data, in terms of allowing us to capture the effects of inspections 
and of changes in methods. Then we will consider and compare examples of “non risk-based practice” 
(or “insufficiently risk-based”) and examples of inspections that define themselves as risk-based, 
attempting to understand what such practices consist of, what effects they produce, how their 
outcomes compare. As part of this, we will attempt to better define what, exactly, risk-based 
inspections mean in practice, and discuss instances of what we think are misunderstandings of what 
“risk” means in this particular context, which lead to problems in implementation and inaccurate 
assessment of results.Finally, we will review a few cases of ongoing or past reforms from one system 
to another, so as to understand their aims, logic and results.  
- In conclusion, we will consider the evidence for the contention that risk-based inspections are more 
effective and more efficient, i.e. produce better (or constant) public welfare outcomes (and trust) at 
constant (or reduced) costs. In addition, we will briefly look at what further work could be undertaken 
in order to produce better, more conclusive data and findings. 
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The selection of the cases and examples used in this research was guided by a set of criteria. First, and most 
importantly for scientific “robustness”, cases were selected for their relevance. Regulatory domains studied 
(food safety, occupational safety and health) are both among the first to have seen the emergence of “modern 
inspectorates”, among the most important from a public “risk perception” angle, among the most significant 
in terms of institutional size and number of inspection visits, etc. Thus, they are quite acceptable proxies for 
the rest of the regulatory fields, in that they form a very important part of the total. Countries selected for the 
historical review are some of the most important and influential economies in the periods considered, and 
cover the most influential legal and administrative traditions. Cases selected in the third part illustrate strongly 
the different approaches to inspections and enforcement – risk-focused and risk-proportional vs. “risk averse” 
and “zero tolerance”, for instance. Since a limited number of examples had to be chosen, the effort was to 
take cases that would have a high significance (large economies of groups of countries, major inspection 
functions) and sufficiently contrasted practices. 
Second, availability of data. Since the purpose of the research was to attempt a comparative study of 
inspections across time, countries and regulatory domains, it was inherently impossible to also undertake 
considerable research to “construct” data where it is not already available. Thus, the cases chosen were all 
instances where publications existed, quantitative data was easily available, specific surveys had been done 
and their findings released, etc. 
Finally, familiarity. Because the study focuses largely on methods and practices, it was important that the 
author be as knowledgeable as possible about the practices in the cases used. To some extent, therefore, the 
selection of these cases was “path dependent” on the author’s professional activities over the past twelve 
years, which allowed to get more details and depth in insights. 
 
1.4. Limitations in scope 
There are a number of important topics that, due to the need to somewhat limit the scope of this research, 
we will only superficially touch. Among these are the related issues of corruption and capture. While both 
theoretical accounts and empirical evidence suggest these are quite important in relation to inspections, and 
some of the reforms we consider in the second part have been launched precisely with the aim to decrease 
them, we will not be able to conduct a full discussion of this question. We will, however, attempt to shed some 
limited light on such issues, and lay down some markers for further, future research. 
One of these questions that will have to remain to some extent unanswered is, however, of more significance 
than others – it is that of the economic impact of risk-based inspections, in comparison with other, “non-
smart” practices. One of the main contentions of regulatory reform of all kinds, “better regulation”, “smart 
regulation”, is that they will allow for stronger (and/or more diversified, more sustained) growth (and more 
jobs), as a result of increased investor confidence, greater innovation and technology adoption, stronger 
competition, etc. For some countries, these growth benefits can also result from a better access to foreign 
markets – when such access was constrained by regulations that did not conform to WTO and/or EU 
approaches, for instance. Sceptics, however, point out that whatever changes to competitiveness are induced 
by such “micro-level” reforms are dwarfed in terms of growth and employment by the effects of “macro-level” 
policies (both fiscal and monetary), and of more “fundamental” growth drivers (demography, geography, 
capital, etc.). Seriously considering the merits of both perspectives would require an entirely different, major 
research undertaking – and economic skills that the author of this work clearly does not have.  
What we will instead have to limit ourselves to, in this research, is a modest assumption: that, all things being 
otherwise equal, the advantages provided to economic activity by a “better” or “smarter” inspections regime 
will give economic benefits. These may be at the margin, but nonetheless real. For smaller economies, less 
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integrated into international markets, the benefits may be stronger. While we will not be in any position to 
test the validity of these assumptions from an economic perspective, we will nonetheless refer to some of the 
existing research that can back it up (such as Koedijk and Kremers 1996 – Djankov, McLiesh and Ramalho 2006 
– Loayza, Oviedo and Servien 2005) and consider a few concrete examples and cases of changes that may, 
indeed, contribute to substantial economic benefits for the countries that have implemented them. 
A final note is that, in this research, we have attempted to present findings for a double audience: academics 
and researchers on the one hand, and “practitioners” (regulators, regulatory reformers) on the other. This has 
meant that the volume of the work increased significantly, because we attempted to clarify issues that would 
be relevant for each audience, even while other points may appear relatively self-evident to one group. We 
hope the readers will show some indulgence and navigate this work to the sections that are of highest 




2. Inspections, risks and circumstances – historical development, diversity of 
structures and practices 
 
41. An inspector under this Act shall have power to do all 
or any of the following things ; namely, 
(i.) To make such examination and inquiry as may be 
necessary to ascertain whether the provisions of this Act 
(…) are complied with in the case of any mine : 
(ii.) To enter inspect and examine any mine, and every part 
thereof, at all reasonable times by day and night, but so as 
not to impede or obstruct the working of the mine (…) 
 
42. (1.) If in any respect (…) any inspector finds any mine, 
or any part thereof, or any matter thing or practice in or 
connected with any such mine, to be dangerous or 
defective, so as in his opinion to threaten or tend to the 
bodily injury of any person, he may give notice in writing 
thereof to the owner agent or manager of the mine (…) and 
require the same to be remedied; and unless the same be 
forthwith remedied shall also report the same to a 
Secretary of State. (…) 
(3.) If the owner agent or manager fail to comply (…) the 
time of making the award (as the case may be), he shall be 
guilty of an offence against this Act, and the notice and 
award shall respectively be deemed to be written notice of 
the offence. 
United Kingdom Coal Mines Regulation Act, 188711 
 
Inspections are so much a part of modern economic life – and the expectation of safety regulations and their 
enforcement acting as a “backstop” to our daily life so anchored in assumptions of developed countries’ 
citizens – that it is worth remembering that this is a relatively recent development. Indeed, the first 
inspectorates looking at safety were created not earlier than the second half of the 19th century. Looking 
briefly at the historical emergence of inspections is an essential introduction to a broader consideration of 
what these inspections are supposed to achieve, and more broadly of how risk, regulations and compliance 
are connected, and of the limits of these connections. 
The history of the emergence of formal (in particular written) law has generally been given more prominence 
than the question of how laws were enforced and implemented (and how much they were complied with) – 
both for “ideological” reasons (traditional priority given to formal rules and official decisions over the more 
“menial” issues, one could say the “logistics” behind the laws) and for practical ones (sources on written, 
official laws are relatively abundant – finding out about enforcement and compliance is considerably more 
difficult).  
                                                           




In addition, while historians have in fact covered “economic regulations” (when they were adopted), though 
rarely as much as other legislation (covering civil or criminal issues, say), there is no real body of historical 
knowledge specifically looking at the “history of regulations” – i.e. when, why and how certain economic 
activities or fields came to be covered by specific rules. When this has been covered in existing literature, this 
was mostly by economists and political philosophers, but their work has tended to look only at some examples 
that were relevant to the theory being developed, or were known to them. There has not really been a 
systematic investigation of the issue over time and space. 
The reason why this is relevant to this research is that the basic premise of our work here is to question the 
existing enforcement structures and practices. Doing so leads us also to wonder since when they have existed, 
in which forms, regulating which areas – and also why they came about, what was expected from them, what 
they replaced. Thus, even though this can only be a short and partial overview, and there is no easy body of 
research to use, we have attempted this modest and partial summary. 
 
2.1. Controlling compliance, controlling safety – the early history 
 
a. Tracing the earliest examples of “inspections” from Egypt to Greece and Rome 
To understand better what are the specificities of inspections and inspecting institutions, it is worth 
considering their emergence, and looking at when and how were first created structures specifically mandated 
with controlling and enforcing specific rules. “Regulation” of human activities, in its broadest meaning, may 
be at least as old as the earliest urban societies. As activities specialized in a way that we could now name 
“economic activities”, different “regulatory” measures and instruments were introduced. Morris Kleiner 
(2006) thus suggests that “among the oldest evidence of rules governing occupations is the existence of the 
Babylonian Code of Hammurabi, dating to around 1780 B.C.E. This body of codes stipulated both the fees 
patients were to pay for medical services and the punishments practitioners were subject to for negligent 
treatment” (p. xiii). This earliest example already featured the multiple purposes of regulation: safety 
(“negligent treatment”) but also other considerations, in particular costs, affordability etc. (“fees”). We do not 
have indications of the Code being enforced through “inspectors”, but rather it seems to have been used in 
judicial rulings, though not necessarily with direct references to its text (Charpin 2010). Thus, right from the 
origins of regulation, we can witness the decoupling of rules and enforcement. Not every rule (far from it) has 
its implementation inspected and enforced by a specific institution. In fact, historically most regulations (and 
even today many of them) can be said to have been left entirely to “reactive” and “private” enforcement, i.e. 
only by judicial decisions when litigation happened12.  
Nonetheless, efforts to promote and ensure better implementation of policy directives, and compliance with 
rules, started early on. Ancient Egypt in the New Kingdom era (16th-11th centuries B.C.E.) already had a 
complex administrative system with technical staff at the lower levels that were in charge of making sure that 
central directives (e.g. relating to irrigation systems etc.) were properly followed (Moreno Garcia 2013). 
Specialized institutions or officials in charge of control of compliance with rules probably first came into 
                                                           
12 Indeed, even though police forces often have broad jurisdiction and notionally could (and in some countries effectively do) control 
compliance with some (or many) regulations, this is a relatively recent development. Development of police forces itself was gradual 
and came relatively late compared to the establishment of urban societies, with Classical Athens (the “rod-bearers”) and Augustean 
Rome (the vigiles) among the first reported to have had significant numbers of officers tasked with maintaining public order and 
fighting street crime and other hazards. Police forces were mostly small in numbers for many centuries, and clearly focused on violent 
crime and threats to the state authority. Even though there are some indications that there was some enforcement of weights and 
measures in Athens, any such activities were quite limited. 
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existence to supervise payments of customs duties and taxes13 - being gradually developed in ancient Greek 
city-states, Hellenistic kingdoms and Rome. Officials in the ports controlled ships to ensure proper payment 
of trade duties. Still, these administrations underwent only limited development in staffing, professionalism 
and methods (at least as far as we can make out) – republican and imperial Rome relied on publicans 
(contractors) to make an advance on the product of taxes to the state treasury,14 and then collect actual taxes 
– thus, tax collectors were in fact private contractors. Tax farming remained, if not the norm, at least a very 
common method, until the 19th century C.E. (one of the most important examples remaining France’s Ferme 
Générale,15 which was abolished by the Revolution). 
Looking more closely we can, however, find some real examples of direct state control, for instance in Athens. 
In the Constitution of the Athenians attributed to Aristotle one can thus read that among the magistrates to 
be chosen by lots were 10 agoranomes (whose tasks included checking that goods on the market were not 
falsified), ten metronomes (verifying weights and measures) and ten (and later thirty-five) sitophylakes 
(checking that sales prices of wheat were in proportion of grain prices and weights, etc.) (Austin and Vidal-
Naquet 1972, pp.326-327). While Athens is likely to have been “ahead of its times” in terms of how organized 
and specialized the city offices were, we should also remember how thoroughly incomplete and partial our 
knowledge of ancient times is. It may well be that such magistrates were far more frequent than the traces 
we have. This would thus suggest that the importance of securing the truthfulness of market transactions, but 
also to some extent the safety of consumers, and (more importantly considering the number of magistrates 
allocated) the fact that consumers were not “gouged”, were very early concerns, and among the first gave rise 
to active state control.  
A few more remarks on these early examples. First, we are not absolutely sure to which extent these controls 
(early “inspections”) were based on clear “regulations”, or enforced far more diffuse “acceptable practices” 
relying more on experience, customs etc. – and clearly on the question of “fair prices” at least, and of 
falsification, it is unlikely that rules (if they existed) were very detailed (weights and measures being one issue 
where, on the contrary, the rules were certainly clearer). This means that the question of inspectors discretion 
was already very relevant. Second, the Athenian magistrates were (as for most other functions) selected 
randomly – the idea of professional inspectors was one that was not yet present.  
Still, while these functions undoubtedly related to enforcement, control and inspections, the structures in 
place did not necessarily look very similar to what we would nowadays understand as “inspections”. These 
developed gradually, over a number of centuries – both in terms of scope, professionalism and methods. Some 
important steps can be sketched out as “landmarks” in this emergence of “inspecting institutions”16 – from 
the Middle Ages to the 19th century. 
 
b. The developments of the Middle-Ages and Pre-Modern times – and their relevance 
The relatively simple character of fiscality – and of accounting, at least until the 14th century – in pre-modern 
times means that the complexity of operations needed to assess taxes and duties was limited – and inspectors 
were not really distinct from collectors. These collectors did not really constitute a corps of “inspectors” that 
would have looked in details at operations of economic agents. It is in other fields that we can trace some of 
                                                           
13
 See Asakura 2003, Austin and Vidal-Naquet 1972 
14 See e.g. Badian 1983 
15 See e.g. Pion 1902 
16 This outline is clearly done from a Western European perspective as, institutionally, this is where the model of modern inspecting 
institutions comes from. This is, of course, not to say that other regions did not develop their own approaches to problems of safety, 
compliance, market regulation etc. – only to focus on what is the most relevant for our present study. 
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the origins of modern, “professional” inspectors – and in ways that often show a very strong link between 
“risk” and “control”.  
 
i. Food Scares and Food Controls – unity of concerns, diversity of approaches 
There were, however, other aspects to economic activities than taxes and levies, some of which were deemed 
very important by populations and rulers. This is the case of the “quality” of goods, works and services, in 
particular (the notion of “quality” is a highly problematic one, but this was the term that was most frequently 
used at the time). As Madeleine Ferrières has managed to sketch out (in spite of the fragmented nature of 
sources) in her ground-breaking book on the history of food fears (Ferrières 2002), an increasing number of 
control measures were brought in from the late 12th century onwards, as cities again started to grow in 
Western Europe, in order to alleviate “fears” about the “safety” of animals being brought into the city, 
slaughtered and sold. While the contents of regulations imposed, the way in which controls are implemented, 
were grounded in the conceptions held at the time about what was “healthy” or “unhealthy”, “safe” or 
“unsafe”, and had nothing to do with modern science (except by some chance overlaps between the two) – 
they still manifested a concern that is very much akin to what now drives the development of food safety 
regulations and inspections. The intellectual background for regulation of food was very different then from 
what it is now. Bacteria and other germs were unknown, as were the real mechanisms of contamination. Food, 
however, had a centrally important role in medieval medicine and beliefs on health. The existence of animal 
diseases was of course known, some parasites were, if not understood, then to some extent identified, and 
there were many fears, that drove the demand for regulation. Because medical conceptions were so different, 
and understanding of biological mechanisms was yet to be developed, many of the rules and practices imposed 
at the time would not make sense from our perspective17 – but the question here is not whether rules were 
appropriate to control diseases (they often were not), but how they were enforced. 
The number of cities regulating the sale of meat, in particular, kept increasing over the 12th-15th centuries 
(Ferrières 2002 pp. 43-45)18. Very early on, too, emerge crucial differences between what we would now call 
“regulatory approaches”. While cities in Southern France and the Mediterranean region more broadly (Italy, 
Spain) relied on municipal regulations, detailed written law (these were Civil Law regions) , and officers 
appointed by municipal authorities to control the “safety” of meat, Northern France (and England, or the Low 
Countries) had a different model. There, professions such as butchers were “self-regulated” by guilds, they 
were “sworn trades” and swore to obey the guild’s charter. Rules are less detailed in this case, the prohibition 
of selling “unsafe” or “unsuitable” meat is meant to be implemented by professionals who have the knowledge 
and “know how”. Guilds themselves control compliance (ibid. pp. 45-46). There is no evidence of a marked 
difference in effectiveness between the two, but it is noteworthy that two models existed from the onset, 
based more on inherited legal, social and political differences between these two areas, rather than on 
considerations of how effective the control may be – and worth noting that this difference has, to a significant 
extent, endured, with a stronger reliance on self-regulation and involvement of professionals in England or 
Germany, and more emphasis on state control and written rules in France or Italy, say. 
                                                           
17 Even though everyday experience did yield some practices, such as thorough cooking, that do make sense from a bacteriological 
perspective, many other requirements would be more questionable from a “modern” view. For instance, in pre-modern Europe, rules 
generally mandated animals to be killed in view of all, i.e. on the markets themselves, with corresponding hygiene issues – but thus 
avoiding fraud on the actual state of the animals being slaughtered (see Ferrières pp. 48-51 and 348-356). It should be noted that this 
concern and belief that animals killed “in sight” are safer is still widely spread in developing countries around the world today, and 
thus probably corresponds logically to a situation where consumers have no other trusted sources of information about products than 
their own eyes. 
18 It is notesworthy that regulation at this time is essentially done at the municipal level. National, rather than local, regulation came 
in much later. 
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While the control of animals “imports” (into the city), slaughter, and sale of meat were the earliest food-
related regulations and “inspections”, successive centuries saw additional types of foods and food trades 
increasingly regulated – in line with epidemics and “food scares”, i.e. in our modern language real and 
perceived risks. To these traditional forms of control was added some supervision of street vendors (ibid. pp. 
222-223 for the example of pâtés and their regulation in the 16th century) and food shops in large cities by 
police forces (e.g. in Paris), that gradually developed and indicated an increased concern on the side of political 
authorities – because food scares could rapidly degenerate into unrest. This was the case with disputes about 
new bread baking techniques that led to royal intervention and regulation in Paris (ibid., pp. 158-163). Major 
epizootic crises gradually contributed to a more organized and constant involvement of central state 
authorities (necessary to enforce quarantine), but this happened only slowly, and with a number of reversals, 
over the 17th-19th centuries (ibid., pp. 294-311 and 392.402). Slaughterhouses, along with state-run 
enforcement, were introduced in France in the early 19th century, and thus live animals removed from the 
food markets. In 1906, sanitary inspections were made mandatory in slaughterhouses in France and the US 
adopted the Pure Food and Drugs Act (ibid., p. 431) but it is only well into the 20th century (Ferrières. pp. 428-
432 – see also Blancou 2000), long after Pasteur’s work gave the scientific foundation for modern food safety 
control, that food safety services were systematically organized19. 
Food-related “scares” or, to use a modern term, “risks” were not, however, the only application of early efforts 
at regulatory control. Much as today we can still see a nuance between some types of inspections focusing 
strictly on safety and physical threats, and others looking at consumer protection and other “economic 
interests”, early examples of regulation also included interventions aiming at safeguarding consumers from 
fraud and deceit. The food-related controls we discussed above had a dual purpose – protection against 
“unsafe” foods, and fight against adulteration and fraud (e.g. the purported use of cat instead of rabbit meat 
in pies – see Ferrières pp. 216-225). This was, however, not the only area where rules and processes existed 
with the aim of protecting consumers. Just as guilds were involved in the food trade, the craftsmen guilds that 
emerged in a number of cities from the 11th-12th centuries onwards covered most of the significant crafts and 
trades in Western Europe, and a major part of their functions was to control the way their members worked, 
and the “quality” of their wares, works and services.20 Guilds were also found in non-European contexts and 
played an important role21 in what could be called early examples of “self-regulation” or “regulated 
professions” or “enforced self-regulation” (depending on the specifics of each case).  
In many jurisdictions and in many aspects, one could thus say that “enforced self-regulation22” preceded 
“regulation”. Guilds regulated their members (often with a limited amount of details in written rules, and more 
emphasis on practice) – and authorities (municipal, state or otherwise) provided an “enforcement backup” for 
whoever would try and operate outside of the guild and its rules. In this perspective, it could be interesting to 
study more closely whether the liberalisation of entry into economic activities and the abolition of guilds’ 
monopolies (e.g. in France with the Loi Le Chapelier adopted in 1791) had an influence (even delayed) in the 
gradual emergence of more direct state regulation. It would not be absurd to imagine that states that more 
thoroughly eliminated the old guilds system (e.g. France) would rely less on professional regulations than 
others (such as Germany) where changes were slower and less radical – and this could have reinforced a 
                                                           
19 See e.g. overview of the United States FDA’s history: http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/Origin/ucm124403.htm  
20 See e.g. Martin Saint-Léon 1922. 
21 See Lucassen et al. 2008 




difference in regulatory approaches that, as we have seen above, has some origins in the Civil Law/Common 
Law “divide”23. 
 
ii. The French Manufactures Inspection – an early example of “inspectorate” 
One of the most interesting early examples of regulatory inspections, however, involved direct state 
intervention to ensure an adequate level of “quality” for the era’s most important consumer goods – textiles. 
The story of textile manufacturing inspections bears striking resemblance to many of our time’s inspections 
and enforcement logics, challenges and reform attempts. It also features England following up in France’s 
regulatory footsteps, which does not fit with today’s stereotypes on the two countries. Covering this case in 
some detail is worth the insights it can give us on how issues we tend to see as “contemporary” are in fact 
further developments of long-present trends and challenges. 
One of the first “inspectorates” defined as such was created in 17th century France to supervise textile 
manufacturing. In August 1669, Louis XIV enacted the Règlement Général des Manufactures et Teintures, on 
the recommandation of Jean-Baptiste Colbert, Contrôleur Général des Finances – his chief minister. Further to 
this major regulatory act, in april 1670 Colbert (who was also “Surintendant des Bâtiments, arts et 
manufactures de France”) issued an instruction on its implementation24 (Lenoble 1908 pp. 1-3). The regulation 
included rules to ensure raw materials (wool, primarily) were not damaged, detailed mandatory prescriptions 
on the way weaving and dyeing should be done for different types of cloth, requirements to check the cloth 
for conformity and mark it with a lead seal – as well as serious sanctions for those who would violate these 
rules (ibid., pp. 2-3). This initial regulation was followed by subsequent additions, amendments and reforms: 
first, aiming to strengthen and complement it and then, later, trying to make it more flexible to accommodate 
market demand for more diversity and lower prices, more “segmentation” as we would now say (Lenoble 1908 
p. 2 and Minard 1997 p. 490). The inspection itself underwent gradual development over several decades, 
with inspectors appointed throughout the kingdom, then “inspector generals” created in 1727 (Lenoble 1908 
pp. 3-4) – reaching a staffing level of 50-60 (Minard 1997 p. 488) – modest by modern standards, but far from 
insignificant for states in the 18th century, and considering the limited number of manufacturing facilities to 
be controlled.  
Even though the inspection was to be abolished quite suddenly (Minard 1997 p. 487, Lenoble 1908 p. 9) in 
1791 by the Constituent Assembly (in the same year that it also abolished all guilds and corporations, and 
forbade trade unions and strikes, by the Loi Le Chapelier), the inspection was not only well established but, to 
an extent, imitated elsewhere. Building further on the policies of successive Tudor monarchs who “used 
protectionism, subsidies, distribution of monopoly rights, government-sponsored industrial espionage and 
other means of government intervention to develop England’s woollen manufacturing industry” (Chang 2007 
pp. 40-41), in the 1720s Robert Walpole and his cabinet went further. Not only was Walpole’s 1721 legislation 
adopted to “protect British manufacturing industries from foreign competition, subsidize them and encourage 
them to export” – in addition, “regulation was introduced to control the quality of manufactured products, 
especially textile products, so that unscrupulous manufacturers could not damage the reputation of British 
products in foreign markets” (ibid., p. 44). While “Walpole’s protectionist policies remained in place for the 
next century” (ibid., p. 45), state-imposed quality controls were also phased out in the 19th century as part of 
a broader wave of free-trade reforms. 
                                                           
23 A number of regulatory features have origins as far back as the French Revolution – for instance, the way French building safety 
regulations are primarily enforced through a 10 year liability on builders dates back in essence to the 1804 Code Civil – see World Bank 
Group 2013 b, pp. 82-87. 




Cursory information suggests the system was imitated also in other countries, but since information available 
is limited, we will focus on the original French example in order to briefly describe some of the main goals, 
characteristics, challenges and lessons of the “manufacturing inspection” experience. The overall goal of the 
regulation of manufactures (primarily textile, but with coverage of rules and inspections also extending to 
other sectors) was the economic development of the country through an increase in manufacturing 
production (both for import substitution and exports), aiming at capturing more of what was not yet called 
“added value” (see Lenoble 1908 p. 1). Inspectors are supposed to help achieving this goal first by improving 
the consumers’ confidence and trust in the products being sold to them – meaning both domestic consumers 
and foreign consumers, with French products supposed to gain market share, and maybe also with the idea 
that trust will help “grow the market” by increasing overall demand (Minart 1997 p. 489-490). In addition, 
inspectors also provide (or are expected to provide) advice to manufacturers (or would-be manufacturers) and 
to local officials such as the intendants on where to set up their facilities, how to source raw materials, which 
products are more in demand, which markets they could target, which technologies they could use etc. 
(Lenoble 1908 p. 6) They also collected statistics for the government. 
The corps of manufactures inspectors reportedly “survived” an early “temptation” by Louis XIV who, cash-
strapped after the Spanish Succession War, decided in 1704 to sell offices of inspectors and controllers of 
manufactures, and let them levy a duty on cloth. Petitions by manufacturers and traders led to this decision 
being repealed, and the corps increasingly became what Minart (ibid., p. 488) calls a “laboratory” for a new 
type of “Ancien Régime Civil Servant” – with “all the elements” (or at least many) typical of the “modern civil 
servant”: hierarchy, entrance examination25, status, career profiles, discipline, obligation to reside in duty 
station, pension. The inspectors were under a clear vertical hierarchy reporting to the minister (Contrôleur 
Général des Finances) though they also coordinated to a large extent with the local intendant (whose role was 
close to the modern French préfet).  
We do not have sufficient information (and even less data) to attempt an assessment of the inspectors’ 
effectiveness, even more so considering that their purpose (increasing production) was one where their role 
would evidently be (at best) very minor compared to other factors (geography, trade, geopolitics, technology, 
overall institutional and political framework etc.). Nonetheless, Minart (ibid., p. 489) suggests that 
manufacturers and traders in fact, to a large extent, supported the system because of the trade facilitation 
effect it created (through increased trust). The excessive complexity brought by ever-increasing detailed 
prescriptions, the heaviness of the limitations on innovation or lower-cost production (and the undercutting 
of compliant producers through cheaper, “informal” production) led to series of reforms, in particular under 
the ministries of Turgot (1770 – see Lenoble 1908 p. 2) and Necker (1779 – see Minart 1997 p. 490). In 
particular, the latter issued instructions to inspectors to “clarify and narrow down the scope of regulation”, 
accommodate more “freedom of creation, flexibility in implementation of norms” and “quality-price oriented 
consumption” (ibid.). 
In spite of this, the regulation and inspection of manufactures was increasingly seen by the French liberals as 
a “carcan gothique26” (ibid. p. 489) – and it was abolished, as mentioned, during the Revolution. What is 
fascinating for the student and practitioner of modern inspections, is the number of aspects where this system 
reminds us of contemporary product market regulations and their enforcement – and their challenges.  
First, the tension between the need to enable market development through trust, and the barriers to 
innovation and growth imposed by excessively detailed and strict regulation. Defining precisely what certain 
product names should mean, and imposing specifications and certification, are still methods that are in use 
                                                           
25 Though Lenoble 1908 reports famous cases of nepotism in appointments – which is not necessarily contradictory with a practice of 
examinations for most cases and/or at a later stage (p. 5) 
26 A “gothic straightjacket” – a qualification at least as harsh as those used by modern-day “regulatory reformers”  
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today – however, in the EU for instance, these are generally voluntary (i.e. to be complied with only if one 
wishes to sell a product using this specified controlled denomination – alternative products, named differently, 
are allowed) and certification is not done by state inspectors (but by accredited and authorized conformity 
assessment bodies)27. However, many countries around the world (e.g. most former Soviet countries) have 
systems where most products are subject to mandatory certification, alternative product types and production 
methods are not allowed, and certification is done directly by state bodies which also conduct inspections. 
Second, the arguments used to create the institution, propose its reform and its abolition, as well as the ways 
in which it was reformed (and then abolished), all remind us of modern situations as well. Developing an 
industry and protecting consumers are oft stated goals in developed and developing countries alike when it 
comes to introducing regulations and creating inspection institutions. Removing barriers to innovation, 
reducing prices and allowing diversification are frequent reasons why reform is advocated. Introducing more 
flexibility compared to a more rigid initial practice is a common reform approach – just as the “radical” 
approach to free up markets fully from restrictions that are not necessary for safety but only aim at ensuring 
“quality” is another option that is just as present in contemporary reform situations.  
Finally, the ways in which the inspectorate developed – an initial decision to regulate, the recognition that 
inspectors were needed, gradual build-up of staff without a very clear initial plan, and progressive 
formalization, are close to what often is seen to happen in modern times. The decision to regulate is taken 
quickly based on goals that seem undisputable but with a “theory of change” that is not fully thought through 
and excessively optimistic. The need for implementation and enforcement resources emerges quickly, but 
there is no initial vision of how to structure it, and it progresses in a partly “unplanned” way. Path dependence 
is a strong factor. 
In conclusion of this small case of “pre-modern” inspection, we can say that the historical study of regulation 
and regulatory enforcement appears to hold much promise in order to better put our own contemporary 
problems in perspective, and comparisons of countries with different regulatory approaches and reform 
decisions could be even more enlightening. What is clear, in any case, is that our modern issues are far from 
being uniquely novel. There are relatively few studies of institutions that (under whichever names) could be 
considered as forebears of “inspectorates”, but it is noteworthy that the intent to create institutions to both 
foster and control specific industries is not new, and neither are the tensions between these different 
missions, and the many questions of institutional structure, resources and methods. Further research on 
historical roots of inspections and enforcement regimes may yield valuable insights on today’s differences 
between countries, as well as on the strengths and weaknesses of different institutional models. 
 
2.2. The emergence and development of modern inspectorates 
What this brief overview shows is first that control activities existed (and were seen as necessary) already in 
the Middle Ages in most of Western Europe (and possibly beyond), and were created at that time primarily in 
response to “fears” (often but not always corresponding to real hazards) related to food “quality” or “safety”. 
Protecting a trade from competition was also an important function of guilds, but for the public, safeguarding 
“quality” was seen as their role. Further development of inspections in the 17th and 18th centuries were linked 
to “quality” again, this time of manufactured goods, with a view to strengthening trade opportunities for 
domestic producers. 
                                                           
27 Note that, interestingly, the quickly-reversed 1704 reform that aimed at selling the offices and letting them recoup their costs 
through a duty on textiles would have had some features of the “private” modern system of conformity assessment. 
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The second notable point is that several models existed, one based on self-regulation, another on control by 
public authorities (municipal), and (later on) a third on inspectors appointed by the central government. The 
adoption of one or another model (at least between the first two) appears to have been the result not of an 
“effectiveness evaluation”, but of institutional structures, social, legal and political dynamics. The 
development of more systematic control, led often (but not always) by central authorities (or at least by 
municipal ones), was very gradual (at least for food) – and spurred by the combination of the general growth 
of modern states, major food-related crises (e.g. epizootics), advances in scientific knowledge, and changes in 
mentalities. In contrast to this gradual process, the manufactures inspection provides the example of how a 
centralized institution could be created due to a deliberate government decision. 
This suggests is that there is nothing self-evident in what is or is not inspected, and with which structures. 
Medieval cities introduced supervision of food trade, but it did not exist everywhere in the same form, and 
many other issues were left without a specific “inspection”, even when in fact they were submitted to many 
rules (such as the different forms of pollution, including noise, that could arise in cities – rules were often 
adopted at various stages in the medieval and pre-modern times, but there was no “environmental inspection” 
nonetheless). It is also far from clear that these inspections were actually effective, or useful, in most cases. 
Ogus (1994) summarizes regulation in the “Tudor and Stuart Periods” as “often over-inclusive, incurring the 
hostility of those unintentionally caught by the provisions, or under-inclusive, leading to avoidance behaviour 
by those intended to be caught” (p. 6) and adds that “enforcement was a matter for local administration and 
often ineffective”. 
 
Most of the control exerted by the state (or by non-state actors with regulatory functions, such as guilds) in 
pre-modern times applied to the trade angle: ensuring that buyers were not defrauded, and that the quality 
of goods sold abroad was high enough to sustain high levels of exports against the competition. Just as weights 
and measures were a core prerogative of the sovereign, avoiding deceit on markets was seen as an issue 
worthy of rules, and enforcement. Other issues, which to us would appear as high priorities, were on the 
contrary mostly left without specific enforcement (if not necessarily without rules), such as safety in the 
workplace28, fire and buildings safety, “environment” (even understood in a pre-modern context), etc.  
Thus, while manufactures were inspected in France (and some other countries) from the 17th century at least 
(and most crafts in Western Europe subject to enforcement by guilds), workers safety only became an area of 
state control in the 19th century. Regulations and enforcement centering on health and safety appeared in 
connection to large-scale industry and in particular mining, and what contemporaries started to perceive as 
the horrifying conditions workers (and in particular children and juveniles) had to endure. Ogus suggests that 
the interesting and specific aspect of the new regulations appearing in the 19th century, compared to the 
previous period, was “the large number of measures dealing with public health and the conditions of 
employment” (Ogus 1994 p. 8).  
As Ogus rightly points out (and as we have illustrated above), “state intervention did not result from any abrupt 
shift (…) but rather emerged gradually” (ibid., p. 7) – and indeed regulation had been around for far longer. 
The new situation was “the emergence of administrative structures capable of diagnosing the problems and 
formulating solutions to deal with them” – as “the existence of specialist bodies served to inject an almost 
unstoppable momentum into the growth of regulatory law.” As administrators found shortcomings while 
implementing existing rules, “to correct the defects, they would demand amendments to the provisions or an 
extension to their own rule-making powers” (ibid., pp. 7-8). As we have seen above, France’s Inspection of 
Manufactures was in many ways a prefiguration of this trend, and thus “specialist bodies” were maybe not as 
                                                           
28 Lenoble (1908) specifically indicates that the manufactures inspectors did not look at safety and related issues at all – though they 
monitored social situations, occasionally organizing assistance for manufacture workers in times of crisis, more often warning about 
the dangers of strikes (p. 9). 
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novel as Ogus states – but the ways in which the Inspection indeed constantly prodded the further 
development of regulations surely validates Ogus’s claim that this institutionalization was a key cause for the 
growth of regulatory law. 
In Britain, at least, the emergence of new regulatory areas and institutions often started with “ad hoc 
commissions to investigate social conditions”, which often led to the creation of “boards” and “inspectorates” 
to implement new legislation, but with often an unclear relationship to Parliament and state structures (ibid.). 
Eventually, criticisms led to the “decline of the independent regulatory agencies” – with, for some, powers 
“transferred to central or local government”, for others, “more formalized arrangements regarding (…) the 
legislative definition of their powers and their accountability” (ibid.). Such trends, to an extent, can be seen in 
other countries, but with different degrees of speed and resilience of “independent” structures (e.g. these 
seem to have often survived far longer in the Netherlands29).  
When “inspectors” were appointed or “inspections” set up, it was also often to look at the state administration 
itself, rather than at the private sector. This was particularly important in France, and in countries that imitated 
(to varying extents) the French model (or “inherited” it later through colonization). Gogol’s “inspector general” 
was one of these. Looking at these “internal” state inspections would be the subject of a whole other research, 
but it is striking that Gogol’s work shows issues that are still salient today: the fear of the inspector (not 
universal certainly, but frequent), the misconceptions about him – and the risk of corruption. 
Looking at the gradual emergence of modern inspectorates in a number of countries would be a task far 
beyond the scope of this research, and would add little to our purpose of understanding the problems that 
inspections face, and to which extent risk-based approaches can remedy them. What is, however, helpful is 
trying to get a glimpse of the mechanisms that have led to the current structures and resource allocations – 
and, to this aim, some history “snapshots” are useful. To this aim, we will look at examples taken from the two 
inspection functions that were formalized in a “modern” way earliest: occupational safety and health (OSH) 
(in some depth), and food safety (briefly). We will describe at some length the example of OSH in the UK, a 
country that is often considered now among the most representative of the practice of risk-based, “smarter” 
inspections, with some shorter summaries of the experience of other major economies (France, the 
Netherlands, Germany and the United States). The consideration of food safety will be considerably shorter, 
for the amount of available research on the history and development of regulatory institutions in this sphere 
is much smaller (a point we will discuss at the beginning of that section). The idea is to look for an illustration 
(and not, at this point, for models or regularities) of how institutional structures and resources came about, 
and in what relation to risk, and for this purpose one case and a few “snapshots” should be sufficient – and 
not take up an excessive part of this research. 
 
The cases were selected based on a combination of criteria. First, because the development of modern public 
administration structures largely proceeded first in a small number of major powers, which were the earliest 
industrial economies and wielded the most influence in the late 19th and early 20th centuries, we sought to 
select these in priority. This meant a long-list of Britain, France, Germany and the United States (with Britain 
and France having had major influence through their colonies, France and Germany having significant 
influence in Continental Europe and Japan, and the United States in many Latin American countries, and the 
Philippines). Second, we focused in particular on “prime movers”, i.e. the countries that were the first to 
establish inspectorates in the fields selected for study (e.g. again Britain, France and Germany for OSH). To 
this list, for the particular case of food safety, we decided to add the Former Soviet Union, as its institutional 
and policy model was both relatively “advanced” for the time of its creation (1930s), taking place as it did in a 
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crisis context and in a situation of tabula rasa of earlier institutions – and as it still influences contemporary 
structures not only in successor states of the USSR, but in all countries that were under its influence. Third, 
where there are significant differences in timelines and approaches concerning the establishment of 
inspections and enforcement legislation and institutions, we have sought to present cases that illustrate the 
different paths taken (e.g. United States and European Union in food safety, or Netherlands in OSH as a “late 
mover” example, or Britain, France, Germany and United States as four very different models in OSH). Fourth, 
it was particularly important to discuss the impact of the European Union in food safety, where it has had a 
major impact not only on Member States but as an international model that is being imitated far and wide 
(even, to some extent, by the United States). Finally, there was an element of opportunity in some of the 
choices, as the development of inspectorates and inspections has been the object of far more studies in some 
countries than others, e.g. Britain and the United States. As a result, the list of countries includes Britain, 
France, the Netherlands, Germany and the United States for OSH. For food safety, it comprises Britain, the 
United States, France, the Former Soviet Union and the Netherlands. 
These examples will enable us to understand better the contexts in which inspectorates have been created 
and have developed, the different paths taken in terms of institutional models and approaches to fulfilling 
their missions, the role of path dependency in explaining differences that still hold true today, and to start 
exploring the degree to which these historical differences may explain contrasts in practices and results today. 
 
Finally, the reason we decided to focus specifically on OSH and food safety, and to treat them separately, is 
that it would be impossible in practice to try and cover the emergence and development of all inspection 
functions, and that these were both historically the first “new inspection functions” (as distinct from earlier 
ones such as tax or weight and measures) to emerge, and functions that were seen as so centrally important 
that such inspectorates ended up being created practically everywhere. They also typically represent 
institutions of a significant size today, with important resources and staff. Other functions (e.g. environmental 
protection) emerged much later (late 20th century), or are not present everywhere “as such” (e.g. fire 
protection), and/or have much smaller staff (e.g. environmental protection in many countries) etc. For all 
these reasons, we concluded that OSH and food safety could meaningfully serve as examples and as the richest 
and most insightful cases we could consider from a historical perspective. Studying them separately allowed 
to compare specific historical trajectories between different countries for a given function, which was our key 
purpose here. It is worth noting that these cases (countries and regulatory functions) do not fully match those 
selected in chapter 4 to investigate the implementation of risk-based approaches in practice. To the extent 
possible, we did cover some of the cases in both chapters (e.g. Britain, Germany, France and the United States 
in OSH, Britain and the Former Soviet Union in food safety), but we did not do so systematically. First, because 
the purpose was different – in chapter 4, we selected cases specifically to look at the results of risk-based vs. 
non-risk-based approaches. Second, because our selection in chapter 4 was to a large extent driven by the 
availability of strong “examples” (i.e. practices clearly representative of risk- or non-risk-based approaches) 
and – most crucially – the availability of data. Since data on inspections burden and outcomes is (as we will 
discuss further in chapter 4) frequently unavailable, the selection of this second set of case studies was 
consequently far more constrained, and could not in any case fully match those that we will now consider 






a. The emergence and development of modern inspectorates - Occupational Safety and Health30 
 
iii. Why did Occupational Safety and Health come first? 
Perhaps surprisingly, considering that the “safety” and “quality” of food (or whatever was then understood 
behind these terms) had been probably the issue on which most of the early regulatory efforts were made 
(looking at the Middle Ages onwards), the first modern inspectorates created did not aim at improving it. Nor 
did they cover any of the other long-standing market issues (like weights and measures) that had been a key 
domain of state intervention. Rather, they targeted a problem that was “brand new” – maybe not in its 
substance, but in the way it was perceived: the way workers were treated in the newly developing factories 
and mines, and in particular the fate of women and children.  
Let us pause for one instant and challenge what may seem obvious to modern readers who know well the 
picture of terrible abuse and horrific conditions painted by Dickens, Zola and others. While the way workers 
in general, women and children in particular, were treated in textile factories, coal mines and other industrial 
establishments was indeed horrific – it is not self-evident that this was the “greatest risk” of the time, nor is it 
absolutely clear that this abuse was a shocking novelty.  
Looking only at the magnitude of risks, and at the impact that prevention could have had, hygiene, water and 
sanitation would probably come first (at least in retrospect). The time of the creation of the first labour 
inspectorates was also the time of the great cholera pandemic. In France, in 1832, 20,000 persons are thought 
to have died in Paris – and researchers estimated that mortality in affected regions doubled – and in the 1854 
epidemic, mortality even quadrupled in a large swathe of Eastern France (Raulot et al. 1978, p. 140). In London, 
as late as 1866, a major cholera outbreak killed “nearly four thousand people there between the end of July 
and the beginning of November” (Luckin 1977 p. 32). Though the reason the epidemics did as much damage 
as they did was the new development of exchanges and trade, and increased mobility of people across and 
within countries (Raulot et al. 1978, p. 140-141), the direct causes of these outbreaks were (theoretically) 
preventable, and caused by poor hygiene.  
For London in 1866 “it was the action (or, more accurately, the negligent inaction) of the East London Water 
Company which decisively determined the dissemination and scale of the outbreak” (Luckin 1977 p. 32). 
However, even in 1866, “it was only a minority within what may be loosely characterized as the avant-garde 
in the nascent profession of epidemiology which gave unqualified support to the view that the outbreak (…) 
was decisively carried by water” (ibid. p. 33). Indeed, even though the bacterium causing cholera had in fact 
been discovered in 1854 by Filippo Pacini31, this discovery had been ignored, and most “experts” still clung to 
the old “miasma theory” of epidemics causation (which explained why the discovery was ignored). Pasteur’s 
and Koch’s32 works were still to come. Thus, to an extent, people (including policymakers) at the time simply 
had too little understanding of the disease to act effectively. However, some understood the fact that clean 
water was important to epidemics control, even without a correct explanation for how the diseases were 
caused. In fact, “the [water] company had clearly contravened a clause of the Metropolitan Water Act of 1852 
which outlawed uncovered reservoirs within five miles of St. Paul's” (ibid. p. 34). The impossibility to 
demonstrate the link between contaminated water (since one did not then know what contamination to look 
                                                           
30 The reader may be surprised that in the historical account below we very rarely mention the EU (only for the German case), and do 
not cover the International Labour Organization (ILO). The reason is that these have had at most quite a late and relatively marginal 
impact on the countries we are discussing, which were among the first to have an OSH inspection system, and thus took part in defining 
the standards to be followed rather than being “standard takers”. This does not mean there was, of course, no impact at all – but that 
for our issue, which was understanding the different paths taken by OSH systems in these countries, the ILO convention (n. 81) on 
labour inspections (1947) and the EU Directive 89/391 (1989) both came quite late and, at least for the ILO, added little to the 
framework already existing. Where the EU additions had significant effects (i.e. at least in Germany), we shall discuss them. 
31 See http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Filippo_Pacini and http://www.ph.ucla.edu/epi/snow/firstdiscoveredcholera.html  
32 Whose “re-discovery” of Vibrio Cholerae in 1884 was, this time, fully acknowledged 
38 
 
for, and how) and the epidemic, however, made action impossible. “Both during and in the immediate 
aftermath of the virulent epidemic, the company retaliated against the accusations of the "progressives" by 
citing authoritative miasmatic and "sociological" theories of disease (…)The company was also able to rely on 
the open or tacit support of a majority of the metropolitan medical officers of health.” (ibid. p.35) Even though 
there already existed “inspectors” and “Rivers Pollution Commissioners” (ibid. p.38), their inability to 
understand cause and effect in the epidemic doomed them to ineffectiveness. 
Still, in 1866, the level of understanding of epidemics mechanisms (if not of their causes) had improved enough 
to lead gradually to change: “it was Netten Radcliffe's persuasively commonsensical, although almost 
excessively non-doctrinaire advocacy of the detailed analysis of each epidemic (…) which eventually 
superseded its rivals. According to this approach, it was imperative to act as though unsafe water was likely to 
have been the primary medium during any wide-ranging outbreak of cholera or typhoid, and in the thirty years 
following the epidemic of 1866 it provided the ground rules for an increasingly efficient surveillance of the 
metropolitan water supply.” (ibid., p. 42). For most of the 19th century, however, this level of knowledge and 
understanding had simply been missing. Addressing a major risk requires to at least understand its most basic 
parameters, at least some of its nature and causes. Public health, until the end of the century, was thus not a 
field where it was possible to create credible, effective inspecting institutions. 
Returning to the origins of the first labour inspectorates, it is clear that, by contrast, poor treatment of human 
beings by other human beings, and malpractice in industrial installations, were problems that were both 
understandable, and could be addressed in practice. What remains striking is why this started to become a 
problem that society decided to address at this precise moment. After all, children and women had been 
working for centuries on farms and, in times of hardship, their lives had been in serious jeopardy. In England, 
in fact, the “enclosures33” and the rapid development of sheep breeding for wool, and of the wool industry 
(strongly supported by the state from the Tudors onwards) had led to a growing number of urban poor from 
the 16th century, and to many of them working in very unsafe conditions in “proto-factories” (including women 
and children). The reaction to this had not been labour inspections targeting the employers, but the “poor 
laws34” that, while organizing some scarce assistance, mostly aimed at controlling the poor – the “Overseers 
of the Poor” were in a way “labour inspectors in reverse”. A number of parameters, however, had changed by 
the first half of the 19th century.  
First, one could argue, the democratisation of politics and the overall effects of the Enlightenment, suggesting 
slowly that poor people were also people, whose lives deserved at least a modicum of concern – and, possibly, 
the French Revolution had shown the risks of letting the social situation deteriorate too far. As Eves (2014) 
puts it: “memories of the disturbingly radical ideas of the French Revolution of 1789 were fresh in the uneasy 
minds of British political leaders. Amid widespread unrest, demands were being made for Parliamentary 
reform and fairer representation of the people.” 
Second, “shocking evidence was emerging of serious physical and moral harm suffered by children and young 
persons in the cotton textile mills (…) as the result of an entire system for exploitation of cheap labour (the 
‘Factory System’). Skilled workers employed by a ‘cotton master’ would themselves pay unskilled women and 
children to help them”. Beyond this, new technologies created new hazards and new harms. We could be 
seeing here an early illustration of what Slovic et al. describe as “the selective nature of attention to different 
sources of risk or danger” (Slovic and Weber 2002, p. 18). To the extent that modern industry and mining were, 
precisely, “modern”, i.e. new and radically different from the traditional activities and trade of an hitherto 
mostly rural society, they could have carried what Slovic calls a “dread” factor35 - “an accident that takes many 
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35 And indeed the very negative ways in which modern industry is generally described in Romantic-era literature may point to this – 
beyond the actual harms, industry was seen as something as “dreadful” as nuclear power or GMOs are today for many 
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lives may produce relatively little social disturbance (beyond that caused to the victims’ families and friends) 
if it occurs as part of a familiar and well-understood system (…). However, a small incident in an unfamiliar 
system (…) may have immense social consequences if it is perceived as a harbinger of future and possibly 
catastrophic mishaps” (ibid., p. 13). 
A last point may help explain why regulating manufacturing industry and mining became a priority at that 
point in time. Regulation of industry by state inspectorates (e.g. HM Factories Inspectorate in the UK) 
intervened in a context where modern industry had developed in parallel (possibly partly thanks to) the 
weakening or dissolution of craftsmen’s guilds hold. Modern workers were mere wage-labourers, with a very 
weak bargaining power, and hence without regulation extremely harsh and hazardous working conditions 
arose. On the contrary, in a guilds-controlled economy, freedom of establishment (and innovation, and 
growth) were seriously limited, but workers had a considerably higher power and state supervision was not 
seen as needed. There may thus be a sort of trade-off whereby less stringent conditions on establishment 
(partial or complete freedom) tend to lead to more supervision role for the state, and more stringent self-
regulation (“sworn trades”) and limits to establishment may correspond to a (real or perceived) lesser need 
for state supervision. Our practical experience suggests that this is a (real or imaginary) trade-off that is visible 
today in a number of countries, where an abundance of restrictions to entry (licensing and others) coexist with 
overall weak inspection and enforcement practices. 
The creation of the institutions in charge of labour protection (what later became known as “occupational 
safety and health” in the narrow sense, as well as regulations on working hours, women and children at work 
etc.) was gradual. In Britain, Her Majesty’s Factory Inspectorate was created in 1833, the Mining Inspectorate 
in 1843, the Quarry Inspectorate in 1895 – but one had to wait until 1956 for OSH provisions covering 
agricultural workers36, even though all studies repeatedly show that this is a high hazard occupation37. For a 
long time, the focus was exclusively on activities that were perceived as high risk by the public and 
policymakers – as indicated above, and as suggested by Slovic et al., it is likely that agriculture was deemed 
too “normal” to let its high level of hazard be really acknowledged. Similarly, most services (including retail 
warehouses and retail trade, however large etc.) were considered low risk and remained for a long time 
outside of the OSH net. From 1974, they have been covered by legislation, but as we will see enforcement has 
remained separate (under Local Authorities) as an inheritance of earlier situation and vision. 
 
iv. OSH in Britain – from the Factory Inspectorate to the HSE 
 
The gradual extension of the scope of control in Britain 
The circumstances that led to the creation of the first inspectorate (Factory Inspectorate) were ones of broad 
social tensions and reform – including political (extension of suffrage and change of constituencies’ 
boundaries): “By 1831 the Prime Minister, Earl Grey, judged the pressure for Parliamentary reform to have 
become irresistible and he persuaded King William IV that a Bill to widen the franchise should be introduced 
into Parliament. Although the Bill was passed by the Commons, it was defeated in the Lords, whereupon 
serious rioting broke out in several towns. (…) Another Bill was introduced by Grey in 1832. This time 
Parliament narrowly passed the Representation of the People Act (or ‘Great Reform Act’).The general election 
that followed and the arrival of new Members of Parliament soon led to further reforms, some the result of 
pressure from philanthropists such as Lord Shaftesbury, whose campaign against slavery led to its abolition in 
the United Kingdom in 1833. Grey also set about reforming the Poor Laws.” (Eves 2014) By that same time, 
the need for reform of industrial conditions was also perceived as urgent, as “the 1831 census indicated that 
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37 See e.g. US BLS news release for September 11, 2014 available at: http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf – p. 4 
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among the country’s population some three million people worked in manufacturing industry of various kinds, 
including almost a quarter of a million in cotton mills, most of which were in Lancashire. A significant 
percentage of these textile workers were women and children” (ibid.). Reform focused on conditions for 
children: “A Royal Commission (the ‘Factory Commission’) was set up (…). Its inquiries swiftly exposed the 
exhausting working conditions and long hours endured by children (…) [and] prompted Parliament to pass the 
landmark Factory Act of 1833, its full title being ‘An Act to regulate the Labour of Children and Young Persons 
in the Mills and Factories of the United Kingdom’.” In it, section 17 read: “…the Laws for the Regulation of 
Labour of Children in Factories have been evaded, partly in consequence of the want of the Appointment of 
proper Visitors or Officers whose special Duty it was to enforce their Execution” (ibid.). 
Thus, a combination of factors was required for the inspectorate (however small at the time, with only four 
inspectors initially, for 3,000 textile mills) to be created: strong public concern about an issue considered as a 
“dread risk”, favourable political conditions, and experience of implementation problems in previous reforms. 
A similar combination was often found in later reform steps, and successive creations of new inspectorates.  
Whereas “the 1833 Act dealt principally with restrictions on the employment of children and young persons 
less than 18 years of age” in factories (ibid.), “in 1840 a Royal Commission was established to investigate 
working conditions in the mining industry. The Commission's findings published in 1842 made shocking 
reading. Accidents, brutality, lung diseases, long hours and highly dangerous and adverse working conditions 
were found to be the norm. Public outcry resulted and the Mines Act 1842 was brought into force. The Act 
allowed for the appointment of an inspector of mines and collieries and the first inspector (…) had only limited 
powers under the Act but undertook many prosecutions, investigated the condition of the mining community 
and made recommendations (…). In 1850 inspectors were allowed to enter and inspect mine premises and 
Tremenheere's plans for a dedicated mining inspectorate began to be realised38.” The concern about health 
and safety also led to the adoption of new legislation for factories: the “landmark Factory Act of 1844 extended 
the law’s coverage to all textile factories (except lace-making) and took a first significant step towards 
improvement of workers’ safety. Under Section 20, children, young persons and women were prohibited from 
cleaning shafting and other transmission machinery while this was ‘in motion for the purpose of propelling the 
manufacturing machinery’ and from working between fixed and moving parts of machines” (Eves 2014). 
Successive “Factory Acts were passed in 1861, 1864 and 1867 (…) Step by step, the scope of the law was 
widening. (…) The 1867 Act further extended the law’s cover to some other specified trades and to ‘any 
premises in which fifty or more persons were employed in any manufacturing process’. (…) A Royal 
Commission was appointed in 1875 to review the law’s numerous amendments since the Act of 1802. Their 
report in 1876 led to major consolidation of the laws and removal of anomalies by the Factory and Workshop 
Act, 1878. (…)bringing almost all of manufacturing industry within scope of the law, in three clearly defined 
classes of Textile Factories, Non-Textile Factories and Workshops (…). Non-Textile Factories included certain 
specified premises such as shipyards for the first time. Greater protection was afforded to women and 
children: from now on children under the age of ten could not be employed anywhere and between the ages 
of ten and fourteen they could be employed only for half days (and must attend school). Women were allowed 
to work only up to 56 hours per week. The law with respect to secure fencing of dangerous parts of machinery 
and reporting of accidents remained much the same but children were no longer allowed to clean machinery 
while it was in motion and women and young persons were not allowed to clean mill gearing in motion” (ibid.). 
The 1891 Factory Act then gave power to the Secretary of State to adopt “Special Rules”, which greatly 
accelerated the development of technical secondary legislation. Another Act in 1895 strengthened several 
provisions, in particular relating to health. In addition, “the Quarries Act 1894 extended the powers of the 
Metalliferous Mines Regulation Act 1872 to give inspectors the power to enforce provisions of notifying 
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accidents, undertake prosecutions and make Special Rules. This led to the establishment of the Quarry 
Inspectorate39.” 
During the 20th century, successive consolidations of legislation, improvements, additions (e.g. covering 
electricity) etc. were made. Occupational health gradually took more importance as well. Major additions 
came with “the Factories Act 1937, which had the effect of providing for the first time a comprehensive code 
for safety, health and welfare applicable to every factory, irrespective of whether it was a textile or non-textile 
factory and whether or not mechanical power was used (…) [and] included safety provisions for lifting 
machinery, floors and stairs” – and in the “Factories Act of 1948 (…) at long last, regulations were introduced 
for safety, health and welfare at building operations” (Eves 2014). For a couple decades, most of the focus in 
improving health and safety then centered on the development of the National Health Service. Still, “yet 
another Factories Act was passed in 1959. This improved provisions for precautions against fires, prompted in 
no small part by a disastrous fire in 1956 at a Keighley mill” (ibid.). In addition, the Offices, Shops and Railway 
Premises Act 1963 extended OSH protections to “a further 8 million employees40” – in the transportation, 
trade and services sectors – with enforcement left to local authorities41. 
The transformative step that was the creation of the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) in 1974 came about 
on a background of increasing risk overall (at least of fatal accidents), and of the emergence of new risks due 
to new industries and technologies: “Chief Inspectors’ annual reports throughout the 1960s had frequently 
drawn attention to concerns over rising fatal and major injury rates” and accidents were “by no means 
confined to industries regulated by the Factory Inspectorate”, which repeatedly “exposed a serious regulatory 
gap”. As a result, “it was becoming increasingly obvious that the narrow, prescriptive approach of Factory Law 
and the limited powers of Factory Inspectors were no longer sufficient for the effective regulation of modern 
industry”. As an additional stimulus, in 1970 “the USA passed its Occupational Safety and Health Act and 
created a new federal agency (OSHA) to enforce it” (Eves 2014). In 1970, the new Government “decided to 
invite Lord Robens, the Chairman of the National Coal Board who had experienced the tragic Aberfan tip 
disaster, to carry out a fundamental review. A Committee on Safety and Health at Work was formed and took 
evidence over the next two years, reporting in July 1972. 
Their findings became known as ‘the Robens Report’ (…) [and] recommended that a National Authority for 
Safety and Health at Work should be established to replace Whitehall’s existing fragmented administrative 
arrangements and bring together the several Inspectorates scattered between Departments.” Robens 
“believed that a broader and more flexible framework would enable statutory inspection services to be used 
more constructively in advising and assisting employers and workers. At the same time, it would enable their 
resources to be concentrated more effectively on serious problems where tighter monitoring and control 
might be needed.” (ibid.) While the 1974 Act established a Health and Safety Commission (vested with 
analytical functions and regulatory powers) and a Health and Safety Executive (in charge of implementation, 
inspections, enforcement), later reforms finally ended up with the merger of the HSC functions into the HSE 
(in 2008), fulfilling the original vision of the Robens Report. 
The consolidation initiated in 1974 and continued in 2008 is, however, still incomplete – with a duality in 
enforcement between the HSE and local authorities. Löfstedt’s Reclaiming health and safety for all report 
(Löfstedt 2011) lays out the problems this creates: “by allowing each enforcing authority to only consider the 
workplaces within their area of control” this duality generates a barrier to the most efficient targeting of 
enforcement activity across the board. Premises that are considered relatively low risk amongst the 
workplaces overseen by HSE (and which are therefore not inspected) may nevertheless be riskier than many 
of those under local authority control, resulting in too many inspections by local authorities of relatively low-
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risk workplaces” (p. 5). While he does not recommend fully eliminating local enforcement of H&S rules, not to 
risk “losing the synergies with other local authority enforcement responsibilities” (ibid.), he advocates to “give 
HSE the authority to direct all local authority health and safety inspection and enforcement activity, in order 
to ensure that it is consistent and targeted towards the most risky workplaces” (ibid., p. 83). Following up on 
this recommendations, the following changes have been introduced in the past couple of years: “HSE 
published a National Local Authority Enforcement Code (May 2013) that sets out the risk based approach to 
targeting occupational safety and health interventions that Local Authority (LA) regulators should follow. HSE 
has also published (…) a list of higher risk activities in specific LA-enforced sectors suitable for proactive 
inspection (…) [and] supplementary guidance to assist LAs (…). HSE has consulted on the implementation of 
the Code (ended October 2014) and has reviewed the 2013/14 LA annual returns. The conclusion was that LAs 
have been implementing the Code and are now more risk based in their targeting42.” To the extent that further 
developments verify these claims, the “consolidation” process will have been largely completed, as well as the 
spread of risk-based targeting approaches for all OSH inspections. We will come back to these questions in 
more detail, but it is worth looking first very briefly at some markers in the development of resources, methods 
and powers in OSH inspections in Britain. 
 
Evolution of resources over 180 years 
While the Factory Act’s enforcement was initially left to only four inspectors, “were authorised to appoint 
Superintendents (called Sub-Inspectors after 1844) to assist them in their duties” (Eves 2014). Numbers rose 
gradually, and in 1871 “the Inspectorate numbered 35 Inspectors and sub-inspectors” (ibid.). Nearly a century 
later, there were over ten times more: “By the end of 1961 the Inspectorate had 426 inspectors in post, 
including specialists at headquarters, with the majority working in 13 divisions spread over England, Scotland 
and Wales. Divisions were headed by a Superintending Inspector and generally contained six or seven small 
teams, each led by a District Inspector, working from 100 or more local district offices.” (ibid.) Of course, these 
over 400 inspectors now had a broader remit, and a considerably larger population and economy to supervise.  
The 1974 merger resulted in a much larger organization: “As well as the staff of HM Factory Inspectorate, the 
staff of a number of other regulatory organisations were transferred to HSE in 1975, including the Explosives 
Inspectorate (from the Home Office), the Employment Medical Advisory Service (with its doctors and 
occupational nurses returning from the Department of Employment), the Nuclear Installations Inspectorate 
and the Mines and Quarries Inspectorate (from the Department of Energy), the Safety in Mines Research 
Establishment, the British Approvals Service for Electrical Equipment in Flammable Atmospheres (BASEEFA) 
and the Alkali and Clean Air Inspectorate (from the Department of the Environment.)” (ibid.)  
In 2002, the HSE and Health and Safety Laboratory had 4282 staff43, out of which 2794 in operations 
(inspections and enforcement, including management and “operational policy” etc.). In 2006, the same figures 
were 3811 and 2497. In 2009, only 3591 and 2253 respectively. In 2014, the HSE had 3081 staff in total and 
(having moved to another classification method) numbered 1294 staff in “frontline roles”44. After the “spin-
off” of the Office for Nuclear Regulation45, these went down to 2621 and 1059 respectively – and as of 31 
March 2015, 2575 and 1047 respectively (a relative stability). In 12 years, thus, HSE staff was reduced by 
around a quarter (comparing with the data pre-ONR spin-off, so as to have comparable scope of work).  
The point here is not to try and discuss whether these numbers are “sufficient” or not, which would require 
to define “sufficient for what?”, to have reference points, comparators etc. We will discuss later in this 
                                                           
42 See Health and Safety Executive, A progress report on implementation of health and safety reforms – March 2015 (draft presented 
to HSE Board), pp. 9-10, available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/hseboard/2015/250315/pmarb1525b.pdf  
43 This and subsequent figures from HSE statistics and annual reports – see: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/reports/staff06.htm  
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research the question of how well the HSE performs in terms of effectiveness. The notable fact at this stage is 
that staffing levels have clearly never (or at best rarely) been set based on any serious analysis of the scope of 
work and necessary work time, but rather based on whatever seemed “appropriate” at a given time, and 
increased or decreased depending on the prominence of OSH issues among public concerns, on the availability 
of funding, on other budget priorities (increasing spending elsewhere, or reducing the deficit) etc.  
 
Methods and powers 
Powers, methods, and approaches to planning and targeting all evolved constantly over the nearly 200 years 
of OSH inspections and enforcement in Britain. While, initially, inspectors were only able to bring prosecutions 
against violators of the applicable regulations, the 1844 Factory Act gave them power “to give written notice 
to a factory occupier that dangerous parts of machinery should be immediately fenced, an important addition 
to their ability to improve machinery safety (and a fore-runner of the powers to serve improvement and 
prohibition notices that were given to Inspectors 130 years later)” (Eves 2014). Formalization of how notices 
worked, and in which circumstances penalties could be applied, was also gradual.  
There may have been some forms of targeting in the early days (as staffing levels were so low), based on 
whatever information was available, and probably also on material constraints. By the 1960s, “the inspection 
programme laid down by the Chief Inspector required every factory to be inspected on a four yearly cycle, 
regardless of whether risks were high or low. Larger factories were usually divided into units that could be 
inspected in half a day” (ibid.) This may have appeared appropriate in an era of concentrated, large facilities, 
with well-known production techniques – and when the inspectorate’s mandate was still relatively narrow. 
This approach was to prove its relative lack of effectiveness – “the 1974 Flixborough disaster (…) prompted 
the swift establishment of a Major Hazards Branch, a Risk Assessment Group and a Major Industrial Hazards 
Advisory Committee. Meanwhile the Chief Inspector had introduced a system of priority inspections of major 
hazard premises, over-riding the conventional four-yearly cyclical pattern of planned inspections and 
encouraging Inspectors to spend as much time as was necessary to improve controls at these sites” (ibid.). As 
we will discuss more in depth in a later section, risk-based targeting has now become one of the “hallmarks” 
of the HSE, but this does not mean there are not important challenges remaining on this front. 
Another evolution was the degree of liability and responsibility for health and safety resting on operators 
themselves. The question of what could or could not be prosecuted and give rise to sanctions was rather 
unclear in the early days of the Factory Inspectorate, as was the question of compensation (since the Act 
anyway had little to say about safety issues). Case law and written law both gradually evolved to strengthen 
the liability of employers in case of work-related injuries: “The case of Priestley v Fowler46 in 1837 had been 
the first known civil action in which an employee successfully sued his employer. It seemed to establish the 
principle that an employer owed a common law duty of care to his employee which was actionable if a breach 
of that duty resulted in injury. Under Section 24 of the 1844 Act the Secretary of State could empower a Factory 
Inspector to bring an action for damages on behalf of any person who had been injured by machinery. Reports 
indicate that many such actions were successfully taken by Inspectors. Later in the century, (…) the Employers’ 
Liability Act 1880 gave a worker the right to sue the employer, but the worker had to prove that the injury 
suffered was the employer’s fault. However, under the Workmen’s Compensation Act of 1897 it became 
necessary for a worker only to prove that the injury had occurred at work” (Eves 2014). It is, in retrospect, 
fascinating to see that it took over 60 years after the first Factory Act for the law to put clear liability (in a tort 
law perspective) on the employer – considering that this is (at least potentially) one of the strongest incentives 
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injuries” (p. 689) but is a very confusing case and precedent is highly disputed – Stein concludes that “Priestley v. Fowler is best 




to improving occupational safety (at least if there is a reasonable likelihood that courts will award guilty 
verdicts and significant damages)47.  
What one could call the logical consequences of employers’ liability were only drawn nearly a century after 
the Employers’ Liability Act, with the 1972 Robens Report and the 1974 Health and Safety Act. “Believing that 
the primary responsibilities lay with those who created risks and those who worked with them, Lord Robens’ 
Committee concluded that a more self-regulating system of provision for safety and health at work was 
needed and that the traditional approach based on ever-increasing, detailed and prescriptive statutory 
regulation was outdated, over-complex and inadequate. Reform should be aimed at creating the conditions 
for more effective self-regulation48 by employers and workpeople jointly. (…) Much greater use should be 
made of agreed voluntary49 standards and codes of practice to promote progressively better conditions.” The 
Act “imposed general duties to ensure health and safety ‘so far as is reasonably practicable’ not only on 
employers but also on the self-employed, designers, manufacturers and suppliers of equipment and materials. 
For the first time, the safety of the public was to be protected when put at risk by ‘the conduct of an 
undertaking’” (ibid.). As we will discuss later, this approach to defining obligations and compliance led the HSE 
to develop a strong “enforcement management model” in order to clarify what this requirement meant in 
practice, and give a transparent (and risk-based) framework to its officers’ discretion.  
 
A Medium-term perspective on methods and structures 
Some of the most significant research on the HSE’s work, culture and approaches has been conducted by Keith 
Hawkins, and it has spanned both the 1980s and 1990s (see Hawkins 1992 and 2002 in particular). Hawkins’s 
primary focus is to understand how the HSE (and, by extension, an inspecting institution) functions in practice, 
what structures, frames, heuristics etc. shape decisions taken by inspectors – beyond and below the official 
policy documents. In so doing, he gives us important perspective on how the HSE’s structures and methods 
evolved over the past couple of decades, since the HSE was set up following the Robens report and HSW Act 
1974.  
First, Hawkins shows how the culture of HSE staff, the approaches taken both officially and in practice reflect 
the underlying philosophy of the HSW Act. Indeed, “the Robens Committee adopted a rather benign 
conception of the problem of enforcing” OSH regulation “shaped by an assumption that not only the workforce 
but also management had an identity of interest” (Hawkins 2002, p. 144)50. The structure and mandate of the 
                                                           
47 See Ogus 1994 pp. 81-87 for a general (theoretical) discussion of the use of criminal justice and liability in regulatory matters. Liability 
(civil and criminal) is a powerful tool (see e.g. its use in the French building safety system in World Bank Group 2013 b pp. 82-87), but 
it has of course limitations, in particular when (a) the risks of permanent damage (incl. death) are too high given current practices and 
(b) potential victims are likely to be in an unfavourable position to sue (lack of resources, fear etc.) – both of which clearly applied to 
occupational safety and health a century and a half ago (and to an extent still do). 
48 Technically, this is not really “self-regulation” but rather a form of “enforced self-regulation” or, more correctly, of regulation with 
loosely defined performance requirements, the enforcement of which relies on codes of conduct and other “soft law” developed by 
the industry itself (both employers and employees). A similar practice can be observed in other countries and domains, e.g. in the 
French construction safety system the Documents Techniques Unifiés are developed by the different industry stakeholders, but 
compliance with these can be made enforceable in court as they constitute the equivalent of the ‘so far as reasonably practicable’ 
standard, i.e. the obligation of due diligence by the builders. 
49 As per previous note, “voluntary” but in fact likely to be used in enforcement when the need arises to define what is “reasonably 
practicable”. 
50 A note is needed here on this assumption of (at least significantly) converging interests. While it is generally accepted by many 
practitioners (see e.g. World Bank Group 2014 a) that there is an alignment of interests between food business operators and food 
safety regulators (safe food is good for business, because consumers come back), it is far less often thought to be the case in OSH, 
which is rather commonly seen as a “trade off” field – businesses seek to save money by cutting back on OSH expenses, and gain little 
by complying. The Robens report took a different view, assuming that there were clear benefits of OSH for employers (less liability and 
court cases, better image for the company, better workers’ motivation and effectiveness, less disruptions due to accidents etc.). 
Interestingly, while some well-publicized food scandals (see further in the US food safety case) show that the expected “alignment” is 
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Health and Safety Commission (since then merged with the HSE) “embodies a theory of assent in the 
formulation of regulation” (ibid., p. 149) aiming at making compliance more likely (and easier). The HSE (and 
HSC) were clearly positioned from the onset not at bodies functioning in an abstract, aloof independence, but 
working “at the centre of an intricate web of political relationships” (ibid., p. 157) - balancing different 
interests, priorities, needs, with negotiation as central activity (ibid., p. 158). This builds a sharp contrast to 
France, for instance, where the Labour Inspection is seen as being (and having to be) fully independent (and 
even impervious to) any interests on the side of businesses (clearly less so on the side of trade unions), and 
any political pressures (whether it is so in practice is another question). While this difference is clearly linked 
to deep (and historically long-term) divergences in industrial relations, the role and posture of trade unions 
and businesses, it is likely that different approaches taken in legislation have also played a significant role in 
strengthening and hardening these divergences. 
Second, Hawkins shows how there has been a gradual shift over more than two decades in the focus of the 
HSE, and the definition of “risk” that underpins its work, targeting, and enforcement response. Significantly, 
the HSW Act changes the definition of what is being supervised and enforced. Rather than pinpointing specific 
rules and requirements, it establishes a “duty of care” to workers, and any people who may be affected – the 
purpose of the Act is to “ensure that safety is a pervasive value” and it requires that operations should be 
“safe ‘so far as reasonably practicable’, specifically requiring a weighing of cost and trouble against the severity 
of the hazard and likely benefit” (ibid., p. 145). Thus, the Act is founded on a risk-based and approach 
(addressing risks to safety is the purpose, not enforcing specific statutory points per se, and prioritization is 
not only permitted, but called for). Cost-benefit analysis, in a way, is at the core of the HSW Act. In addition, 
the Act “brought statute law to bear on a broader range of sites and problems” – leading to a change in the 
range of risks covered, and in risk prioritization (increasing attention to risks to the public, and comparatively 
less to risks to workers51) (ibid., p. 147). During the 1980s there were again new trends and shifts in focus of 
resources and interest (ibid., p. 161): “shift (…) in the balance of regulatory activities towards major hazards 
and the protection of the public from industrial harms, and (…) a marked increase (…) in public concern for the 
environmental aspects” (ibid., p. 162). The EU “Seveso” Directive in 1984, for which HSE was selected as 
responsible body in the UK, reinforced this shift (along with further national and EU legislation). 
Third, this focus on hazard control and mitigation, and this modulation of inspections and enforcement based 
on risk, have been officially, clearly articulated for a long time – meaning current HSE practice builds on at over 
30 years of experience and gradual consolidation of this approach. Hawkins thus quotes a 1978 official HSE 
document stating that its goal is to “ensure that management recognises its responsibilities for the control of 
hazards” (ibid., p. 155). In another, slightly later, official document (from 1980), the HSE explains that “the 
frequency with which inspections are undertaken in any premises depends on need – the standards of safety, 
health and welfare found (…) at the last visit, the potential inherent hazard (…) and the quality of the 
management” (ibid., p. 167). Thus, both the risk-based targeting model, and the “enforcement management 
model” have long and deep roots. All the HSE inspectors’ actions have to contribute to “tackle root causes 
rather than just the symptoms of undesirable conditions (ibid., p. 166) – and this leads to an approach to 
enforcement that is fundamentally instrumental (concerned with utilitarian goals) more than expressive 
(symbolizing fundamental values). 
Fourth, inspectors’ decisions (and HSE actions more broadly) aim at minimizing risk and, as a means to this 
end, at maximizing compliance. For inspectors, “the seriousness of the event and the seriousness of the risk 
                                                           
not always present in food safety, the generally good OSH situation in the UK suggests that the Robens report’s assumptions may well 
have been correct, at least to a significant extent. This is certainly a topic worthy of further research. 
51 Hawkins does not discuss whether or not this gradual shift was “appropriate” from a data-driven risk perspective, i.e. whether risks 
to the public created in aggregate more harm than strictly “occupational” ones, and we did not have the opportunity to research data 
from this perspective. 
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of harm” are essential in terms of “framing the prosecution decision” (ibid., p. 54). In this perspective, 
“decisions about legal standards and their enforcement” are made in a broader setting, within a given context, 
with decision ‘frames’ “interpretive and classificatory devices” (ibid., p. 48). Whereas “prosecution can provide 
symbolic satisfaction to the public while doing little instrumentally to gain compliance or repair problems” 
(ibid., p. 7) – as a result, “formal enforcement is often reserved for weightier matters”, including particular 
seriousness, visibility, harm, persistence (ibid., p. 41). This is all part of a compliance strategy rather than a 
sanctioning one: “sanctioning is largely concerned with rule-breaking, where compliance strategy is focused 
on results”. Hawkins notes that such an approach is most reliably achieved when there is familiarity with the 
business, stability of relationships between regulator and regulated entities, which means inspectors can work 
on improving matters – with sanctions being far more frequent in other cases (e.g. more “transient” 
businesses) (ibid., p. 46). 
Finally, while the roots of contemporary HSE approaches go back to the 19th century (“the use of prosecution 
as an enforcement move of last resort goes back to Victorian times”, ibid., p. 17), there have been considerable 
efforts since 1974 to create more consistency and uniformity. At the onset, and for a couple of decades, “there 
were markedly different cultures and traditions of enforcement within HSE” (ibid., p. 19). This was the result 
of HSE’s “birth as the progeny of several shotgun marriages”, and “throughout the 1970s and 1980s HSE 
remained essentially a federal structure” (ibid., p. 156).In 1990, a major reorganization was made to ensure 
more consistency, with the creation of the Field Office Directorate (FOD), which replaced the previous “legacy” 
inspectorates52 (ibid., p. 163). Several other institutional changes were made with the “objective of 
maintaining consistency of enforcement practice” e.g. the set-up of National Interest Groups (ibid., p. 154). 
Overall, these all show a consistent “pursuit of greater uniformity of policy and practice in the operation of 
HSE at all levels” (ibid., p. 164). 
The challenge, however, that all efforts at consistency and uniformity have encountered, is that actual 
enforcement work does not proceed through “implementation” of official policies – but rather, that official 
policies are but one of the many drivers of real-life enforcement decisions (and analysing these many drivers 
is what Hawkins’s work is about). In practice, “inspectors have routine conceptions of ‘risks’, ‘accidents’, 
‘problems’, and so on, which assist them in making sense of the difficulties that come to light” (ibid., p. 50) – 
and they also have values, visions of their work, experience and uses, which all contribute to their decision-
making. Reforms in HSE, in recent years, have clearly aimed at bringing consistency to a further level, and at 
achieving a better implementation of the Enforcement Policy53. To this aim, the approach to be used in 
determining whether or not to take enforcement action, and which one, has been spelled out in far greater 
detail, and with a number of “decision trees”, in a document called the Enforcement Management Model 
(EMM)54.  
The EMM reiterates and further develops an approach that was already, as we have seen, in place in the late 
1970s/early 1980s – it does so, however, with more details and precision. The fundamental idea is that the 
inspector should use a risk-based approach at every stage of his work – and in particular when identifying 
violations and assessing their relevance, and when deciding on the enforcement action (or lack thereof). We 
will come back to the EMM later on, but fundamentally it emphasizes the importance of “risk of personal 
injury” and “immediacy of risk”, and to assess them, as well as the degree to which the situation deviates from 
clearly established standards, uses an approach called “risk gap analysis” (p. 9). When determining the 
enforcement action, the EMM considers the overall situation in the establishment, as well as the compliance 
                                                           
52 Keeping, however, some specialized ones for high-hazard establishments, e.g. the ones supervised under the “Seveso” directive. 
53 See HSE Enforcement Policy Statement available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse41.pdf. See also explanatory page on the 
policy: http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/enforcepolicy.htm.  
54 See HSE Enforcement Management Model available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/emm.pdf.  
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history (p. 25). By making the enforcement guidelines far more detailed and specific, and breaking them down 
in a number of steps, more uniformity and consistency is sought. Still, there remains a considerable degree of 
discretion in decision making, and the assessment of conditions and of the “risk gap” are done by inspectors, 
with all the experience, views, ‘frames’ etc. that they bring to the process. Hence, what Hawkins describes in 
his work is still essentially valid, even though it may be that the variation has been significantly reduced (recent 
research on the effectiveness of the EMM in this regard not being available).  
The next step in improving consistency of risk-based approaches is thus to work on the inspectors themselves, 
on their culture and understanding of risk, on their “competencies”. Considering the HSE’s history outlined 
above, it is no surprise if the development of a new “common approach to competency” for regulators (and 
specifically inspectors) has been piloted to a large extent in the HSE, even though it applies to a number of 
other regulators (and is driven by the UK BRDO). We will come back to this in a later section, but it shows the 
pertinence of Hawkins’s emphasis on the “personal” element in inspector decision making – regardless of how 
detailed and specific policy guidance is, achieving “better” risk-focus (as seen by the regulators’ managers) 
and greater consistency involves working on what inspectors know, believe, think, how they see their work 
and analyse situations. In line with this, one of the “core competencies” identified in this “common approach” 
is “risk” (see BRDO 2015 and the Guidance for Regulators – Information Point Portal55).   
 
Short conclusion 
Among the most noteworthy changes over the years is the scope of what is now understood as OSH control. 
First, the way the institution and its mandate were defined: originally, it was by their object of control – 
factories, mines, quarries. The definition of a type of risk, or a regulatory area, was missing. The type of object 
was seen as defining the scope of work.  
Second, there is the question of what inspectors were expected to control. The 1833 Act only looked at the 
question of child labour, and attempted to limit both the young age at which children could be made to work, 
and the types of tasks they could be made to perform. The 1844 Act went further – it introduced additional 
restrictions of tasks allowed to assign to children, youth and women, and it also “introduced requirements for 
‘secure and continuous fencing’ of fly-wheels, water-wheels, wheel-races, hoists and teagles (lifting 
machinery) near to which children and young persons were liable to pass or be employed, and all parts of ‘mill 
gearing’ (transmission machinery)”. In other words, it now clearly covered occupational safety. Under this Act, 
“Inspectors were authorised to appoint ‘Certifying Surgeons’ to whom (…) any accident preventing the injured 
person from returning to work by nine o’clock the following day had to be reported. The Surgeon was required 
to make a full investigation of the nature and cause of the accident and report to the Inspector” which allowed 
to seriously start monitoring, investigating, understanding occupational hazards (ibid.). In 1850, the Ten Hours 
Act was voted, “reducing the maximum length of a working day for women and young persons employed in 
textile factories” (ibid.). Successive Factory Acts and other legislation in the 19th century continued to introduce 
safety requirements only gradually, and to mainly regulate issues in regard to children and, to a lesser extent, 
women. The safety of adult workers was, for long, left unregulated.  
Was it, then, that the risks were greater for children? Purely statistically, it is unlikely – adult, male workers 
were the majority, and an even greater majority of those performing hazardous tasks. What counts here is 
however risk as perceived by the society as unacceptable (and requiring regulation). For a variety of (relatively 
obvious) reasons, children were seen as more vulnerable, less able to understand and manage risks 
themselves, more in need of protection etc. – and thus, adopting regulations to protect them (but not adult 
workers) was seen as appropriate. Adult males were expected to be able to assess and manage their own risks. 
                                                           




As for women, the fact that they were awarded more protection than men (but less than children) reflects 
both the period’s mentalities and culture (women generally seen as “minors”, “weaker”, “in need of 
protection”) and sociological realities (women that had to do factory work to survive were very poor, 
underpaid, and often in serious jeopardy, physical and otherwise).  
Perception of risks continued to shape priorities and structures for a long time. Agriculture was only covered 
by OSH legislation, and trade and services were included in 1963, but with enforcement left to local authorities 
– which resulted in the “twin peaks” problem, whereby both the HSE and local authorities build separate and 
unrelated “risk pyramids”, i.e. classification of objects (establishments) on the base of risk56. Because the scope 
of competence of HSE and local authorities is different, there is the possibility (and indeed this is often the 
case in practice) that the “peak” of the local authority’s pyramid is in fact lower in relative risk compared ot 
the “base” of the HSE’s pyramid. As a result, this “local peak” will be inspected frequently, whereas the 
(objectively riskier) “HSE base” will be inspected rarely or not at all. As the Better Regulation Executive put it, 
this “limits the ability of regulators to target overall inspection resource on workplaces where the risk of injury 
and illness is highest” (Better Regulation Executive 2008 – quoted by Löfstedt 2011 and the main basis for his 
recommendation to put HSE in charge of “directing” local enforcement too). 
In conclusion, the question of how risks were conceived and perceived was central to the adoption of 
regulations, creation of inspection institutions, development of their scope of work, powers and methods. 
What was required in order to have regulations adopted and an inspection institution created was not just a 
risk, or even a major risk, it was a combination of factors. First, the risk had to be identified and understood 
(or thought to be understood), and perceived as something that could possibly be mitigated through 
intervention – a poorly understood risk, to which science and techniques were unable to respond, would not 
produce the same reaction, however significant its statistical impact (as the cholera example shows). Second, 
it has to be seen as a risk “out of the ordinary”, unacceptable, what Slovic et al. call a “dread risk”. New 
techniques and industries, disruptions in what was hitherto considered normal, create “dread” – but large 
amounts of preventable deaths in ways and occupations that have been part of everyday life’s fabric for 
centuries often simply do not register (e.g. agriculture). Similarly, in the 19th century at least, adult men 
engaged in hazardous occupations was seen as “normal” – but children exposed to the same risks appeared 
shocking. Third, moving from “no intervention” to “some intervention” usually takes a combination of factors 
including “crisis events” or broader social pressure. Finally, the way in which institutions are set up, develop 
and grow is generally not thought through at the beginning, is strongly subject to path dependence, and 
getting towards a somewhat more “rational” set up can take a very long time indeed (and many “lessons 
learned”).  
A few more words should be said to emphasize the complex set of changes in structures, policies and 
(eventually) staff training and competencies involved in making an institution more “risk-focused”, and 
inspectors’ decision-making more consistent. In all these respects, as we will see in further sections, the HSE 
will serve as a very important example, and help us test different hypotheses. 
 
v. A brief look at other countries 
The gradual establishment in Britain of specialized inspectorates for the enforcement of labour-related 
legislation was to an extent paralleled in other “advanced” economies of the time, but the timeline and 
specifics differed.  
 
                                                           
56 The “pyramid” metaphor conveying the idea that, by design, there should be larger number of lower-risk businesses, and a smaller 
amount of high-risk ones, so that there can be real focus of activities – this classification is the result of prioritization, and does not 




In France, the context and timeline to some extent resembled what was seen in Britain, and so did some of 
the initial measures, but the two systems were to strongly diverge over time. The same social blights 
associated with the rise of modern industry were highlighted in France, as they were in Britain – one of the 
most prominent publications in this perspective being the report by Dr Villermé57 that was commissioned by 
the Academy of Moral and Political Sciences and presented (for its first part) in 1839. Villermé exposes in 
details the living and working conditions of workers in the textile industry but, while demonstrating the 
hazards they create and the depth of misery, it is also very much a socially conservative account. He only 
criticizes “abuses” (and in particular in relation to children), otherwise puts substantial blame on the poor 
themselves, and calls for some remedies but clearly “no radical solutions” (Tyl 1971, Introduction). This 
perspective very much reflected that of the higher bourgeoisie who dominated the July Monarchy regime of 
the time – and Villermé’s report led to the adoption of the 1841 law on child labour in factories, manufactures 
and workshops. For similar reasons to those seen in Britain, this was the issue in regard to which state 
intervention was seen as appropriate and urgent – safety of workers more broadly was still far from being 
regulated.  
In the post-revolutionary context, limitation of working hours was adopted in 1848 – but further legislation 
had to wait for the fall of the Second Empire and the re-establishment of the Republic. In 1874, a new law 
further regulated child labour, as well as women employment conditions. This was also the law that effectively 
created a labour inspection – a full 33 years after adoption of the first law on child labour. Indeed, after some 
debate, the 1841 law had left the matter to the government to decide through a decree (Bouquet 1895 p. 1), 
and the initial decision was to have volunteer local commissions in charge of inspections. This seems to have 
quickly proved ineffective (ibid.) and, from 1847, there were repeated plans, draft laws etc. aiming to replace 
these by a professional inspection. All, however, failed, mostly due to far larger political events – the 1847 
draft to the revolution of February 1848, a 1850 discussion was left without follow-up (in a very tense political 
context that led to the 1851 coup by then-President and future-Emperor Louis-Napoléon Bonaparte), another 
project in 1858 was again not followed through, and a 1870 draft was quickly side-lined by the Franco-Prussian 
(or Franco-German) war that started in July (ibid., pp. 1-3). Even though a few local administrations 
(départements) had created their own inspections, they lacked proper powers and a clear framework and had 
limited effectiveness. This period seemed to demonstrate a contrario the usefulness of inspections, through 
the very limited progress in implementing the 1841 law that was observed in the absence of an inspectorate. 
The system created in 1874 was a kind of hybrid: it retained local discretion in hiring and appointing local 
inspectors (in some départements local authorities hired quite a few, in others none), as well as local volunteer 
“commissions”, but added a professional, central service (with 17 inspectors) and a Central Commission58. 
In 189259, a new law was voted regulating employment of women (in particular minors) and children – and, 
crucially, this new law restructured (and strengthened) the inspection function. It got rid of local inspectors 
altogether, as well as of local volunteer commissions. The labour inspection now would have 11 superior 
inspectors, 76 departmental inspectors (in charge of a département) and 16 departmental female inspectors60. 
Inspectors were henceforth to be recruited via a concours (competitive examination) covering a range of legal 
                                                           
57 See Tyl 1971 for a modern edition and presentation  
58 With representatives from industry, politics and science, and a role that in some way could be seen as a prefiguration of the UK’s 
Health and Safety Commission created a century later: assessing problems, proposing solutions, developing recommendations etc. The 
commission filled a need (as the inspectorate was not endowed with the regulatory powers given to HM Factory Inspectorate in 
Britain), and helped “bridge the gap” between government administration and private industry (cf. Bouquet 1895 pp. 4-5). 
59 A point of context was the 1890 International Conference on Labour Law in Berlin. 
60 In line with the prejudices of the day, there were arguments against having female inspectors at all, but they were retained due to 
successful local experimentation in Paris and its suburbs in the earlier period – but they were confined to all-female factories and 
workshops, and to workplaces with no engine-powered mechanical equipment (and their entrance examination had the same topics 
as male inspectors, with the exclusion of mechanical engineering issues) (Bouquet 1895 p. 8). 
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and regulatory, chemistry, engineering, safety and workplace organization questions (ibid. p. 9). The 
profession of inspector now opened to a real career. For mining establishments, the 1892 law left 
responsibility of inspections to the corps of mining engineers (a long-established state body). 
Like in Britain (but in a faster succession – which is understandable given much later creation of the 
inspectorate), the remit and mandate of inspectors gradually expanded – starting only from rules on children 
and under-age girls in manufacturing. In 1883 they were given authority to enforce the 1848 legislation on 
work duration in manufacturing industry. The 1892 law which re-organized the inspectorate added the 
employment of children in “peddling and itinerant trades”. It was only with the 1893 law on workers hygiene 
and safety in manufacturing establishments, however, that their functions really came to cover “health and 
safety” in a broader meaning, beyond the limited provisions until then existing for children and women (ibid., 
p. 11). This last addition, one could argue the most critical one from a “risk prevention” perspective, was 
however to be the most complex to translate into practice – requiring the development and adoption of 
specific technical norms, and requiring a relatively complex enforcement procedure (Guérard 2000 – see 
below). 
The fact that regulations and inspections first focused on regulating children (and later women) employment 
(and left adult men to fend for themselves for a long time) again reflects contemporary vision and ideology – 
in other words, risk perceptions are mediated by what is considered normal and acceptable, or not, rather 
than being purely (or even mostly) driven by objective data such as injury or fatality rates. A prominent 
representative of that day’s legal thinking, Advocate General at the Court of Cassation Louis Sarrut, put it thus: 
“if one can, to an extent, argue against the legislator’s setting working conditions for men having completed 
their physical development and with full civil capacity, it is beyond doubt that the legislator has to intervene 
in the interest of minors and women (…) For a well-organized State, valid citizens are needed. The limitation 
of women employment is indispensable to the good upkeep of the household” (Sarrut 1894, pp. 16-18, 
author’s translation). What is being seen as a risk, here, is mostly the social risk: “the withering of the race” 
(ibid.) is what could happen if the state did not intervene (and this would have, one can read between the 
lines, consequences in the international rivalry and contest, particularly with Germany). Still, in Sarrut’s time, 
the view that harm to (male, adult) workers was also a risk worth addressing had prevailed (but it had not 
been self-evident). As Sarrut himself puts it, commenting the introduction (under discussion at the time, 
adopted into law in 1898) of no-fault liability for employers in labour accidents: “modern industry (…) has 
become by itself hazardous for the worker. (…) Accidents proceed far more from the kind of work and tools 
than from worker’s actions. Industrial work implies risks – and this kind of work and these tools are established 
by the employer” (ibid., pp. 20-22). The justification of no-fault liability also relies on economic reasoning: 
“industrial labour is the source of the master’s benefits. These benefits are the risks’ compensation. The 
worker, on the contrary, is limited to a set salary. It is thus as rational as it is equitable to (…) impose to the 
employer the reparation of damages” (ibid.). This view of risks, once again, has part of its foundation in the 
“dread risk” aspect of industrial employment as distinct of, say, farm work – but it receives conscious 
justification and elaboration, a justification that is linked to the economic question as well. Because industrial 
activities (unlike farming, at least at the time, and/or at least in the mind of contemporaries) involves novel 
techniques, arrangements set by the employer (and not, say, by tradition), and unique perspectives of profit, 
regulation is justified61, which would not be possible from a classical legal perspective. Indeed, on the question 
of no-fault liability, Sarrut approves of the departure from “very ancient doctrine, transmitted by Roman Law 
(…) that the affected party can only obtain reparation of the damage in court if it can demonstrate fault” (ibid., 
p. 20).   
                                                           
61 The 1898 law excludes agricultural activities, as well as most trade and services – it covers “workers employed in construction, 
factories, manufactures, public works, land and water transport, loading and unloading, public warehouses, mines, quarries and any 
establishment (…) where are manufactured or used explosives, or machinery activated by a force other than man or animals”. 
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Decisions on the scope and aim of legislation were thus strongly driven by ideology and perceptions, rather 
than be actual data on the health and safety risks presented by different activities. The same seems to have 
been the case for enforcement approaches and instruments. Commenting on the implementation of the 1892 
law, Sarrut wrote: “sanction can seem insufficient, for violations are brought before the Police Court [note: 
Minor Offences Court], and a fine is in principle the only penalty; but fines are cumulative in case of several 
violations or felonies (…) Anyway the legislator, not without reason, appears to expect full compliance with 
the law more from the vigilance of inspectors and commissions than from penalties” (ibid., p. 16). Inspecting 
as frequently as possible seems to have been the approach taken in practice – commenting on the pre-1892 
set-up, Bouquet wrote that inspectors “saw at a maximum a little over half [of establishments under 
supervision] per year. The inspection of each establishment, particularly small workshops, was thus 
insufficiently frequent to avoid that, in the meantime, the industrialist fell again in its old errors” (Bouquet 
1895, p. 7, author’s translation).  
Unfortunately, little can be said about these inspections’ effectiveness. Statistics of the time, and later articles, 
have focused mostly on the volume of enforcement activities (see e.g. Guérard 2000 p. 12), but not on whether 
it made factories more compliant with child labour rules, or reduced the rates of injuries and fatalities. These 
were in any case still very high at the beginning of the 20th century – 130 for 100,000 in construction, over 100 
in metal industry (1905 data, quoted in ibid. p. 3), whereas similar rates at the end of the century in major 
industrial economies would be around 10-15 times lower for construction, even lower for industrial activities 
(see Feyer et al. 2001 and section 4.2.a.i. below).  
Many other aspects and issues of early labour inspections in France were to have long-lasting effects. We will 
only briefly discuss one of the most important: enforcement tools and the requirement to use “improvement 
notices” (or their French equivalent).  
On the first issue, the 1893 law on labour safety, further detailed by a 1894 decree, required inspectors, when 
they enforced regulations taken by the government on safety issues, to first issue a “mise en demeure” 
(improvement notice), and give a delay for putting the establishment in compliance (Guérard 2000 pp. 1 and 
7 – Bouquet 1895 p. 14). This was opposed to cases where inspectors enforced direct provisions of the law, in 
which they could directly issue a “procès verbal” and bring the offender to court for swift sanctioning. The 
delay foreseen for the improvement notice was a minimum of one month, and could be much longer in some 
cases.  
Such a provision is quite unusual in French law – leaving officials some discretion as to whether they should 
enforce a rule or not is done in some (though not all) laws, but requiring them to first give a warning and 
improvement period is quite a unique case. The suggested explanation is that there was a legal problem in 
foreseeing sanctions for violations which were still for the most part vaguely defined (or not defined at all yet). 
While violations of the rules on employment of minors and women (1892 law) were clear, the safety 
requirements (1893 law) had mostly not been laid out yet. As Guérard puts it (ibid., p. 1): “so that an employer 
could be penalized, in accordance with the legal principles formulated by the French Revolution, all the 
elements of the violation have to be defined in the law or in legislation that stems from it. But in matters of 
safety, the law can obviously not foresee everything. It is thus necessary to rely on implementation decrees 
already (…) that are insufficient, in the initial state of prevention concepts and methods, to define in detail the 
measures to be implemented. Whence comes the use of improvement notices by labour inspectors, procedure 
imposed by the (…) 1893 law for all regulations issued to implement it”.  
The extended delays for improvement foreseen by the 1894 decree, the lack of flexibility and exceptions in 
the procedure (e.g. for construction sites which, unlike many other establishments, are temporary and change 
rapidly, improvement notices with long delays were simply inadequate – see ibid. p. 7), as well as the 
cumbersome way in which notification had to be done (see ibid. p. 8 and Bouquet 1895 p. 14). As a result, 
inspectors are constantly complaining about this requirement, and a new law in 1912 includes a number of 
specific safety requirements so that they can be directly enforced (Guérard 2000 p. 10). Later on, a 1931 law 
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will reform the system so that improvement notices become the exception rather than the norm. By contrast, 
in Britain, improvement notices are a major part of the HSE’s activities, and inspectors are clearly satisfied 
with the system’s effectiveness (see Tilyndite 2012 pp. 137-138 and 249-253). While the difference may reflect 
a number of institutional and cultural issues, the exceedingly unpractical notification procedure and long 
delays adopted in France in 1893-1894 probably played a role in making the system function poorly, thus 
lastingly “disqualifying” this instrument – and contributing to a modern system which is seen by employers as 
often excessively harsh. It is also interesting to see that the practice of prior notices was in a way only seen as 
a “stop gap” measure until more precise requirements could be developed, and not as a useful tool by itself. 
Finally, this initial difficulty also reflects the problems created by constant technical developments, which 
meant that regulations were always outdated compared to the latest innovations (Guérard 2000 p. 5) – a 
problem that was only gradually solved over the following decades, with the growing reliance on performance 
or target standards, rather than specification standards (see Ogus 1994 pp. 151-152 and Baldwin 1995 pp. 
175-185)62. Even in the way such performance-based rules are used, however, French labour inspectors exhibit 
to date a considerable reluctance to give specific guidance63, in strong contrast to the HSE’s practice64. 
A couple more remarks on the long-lasting effects of initial choices. First, the initial choice to have 
“departmental” inspectors, and to keep one inspector per département even once they became state 
inspectors, has been preserved in a structure where the fundamental organizational unit is local (in spite of 
inspectors being state civil servants), and staffing levels are only poorly proportional to the level of activity 
(the “one inspector per department” was evidently inbalanced froms this perspective). Second, merging the 
different inspectorates respectively in charge of “general” labour inspections, labour inspections in 
agriculture, and labour inspections in transports, had to wait until 200965. Finally, France’s decision to build a 
medical insurance system based on a “Bismarckian approach” in 1945 (i.e. based on a network of industry-
specific statutory health insurance funds) rather than a “Beveridgian approach” (a national, tax-funded health 
service) resulted in a duality of inspections, whereby the health insurance funds conduct occupational health 
visits with no connection to the labour inspection66, a problem that is not without connection with what can 
be observed with the occupational accidents statutory insurance funds in Germany (see Tilyndite 2012 pp. 
162-164). 
A very brief look at a few other countries67 confirms both some level of similarity in timelines, and some 
important differences that relate to different “country trajectories” in terms of overall political and 
institutional context, social issues etc.  
 
Netherlands 
In the Netherlands, labour legislation was introduced relatively late compared to Britain and (to some extent) 
to France. In 1874, child labour was banned in factories (van Houten legislation), then in 1919 the Labour Law 
comprehensively prohibited child labour and mandated rest periods and maximum working hours. It was only 
in 1934 that the Safety Act introduced mandatory norms on labour safety. The Labour Inspection was created 
                                                           
62 For more explanation and discussion of the different types of standards, see below pp. 107-112 
63 Author’s interviews with French government officials and businesses. 
64 See illustrations of it at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/guidance/  
65 See France’s report to the ILO for 2009, available at: http://travail-
emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_au_BIT_intranetW_28022011.pdf. Note that labour inspections in mining, electricity and gaz 
industries remain separate. 
66 Author’s interviews with French government officials and businesses. 
67 The following cases were selected for their relevance (major economies, among the early industrial powers, particularly for the US, 
Germany and France) and because they exemplify very different approaches (Germany and France for instance), and diverging 
timelines (earlier actions in Germany and France, later in the Netherlands and the US). As such, they allow to present an overview of 
the diverse paths taken in setting up OSH inspections, their similarities and differences, and the significance of historical path-
dependency for today’s inspections practices. 
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in 1890, which is also considerably later than in Britain (and a bit later than in France). It would be interesting 
to look more closely in future research as to why there was this delay (given comparable stages of industrial 
development), and whether this resulted in any difference in how injuries and fatalities rates evolved 
(declined) over time (i.e. whether this decline was slower in the Netherlands, which could be because of later 
introduction of regulation and inspections, or whether there is no observable difference, and the main drivers 
appear to be technology, culture, economic structure etc.).  
An interesting feature of the Dutch system was the creation, in 2012, of the Inspection for Social Affairs and 
Employment (“Inspectorate SZW” in English or “Inspectie SZW” in Dutch, with SZW standing for “Sociale Zaken 
en Werkgelegenheid”). This institution regroups “the organisations and activities of the former Labour 
Inspectorate, the Work and Income Inspectorate and the Social and Intelligence Investigation Service of the 
Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment68”. It thus gathers a number of functions, some of which are 
frequently found combined elsewhere, but rarely all. It supervises compliance with “regulations in the area of 
working conditions and the prevention of major hazards” (like the HSE – but unlike the French Labour 
Inspectorate, which does not oversee major hazards69), regulations concerning illegal employment and 
minimum wages (to some extent like the French Labour Inspectorate70 but unlike the HSE, which deals only 
with health and safety71), and it is also involved in “detection of fraud, exploitation and organised crime within 
the chain of work and income (…) under the direction of the Public Prosecution Service (some of which, but 
only a small part, falls within the purview of the French Labour Inspectorate72 – and none of which is done by 
the HSE) as well as “studying the implementation of social security acts by the Employee Insurance Agency 
(UWV), the Social Insurance Bank (SVB) and municipalities73” (a function that is typically done, if at all, by 
completely distinct bodies from OSH/labour inspectorates).  
There is no easily accessible, open information on the reasons why the Dutch government decided to go for 
this precise merger, rather than envisioning potentially different mergers, with different synergies, e.g. 
merging all functions related to social security fraud with the Tax Service74 – it is not even clear that other 
merger options (or full transfer of some functions to other institutions) were considered at all. The only official 
information we were able to access (internal documentation of the Ministry of Social Affairs and Employment 
from 2012, gathering working documents from 2009) treats the merger as a fait accomplis and does not 
discuss the reasons this precise merger was decided – it only advocates its benefits, and lays out how to make 
it happen. What we can piece together75 is that, at some stage probably in the first half of the 2000s, the 
Netherlands government decided to consolidate national inspectorates (excluding the Tax Service) and to 
more than halve their number (from 25 to 10), as a way of reducing staffing levels (down close to 30% over 15 
years) – consolidation being seen primarily as a way to make this staff reduction possible while keeping roughly 
similar levels of effectiveness. 
It is too early to discuss the results of this merger, and it may turn out to be a very good decision in terms of 
overall effectiveness, but what is interesting from our perspective is that (at least based on the information 
                                                           
68 Official English-language brochure “What does the Inspectorate SZW do?” – available at: http://www.inspectieszw.nl/Images/What-
does-the-Inspectorate-SZW-do_tcm335-330702.pdf  
69 In France, this is done by the Inspection des Installations Classées see: http://www.installationsclassees.developpement-
durable.gouv.fr/  
70 Which does not look at social contributions, handled by the bodies in charge of the social security system. 
71 In the UK, illegal employment of foreigners is tackled by the UK Border Agency and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority (see: 
http://www.gla.gov.uk/ ) which “regulates businesses who provide workers to the fresh produce supply chain and horticulture 
industry, to make sure they meet the employment standards required by law”. Compliance with wage and working hours regulations 
is not enforced by public inspection institutions, but by litigation, wherein workers are supported by Trade Unions. Payment of social 
contributions is handled as part of the tax inspections by HM Revenue and Customs. 
72 Social security fraud is handled by social security institutions themselves. Organized crime is tackled by special units in the police.  
73 And some additional analytical functions, risk assessment in the field of social affairs etc. 
74 Whereas collection of social contributions has been done for a long time already by the Tax Service – see Bakirtzi 2011 pp. 67-71 
75 Author’s discussions with current and former Netherlands government officials involved in inspections issues.  
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we could obtain) there does not seem to have been a real conceptual review of what inspectorates were doing, 
what (if anything) from this set of duties could possibly abandoned, what could be done better through 
mergers or transfers of functions (and which ones). Rather, it was decided to conduct mergers to save costs, 
and these were done by grouping together the functions that looked most similar or, simply, were under the 
same ministry (in this case SZW). This illustrates once again how rarely “evidence-based” decisions are taken 
regarding inspection structures, staffing levels etc. 
 
Germany 
The occupational safety and health regulatory and enforcement system in Germany, as in the other countries 
we have reviewed, has features reflecting its history – but maybe even more so than others.  
The German OSH system is characterized by a system that is both “federal and dual” (Tilyndite 2012 p. 16176) 
– there is a federal labour law but inspections are done by the Länder (federated states), and in parallel there 
is a set of “non-governmental” (but government-backed) regulations and inspections handled by the 
“statutory insurance bodies” (“Berufsgenossenschaften”). We will try and briefly cover the origins of such a 
rather unusual structure (and we will discuss in a later section how the system appears to perform compared 
to the British one). 
The early origins of the OSH system are not very different from what they were in Britain and France, and 
contemporary as well – but, due to the political fragmentation of Germany at the time, they took place in one 
state at a time. The most significant developments were in Prussia, which was to become the “unifying” state 
over the 1860s (and with full unification of Germany achieved in 1871). Like in other countries, the first 
concern was about children working in factories, and the emergence of the concern took place in the 1830s. 
A particular twist of the German situation was that the driving worry that led to call attention to the plight of 
children in modern industry was military – that, because of stunted development, the army was unable to find 
sufficient numbers of able recruits77 (report of Lieutenant-General von Horn to King Friedrich Wilhelm III). This, 
and other similar reports, led to the adoption in 1839 of the “Prussian Regulation” (“Preussisches Regulativ”) 
that, similarly to the 1833 UK Act and the 1841 French Law, limited employment of children (in terms of 
minimum age, maximum duration, schooling requirements). Like in France, and unlike in Britain, no specific 
inspectors were appointed – enforcement was left to local police, school authorities and (from 1847) voluntary 
local commissions. Due to their limited effectiveness, in 1853 state inspectors were appointed (and, at the 
same time, rest on Sunday and public holidays made mandatory). In 1869, a regulation (first applicable to the 
Northern German Confederation, then from 1871 to the whole German Empire) gave a stronger basis to the 
activities of labour inspectors, and further reinforced existing requirements on working conditions, age, hours 
etc. 
The developments from the 1870s again to some extent paralleled those observed in France and Britain, with 
a legal amendment adopted in 1878 that allowed inspectors to conduct at any time a “revision” of the 
workplace, and order safety improvements, but implementation was still problematic. From 1874, the 
                                                           
76 This short account of the German system and its origins is based on Tilyndite 2012 for the present, and on publicly available 
information, in particular websites such as the Helmut Schmidt Universität’s http://www.hsu-hh.de/arbeitsschutz as well as the 
Arbeitsschutzverwaltung im Freistaat Sachsen’s http://www.arbeitsschutz.sachsen.de/ as well as a section on “40 years of labour law” 
on the TÜV Rheinland website http://www.tuv.com/de/deutschland/aktuelles/40_jahre_arbeitsschutzgesetz/40_jahre_asig.html. 
Given the fact that we just aimed to present some of the key characteristics of the system, and how it differs from France and Britain, 
such publicly available facts were sufficient and we did not do a further literature review. 
77 Note that this concern, though not necessarily articulated in the same way, was clearly present elsewhere, at least in France – see 
Sarrut 1894 and his concerns about consequences for “the race”, which mirror von Horn’s. This again shows that what was perceived 




increasingly significant scores obtained in elections by “workers’” and “socialist” parties78 were creating a 
growing incentive for the Government to try and “undercut” these parties by making significant reforms that 
would secure the support of industrial workers for the regime. Accident and health insurances for workers 
were announced in an Imperial statement in 1881, and turned into law in 1883 (health insurance) and 1884 
(accident insurance) (cf. Tilyndite 2012 p. 167). The latter, crucially, replaced the 1871 regime of compensation 
for work accidents (where workers had to prove the responsibility of the employer, which seldom was 
possible) by a “no-fault” compensation regime. Finally, in 1891, the “Law on Worker Protection” 
(“Arbeiterschutzgesetz”) was adopted. This gave a stronger foundation to state labour inspections, and 
extended them to all industrial activities regardless of size and sector. As a result of these reforms in the 1880s 
and early 1890s emerged a dual system of state supervision and supervision through the mandatory insurance 
bodies institutions (since the “no fault” system meant there was otherwise a risk of “free riding”, where 
employers with poor safety practices would just be subsidized through other employers’ contributions, the 
Berufsgenossenschaften had from the start a supervisory role). The new system saw a strong decrease in work-
related injuries and fatalities until the First World War – though, as we will see in other sections too, how 
much of this can be attributed to the specifics of the inspection system is debatable. 
The “state supervision” side was from the start exercised by the federated states – and this was further 
reinforced by the 1949 Constitution, which reserved a number of powers to the Länder. Further developments 
of labour law included the 1973 Labour Safety Law (“Arbeitssicherheitsgesetz”), which required for each 
business to have an assigned medical doctor for occupational health, and one (or several) staff members 
assigned for safety (mirroring developments in Britain and France, and institutionalizing gradual developments 
in Germany since the 1920s). In 1996, a new Labour Protection Law (“Arbeitsschutzgesetz”) incorporated the 
EU OSH directives and principles, in particular risk assessment. 
What is particularly noteworthy is how specific early decisions, and features of the legal and institutional 
structure, have had a defining effect on the OSH inspection system. First, Länder inspectorates, even though 
they implement the same law, are organized in very different ways (see Tilyndite 2012 pp. 166-167), and with 
varying staffing levels (ibid., p. 176). In addition, in some of the federated states, “state inspectors perform 
not only OSH tasks but have functions in the areas of, for example, consumer or environmental protection” 
(ibid., p. 175). While a similar variety can to some extent be seen between different Local Authorities in Britain, 
the HSE provides unity in methods, and of course directly supervises “higher risk” sectors. Second, a complete 
parallel system of inspections by the mandatory insurers exists, with its own legal foundation 
(“Sozialgesetzbuch VII” – Seventh Volume of the Social Code, adopted in 1996, is the current framework), and 
a considerably higher number of inspectors than state inspectorates (see Tilyndite 2012 p. 175). Indeed, even 
though their purposes are defined differently (with a strong emphasis on prevention for the insurers) and stem 
from different laws79, both state and mandatory insurers inspectors “have similar enforcement mandates but 
different tasks, organizational structures and enforcement approaches80” (ibid. p. 195). We will see in a later 
section that this appears to result in far higher frequencies of inspection visits, and difficulties in coordination. 
 
United States 
                                                           
78 Until 1887, these got up to around 10% of the votes in each Reichstag election. From 1890, the SAPD and then SPD got 20% and 
more. See: http://de.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reichstagswahl_1884  
79 In addition, the mandatory insurers enforce their own statutory requirements (binding accident prevention regulations), resulting 
in a certain level of complexity and even confusion (cf. Tilyndite 2012 p. 170). 
80 When the system was created, in the late 19th century, state inspectors were more clearly focused on rules concerning employment 
of children and women, and working hours and rest days, whereas mandatory insurers looked more at the technical safety issues – 
but this allocation of responsibilities, if it ever was clear, has long ceased to be straightforward, as state labour law has increasingly 
regulated technical safety issues. 
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By contrast with the different European cases seen above, which share a number of common characteristics 
at least in terms of initial timeline, the development of OSH regulations and inspections in the United States 
has a number of specific features – the late emergence of state intervention in the OSH sphere, the prominent 
role of industry actors for several decades, the choice of a radical reform path in 1970, and of a legal framework 
that very starkly constrains inspector discretion.  
As Aldrich (2001) puts it “Before the late nineteenth century we know little about the safety of American 
workplaces because contemporaries cared little about it. As a result, only fragmentary information exists prior 
to the 1880s” – which means that the recognition of the relevance of labour conditions came significantly later 
than in Western Europe. For a variety of reasons, including “legal and regulatory climate that diminished 
employer’s interest in safety” (ibid.) as well as economic and natural conditions, and the practice of piece rates 
payment, which incentivized workers to producer more, even at the expense of safety81. As a result, injuries 
and fatalities appear to have been substantially higher than in Britain, for instance (Aldrich 1997 calculates 
that in coal mining, fatality rates were approximately 2.5 times higher than in Britain between 1890 and 1904. 
Similarly, fatality rates in railroad work were approximately twice higher). 
In many matters, the United States are often said to have a more “litigation-based” than “regulation-based” 
approach – while the general validity of such a claim can be disputed, it certainly seems to have been the case 
for OSH in the 19th century. Unfortunately, as Aldrich (2001) puts it: “workers injured on the job or their heirs 
might sue employers for damages, [but] winning proved difficult. Where employers could show that the 
worker had assumed the risk, or had been injured by the actions of a fellow employee82, or had himself been 
partly at fault, courts would usually deny liability. A number of surveys taken about 1900 showed that only 
about half of all workers fatally injured recovered anything”. This meant that the economic incentive was too 
limited for most firms to do real efforts (and investments) in worker safety. 
The first responses came in form of insurance coverage against accidents, which developed in the late 19th 
century, some purchased individually, some provided by unions, and some by the (larger) employers 
themselves. The first state-led efforts were some commissions to improve the situation in railways and mines, 
which developed from the 1840s and 1860s respectively, but with little powers and even less results. The first 
noticeable improvements “began on the railroads in the 1880s as (…) railroad regulators, workers, and 
managers began to campaign for the development of better brakes and couplers for freight cars” (ibid.). The 
technological solutions turned out to mean “not only better safety, but also higher productivity and after 1888 
[railway companies] began to deploy it”. State intervention then further accelerated the process. First, through 
information “in 1889-1890 (…) the newly-formed Interstate Commerce Commission (ICC) published its first 
accident statistics. They demonstrated conclusively the extraordinary risks to trainmen from coupling and 
riding freight (…). In 1893 Congress responded, passing the Safety Appliance Act, which mandated use of such 
equipment” (ibid.). This led to the rapid diffusion of the new equipment, and major improvement in injuries 
and fatality rates for trainmen. 
The next steps of state intervention in OSH took place in the “Progressive Era” between 1900 and 1914, which 
also saw the adoption of the Pure Food and Drug Act (1906) and of the Federal Reserve Act (1913). In 1910, 
the Bureau of Mines was established, but it “was to be a scientific, not a regulatory body and it was intended 
                                                           
81 E.g. the differences in types of deposits and methods of exploitation between British and US coal mining – “In Britain, coal seams 
were deep and coal expensive. As a result, British mines used mining methods that recovered nearly all of the coal because they used 
waste rock to hold up the roof. British methods also concentrated the working, making supervision easy, and required little blasting. 
American coal deposits by contrast, were both vast and near the surface; they could be tapped cheaply using (…) coal pillars and timber 
to hold up the roof, because timber and coal were cheap. (…) labor supervision was difficult and much blasting was required to bring 
down the coal. Miners themselves were by no means blameless; most were paid by the ton, and when safety interfered with 
production, safety often took a back seat. For such reasons, American methods yielded more coal per worker (…) but were far more 
dangerous” (Aldrich 2001). 
82 See also Stein (2003) on the difficulties of the “emerging tort of negligence”, employers’ and co-workers’ responsibilities. 
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to discover and disseminate new knowledge on ways to improve mine safety” (ibid.). The most important step 
for OSH was the passing in 1908 of a “federal employers’ liability law that applied to railroad workers in 
interstate commerce and sharply limited defences an employer could claim”, and sharply increased 
compensation. Following up, “in 1910, New York became the first state to pass a workmen’s compensation 
law”, modelled on “no fault” compensation already in place in much of Western Europe. It “appealed to 
businesses because it made costs more predictable and reduced labor strife [and] to reformers and unions it 
promised greater and more certain benefits. (…) Between 1911 and 1921 forty-four states passed 
compensation laws” (ibid.). 
As per Aldrich (2001), “the sharp rise in accident costs that resulted from compensation laws and tighter 
employers’ liability initiated the modern concern with work safety and (…) the long-term decline in work 
accidents and injuries. Large firms (…) suddenly became interested in safety. (…) Managers began to look for 
hidden dangers at work, and to require that workers wear hard hats and safety glasses. They also set up safety 
departments run by engineers and safety committees that included both workers and managers. In 1913 
companies founded the National Safety Council to pool information” (ibid.), Government agencies and 
universities participated in the effort. As a result, after 1910, fatality rates in railroads, steel making, and a 
number of other major industries (e.g. chemical) declined. There were also social and technological changes, 
such as a “decline in labor turnover [that] meant fewer new employees who were relatively likely to get hurt, 
while the spread of factory electrification not only improved lighting but reduced the dangers from power 
transmission”. Overall, “manufacturing injury rates [went down] about 38 percent between 1926 and 1939” 
(ibid.). Improvements, however, remained uneven, particularly in smaller firms – and, in spite of progress, 
hazards in mining remained significant, which led to the 1941 Federal Mine Inspection Act. Other inspections, 
where they existed, were organized by the states. While not insignificant in many instances, they had a 
“relatively conciliary stance” and “saw themselves less as adversaries of industry than as technical advisers to 
it” (Vogel 1986 p. 232, quoted in Clark 1999 p. 97).  
Against this background and early history, the adoption of the 1970 Occupational Safety and Health Act comes 
as a major turning point, a radical change of course. The view of backers of this new legislation was that it had 
been made strictly necessary by the situation with workers’ health and safety, which they saw as having gotten 
worse. A few years after the Act’s entry into force, for instance, Stender (1974) wrote: “The increasing growth 
and complexity of modern industry, with its sophisticated work processes and cascade of new materials, were 
resulting in the deaths of more than 14,000 workers and disabling injuries to more than two million others in 
the years immediately preceding passage of the Act. (…) In addition to the needless human suffering involved, 
this workplace toll constituted a significant drain on the resources of the country. Lost wages exceeded $1.5 
billion a year and the total workmen's compensation cost to employers was $4.82 billion in 1970 alone. By the 
middle of the last decade it was apparent that the efforts of those concerned with this problem-state 
legislatures, industry and its safety specialists, and labor unions-had not decreased the workplace toll” (p. 
641). Now, we have seen that this particular claim (that the “workplace toll” had not decreased) is false when 
seen in longer perspective. It is unfortunately difficult to access statistics from the decades immediately 
preceding 1970, so we have not been able to verify how true it was from a shorter historical perspective, i.e. 
for the decades immediately after WWII. Aldrich (2001) puts it thus: “in the 1960s however economic 
expansion again led to rising injury rates83 and the resulting political pressures led Congress to establish the 
Occupational Safety and Health Administration (OSHA) and the Mine Safety and Health Administration in 
                                                           
83 As evidenced by Smith (1972), injuries usually rise when unemployment falls because work intensity increases and many 
inexperienced workers are hired. 
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1970”. It seems that there may indeed have been a plateau in the decline in injury and fatality rates in the 
1950s and 1960s, at least in some sectors84.  
There was also an emergence of the “health” concerns in OSH – while injuries and fatal accidents were readily 
observable, the long-term health effects of many substances were poorly understood, or had been hidden on 
purpose, for a long period, leading to serious health effects on workers. Stender (1974) thus mentions several 
chemicals-related concerns: “occupational health was often misunderstood or ignored completely. Even 
where effective state regulation was attempted, it was necessarily limited by state boundaries. When 
Pennsylvania banned the manufacture, use, and storage of the chemical betanaphthylamine, an extremely 
hazardous substance linked with cancer of the bladder, the manufacturer moved its plant to Georgia, which 
did not then regulate the chemical. Industry's response was similarly ineffectual. Many large manufacturers 
had developed programs designed to create employee awareness of safe work habits (…) [but] few of these 
programs even considered the deleterious effects of toxic substances, partly because of the long studies 
necessary to prove a correlation between a substance and its effect on those exposed to it” (p. 642). Stender 
goes on to show that this concern with long-term health effects of chemicals was one of the points highlighted 
by the bill’s sponsors, e.g. Senator Williams: “the competitive disadvantage of the more conscientious 
employer is especially evident where there is a long period between exposure to a hazard and manifestation 
of an illness. In such instances, a particular employer has no economic incentive to invest in current 
precautions, not even in the reductions of workmen's compensation costs, because he will seldom have to pay 
for the consequences of his own neglect” (quoted in ibid.). The reform’s advocates were thus well aware of 
how the previous setup had achieved considerable improvements by relying on workers’ compensation and 
economic incentives, but they considered that the system was not anymore adequate to current conditions, 
in particular because (i) those that invested the most in safety ended up at a competitive disadvantage (since 
insurance covered all workplaces and rates were set regardless of their record) and (ii) the health effects of 
many technologies and products were too long-term to be properly addressed through this system anyway, 
as the effects could happen far beyond the time horizon businesses were planning for.  
This leads us to several extremely important points. First, we can see that in this case there seems to have 
been a combination of actual risks possibly increasing (and/or at least stopping a secular decrease), and new 
risks that scored strongly on the “dread” and also on the “unknown” dimensions (see Slovic and Weber 2002, 
p. 11) – and were also for many of them objectively under-addressed by current regulations and practices85. 
Second, when the United States had established worker compensation insurance as the cornerstone of its OSH 
efforts in the early 20th century, it had only partially copied the German system – in that it took “no fault” 
compensation, but not the inspection and enforcement powers of the “statutory insurers”. Thus, there was a 
real problem of “free riding” by the least conscientious businesses, since there also was generally little (if any) 
link between insurance premiums and the track record of a business in terms of safety86. This illustrates well 
that, for any system intending to promote compliance and safety practices, it is essential to understand how 
all pieces of the system fit together. Third, context played again an important role – as these trends did not 
take place in a vacuum but on the contrary concerns with health and safety, and in particular with toxic 
chemicals, were growing outside of the workplace as well, and environmental and consumer activism were on 
the rise. As Clark (1999) puts it, the 1960s and 1970s “marked a major transformation of US politics, with the 
                                                           
84 See CDC (1999), p. 466, for a graph of mining fatality rates, which shows precisely such a plateau between 1950 and 1970, but the 
time periods are too broad to identify precisely the turning points. 
85 On the policy mistakes in the field of chemical safety caused by over-optimism about long-term effects, see e.g. Blanc, Macrae and 
Ottimofiore 2015, pp. 61-62. 
86 This contrasts e.g. with the French system for mandatory insurance of construction contractors – where premiums are based on the 
risk of the project and on the risk profile of the company being insured (research by F. Blanc and G. Ottimofiore for a forthcoming 
World Bank Group publication). 
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emergence of new social movements pressing for change in fundamental social values in the areas of civil, 
welfare and consumer rights (…) and environmentalism” (p. 98). 
These elements led to a reform coalition where “US advocates for occupational health and safety reform had 
ties to the contemporaneous environmental and consumer movements” but where, on the contrary, labour 
unions had limited influence – which helps explain “why a statutory approach to the occupational health and 
safety ‘problem’ was pursued” despite US unions’ “wariness” towards “legislative solution for ‘industrial’ 
issues” (ibid., p. 99). The reform design adopted was aimed at preventing by all means “regulatory capture” 
and reformists, considering that “political influence of industry” had made previous efforts ineffective, were 
“resistant to any regulatory solutions that institutionalised collaboration between regulatory officials and 
industry representatives” (p. 99). In this new system, “conflict was deliberately designed [in] (…) and discretion 
(…) was deliberately designed out” (Vogel 1986 p. 255 quoted in Clark 1999 p. 98). A small example can 
illustrate this approach – on advance notification. While the 1947 ILO convention (of which the United States 
are not a signatory, but which we use here simply as reference point) requires that signatories give the right 
to inspectors to enter premises at any time, unannounced, the 1970 OSH Act goes a step further. Indeed, not 
only did the Act authorize “OSHA compliance officers (inspectors) to make unannounced inspections of 
virtually any establishment” but “anyone giving advance notice of an inspection without authority from OSHA 
will, if convicted, be fined up to $1,000, imprisoned for up to six months, or both” (Stender 1974 p. 645). The 
rationale for this, of course, is that “if employers received advance notice of an inspection, they would tend 
to make cosmetic corrections of hazardous conditions, which result in no more than momentary protection 
for employees” (ibid.). Now, in reality, OSHA standards usually require considerable investments for 
compliance, and short-term “cosmetic corrections” would be very unlikely to bring an establishment from 
massive violations to complete compliance, but this illustrates well the spirit of the Act. It is also worth noting 
that, precisely because “discretion was designed out”, OSHA inspectors are far more restricted to looking at 
“objective” and “material” aspects than inspectors in, say, the HSE, who can look more at practices, how 
workers and supervisors understand their roles, how risk-assessment is conducted etc. – and thus could on 
this basis see beyond any “cosmetic” improvements anyway87. 
 
Short conclusion 
Overall, all the OSH cases reviewed above show how much the scope and type of regulatory intervention, 
structure, powers, methods and resources of inspection agencies all depend on a number of factors – 
perception of risks as mediated by the culture of the times, institutional and political context etc. As the effects 
of initial decisions can still be seen many decades later, many aspects of the structures and practices of 
inspection institutions end up having far more to do with contingent historical trajectories than with a science-
based risk assessment.  
 
b. The emergence and development of modern inspectorates - Food Safety 
 
As we have seen above, some of the earliest regulations and reported cases of “inspections” applied to food 
– aiming at preventing fraud, adulteration, ensuring that consumers are not abused, but also not poisoned. 
Thus, controls of food safety and food labelling have deep roots in the past. In spite of that, and in sharp 
contrast with the OSH field, there are few research works looking at the origins and developments of food 
regulations and food control functions. Most of the research work is not “about” food safety but “in” food 
safety – microbiological, chemical, epidemiological work, looking at pathogens, contaminants, prevention 
                                                           
87 Authors’ interviews with officials in HSE and UK Better Regulation Delivery Office. See also HSE Enforcement Management Model 
(discussed in later section), available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/enforce/emm.pdf.  
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measures etc. The issue appears to be simultaneously far less contentious than OSH (where debates between 
advocate of more or less regulation have fuelled a considerable amount of writing), and more technical (at 
least in comparison with the “safety” part of OSH, not with the “health” side), thus possibly “scaring away” 
lawyers, social scientists and economists. It may also be that the topic is simply too little known to attract 
much interest – whereas “hotter” food safety issues, particularly when it comes to whether certain practices, 
additives etc. are “safe” or present “unacceptable risk”, have ignited major disputes (and significant research 
efforts). What historical research on food regulation and its enforcement is mostly focused on the United 
States Food and Drugs Administration, its origins and development – which makes our aim to compare 
different cases difficult to reach. 
Because of this scarcity of sources, we will limit ourselves to a relatively cursory overview of some of the most 
relevant aspects of the historical development of food inspectorates, in particular inasmuch as they help to 
understand lasting differences in practices, and challenges in the implementation of the most modern 
approaches – with more details on the United States case, by virtue of the larger volume of accessible research 
(and of its strong relevance to our central questions). This overview will rely to the extent possible on some of 
the most significant publications, e.g. Wagstaff 1986, Young 1989 and 1992, Coppin and High 1999, Koolmees 
2000, Theves 2000 and 2002, Ferrières 2002, Shears 2008, Lásztity et al. 2009, Hardy 2010, Manion 2012 et al. 
– but these cover more heavily the United States than other countries, and rarely cover the control and 
inspection questions in depth. Thus, we have supplemented them with a combination of public information 
(websites of the relevant agencies and institutions), and on authors’ repeated interviews and discussions with 
regulatory officials involved in food safety in all the countries covered here.  
We will first briefly present the timelines and most salient features of several food safety inspection systems 
(the United States and Britain in greater details, France with less details on the timeline, the Netherlands more 
cursorily – and we will also add a short discussion of post-Soviet systems), as well as the influence of 
international organizations (the Office International des Epizooties, OIE – as well as UN FAO and UN WHO) and 
of the European Union (which, in this area, has had a major impact), then briefly consider the factors involved 
in the emergence and development of different structures and approaches (and the way these factors, 
including “crises”, present similarities between past centuries and the most recent period). From this, we will 
consider three transversal themes: the interaction between food regulatory inspections and science (in 
particular the limitations of science at the time of regulation, and the difficulty to fit new science into old 
structures), the difficulty to settle disputes as to the effectiveness and relevance (or lack thereof) of these 
inspections, and the question of how risk is and has been understood, assessed and prioritized. 
 
i. Emergence and development of food safety inspections – introduction  
 
At different points in the 19th and early 20th century, most of what then counted as the world’s “developed” 
economies established systems of food control that featured a stronger emphasis on safety as had been the 
case until then, a new vocabulary, and new methods. The extent to which these new controls were in fact 
really “scientific” increased gradually – the first decades had maybe a scientific ambition but not really a 
scientific content (or the science was simply too weakly developed to be of use), this changed from the 1900s 
at the latest, but considerable gaps in understanding remained. Successive decades, in particular post-WWII, 
brought major improvements in our understanding of food-borne diseases88. These led to significant changes 
in the regulatory and institutional frameworks – but also revealed weaknesses and tensions in the structures 
                                                           
88 Which, we would argue, should make us modest about our assessment of our current level of understanding – it is likely that much 
will be discovered in future, leading to re-assessments of risks. 
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inherited from earlier steps, not all of which have been solved to date (far from it), showing once again the 
significance of path dependence. 
 
ii. Food Safety in Britain 
Early developments – Britain as a “precursor” 
As in the field of OSH, Britain was in some ways a precursor in food control regulation and inspections (but, as 
we shall see, this “early mover” status also included significant shortcomings). In response to growing reports 
and concerns about food “adulteration”, and complaints and worries about “nuisances” (e.g. from slaughter), 
a series of Acts of Parliament were adopted, some of them accompanied by the creation of new types of 
inspectors. “Nuisances” came first, driven by the growth of “hygienist” conceptions: “Edwin Chadwick, a Poor 
Law Commissioner, conducted an inquiry into the causes of poverty which concluded that people often 
became poor because of ill health due to a bad environment. He believed that improving sanitation was the 
key to breaking this vicious circle. Chadwick led a vigorous campaign for change (…) resulting in the Public 
Health Act 1848. The Act provided for the appointment of Inspectors of Nuisances (…) in areas of need89”. 
However, the scientific basis for “nuisance inspections” was tenuous, hiring of inspectors at the discretion of 
local authorities, and their effectiveness mixed at best90. More clearly focused on food (but also on drugs) was 
the “first Food Adulteration Act (…) passed” – but several key points were missing, “most importantly perhaps 
the compulsory appointment of food inspectors” (Shears 2008 p. 126). The real creation of food safety91 
inspections in Britain came in 1872 with the “Adulteration of Food and Drugs Act strengthening enforcement 
powers by requiring the appointment of a public analyst and empowering local enforcement officers to take 
samples and bring prosecutions” (ibid.). This was followed by the 1875 Sale of Food and Drugs Act which 
“created two basic adulteration offences: the mixing of injurious ingredients; and selling to the prejudice of 
the purchaser a food not of the nature, substance or quality demanded. (…) The Public Health Act 1875 gave 
local enforcement officers powers to inspect and seize.” (ibid.) The entire food safety inspection system in 
Britain was to remain based on local authorities’ inspectors, first called “Public Sanitary Inspectors” and later 
“Environmental Health Officers”, organized in an Association in 1883 (since 1984 the Chartered Institute of 
Environmental Health), and with gradually increasing qualification requirements (a certificate was required 
for London in 1891, then this became the norm gradually throughout the country, and the level of 
qualifications increased throughout the 20th century)92.  
While, as elsewhere, the initial remit of these inspections included food fraud even when no adverse effect on 
safety was expected, their focus was clearly on health, and issues of consumer fraud not involving safety were 
to become over time the purview of Trading Standards Officers (also working for Local Authorities). One of the 
most marked specificities of the model was that, in England and Wales at least (though not so in Scotland), 
veterinarians were mostly excluded from the build-up of the inspection services and practices. Indeed, 
“Britain’s public health administration” as first between 1850 and 1875 “was dominated by medical men and 
medical models of human disease (…) [that] medicine viewed the opinions of veterinarians with suspicion” 
(Hardy 2010 p. 371). This early feature was driven both by the relative weakness of the veterinary profession 
in comparison with other countries in Western Europe (e.g. the stronger prominence of veterinary medicine 
in France where the first royal veterinary schools had been founded in the 1760s), and by what was to be a 
lasting feature: “the popular perception that animal disease constituted a very small risk to human health in 
                                                           
89 Chartered Institute of Environmental Health (CIEH) website – “history” section, accessed at: 
http://www.cieh.org/about_us/history.html  
90 See above on their lack of effectiveness in the context of the 1866 Cholera epidemic in London. 
91 In terms of their purpose, and regardless of their scientific basis and effectiveness, or lack thereof, at the time. 
92 See CIEH website at http://www.cieh.org/about_us/history.html  
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Britain” (ibid.). This situation also contrasts with the US’s where, as we will see in the next section, veterinary 
inspections were set up at the federal level even before the Food and Drug Administration’s creation93. 
 
Attempting to understand the weak role of veterinary control in Britain 
This difference is important in understanding the contrasts between the UK and “continental Europe” systems, 
in both its relative strengths and weaknesses – and thus, understanding its roots is relevant to our research. 
The origins of this dominance of “medical men” and of the veterinarians’ weakness appear to lay in a 
combination of specific aspects of the British market, both cultural and economic, combined with path 
dependence. 
First, the British market, until World War II, was wealthier than the rest of Europe, with higher meat 
consumption, and more of it coming from imports. At the same time, eating habits contributed to relatively 
safer conditions: “the country felt wealthy enough to dispense with [meat hygiene controls], priding itself on 
the production and import of quality meat, and (…) was comparatively free from meat-derived human disease 
owing to the British preference for well cooked meat, and to livestock more or less free from such conditions 
as trichinosis and beef measles (…). In other words, tuberculosis apart, animal infections had not constituted 
any serious threat to human public health in Britain in the period before World War II” (Hardy 2010, p. 374). 
In addition, the country’s relative wealth meant that there was a far greater importance of imports, and as a 
result more emphasis on import than on domestic controls: “meat consumption in Britain was94 amongst the 
highest in Europe (…) The market share of imported meat rose from less than 30% in 1880 to a peak of around 
50% by 1923 (…). Precisely during this period, major meat exporting countries around the globe, as well as 
most European states, were implementing meat inspection systems under veterinary supervision (…). By 1930, 
Britain’s imports came from countries whose exports were certified by qualified veterinary inspectors, and 
verified by meat inspectors at the port of entry. (…) Meat coming into Britain was examined and passed as fit 
for human consumption according to the rules of ‘meat hygiene’, a more rigorous system than that imposed 
on home-killed meat95” (ibid., p. 377). 
A second aspect that seems to have driven this weak role of veterinary control is trust. Whereas there is a 
general assumption that confidence in the effectiveness of control is an important factor in securing trust in 
the market, it can be observed (e.g. in the US’s case, see next section) that the “demand” for inspections only 
arises when pre-existing trust is on the decline because of changes in the structure of the market. In Britain’s 
case, it seems that trust in the market remained relatively strong as far as meat is concerned, for a variety of 
cultural factors, and thus the push for more regulation remained rather weak for a long time. This is at least 
what research on consumer trust in Britain can suggest: underlying trust in the mechanisms of food control 
may provide the key to this apparent British indifference to germs in meat and milk. One recent study, which 
argues that trust in food is dependent on the way in which a given country or government deals with food 
issues, found high levels of trust in food among modern Britons, despite the food crises of the years 1985-
2000 (Kjaernes, Harvey and Warde, 2007, 1, 60-1). The British consumer, this study noted, trusted her local 
butcher, and advice given on food labels (…) In the nineteenth century, Keir Waddington has argued, food 
consumption was shaped by material concerns, standards of living and domestic technology rather than by 
medical or press reports and the fears they engendered around food and disease (Waddington, 2010, pp. 51-
                                                           
93 Even though Hardy (2010) lists also the US as having a weaker veterinary involvement than most European countries in food safety, 
this involvement has clearly been far earlier, and stronger, than in the UK. 
94 Again, before World War II. 
95 Exactly how and at which stage these controls happened changed over time, of course: “Domestic supplies were augmented initially 
with live animal imports, and veterinary surgeons became involved with state efforts to limit the associated import of animal diseases 
following the major outbreak of cattle plague in 1865 (…). By the end of the century, animals were being slaughtered on arrival at the 




71). This seems to have been especially the case in respect of culturally prized staples like meat, where actual 
food poisoning was only rarely associated with the meat itself rather than with manipulated foods (pies, 
sausages), and where episodes of more or less minor gastric disturbance were a commonplace experience” 
(ibid., p. 375). None of this appears entirely conclusive, but we can assume that cultural and social factors 
played a role in making meat safety concerns relatively less prominent in Britain.  
Finally, once the original set up of the system started being in place, path dependence ensured it remained 
mostly in place going forward, i.e. that veterinary control remained secondary for in-country meat trade: 
“medical men were the managers of Britain’s public health administration, and their loyalties lay with their 




Limitations in effectiveness – pressure for change 
Overall, not only were veterinarians “marginalized”96, but the overall level of supervision of the meat supply 
was, for a long time, markedly more relaxed than elsewhere in Europe – where national veterinary supervision 
and systematic inspection in slaughterhouses were introduced in many countries from the late 19th century. 
Whereas “Belgium and Norway passed meat inspection acts in 1891, and their example was followed by 
Luxembourg (1892), Germany (1903), France97 and Spain (1905), Austria-Hungary (1908), Switzerland (1909) 
and Denmark (1911)”, England focused on regulating imported meat “with Merchandise Marks Acts between 
1887 and 1953, and for the inspection of imported meat with the Public Health (Foreign Meat) Regulations of 
1908, but placed that responsibility in the hands of customs official and medical men” (Hardy 2010 p. 377). It 
was assumed that domestic supply was safe – which was, in fact, a somewhat heroic assumption.  
Indeed, “in general, slaughtering in England and Wales was conducted in small, local slaughterhouses, of which 
there were said to be some 15,000 on the eve of World War II. (Bywater, 1948, p. 219). Many of these were 
in rural areas which were very difficult to regulate systematically. At any point when slaughtering became 
concentrated in a particular locality, either on grounds of economy of effort during the Great War, or through 
the very gradual movement towards the establishment of municipal abattoirs, startling increases in the 
number of carcases being condemned were noted” (ibid., p. 378), which strongly suggests that problems 
existed, but control was too infrequent and unequal to consistently detect them98. This also raised, as Eleni 
Michalopoulou has noted, serious questions of market distortion between producers and traders in more 
strictly controlled areas, and others operating in loosely supervised ones. This was only addressed at the end 
of the 20th century with the development of a national meat hygiene service, and then the creation of the 
Food Standards Agency. 
                                                           
96 “In Scotland, the veterinary supervision of meat supplies was introduced in 1897, and local authorities in England and Wales, slowly 
and in piecemeal fashion, began to do likewise; by 1937, local authorities were employing some 220 full-time and 700 part time 
veterinary inspectors” (a trend that was to be reversed after the establishment of a national veterinary service in 1938, which led to a 
decrease in the number of local authorities’ veterinarians) – but “medical men were the managers of Britain’s public health 
administration, and their loyalties lay with their staffs of trained sanitary and meat inspectors” (Hardy 2010, p. 372). 
97 Cf. also Koolmees 2000 – passing laws did not always mean creating serious inspection services – while Belgium did create a real 
veterinary inspection, in France it was only present in major cities – see below. 
98 Indeed, “when, during the war, the Home Counties kill was concentrated in the London borough of Islington, and the private 
slaughter houses closed, the amount of meat condemned rose from some 2-300 tons per annum to the ‘appalling figures’ of between 
1,600 and 2,000 tons (…). A similar situation arose when the city of Sheffield opened a new public abattoir in the late 1920s: the amount 
of diseased meat detected shot up by 80%. As the abattoir’s designer noted, the only possible inference was that this was the amount 
previously eaten, mostly by the poorest classes” (Hardy 2010, p. 378). Similarly, worrying issues are noted in an unpublished 
presentation by Eleni Michalopoulou, University of Liverpool, School of Veterinary Science, e.g. the very poor conditions even in 
centralized slaughterhouses (e.g. Manchester in early 20th century), and unequal levels of inspection, unequal stringency in seizures 
etc. See: http://www.northwest-zoonoses.info/writedir/963aRegulation%20of%20food%20controls_Eleni%20Michalopoulou.ppt  
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Increasing international “benchmarking” and harmonization were the forces that started to generate changes, 
as they showed not only the specificity, but the overall laxity of the system: “by the mid-1950s, when a survey 
of meat hygiene practices in Europe was conducted under the auspices of the World Health Organisation, 
Britain was the only country (…) which did not normally carry out ante-mortem inspection by qualified 
veterinary surgeons, and (…) [Scotland excepted] where the post-mortem examination of animals slaughtered 
for commercial purposes was not obligatory by law” (ibid.). Only during WWII was 100% inspection achieved 
in slaughterhouses, and this was quickly reversed by the reopening of a vast number of private premises once 
rationing ended. 
Growing evidence of contaminations and outbreaks (in particular caused by salmonella) in the 1950s led to 
the Slaughterhouses Act 1958 and several sets of successive regulations and legal amendments (including to 
empower local authorities to “close private slaughterhouses under certain conditions”). In particular, “the 
establishment of the Public Health Laboratory Service (PHLS), initially as an emergency war-time measure, 
now led to more systematic and rigorous scientific investigation of many of these outbreaks” (ibid., p. 381) – 
which, in turn, built up knowledge and evidence, and led to increased action. This shows an important link 
between better detection ability and increased demand for control, that we will also observe in other cases 
(e.g. the US food safety case in the next section). The new evidence meant that a “chain of infection” had been 
“demonstrated from the farm to the consumer, and abattoirs (…) shown to act as a focal point for the 
transmission of infection among animals awaiting slaughter” (ibid., p. 383), which led to increased attention 
paid to the problem. In addition, effectiveness was hampered by the lack of continuity in food chain 
supervision: “it was pointed out that veterinary surgeons were greatly handicapped in their work with animal 
disease by the unavailability of slaughterhouse evidence that could be correlated with live animal statistics” 
(ibid.)99.  
While the number of slaughterhouses was reduced, and the physical premises much improved, practices 
remained problematic, and the lack of a link between veterinary surveillance and pre-slaughter inspections 
also created a gap in surveillance100. Additional regulations in the 1960s only brought about limited change 
(ibid. pp. 384-385). Even Britain’s joining the EEC did not bring major changes initially, as European regulations 
in the 1970s only covered exports. This changed radically with the European Single Market, and the unfolding 
of the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis101: the Fresh Meat (Hygiene and Inspection) Regulations 
1992 (adopted in view of the Single Market start date in 1993) led to 300 local authorities establishing full 
meat hygiene services (ibid. p. 387). The worsening of the BSE and nvCJD scare then led to “the establishment 
of the Meat Hygiene Service in April 1995, in which veterinary surgeons played a central role, local authority 
veterinarians being transferred into the new service” (ibid.).  
 
The BSE crisis, the creation of the Food Standards Agency, and the modern food safety system 
in Britain 
The considerable loss of credibility caused to the system by the BSE crisis (and other scandals) then led to 
another radical reform: the creation of the Food Standards Agency (FSA) in 2001. The Government vision was 
of “an Agency with a clear focus on protecting the public and a powerful statutory remit across the whole food 
chain, at arm’s length from Government and independent of sectoral interests, governed by a Chairperson 
                                                           
99 An early example of the importance of “Farm to Fork” control, that we will discuss in the EU section later on. 
100 Hardy 2010 p. 383: “it was pointed out that veterinary surgeons were greatly handicapped in their work with animal disease by the 
unavailability of slaughterhouse evidence that could be correlated with live animal statistics” – as we will discuss further, all models of 
effective food safety inspections emphasize the importance of achieving unified surveillance over the food chain. 
101 The BSE scare alone, as previous food scandals too, had not been enough to profoundly change the system – it led to limited changes 
only: “Authorised Officers (Meat Inspection) Regulations 1987 included veterinary surgeons among the personnel permitted to 
undertake such duties, along with Environmental Health Officers and qualified meat inspectors. Responsibility for meat inspection 
remained in the hands of the local authorities” (Hardy 2010 p. 387). 
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and Commission appointed openly on the basis of their personal standing and expertise, operating under 
guiding principles which put the interest of the public unequivocally as the first priority, able to make public 
its views on any issues related to food and public health, taking a strategic view of food safety and standards 
issues across the whole food chain, with wide-ranging powers to commission research and surveillance, 
propose legislation, monitor food law enforcement and take action to remedy problems, with a clear 
responsibility to provide the public with information and advice102”. The FSA took over the Meat Hygiene 
Service as one of its divisions, and assumed a role of guidance and supervision on the inspection and 
enforcement work of local authorities (which supervise the food chain “downstream” from primary 
production), of coordination and sharing of information, as well as of scientific risk assessment.  
This historical process has resulted in a structure where nowadays control responsibilities are divided between 
local authorities on the one hand (“lower tier” authorities, e.g. district councils, are responsible for food safety 
and hygiene - there are 406 of these - and “upper tier” authorities, e.g. county councils oversee food labelling), 
and central structures on the other103. Local authorities in fact handle most of what would have been the 
province of the “hygienists” or “sanitarians” in earlier times104 - and are responsible for the food chain 
“downstream” from primary production (processing, transport, handling and storage, sale, catering etc.). 
Primary production is controlled by the Meat Hygiene Service (part of the  FSA), animal health and welfare are 
supervised by several agencies under the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs (DEFRA), and 
other parts of DEFRA supervise plant protection and phytosanitary issues generally, but specifically safety of 
phytosanitary chemicals is overseen by the Health and Safety Executive (HSE)105. In spite of the creation of the 
FSA, and of some consolidation efforts within DEFRA, the set-up has remained to a large extent as “inherited” 
from earlier times. Thus, efforts to make regulatory supervision and enforcement better coordinated, more 
consistent, built on a stronger risk analysis have proceeded without affecting the structure, using different 
mechanisms (guidance, evaluation, Primary Authority scheme etc.) that we shall describe further in this 
research. 
The creation of the FSA appears to have been, overall, successful. Anecdotal evidence can be taken from the 
fact that the reaction to successive food-related “scandals” or “scares” (e.g. the 2013 horsemeat scandal) have 
not given rise to the same loss of confidence as in the 1990s – but also from the fact that these scares were 
simply far less significant in terms of danger to human health. The FSA also was found to enjoy strong public 
support, and rumors that it may be abolished in 2010106 did not come true (though the Government did take 
away some of its responsibilities relating to nutrition – which in turn led Scotland to create its own “Food 
                                                           
102 The Food Standards Agency, A Force for Change. Command Paper presented to Parliament by the Minister of Agriculture, 
Fisheries and Food, January 1998 – available at 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/265718/fsa.pdf  
103 For details on the basic FSA/Local Authorities split see the FSA website: https://www.food.gov.uk/enforcement  
104 As we have noted above, this is a feature of the British system that is relatively unusual in the EU, and among developed countries 
– but a number of other countries around the world have food inspection systems with a strong prominence of sanitary inspectors 
with a medical background – e.g. most of the former Soviet Union (where, by contrast with Britain, inspectors are typically MDs, and 
not environmental health officers). 
105 We have to clarify that this presentation is an over-simplification, based on public information and on many clarifications given 
directly by staff of the UK Better Regulation Delivery Office. Exposing full details would take much space and time, and add little to the 
essence. One point of importance, however, is that the exact set up differs in each constituent part of the United Kingdom, and is 
evolving. The latest change is that Scotland now has its own Food Safety Scotland agency, instead of the FSA, with the same remit as 
the original FSA remit (the UK Government having in 2010 taken the decision to transfer responsibility for nutrition and food labelling 
and standards in England from the FSA to the Department of Health and the Department for Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – a 
decision that was widely seen as following industry complains about the FSA being “too aggressive” – led to the Scottish Government 
deciding to create a new agency for Scotland, with the full original mandate) – see https://www.food.gov.uk/about-us/new-scotland 
and also http://www.foodstandards.gov.scot/about-us.  
106 The discussion was well covered by the media at the time – see e.g. in the Guardian: 
https://www.theguardian.com/politics/2010/jul/11/food-standards-agency-abolished-health-secretary and Reuters: 
http://uk.reuters.com/article/uk-britain-food-idUKTRE66A1AI20100711. The Chair of the FSA reacted through an open letter to the 
Health Secretary: http://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdfs/board/letter140710.pdf  
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Safety Scotland” agency, with nutrition included in its mandate107). Rumors of the FSA being abolished after 
the Conservative Party’s 2015 electoral victory also met with negative reactions108, and were not followed up 
in fact. Existing evaluations also conclude broadly to the FSA’s success in improving food safety governance, 
enforcement effectiveness and consistency (see Flynn et al. 2004), and to its ability to do so with innovative 
approaches, and a more “growth-friendly” approach (see BRE, BERR and NOA 2008). We can thus conclude 
that the FSA’s set up and activities appear to have been successful, as have been reform efforts in the local 
authorities’ practice in the last decade, and there is reason to consider the “new” British system as a very 
interesting example of risk-based and risk-proportionate inspections and enforcement, and of “responsive 
regulation”109. It remains, however, that the system has many features that result clearly from historical 
accident and not from rational design, and have long hindered its effectiveness and development, and that 
only strong external pressure and major crises were able to bring about deep changes. On the positive side, 
however, one can argue that the reliance on local authorities “environmental health officers” (as they have 
been known for the last few decades) has considerable advantages: more flexibility and ability to experiment 
and innovate in methods (compared to a centralized system), more information and resource sharing between 
different, related inspection fields (food safety and OSH, which environmental health officers both supervise, 
but also trading standards, which are controlled by other specialists, but as part of the same enforcement 
services of local authorities). Thus, one should not look at idiosyncrasies in structures only as a negative – but 
clearly as evidence that the shapes and functions of inspection bodies how much to history, culture, 
institutions, and little to rational planning. 
 
iii. Food Safety in the United States 
While discussions of adulteration and the risks it created to health were intense, and roughly contemporary 
with the same concerns in the UK, the development of regulation and inspections took a very different route 
– and, overall, was significantly slower and difficult. The specific features taken by the regulatory framework 
and the inspections system in the US can, it seems, be traced back to a significant extent to their historical 
development – starting from a background of purely municipal/local regulations (as in much of Europe at the 
time), but with a somewhat slower and more conflicted development of “national-level” intervention (with 
the tension of whether this should mean “state” or “federal”), and successive major turning points in the 20th 
century. 
 
Early History: controlling export quality to build trust 
The first rules and controls applying to food appear to have been aimed at ensuring exports were of adequate 
quality, and thus the exporting city or region (colony, state) did not lose export markets. The risk that was 
being addressed was that of losing market share, and thus precious income. As Young (1989) puts it, in the 
17th century, “officials were far more concerned with the city’s commercial reputation than with what the 
citizens ingested” – for instance, Massachusetts “began to inspect exports of fish, beef and pork routinely (…) 
in 1641” (p. 35). Even though Young also writes that “legislatures in British American colonies imitated statues 
earlier enacted in the mother country seeking to protect the purses and safeguard the health of their citizens” 
                                                           
107 See an archived FSA web page on this creation: 
http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20150624093026/http://www.food.gov.uk/about-us/new-scotland  
108 See article in Environmental Health News, the magazine of the Chartered Institute for Environmental Health: http://www.ehn-
online.com/news/article.aspx?id=14246  
109 One point to note is that the FSA’s creation and demonstrated independence, and the overall perceived success of the reforms, 
have managed to re-establish public trust in food safety regulation, which had been dented by the BSE and other crises. The high level 
of trust is noted in Kjaernes, Harvey and Warde 2007. The interpretation of this being because of the FSA’s role and overall changes in 




(p. 3), the main focus in terms of controls appears to have been on exports. This shows the intimate 
relationship between the establishment of inspections and the need for establishing trust. Local commerce 
and food supply clearly were perceived as inherently more “trustworthy”, better known, less risky. Imports 
from distant locations were where trust could break down – and where inspections could help safeguard or 
restore it. 
 
Drug regulation as a precursor of food regulation – the “adulteration” 
issue 
The first half of the 19th century seems to have seen rather a loosening up of regulations than their 
strengthening, with a combination of democratic and laissez faire trends resulting in the United States being 
most probably one of the most lightly regulated countries in the North Atlantic space. An example of this is 
the trend in health care and drugs regulation (which, in the United States, has its history tightly linked to food 
regulation). Whereas, in the early years after the Revolution, the “patrician elite” of doctors educated in the 
first medical school “used their prestige and power to strengthen (…) a licensing system to control admission 
to their profession”, these restrictions came under strong criticism. As a result “opponents of orthodoxy swept 
licensing laws from the statute books” (ibid., p. 22). 
What brought back regulations and control efforts was the fear of adulteration (very much like what was 
observed in the United Kingdom). Scientific and technical progress was one of the driving forces for this - 
“American scientists adopted the ever-improving European techniques of analytical chemistry (…) which 
advanced the art of detecting adulterants beyond the centuries-old organoleptic tests” (ibid., p. 8). Tools were 
now available, which enabled scientists to ascertain (to some extent) whether a product was indeed what it 
was advertised to be. The first efforts to fight adulteration focused on drugs – and relied on a treatise published 
in 1846 by Dr Lewis Beck that purported to show the extent of adulteration (particularly of imports), as well 
as the means to detect it (ibid., pp. 9-12). There does not appear to have been actual reports of adverse effects 
of this adulteration, at least nothing that could pass as even rudimentary statistics showing effects on life and 
health. Indeed, while science had made progress in chemistry, it had made significantly less in medicine, and 
the adulterated medicines were judged a danger from the perspective of medical theories which were mostly 
to be proven wrong later on. Dr Oliver Wendell Holmes Sr. (the father of the later Supreme Court Justice) 
famously wrote: “I firmly believe that if the whole materia medica, as now used, could be sunk to the bottom 
of the sea, it would be all the better for mankind – and all the worse for the fishes110” (quoted in ibid., p. 19). 
It is likely that much adulteration was indeed dangerous (ibid., p. 12) – but it is noteworthy that the fight for 
regulation was based more on the availability of detection tools, than on an observed public health crisis. 
The first attempt at regulating drug imports was a 1848 law establishing border controls, but its enforcement 
was difficult and haphazard, and unscrupulous traders could always go to another port “at which the examiner 
was more lenient” (ibid., p. 15). Then, “when poor enforcement kept that [1848] law from being effective, 
organized pharmacy launched a new attack on drug adulteration by reviving state laws (…) Enforcement, 
however, was feeble” (ibid., p. 31). Then, during the Civil War (in a time when the effectiveness and safety of 
drugs was of course a major concern), Congress enacted “a law aimed at banning adulterated drugs offered 
for import” (ibid., p. 3). All these laws were limited in their effectiveness by the weakness of enforcement 
means – one also is brought to wonder to what extent these issues appeared to be a serious concern to the 
public at large, as opposed to the medical professionals that were pushing for their adoption – indeed, 
regulating the trade and sale of drugs was linked to a large extent to chemists, doctors and pharmacists trying 
to strengthen their social and economic status (Swanson 2011, p. 339).  
                                                           
110 He made exception for opium (clearly and effective medication, but which we owed to nature), and for wine (“which is a food”, he 
added, and for which doctors could thus claim no credit). He led an ongoing fight against “massive bleeding and purging” (ibid., p.21), 




Key drivers of early efforts at food regulation 
While the first efforts at strengthened regulation focused on drugs, foods were not very long to follow – indeed 
“throughout much of the nineteenth century, the boundary between food and drugs was porous” (ibid., p. 
341)111. Again, the successive efforts at promoting stricter regulation, and the regulations effectively adopted, 
were largely linked to the development of control methods, to commercial interests, and to conceptions of 
disease and health that were later often disproved. Infectious diseases were of course widespread (and among 
them a large amount of food-borne diseases), but there is little evidence of a link between outbreaks and 
regulation. We will look briefly at each of these drivers of regulation. 
The emergence of modern methods for chemical analysis clearly was a critical factor in the push for more food 
regulation: “microscopes and lactometers offered enhancements to traditional ways of seeing based on the 
intuitive knowledge of the dairyman or housewife. But chemistry, that is, laboratory analysis of compounds, 
offered an entirely new understanding of both food and drugs. In the laboratory, any food or drug could be 
analysed for its constituents” (ibid., p. 345). Indeed, not only did the new chemistry offer tools to identify 
adulteration, it also “created a new ontology of food and drugs” by allowing to define them based on a “cellular 
and molecular understanding” (ibid.). Selling consumers anything else could be presented as abuse – not 
necessarily endangering their health (though this was often argued), but definitely defrauding them 
financially. 
Commercial interests did contribute powerfully to the development of food regulation and control –not 
necessarily always the consumers’ best interests, but rather that of groups of producers and traders. In 
practice, “although most of the rhetoric of regulation addressed itself to issues of nutrition and health, most 
of the actual regulation addressed itself to competition” (Coppin and High 1999, p. 18). One of the earliest 
focal issues for food regulation was the “dreaded” oleomargarine (a French invention, followed by successive 
similar products developed by American industrialists) – dreaded not because of its health effects, but for its 
effect on sales of butter. Thus, the margarine regulation fight pitted dairy producers (supported by a number 
of scientists and officials, whose views and/or interests coincided with theirs) against oil-seeds farmers and 
margarine processors. Arguments were that margarine was not natural – but “Wiley [who was to be the lead 
inspirator of the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act] used the term natural not as a scientific term, but as an 
emotional term that commended products of which he approved” (ibid., p. 32). The words of a deputy food 
commissioner for Connecticut, working on the enforcement of a new law regulating margarine, are telling: 
“we are trying to make everybody believe we are doing them a favor by enforcing the oleomargarine law” 
(ibid., p. 26). Low-income consumers clearly were ready to buy the cheaper product (margarine)112, and dairy 
production was losing considerable market share. In the end, the fight between two lobbies resulted in a 1886 
Act of Congress “placing a tax of two cents per pound on margarine and requiring license fees (…) Although 
burdensome, the legislation did give margarine official recognition as a food product” (ibid., p. 32). Overall, 
the “consumer information” or “consumer protection” driver of regulation was (and has remained) ambiguous 
from the onset. On the one hand, “consumer advocates would increasingly identify knowing foods as a 
problem, eventually calling for federal regulations setting standards for a multitude of foods, particularly those 
sold in packaged and/or processed forms. A pickle, it turned out, could be defined and known scientifically113” 
                                                           
111 This connection between food and drugs has a long history – cf. Ferrières 2002 pp. 38-42, 105-113, 364-369 etc. 
112 Indeed, the very persistence of massive adulteration on the market strongly hints to demand for these products: “given the large 
percentage of income that they spent on food, workers often chose the cheaper cut of meat (…) even goods that were classified as 
adulterated found a market if the price was low enough” (Coppin and High 1999, p. 26). Note that once again “adulterated” was far 
from meaning ipso facto more hazardous than other foods (which were themselves often unsafe given problems with hygiene, 
preservation etc.). On demand for cheaper (even adulterated) foods see also Alsberg 1921 p. 213. 
113 Margarine was one of the first foods thus regulated. The FDA was to adopt many standards defining what given food names were 
to cover starting from the 1930s (see Swanson 2011 p. 365). Many other countries, and the EU, were to follow the same approach. 
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(Swanson 2011, p. 346). On the other hand, in these early times of food regulation development, “although 
most of the rhetoric of regulation addressed itself to issues of nutrition and health, most of the actual 
regulation addressed itself to competition” (Coppin and High, p. 18) – and the strongest forces seem to have 
been those of commercial self-interest. 
Another important area of early food regulation, milk, would appear at first glance to have been more driven 
by safety concerns (and thus more in line with our modern understanding of food safety regulation, and with 
the official pronouncements of proponents of regulation) – but a closer look makes this seem less of a clear 
case. Milk has long held a particular place in North-Western European and North American food culture114 - 
and in the 19th century fresh milk was the only substitute to breastfeeding for infants. Because of its inherently 
high epidemiological risk (a warm, nutrient-rich liquid is just about the most conducive medium for bacteria 
growth), milk was certainly a major factor in food-borne disease outbreaks (and consecutive deaths) in the 
19th century – in fact, even before the science to explain it (Pasteur’s and Koch’s discoveries in particular) 
emerged, observation of epidemics origins and spread led to the conclusion that milk was involved in a number 
of them – “the first typhoid fever outbreak traced to milk was in the year 1857, in Penrith, England” (North 
1921, p. 247). In this context, it is not surprising that some early efforts to impose new rules and controls 
focused on milk. In New York City in the 1830s, a “crusader against impure milk”, Robert M. Hartley, launched 
a campaign against “swill milk” – milk produced by cows held in stables adjacent to alcohol distilleries in the 
city, and few “swill”, the remnants of fermented grain and malt used for distillation. He saw “distillery milk as 
the primary cause of death among slum children” (Young 1989, p. 36) his arguments combined religious piety, 
“common sense public health” and compassion. A 1848 report by “a committee of the New York Academy of 
Medicine (…) blamed swill milk for the high infant death rate in the city” (ibid.). Then in 1858, Frank Leslie’s 
Illustrated Newspaper launched a “major continuing campaign” against swill milk – with pictures that 
attempted to “depict the filth of the stables” (ibid., p. 37). While conditions depicted by Leslie’s reporters were 
indeed quite gruesome, they went further and “quoted physicians reiterating the earlier charge that distillery 
milk was the leading cause of infant death” (ibid., p. 38). The City Aldermen, however, essentially did nothing 
– some very friendly investigation, leading to them declaring distillery milk fully fine. Young sees this as a clear 
proof of corruption resulting in Aldermen protecting the industry – which, knowing the 19th century “Tammany 
Hall politics” is indeed quite likely. What is interesting, however, is that modern science does not support 
Leslie’s (and others’) insistence that “swill milk” was particularly bad. In fact, distillery residues are highly 
nutritious feed, and are among the animal feed types routinely used in modern farming115. That “swill milk” 
was held to be uniquely evil was most probably due to the religious and moral vision of its opponents, and the 
link with anti-alcoholism views. Probably, distillery stables had indeed very poor hygiene and practices, and 
their milk was unsafe – but so was the milk from pretty much every stable at the time, regardless of how 
“natural” and “rural” it was. Eventually, “swill milk crusaders” were successful - in 1862 the State adopted a 
law making it “a misdemeanor to sell of exchange ‘impure, adulterated, or unwholesome milk” (…) [and] 
keeping cows in “crowded or unhealthy conditions’ and feeding them food that made their milk impure” (ibid., 
p. 39) and an amendment two years later clarified that distillery milk was “automatically impure”. But this is 
vanishingly unlikely to have had any significant effect on public health, in particular on infectious diseases. 
What was to change matters on that front was the understanding of microbial contamination, and how to 
prevent it. 
                                                           
What has increasingly emerged as modern “good practice” food regulation, however, is that such “labeling” rules are mandatory only 
to the extent that one wants to use a certain name that is protected by legislation – but producers are free to put other goods on the 
market, as long as they are safe. In many countries, however, food standards are fully mandatory, i.e. it is forbidden to produce and 
sell goods that are not included in the list of food standards, and/or not made in accordance with them (this is the case in many post-
Soviet countries). 
114 See Ferrières 2002 pp. 99-104 and 387-389 or, for a more recent example (and from the United States), North 1921. 
115 See e.g. the absolutely neutral, dispassionate and factual account in the Feedipedia portal (a joint project of INRA, CIRAD, AFZ and 




The run-up to the 1906 Pure Food and Drugs Act – progress without 
regulation, and a jarring scandal  
In 1906, after several decades of discussions about the topic, Congress adopted the first real federal regulation 
of food and drugs – the Pure Food and Drugs Act. The “classical narrative” is one of a breakthrough against 
industry abuse, and of the forces of progress finally overcoming corrupt opposition. The impetus for the Act’s 
adoption was given by Upton Sinclair’s The Jungle – a book whereby he in fact purported to advocate for 
socialism against the havoc wrecked by capitalism upon the poor’s lives, but whose descriptions of astonishing 
malpractice in Chicago’s “meat packing” industry led to a public outcry against slaughterhouses and factories 
seen as poisonous and deceitful. The direct cause-and-effect relationship is taken as granted by most authors: 
“public outcry over unsanitary meat products in the early 20th century resulted in the passage of the Pure 
Food and Drug Act of 1906” (Manion 2012, p. 539). 
Several elements are in fact somewhat puzzling for a modern analyst of food safety regulations and 
inspections. First, food safety is commonly seen as being one of the areas where incentives for 
producers/sellers are to a large extent aligned with regulatory objectives: indeed, poisoning one’s customers 
is rarely good business, and unlikely to lead in increased or sustained market share – thus, deliberate flouting 
of hygiene and other food safety rules (as opposed to involuntary mistakes) is expected to be rarely seen 
outside of “fly-by-night”, deliberately criminal operators, who aim at a quick profit before disappearing. How 
to understand, then, that the Chicago “meat packers” exhibited such massive, total, lasting disregard for all 
the most basic, “common sense” precautions? Second, a substantial part of the food industry was in fact 
actively working on improving safety – for well-understood commercial reasons (and, possibly, for 
philanthropic reasons too in some cases). The first federal meat inspections themselves were “made available 
at the request of meat packers whose products needed Government endorsement before they would be 
accepted for import into certain foreign countries” (Wagstaff 1986, p. 630)116. It had long been understood 
that higher, more reliable safety could be a commercial argument – in the mid-19th century, the inventor of 
condensed milk, Borden, “had to overcome any suspicion that his milk was contaminated. He developed a 
strict set of sanitary rules for the farmers (…) and even sent inspectors around” (Coppin and High 1999, p. 
20)117. In fact, some of the most significant changes in production and processing practices in terms of reducing 
morbidity and mortality were introduced voluntarily by the industry, using processes recently developed by 
scientists and inventors, with very little or no regulatory pressure, at least at first – this is particularly the case 
for milk. As North (1921) retraces, medical and scientific developments in the years 1880-1890 led to better 
understand the “necessity for heating milk for the artificial feeding of infants” (p. 238, see also pp. 265 and 
269-277). Improvements in sanitation of dairy in the early 1900s were an important step (ibid., pp. 265-266), 
but what brought a “decided drop in the number of epidemics (…) and also a great reduction in the infant 
mortality” (ibid., p. 242) was the spread of milk pasteurization in 1907-1910. This, however, had nothing to do 
with the Pure Food and Drugs Act (or the Meat Inspections Act) of 1906, neither of which mandated 
pasteurization. Rather, it was primarily driven by the industry itself (eager to secure market share with a 
demonstrably safer product), gradually supported by a number of municipal regulations (ibid., pp. 275-277). 
Considering this, while it would not be surprising at all (in the context of a still very partial understanding of 
microbiology and other food safety issues) that the Jungle’s “meat packers” would have some important lapses 
in hygiene or cross-contamination control, Upton Sinclair’s description of pure horror remains puzzling. It 
                                                           
116 But early meat inspections had limitations: “A meat inspection law was passed in 1891, but this law was not very effective and meat 
inspection did not become so until 1906, when the present meat inspection law was passed and machinery in the Bureau of Animal 
Industry provided for its enforcement” (Alsberg 1921, p. 216) 
117 This helped him gain a very strong standing in the regional market around New York – the Civil War then proceeded to make his 
product a major success nationally, as a fundamental army supply. 
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would be tempting to partly dismiss it as literary hyperbole, but all accounts report that President Theodore 
Roosevelt’s envoys on site generally confirmed all or most of the book’s descriptions (see e.g. Young 1985). 
Now, it may of course be that these envoys were also complicit in a conspiracy aimed at tarnishing the meat 
industry and helping the adoption of new legislation, but this kind of conspiracy theory makes for bad history. 
Far more likely is that conditions in Chicago’s slaughterhouses and the attached processing plants were indeed 
really dismal – but the modern reader then is bound to think “how was there no outbreak of fatalities 
prompting action, why was a novelist’s work necessary?”. Several hypotheses come to mind. First, there might 
indeed have been an increase in morbidity and mortality, but little noticed among a generally high prevalence 
of infectious diseases and overall far higher mortality compared to today’s rates. Second, meat was at that 
time generally thoroughly cooked – this would have strongly limited the potential for infections – remained 
possible chemical contaminations, but even all the dirt described by Sinclair as making its way into sausages 
would not generally have killed people in any sudden way. Any spikes in morbidity would likely have taken 
years to be visible, and only if there had been serious statistical research (which was not yet the case). It thus 
seems that, in an age of higher mortality, weaker statistics and safer cooking habits, the “meat packers” could 
maybe genuinely think they could get away with such practices without losing their customers. Once exposed, 
however, the damage was severe, particularly for exports - “in response to these types of writings, American 
meat purchases, both domestic and foreign, fell by one-half. As a result, Congress passed the Pure Food and 
Drug Act and the Meat Inspection Act in 1906” (Manion 2012, p. 539). 
Still, from the above it is obvious that what could be called the “Jungle meat packing scandal” was only one 
part of the story – the last drop, rather than the main driving force. As we have outlined above, there was a 
coalition of interests and beliefs at play, as well as scientific theories – which all seem to have pre-existed any 
actual scandal or outbreak. Coppin and High (1999) see the 1906 Acts118 as linked to a combination of “conflict 
between local and national food companies” (with “federal regulation [conferring] competitive advantage on 
national firms”) (p. 6) and “bureaucratic entrepreneurship” on the side of the Bureau of Chemistry and Wiley, 
his head (p. 5). In support of this perspective, it is noted that the new regulations and control power did 
relatively little (at least in the short term) to effectively promote safety (in spite of their claims to this effect) 
– in fact, “the 1906 [Act] was built on the idea that false claims must be prosecuted, rather than addressing 
the real issues of whether food put on the market [was] safe” (Manion 2012, p. 542). The Act did deem food 
to be adulterated “if it contain[ed] any added poisonous or other added deleterious ingredient which may 
render such article injurious to health” (ibid., p. 539) but it made no difference between this and other 
(relatively harmless) forms of adulteration, and had no provisions for preventive control at the production or 
processing stage. 
Most research seems to concur on the question of trust having been the most fundamental and powerful 
driver for the new regulation – both in terms of long-term, deep trends, and in the way the “meat packing” 
scandal unfolded and was addressed. At its core, the increasing demand for food regulation came from “the 
transformation of the United States from an agrarian to an industrial society changed the way in which people 
ate. Food became something to be purchased rather than something to be home-grown” (Coppin and High 
1999, p. 18). “Through urbanization, consumers and producers became strangers to each other, separated by 
distance, and through industrialization, dairy products also became strange to consumers, created by 
mechanisms of production that were no longer part of the general knowledge of an agrarian population” 
(Swanson 2011, p. 339). With food obtained more by trade than self-production, and trade increasingly 
                                                           
118 Note that the Pure Food and Drugs Act is mentioned far more often than the Meat Inspection Act, even though one could argue 
that the latter was far more important to advance actual food safety at least for the first decades (until the Food and Drugs 
Administration – FDA –  was created and its powers increased) – just as nowadays the FDA is far better known than the US Department 
of Agriculture’s Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS), even though the latter plays a major role in ensuring safe food (in charge of 
all the meat supply chain). Whether this is due to the more striking name (including “food” prominently), the different institutional 
status, or other causes, it somewhat distorts the public perception of the US food safety system. 
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involving large distances and very unequal actors (individual consumers vs. large corporations119), trust 
increasingly became problematic. Regulation and regulatory control (inspections) came to be increasingly seen 
as a response to this breakdown of trust – as an instrument that would make it possible to move from “trust 
from familiarity” (which was not possible anyway) to “trust in rules and control” (which was to be established).  
Very interestingly (and this is one of the reasons why we thought it worthwhile to present this historical 
account in some details), the situation has many similarities with what is observed in contemporary regulatory 
issues, and with a phenomenon that has been coined the “Risk Regulation Reflex”120. In both cases, a real issue 
of lack of trust on the side of customers and citizens is used by active interest groups to promote specific 
regulations that correspond to their (financial, professional or ideological) interests – the resulting regulation 
may have some benefits for safety, but its costs may be higher than its benefits, and/or its impact on safety 
may be far smaller than its effects on competition, markets etc. Coppin and High (1999) thus write that “on 
the consumer side, the change from growing food on the farm to buying it in the market created doubts about 
purity and healthfulness. These doubts were the origin of demand for food experts” (p. 33). They also insist 
on the importance of “bureaucratic entrepreneurs” in promoting new regulation, on the need for such 
“entrepreneurs” to “influence voters or elected officials” (p. 13) – reminding that “voter preferences (…) can 
be manipulated and created through the information and misinformation provided” (p. 14). Such an account 
is very close to what Helsloot and Schmidt (2012) write about the role of “experts” in pushing for new 
regulation in a “Risk Regulation Reflex” situation: “The single minded risk professional is (…) only interested in 
the best possible defence against his own pet risk, his advice is difficult to ignore for administrators when they 
have no other means of mobilising expertise to balance that advice” (p. 312). They also expose the way in 
which “risk experts” effectively work to shape public opinion in favour of regulation “no matter the costs”, 
whereas an informed and nuanced public debate could end up with public opinion striking a very different 
balance (pp. 308-310). 
 
The early days of food regulation in the 20th century 
The twin Acts of 1906 (Pure Food and Drugs and Meat Inspection) foresaw significantly different provisions 
and mechanisms, and led to different evolutions. The Food and Drugs Act121, as we briefly indicated, mostly 
went after “adulteration” and “deception” – it was more about ensuring that label were not deceiving 
consumers than controlling production, and constitutional limitations also meant that it had to be combined 
with state legislation in any case (which was also true of the Meat Inspection Act): “because of the limitations 
of Commerce Clause jurisprudence, it outlawed [only] the interstate shipment of “adulterated” or 
“misbranded” food or drugs and their manufacture [solely] within the District of Columbia and the territories” 
(Swanson 2011, p. 363).  
The focus for meat inspections was relatively clear from the onset – led by the Bureau of Animal Industry, they 
took place at slaughter/processing stage, they concentrated largely on “controlling Trichina and other types 
of parasitic infestations of meat” (Wagstaff 1986, p. 628). Over time, these infestations (and their health 
                                                           
119 Quoting Coppin and High: “mass distribution in the form of chain stores” as well as “large firms that integrated mass production 
with distribution had begun to appear in the 1880s and 1890s” (p. 18). 
120 See on the “Risk Regulation Reflex” (RRR) e.g.: Tol 2012, Tol 2014, Helsloot & Schmidt 2012 (a), and Blanc, Macrae and Ottimofiore 
2015.  
121 It is worth pointing out that the way the Act was drafted was not a foregone conclusion – it ended up conforming mostly to Wiley’s 
vision, but many others had pushed for alternative approaches: ““Wiley’s version of a pure food law was vigorously opposed by many 
respectable persons who simply wanted a different law”. Many (but not all) state food officials “favored national legislation, but could 
not agree on the administrative mechanisms of a national law (…) Some advocated (…) a new agency headed by a national food 
commissioner (…) Others saw little need for a regulatory agency at the national level; they believed that a law allowing states to 
regulate all foods entering a particular state would be sufficient” (Coppin and High 1999, pp. 5-6). On this last point, modern experience 
and science strongly suggest this belief was mistaken – and indeed “with even fresh milk crossing state lines from producer to 
consumer, the best efforts at the state level were unsatisfactory” (Swanson 2011, p. 349). 
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effects) indeed went down “there were 13 deaths reported for Trichina in 1913 compared with none in 1978” 
(ibid.). By contrast, the Bureau of Chemistry that was tasked with implementing the Food and Drugs Act 
controlled mostly at the market stage, with a far broader scope, and with less clear-cut rules. The Act 
prohibited “adulterated”, “misbranded”, “poisonous” etc. foods, but with no clear guidelines on how to assess 
this – and “judicial decisions narrowed the capacity of the Bureau of Chemistry to enforce the statute by 
requiring high standards for proof of fraudulent intent” (Manion 2012, p. 541). In addition, enforcement 
powers were burdensome to use: “it required that the government take each offender to court and prove that 
each particular food was adulterated or mislabelled, and by what standard it was making that judgment.” 
(ibid., p. 542). This means that, even though inspectors apparently very easily found a number of violations 
(Young 1992, p. 120), it is unclear how much of an impact they could have on the overall level of safety of the 
food supply. 
In terms of approach and methods, the Bureau under Wiley was very prone on controversy, with the support 
of “some branches of business” hoping to use this “as a weapon against competitors” (ibid., p119). The 
“impetuousness” of Wiley led his superiors to start to “distrust his science” (ibid.) and he was eventually 
replaced by Alsberg (ibid.). In these early days, methods were still to be developed, and planning was 
essentially non-existent: “the inspectors, hired to collect samples of foods and drugs entering interstate 
commerce, were given minimal training and no structured plan of action was initially devised” (ibid., p. 120). 
Interestingly, after the initial “conflict-oriented” phase, a far more “cooperative” approach emerged: 
inspectors found that “shortcomings seldom resulted from “wilful intent” but rather from “law or faulty 
control” systems” – and this cooperative approach allowed the Bureau to overcome (to some extent) the Act’s 
limitations: “the law did not give the Bureau direct authority over sanitation in processing plants, but 
inspectors (…) realized how poor sanitation could lead to illegal products” and passed on this lesson to 
manufacturers” (ibid., p.120). Manufacturers, in turn, often agreed to follow these recommendations to keep 
good relations with Bureau officials. 
Gradually, “the Bureau’s somewhat haphazard method of sample collection [was replaced] with a project 
system (…) [which] set priorities of effort for each year” (ibid., p. 121). Investigation of outbreaks (as the 
botulism poisoning case with olives in 1920) led to new knowledge and new processing standards. The 
“entente cordiale” between “regulators and major segments of the regulated industries” allowed officials to 
proclaim victory over “adulteration and misbranding”. It is interesting to note the sharp contrast with OSH: 
whereby OSH inspections in the United States are (as we have seen above) characterized by a high emphasis 
on deterrence, and very limited discretion, food safety inspections from early on were far more “cooperation-
based”, and far less rigid. It is likely, in fact, that this experience, and the claims (justified or not) of “regulatory 
capture” that it led to, was an important factor in the way the OSH Act was drafted. 
 
Weaknesses and reform – from the 1938 Food, Drug and Cosmetic 
Act to the 2011 Food Safety Modernization Act 
In 1927 already the Bureau of Chemistry had become the Food, Drug and Insecticide Administration – but 
changes in name were not sufficient. The crisis that triggered legal reform was drugs-related, but affected 
food regulation and inspections too. The “Elixir Sulfanilamide” scandal resulted in 107 deaths in 1937 (Manion 
2012, p. 542) – and it showed that the focus on “adulteration” was clearly insufficient. In fact, the “Elixir” was 
mostly compliant with existing rules, and the FDA could have done little against it before people died – the 
ingredients used were legal, and the label compliant with rules. However, one of the ingredients had not been 
tested for safety, and proved mortal. The new Act brought completely new powers to the FDA: it “authorized 
administrative establishment” of definitions of “standards of food identity” (ibid.) and also established 
“remedy of court injunctions” and “authorized factory inspections”. On its basis, the FDA “established food 




Problems in the US food safety regulatory system – reality or 
perception? 
While US food safety regulations and controls continued to develop in the subsequent decades, many 
criticisms have been made of insufficient modernization, inadequate methods, lacking resources, weak 
enforcement - “at the turn of the twenty-first century, Americans are inundated with news stories suggesting 
that their food and drugs are not safe. (…) Often, critics suggest that the FDA is inadequately funded to perform 
this inspection role well (…). Other critics identify overregulation by the same agency” (Swanson 2011, p. 332). 
International comparisons have their pitfalls, but in the past couple of decades at least EU food regulations 
have increasingly appeared stricter, and better enforced, than US ones, at least to a number of observers122 – 
even though this is a highly debated issue, with data pointing in opposite directions123 (and presenting many 
reliability issues anyway), and there are many more differences that may influence the results (for instance 
the significantly higher income level of the US, with the EU incorporating countries with very different 
GDP/capita levels, histories, regulatory systems etc. – all of which means that even if its regulatory 
enforcement system were indeed more effective124, the EU could well have overall worse outcomes on food 
poisoning than the US). At this stage, it is enough to note that there was growing agreement that the US system 
needed improvement – in methods, powers, and practice125.  
From an anecdotal perspective, a number of high-profile cases in recent years have pointed to apparent 
weaknesses in the US’s food safety inspection and enforcement system. In 2015, an outbreak of Listeria 
                                                           
122 For arguments and data suggesting higher effectiveness of the EU food safety regulatory system over the US one, see e.g. the 
following articles in ThinkProgress (website of the Centre for American Progress):  
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2014/09/30/3573680/trade-deal-europe-food-safety/ and 
http://thinkprogress.org/health/2013/02/20/1601231/meat-industry-horsemeat/ (but both compare two sets of data that are not 
directly comparable, resulting in incredibly low disease prevalence in the EU – the source for their EU data is here: 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/01/food-ills-sicken-45000-kill-32-in-eu/#.VX2d49LS383). For a contrary view that the US 
system performs better, see e.g.: http://achesongroup.com/2014/03/foodborne-illness-us-eu-compare/. In fact, none of the data sets 
are fully reliable (too much depends on self-reporting, detection rates etc.).  
123 Many arguments centre on the relatively low life expectancy in the US given its high income level, and the fact that it used to have 
higher life expectancy than all EU members – and now lags many of them – see e.g. for a ranking of countries 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_countries_by_life_expectancy. Any internet search of “life expectancy US Europe” will return a 
number of articles drawing conflicting conclusions. While causality is clearly complex, broadly-defined “lifestyle” and “environmental 
health” are likely to play a role (along with health care) – and food safety could be a part of the explanation (but most likely very 
minor). Other food issues (nutrition) are likely to be far more important, and are also handled differently by regulators on both sides 
of the Atlantic. 
124 In spite of perceptions on both sides that one or other system may be “stricter” or “more risk-averse”, research suggests caution in 
conclusions. Wiener et.al. 2011 showed that the level of precaution is higher in the EU for some areas, higher in the US for some 
others. For a specific application to food safety, see a summary presentation of findings by Wiener at: 
https://ssri.duke.edu/sites/ssri.duke.edu/files/Wiener_Duke_Food_Working_Group.pdf - which again suggests the importance of 
different risk perceptions leading to different intensity of responses to different risks, with variations between the EU and US – rather 
than a uniform trend of one or the other being more “risk averse”. A 2005 presentation by G. Kushner on the US Farm Foundation 
website provides a convenient comparison of some aspects of the two systems: 
http://www.farmfoundation.org/news/articlefiles/971-gkushner.pdf - but, as several other documents written in the US, it focuses in 
our view too much on the European Food Safety Agency (EFSA), which is not at all analogous to the US FDA, but rather is only in charge 
of scientific risk assessment. The operational coordination is ensured by the EC Food and Veterinary Office (see below), a very 
important entity (and often insufficiently perceived as such). 
125 For more detaild insights see e.g. Fagotto 2015 
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monocytogenes in Blue Bell Creameries products comes at the latest126, and shows that “upmarket”, highly 
regarded brands are not immune to problems127.  
This comes on top of several significant scandals in the past. In 2009, a major Salmonella outbreak128 was 
traced to Peanut Corporation of America products – and investigations revealed that violations at this firm’s 
plants had been particularly blatant, and repeated over the years129. Eventually, this became one of the rare 
cases in the US where a guilty verdict was delivered on criminal felony charges – highlighting the particularly 
reckless behaviour of the management, and the way in which the contamination resulted from intentional and 
major safety violations aimed at increasing (or maintaining) profits130. Major outbreaks have repeatedly been 
linked to the fast food chain Taco Bell: a 2006 E.coli outbreak that sickened dozens and killed at least 3131, and 
Salmonella outbreaks in 2010 and 2011132. One of the early cases that led to developments in food safety 
practices and in regulatory discussions was the 1992-1993 Jack in the Box fast-food chain Salmonella 
outbreak133.  
Of course, an anecdotal collection of outbreaks does not substitute statistically significant data, and there are 
conflicting arguments as to whether the recent Listeria ice cream contamination cases reflect systemic issues 
with the US food safety system, or just the difficulty to control this bacterium (suggesting that the EU should 
not feel that is immune to such problems)134 . Different outbreaks point to different issues. While the 1993 
outbreak arguably opened a “new era” of heightened attention to microbiological contamination135, and while 
the company (Jack in the Box), after dramatically botching its initial response, changed tack and ultimately 
became by some accounts a “leader” in food safety practices136, the successive outbreaks and controversies 
at and around Taco Bell show how some other firms are far slower at improving – and seem to tend to fight 
                                                           
126 As of late Spring 2015, the outbreak caused 3 fatalities. Details are avaialable on the CDC website: 
http://www.fda.gov/Food/RecallsOutbreaksEmergencies/Outbreaks/ucm438104.htm and the final CDC update on this outbreak here: 
http://www.cdc.gov/listeria/outbreaks/ice-cream-03-15/ as well as additional information on the Wikipedia page for Blue Bell: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Blue_Bell_Creameries#2015_recalls.  
127 Jeni’s Ice Creams, another (smaller) upmarket brand, has also had to conduct a Listeria-caused recall at the same time, though so 
far no human cases have been reported because of it – see: http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/05/a-tale-of-two-recalls-blue-bell-
and-jenis-ice-cream/#.VYPKcNLS381. This article also points out the difficulty and complexity of Listeria management. 
128 See detailed description of the outbreak on the CDC website: http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/typhimurium/update.html.  
129 See Wikipedia page for Peanut Corp. of America: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Peanut_Corporation_of_America#Inspection_findings.  
130 See a CNN news report on the case and verdict: http://edition.cnn.com/2014/09/19/us/peanut-butter-salmonella-trial/.  
131 Details on the outbreak from the CDC: http://www.cdc.gov/ecoli/2006/taco-bell-12-2006.html and overview from Wikipedia here: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2006_North_American_E._coli_O157:H7_outbreaks.  
132 The CDC description of the 2010 oubreak is here: http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/baildon-hartford/index.html and that for the 
2011 outbreak is here: http://www.cdc.gov/salmonella/restaurant-enteriditis/011912/ but in both cases the CDC refused to 
specifically name Taco Bell – see on this point several articles (quoting several state food safety authorities among other sources): on 
the 2010 outbreak http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2010/08/taco-bell-sued-over-salmonella/#.VYVyrtLS380 - and on the 2011 onea 
number of articles: http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/02/analysis-restaurant-a-revealed-to-be-taco-bell/#.VYVyndLS380, 
http://www.theatlantic.com/health/archive/2012/02/restaurant-a-how-bill-marler-tied-taco-bell-to-salmonella-outbreaks/252778/ 
and http://www.cbsnews.com/news/taco-bell-tied-to-2011-salmonella-outbreak-that-sickened-68-report/. 
133 See CDC summary here: http://www.cdc.gov/mmwr/preview/mmwrhtml/00020219.htm and the Wikpiedia page on the outbreak, 
which outlines the follow up and consequences: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/1993_Jack_in_the_Box_E._coli_outbreak.  
134 Arguing that the outbreaks reflect systemic US issues is e.g. this article (but it is by an author writing mostly about environmental 
issues): 
http://www.salon.com/2015/04/24/americas_frightening_food_safety_gaps_how_our_massive_complex_system_undermines_publ
ic_health/ - on the other side, this article in a professional food industry website suggests the problem could just as well affect Europe: 
http://www.foodmanufacture.co.uk/Food-Safety/Listeria-in-ice-cream-could-also-be-a-UK-problem. The EC regulations on Listeria 
emphasize HACCP-based control (which is only now becoming mandatory in the US, see below) – but they also allow for residual levels 
of the bacterium that are higher than the levels found in some US outbreaks – see EC guidance here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/salmonella/docs/guidoc_listeria_monocytogenes_en.pdf and UK FSA guidance here: 
http://www.foodlaw.rdg.ac.uk/pdf/uk-06001-micro-criteria.pdf.   
135 See on how it opened a “new era” in food safety practices and regulations here: http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/01/food-
safety-since-jack-in-the-box-progress-made-and-progress-still-needed/#.VYWJ0dLS380.  
136 See for instance: http://www.ou.edu/deptcomm/dodjcc/groups/02C2/Jack%20in%20the%20Box.htm.  
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back against criticism more than they actually solve problems. The recent listeria outbreaks may point to 
specific weaknesses in the US regulatory requirements and controls137 – but they may also indicate how 
difficult the bacterium is to control, something that may come to create challenges for other food safety 
regulatory systems.  
A note of context is required to assess better the degree to which these large food outbreaks reflect (or not) 
on the underlying robustness of the food safety regulatory regime, and of regulatory enforcement and 
inspections in particular. The United States has a very different enterprise structure from the EU: large 
enterprises (more than 500 employees) make up a substantially larger share of total number of firms and 
(even more strongly so) of total employment – and this holds true in manufacturing and services (in particular 
food service)138. This means that, considering a unified supply chain for many large food firms, outbreaks may 
mechanically end up being larger and more “visible”, even assuming identical prevalence rates for a given 
disease. There may also be a specific vulnerability linked to size and methods of animal feeding commonly 
used in the US: concentrated animal feeding operations (CAFOs) a.k.a. “feed lots” present strong potential for 
spreading of bacteria strains to a vast number of animals139. A tendency to have generally much smaller food 
service operations in the EU may have led so far to more fragmentation and more isolated, undetected cases. 
Supply chain integration, conversely, brings the potential for larger, observable outbreaks, such as the 
infamous 2011 E.coli outbreak originating in Germany and caused by fenugreek seeds used for sprouts140. 
Overall, in spite of claims made on both sides, and of the obvious elements of imitation of some aspects of EU 
regulations in the 2011 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act (see next section), it is not possible on the basis of 
available data and research on whether the US food safety regulatory system performs worse, better, or on 
the same level as the EU one. Some US-specific features, such as the greater reliance on litigation as a 
compliance driver, may relate to characteristics of the entire regulatory enforcement regime, and not only to 
food safety. Indeed, in the US, class action suits are an important force driving regulatory compliance141 - and 
this is true across all regulatory fields. By contrast, in spite of developments in the past few years, class action 
possibilities and practice in EU countries are still narrow and limited in scope, as well as in the amount of 
damages (and thus deterrence strength)142. In this perspective, one could argue that the salience of civil 
lawsuits in food safety scandals in the US is as much a reflection of a strength (the power of this avenue of 
                                                           
137 In particular the lack of systematic testing for listeria (which was not legally mandated), and the delays between the first test results 




138 See OECD 2005 (b) pp. 18-20 and OECD 2014 (b) pp. 26-33.  
139 For the argument that the apparently somewhat larger number of major outbreaks in the US reflects the size of operations, and 
thus makes it possible to observe outbreaks (as opposed to a number of isolated, apparently unrelated, and often unresearched cases), 
see this article by Bill Marler (one of the leading attorneys involved in the 1993 Jack in the Box litigation, on the victims’ side): 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2013/03/publishers-platform-mcdonalds-and-e-coli-30-years-later/#.VYWJ3NLS380.  
140 This case clearly showed the vulnerability of at least some EU Member States’ systems (in particular Germany) – see e.g. Wikipedia’s 
article on the outbreak: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2011_Germany_E._coli_O104:H4_outbreak and see how it compares to other 
food outbreaks here: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/List_of_foodborne_illness_outbreaks_by_death_toll (which again anecdotically 
suggests a higher number of large outbreaks “making the news” in the US compared to the EU). 
141 Even though there is an old usage of “private prosecutions” in the Common Law tradition, most class actions are strictly civil cases, 
not penal, and thus usually do not involve the award of criminal (or other) sanctions that would stem from the regulations directly – 
in this narrow sense, they are thus not an “enforcement” action. However, because the damages awarded are potentially extremely 
high, US class action lawsuits often have a stronger “enforcement” effect (in the broader sense), and definitely a very strong power of 
deterrence. 
142 For comparisons of US and EU practices in class actions, see: short overview but with a number of useful links and references 
http://www.cpradr.org/About/NewsandArticles/tabid/265/ID/593/International-Practice-OverviewComparison-of-US-EU-Judicial-
Class-Action-Structures-Web.aspx - a far more detailed summary of practices in different EU Member States can be found here: 
http://www.libralex.com/fr/publications/class-actions-in-europe-and-the-us - an EU FAQ on “collective redress”, including comments 




redress as a driver for regulatory compliance and safety improvements143) as of potential weakness (of the 
federal and state regulatory enforcement system). The few cases of major food scandals briefly outlined 
above, however, do suggest that some of the concerns with the US food safety enforcement system may 
indeed be founded: one company (Taco Bell) not only was repeatedly involved in several outbreaks (suggesting 
limited, if any, improvements in handling practices and internal control systems), but was shielded from 
negative publicity by the CDC and FDA (and thus one of the most important compliance drivers was left 
unused). In the Blue Bell outbreak, delays in identifying the problem point to weaknesses in internal control 
(HACCP-type) implementation, lateness in recalls indicate insufficiently strict legal requirements in terms of 
food business operator responsibilities, and so does the fact that listeria problems appear to have been 
“endemic” at Blue Bell facilities for a while. All this anecdotal evidence does not allow to adjudicate conflicting 
claims of effectiveness between the EU or US (nor is this necessary for this study), but do suggest that there 
are some aspects of concern in the US system – and we will see in the next section what efforts are currently 
made to address them. 
 
Addressing the problems? The Food Safety Modernization Act, 
and implementation difficulties 
The 2011 FDA Food Safety Modernization Act came as the result of several years of pressure for reforms (with 
a first Food Safety Enhancement Bill having passed the House in 2009 already), and negotiations in Congress. 
It focuses on the FDA, and to a large extent bridges an important gap in powers and approaches between the 
FDA and the USDA FSIS, in charge of meat inspections. In the approaches it mandates, the requirements it puts 
on food business operators, and the new powers it gives to the FDA144, the Act is clearly strongly inspired by 
current EU food safety legislation (namely the 2004 “Hygiene Package” and in particular EC Regulation 
882/2004 on Official Food and Feed Controls145).  
The Act grants “greater systematic oversight of all food production facilities” (Manion 2012, p. 537). It 
specifically gives increased inspection powers – including “comprehensive preventive controls for most 
facilities” (ibid., p. 546), rights of access to records, as well as a mandated (minimum) inspection frequency for 
high risk establishments146 (ibid., p. 548). Specifically, “the frequency of food facility inspections will be based 
on the level of risk associated with the facility, and an increased risk level will result in immediate increase in 
inspection frequency. All high-risk domestic facilities must be inspected within five years of the date of 
enactment and no less than every three years after that.” (ibid., p. 549) 
It also introduces new requirements for food business operators, e.g. mandatory testing in accredited 
laboratories for specific food products and contaminants (p. 548). The Act emphasizes the “scientific” basis of 
new regulation: it “mandates that the FDA ‘establish science-based minimum standards’ to conduct hazard 
analysis and employ preventative controls” (ibid., p. 538). In the Act, “science based” specifically means 
approaches similar to Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Point (HACCP) methodology, data collection and 
                                                           
143 See OECD (2014) principle 2 suggesting the usefulness and relevance of class-action as a regulatory compliance driver. See also 
Bentata and Faure (2015) for an example of how collective litigation can powerfully drive changes in regulatory compliance and 
regulations. 
144 See explanation, contents, guidance on the FDA website at: http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/.  
145 See summary and full text of the 882/2004 regulation on the EC website at: 
http://europa.eu/legislation_summaries/food_safety/veterinary_checks_and_food_hygiene/f84005_en.htm.  
146 The fact that the Act sets a minimum frequency, that is mandatory for the FDA to achieve, speaks to the ex ante situation as being 
one of (at least perceived) under-inspection. In a number of countries, as we will see in subsequent chapters, risk-based planning 
serves to reduce the frequency of inspections – in the US food safety context, it is being used as basis for an increase. Indeed, as we 
will discuss in the last chapter and conclusion, there probably is a lower threshold under which risk-based inspections are not effective 
anymore because overall inspections are too rare – in this perspective, this provision of the FSM Act can indeed make sense. 
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management to monitor and assess epidemiological risks, and is also to be understood in line with the World 
Trade Organization Sanitary and Phytosanitary Agreement (WTO SPS)147 (ibid., p. 539).  
In a US context where introducing new regulation tends to be very difficult because of concerns about 
administrative burden, the Act specifically “includes language to alleviate undue burdens on small food 
producing facilities” (ibid., p. 549) – but its adoption did meet a lot of resistance by wholesalers, farm 
organizations, small and organic farm advocates148 etc. (ibid., p. 545).  
As we have mentioned, rather than breaking entirely new ground, the Act (to a large extent at least) is rather 
bridging the gap between meat inspections and other food inspections in the US – and between FSIS and FDA 
powers and methods. The FSIS work has long been strongly “science based” as the Act now mandates the FDA 
to be149 (ibid., p. 557) – and HACCP has been a cornerstone of FSIS work and requirements for some time as 
well. FSIS can serve as a model of “risk-based” inspectorate for the FDA, as it relies heavily on data collection 
to detect and respond to food contamination hazards. FSIS methodology involves a data analytics technique 
called the Public Health Information System, a web-based application establishing an automated data-driven 
inspection system. This system allows “analysts to identify trends that will automatically adjust domestic and 
import inspections and sampling” (ibid., p. 558).  
Adoption of the FSM Act does not, however, solve all challenges with food safety regulations in the US. First, 
there are significant implementation problems with the Act itself. Second, even though FSIS has in many 
aspects stronger methods (and has had stronger enforcement powers for longer), there are resource 
limitations and areas where its methods are questioned. Third, the duality between federal and state-level 
enforcement not only creates complexity, but also is likely to lead to important variations in effectiveness. 
Finally, the question of the overall institutional structure remains to be addressed (but is starting to be asked). 
Implementing the FSM Act has proven difficult – both in terms of rule-making and of actual controls. The FDA’s 
implementation timeline for the Act shows many draft regulations having been published, but none yet 
adopted so far (though first approvals are forecast to happen by end 2015)150. Possibly even more significant 
is a major funding shortfall that means the required retraining of staff, additional resources for intensified in-
country and border controls are currently not possible to implement. In order to raise the needed resources, 
“the F.D.A. proposed user fees that would cover the bulk of the cost of carrying out the food safety law. Last 
year, for example, it asked for $263 million for the law, with about $229 million coming from fees on food 
companies. But lawmakers soundly rejected those proposals after lobbying by the food industry151”. As a 
result, the FDA has asked for budget funding to compensate for the shortfall, but the requested amount is 
around 50% lower than the projected user fee would have been – and it is unlikely that Congress will even 
                                                           
147 There clearly is an increased attention to the international aspect of food safety in the FSM Act, not only by the adoption of language 
that is comparable to EU or WTO rules, but also by the emphasis on border controls – it “emphasize prevention, inspection and 
compliance, response, regulations on foreign imports, and enhanced partnerships with other government agencies” (Manion 2012 p. 
547). 
148 Two observations are in order here. First, that there has been insufficient assessment of the business and economic impact of the 
EU 2004 “Hygiene Package” (see below on this point). Second, that there are real tensions between environmental sustainability goals 
and food safety regulations (particularly the latest “generation” of ever more demanding ones) – which makes the opposition of organic 
farm advocates relatively unsurprising. This tension between different regulatory objectives (environmental protection, food safety) 
is one that can be expected to be felt increasingly sharply in Europe as well, even though it is still not really widely perceived. 
149 “The term “science-based” also surfaces often in reference to the Food Safety and Inspection Service (FSIS). The FSIS is a public 
health agency of the USDA responsible for overseeing the safe production of meat, poultry, and eggs. (…) FSIS assures processes are 
scientifically validated. Teams of expert auditors conduct periodic in-depth food safety assessments which can take days or weeks to 
complete and may involve extensive microbiological sampling of the plant’s environment and finished products. Annually, FSIS 
conducts more than 8,000 microbiological tests to verify the production processes are under control” (Manion 2012 p. 557) 
150 See the FDA website here: http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm257986.htm and a recent New York Times 
article: http://www.nytimes.com/2015/09/11/science/food-industry-gets-new-safety-rules-to-prevent-illness.html?_r=0  




approve it (given the current Republican majority’s opposition to both government spending and 
regulation)152.  
On the FSIS side, there are also significant challenges, once again related to funding. Presumably for relatively 
similar reasons (industry opposition prevailing), FSIS slaughterhouse inspections are not user-funded153, 
contrary to what is the case in the EU154. Partly as a result of this, and partly because of active policy choices 
leading to a reform of poultry inspections in 1997, FSIS does not conduct 100% inspection of every slaughtered 
animal (unlike what is the rule in the EU). To accommodate higher production speeds, and to cope with lower 
inspection requirements, FSIS allows treatment of chicken carcasses with chlorine or other antimicrobials155 – 
which is frequently and sharply criticized, even within the US but most strongly in the EU156, which has imposed 
a ban on some imports, resulting in a WTO dispute157. Critics of the new FSIS approach (less-than-100% 
inspections, but a more systemic, HACCP-based control approach – and authorization of the use of 
antimicrobial products) say that the antimicrobials are toxic for workers, potentially toxic for consumers 
(though there is no proof of this at present), and that they provide illusory safety only (surface 
decontamination changes nothing to potential internal meat contamination). The HACCP-based approach has 
also been strongly criticized as being too industry-friendly158 – in fact, looking more closely, it appears there is 
a case of confused goals and designs, resulting in problematic implementation. The changes, introduced 
following a series of pilots in the late 1990s and early 2000s, apply to all meat inspections – purporting to 
increase effectiveness, and to put more responsibility on the industry, but doing so in a way that raises 
concerns about other pressures (cost cutting, industry demands). In 2001, the General Accounting Office 
conducted an audit of the pilots and of the proposed reforms, and was highly critical: “notwithstanding the 
project’s design problems159, which we believe make the results unreliable, we found that, so far, the data 
themselves do not conclusively demonstrate that modified inspections are at least equal to traditional 
inspections” (GAO 2001, p. 4). The GAO made a series of recommendations160, which the USDA and FSIS 
implemented (or at least reported to have followed). 
What is remarkable in the case of FSIS reforms and the negative reactions they provoked, is that many food 
safety experts would agree that the general idea of the reforms is valid: 100% regulatory inspections of 
carcasses are inefficient and (because they mostly rely on visual checks) not always effective161, putting more 
                                                           
152 See ibid. 
153 See on the USDA FSIS website the Federal Meat Inspection Act: 
http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/rulemaking/federal-meat-inspection-act as well as summary information on 
slaughter inspections: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/food-safety-education/get-answers/food-safety-fact-
sheets/production-and-inspection/slaughter-inspection-101/slaughter-inspection-101.  
154 For an overview of EU practices see e.g. the UK FSA website – summary here: 
https://www.food.gov.uk/enforcement/monitoring/meat and the guide to different applicable charges here: 
http://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/multimedia/pdfs/chargesguide0311.pdf  
155 See applicable regulation and its annexes here: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/regulations/directives/7000-
series/safe-suitable-ingredients-related-document  
156 See e.g. the following article in Bloomberg Businessweek: http://www.bloomberg.com/bw/articles/2014-08-08/why-chlorine-
chicken-from-america-inspires-dread-in-europe and this article in Salon for a critical view from within the US: 
http://www.salon.com/2014/05/26/chlorine_in_your_chicken_why_poultry_is_more_dangerous_than_ever_partner/  
157 See US background paper on this dispute: https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R40199.pdf  
158 See an example of such criticisms – Washington Post 2013 article: http://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/usda-pilot-program-
fails-to-stop-contaminated-meat/2013/09/08/60f8bb94-0f58-11e3-85b6-d27422650fd5_story.html - there is considerable media 
coverage on this topic, nearly uniformly negative. Also a related article on reductions in the number of inspections in exporting 
countries: http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2012/11/usda-quietly-eliminated-60-percent-of-foreign-meat-
inspections/#.VYfOxtLS381.  
159 The GAO highlights in particular the lack of a control group, and the non-random selection of the plants for the study. 
160 See summary results of the study, and recommendations, here: http://www.gao.gov/products/GAO-02-59  
161 The GAO reports the FSIS inspectors’ views that the new system would be more effective (GAO 2001, p.5). This is also the opinion 
of a number of UK food safety and regulatory enforcement specialists (author’s interviews), suggesting that many practitioners have 
doubts about the old “100% visual inspection” method and suggest it is costly without being really effective. 
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emphasis on responsibility (and liability) of operators is considered a foundation of modern food safety 
regulation162, and HACCP is likewise seen as an approach that is essential to delivering reliable, consistent 
safety throughout the food chain163. The reform, however, reveals some level of confusion between the 
introduction of HACCP as a requirement and a change in inspection methods (which should logically be two 
distinct, though related issues), and tensions which seem related to pressure to reform primarily with a cost-
cutting and burden-reducing perspective, with effectiveness being more of a window-dressing claim than a 
real concern. The enforcement weaknesses seen above when dealing with major outbreaks (even though the 
examples mostly related to the FDA and not to FSIS) may also explain why many (the GAO, food safety 
advocates etc.) are concerned that FSIS may not sufficiently follow through on the “deterrence” aspect in 
order to give credibility to this new, more “focused” scheme. In addition, the GAO highlighted problems in the 
legal basis for FSIS work in terms of enabling discretion and more “focused” inspection activities: “this report 
reiterates our previous recommendation for legislative revisions aimed at reducing the potential for further 
legal challenges by providing USDA with clear authority to modify its inspection system” (ibid., p.5). 
Overall, even though there is no certainty (at this stage) in terms of health outcomes, there is some evidence 
that indeed US food inspections are cost-constrained in comparison with what is the case in the EU at least in 
some respects164. A final challenge faced in improving their effectiveness is due to the fragmented structure 
of food safety control in the US – the duality between FDA and FSIS at the federal level, and the complex 
articulation of federal and state regulation (with state controls themselves coexisting with local inspections 
conducted by counties, cities etc.). The boundaries of different agencies’ competence are dictated by the 
history we have tried to outline, and by US constitutional arrangements – but end up being seriously 
problematic from a “comprehensive food chain safety” perspective (a.k.a. “from farm to fork” or “from stable 
to table”). While the FSIS controls animals and meat at the slaughter and processing stage, it is neither 
responsible for milk and dairy, nor for control of animal health prior to slaughter. Whereas the FDA supervises 
supermarkets, state (or local) authorities are in charge of restaurants. Dairy production is supervised by state 
authorities, dairy products can be supervised by the FDA if they are destined to interstate commerce, but only 
by state authorities if they do not cross state borders. The FDA also does not control conditions in farming – 
the use of pesticides is regulated by the US Environmental Protection Agency (EPA), and state authorities 
supervise compliance with state laws.  
While such complexity and involvement of different agencies and levels is not unusual in practice, it is not 
easily reconciled with aims of achieving optimal effectiveness and efficiency. International organizations tend 
to recommend “unified agencies” dealing with most food safety matters, or at least a very clear split of 
                                                           
162 See for instance: (a) World Bank Group (2014) – module 2, page 8 (pillar 3) “In a food safety system, primary responsibility (and 
liability) for the safety of food rests on food business operators” – (b) in the EU context see EU Standing Committee on the Food Chain 
and Animal Health (2010) p. 14 as well as the text of Regulation 178/2002. In addition, “Directive 85/374 lays down the principle of 
strict liability of the producer, which means that a producer may be held responsible for a damage caused by a defective product s/he 
has put on the market even in the absence of fault” (van der Meulen 2013, p. 88). 
163 See the Codex Alimentarius Recommended International Code of Practice General Principles of Food Hygiene (links: 
http://www.fao.org/docrep/005/y1579e/y1579e02.htm and 
http://www.codexalimentarius.org/download/standards/23/CXP_001e.pdf) – as well as World Bank Group (2014) – module 6, pp. 6-
7 (which also mentions the high costs that an excessively “rule bound” application of HACCP in small businesses can entail). 
164 Though the difference exists, it is not as “massive” as critics of recent trends would have it – a comparison of the USDA FSIS audits 
of foreign countries for meat exports (see here: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/international-affairs/importing-
products/eligible-countries-products-foreign-establishments/foreign-audit-reports) and of the EU FVO work programme for third 
countries (see here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/food_veterinary_office/audit_programmes/docs/fvo_inspect_prog_audit_en_2015.pdf) shows indeed 
overall more EU FVO audits (and with a somewhat more systemic approach to food safety), but the difference in numbers is not very 
large (10 for FSIS in 2014, 16 for FVO planned in 2015 counting only FSIS-supervised issues, but with different approaches and FSIS has 




responsibilities with effective data-sharing mechanisms, and coordination of work165. Though a memorandum 
of understanding between FDA and FSIS on data sharing is in place (since 2012 only)166, it is a long way from 
automated sharing or integrated information management. While the FDA has undertaken efforts to make 
state regulations and enforcement more homogeneous167, this is far from being fully accomplished, and 
concerns exist about the effectiveness of its audit programme to ensure state inspections are all roughly 
equivalent168. In a number of states, the FDA contracts to a large extent its own oversight to state inspection 
agencies169. The overall result is a system where uniformity of means and methods is far from guaranteed, and 
where swift communication of information170, while desired, is not always ensured. In response to this 
situation, and in addition to the efforts to improve coordination and consistency through the (difficult) 
implementation of the FSM Act171, there have been growing calls for the creation of a unified food safety 
agency. In Congress, a proposal has been made to create a new, centralized “Food Safety Administration”, and 
President Obama has expressed support for the initiative and included a variation of it (consolidating all 
existing agencies under the Department of Health and Human Services) in his 2016 Budget proposal172. While 
the current political situation (in particular the Republican majority in Congress) mean this is unlikely to 
happen any time soon, the proposals show that policymakers’ views on the topic are evolving towards more 
“radical” solutions. 
 
Conclusion – path dependence and the challenges of 
introducing “risk-based inspections” in a difficult context 
The notion of path dependence originates in economics, where it is used to explain primarily the entrenchment 
of particular standards, but also the lasting attractiveness of large metropolitan areas due to network effects173 
and – particularly relevant for us – the development of specific institutions. In the perspective of historical 
institutionalism174, which is the one most relevant for our research, the notion means that the development 
                                                           
165 See e.g. World Bank Group (2014) module 4 pp. 7-9, OECD (2014) principle 6 (‘coordination and consolidation’), FAO guidance on 
food safety systems here: http://www.fao.org/docrep/006/y8705e/y8705e05.htm. The EU has also been pushing all candidate 
countries to consolidate their food safety systems as much as possible, something which was done e.g. in Croatia, Estonia, Latvia, 
Lithuania etc. Fragmentation, on the other hand, has been seen by some as a factor in the seriousness of some food contamination 
outbreaks, e.g. the E.coli 2011 crisis in Germany (see: http://www.bloomberg.com/news/articles/2011-06-09/scattered-health-model-
draws-fire-for-germany-s-response-to-e-coli-threat) or the 2008 Listeria outbreak in Canada, which led to some institutional changes 
(see: http://www.phac-aspc.gc.ca/about_apropos/evaluation/reports-rapports/2011-2012/feipdra-pdimeoa/app-ann-b-eng.php).   
166 See : 
http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/PartnershipsCollaborations/MemorandaofUnderstandingMOUs/DomesticMOUs/ucm294512.htm  
167 See e.g. guidance on milk processing http://www.fda.gov/ICECI/Inspections/InspectionGuides/ucm074974.htm - even though FDA 
does not have jurisdiction (except when products are shipped in interstate commerce), it attempts to promote some uniformity of 
approach. 
168 See Gibbs Brown 2000 (Inspector General of the Department of Health and Human Services’ report). Unfortunately the report is 
not recent, but it points out shortcomings in terms of audit frequency and overall resources available to ensure consistency (pp. 2-5). 
169 See http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm315486.htm#coordination_local_state and Gibbs Brown 2000 
170 Which also involves the Centers for Disease Control for outbreaks detection, monitoring, investigation. 
171 See FDA summary on these efforts here: http://www.fda.gov/Food/GuidanceRegulation/FSMA/ucm436155.htm  
172 See a summary of the proposals in RegBlog: http://www.regblog.org/2015/02/17/knofczynski_food_safety_admin/ - and some 
media reports about it: New York Times http://www.nytimes.com/2015/02/21/us/obama-proposes-single-overseer-for-food-
safety.html?_r=0 – USA Today http://www.usatoday.com/story/news/2015/02/02/obama-proposes-consolidating-food-safety-
oversight/22764529/. Unsurprisingly, officials in existing structures are unenthusiastic about a merger: 
http://www.foodsafetynews.com/2015/05/top-food-safety-officials-value-collaboration-between-agencies-over-combination-into-
one/ (but their concerns and remarks also point out to the real challenges involved in making a merger successful, and achieving better 
collaboration is often a more realistic goal indeed).  
173 For a good definition, examples and bibliography, see: Puffert, D. (2008) “Path Dependence”. EH.Net Encyclopedia, edited by Robert 
Whaples. February 10, 2008. URL http://eh.net/encyclopedia/path-dependence/  
174 See Thelen (1999) and Steinmo (2008). A quote from Steinmo about Theda Skocpol’s work perfectly illustrates the gist of historical 
institutionalism: “Most famously, Theda Skocpol wanted to explain the sources and patterns of the great revolutions (Skocpol 1979). 
But rather than assume that class structure or elite power would explain different patterns, she did the hard work of examining actual 
revolutions and placing them in their comparative and historical contexts. Eventually, Skocpol realized that the structure of state 
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of specific systems and practices is neither only determined by the different forces at play (economic, social, 
political) and the interests of different parties, nor by rational calculations and/or ideological models, but also 
(and in a very important way) by the specific choices made at an early stage (possibly under completely 
different conditions, with different forces at play, different ideological models etc.). In a path dependence 
perspective, the fact that specific institutions have been created, laws adopted, officials hired, practices put 
in place, means that it will be far likely that future developments will take place on this basis rather than ex 
nihilo. As Steinmo (2008) puts it: “political choices made at time A have important consequences for time B”, 
and the different variables and factors in historical evolution are not independent. This means in our case that 
the current differences in institutions, legal systems and practices that are found, for the same field of 
inspections, between countries such as Britain, the US or Germany cannot be solely (or even primarily) 
explained by reference to today’s situations (differences in political and social contexts, for instance), but to a 
significant extent arose because of the accumulated differences resulting from initial diverging choices made 
when designing the first regulatory responses to specific issues. 
This overview of the history of food safety regulatory inspections and enforcement in the US has taken us far 
and wide, and abundant sources have allowed us to understand better the roots and successive 
transformations than was possible in other countries and regulatory spheres. If we decided to use this 
opportunity and make this a considerably longer chapter than others in this section is that it allowed us to 
investigate some key issues of relevance for the entire research, and for inspections issues everywhere. 
First, the importance of trust (or its breakdown) and of demands for reassurance in driving inspections 
development. Rather than addressing statistically-assessed risks, regulations and institutions often seem to 
have been created and grown in response to shortfalls in consumer or citizen trust.  
Second, the difficulty of objectively and reliably estimating regulatory inspections’ contribution (or lack 
thereof) to safety improvements, when other forces (e.g. scientific and technological change) are at play in 
the same period, and when data (in particular epidemiological) are subject to caution (at least in terms of 
doing reliable international comparisons). We know that food safety improved over the past century, and we 
know that it is now at a high level (notwithstanding some issues, outbreaks etc.) in both the EU and US – but 
we cannot tell how much of it was caused or even made faster by regulatory interventions, and we cannot 
really tell whether the EU or US perform better (at least not with currently readily available data – in principle, 
an epidemiological survey, or maybe an in-depth review of existing sources, may yield robust results). 
Third, introducing new, more “risk-based” and “risk-focused” approaches is particularly difficult when the 
context features acute political disputes about regulation where its very necessity and legitimacy are 
disputed175, and success is made less likely when reforms that ostensibly aim at improving effectiveness and 
efficiency are made in a context of (and/or as cover for) budget restrictions. There is a serious possibility, in 
such context and circumstances, that public trust will further decrease, and that this will undermine the whole 
regulatory system, and the reform effort.  
 
iv. Snapshots of developments in food safety inspections 
Going into the same depth for a number of cases would go far beyond the scope of this research, but 
considering briefly a few country cases, as well as the influence of international organizations and the EU, will 
help us build a sketch of how (and to some extent why) food safety inspections have developed. We will first 
look at a couple of country snapshots, in particular at the Netherlands, but also at some of the “new” EU 
                                                           
institutions in the pre-revolutionary period had enormous consequences for revolutionary outcomes”. What we are attempting here 
is, in a very modest way, somewhat similar in looking at the development of inspection institutions and practices. 
175 Which, on the other hand, is one of the reasons why the US case has far more abundant literature available. Conversely, situations 
(e.g. in France) where regulation is seen in a large part of the population as an absolute good that cannot be discussed or relaxed, 
however slightly, also create a very difficult context for any reform effort. 
83 
 
Member States. Then, we will briefly consider,  some broad international trends, the role of international 
organizations such as FAO and WHO, the effect of the WTO on food safety regulations, and the 
transformations brought about by the EU. We will then try and summarize a few short and tentative 
conclusions. 
 
A few country snapshots 
What we have seen above for the UK and the US can, to a large extent, be seen in other countries too: first, 
“food safety” as such was for a long time not perceived as a unified field, but rather different aspects of it 
were addressed separately, often combined with other policy issues, creating a fragmented regulatory field. 




In France, for instance, municipal veterinary inspections existed since 1898, but really effective only in Paris 
and, to a lesser extent, other major cities. Regulations ensuring somewhat uniform control were not adopted 
before 1933, and a national food hygiene service (with a veterinary focus) only created in 1965 (Theves 2002, 
p. 56). As for the 1905 Loi sur la répression des fraudes (Law on fraud and adulteration) its focus was initially, 
much like what we have seen in the US, more on protecting commercial interests than on protecting 
consumers from hazards (Canu and Cochoy 2004, p. 6). A service is set up in April 1907176 to implement it, but 
though it looks after consumer interests, it is (at least in the first decades) mostly in terms of prices, labelling 
and adulteration – controlling safety only comes incidentally (ibid., pp. 12-16). The parallel development of 
veterinary legislation and inspections, and of consumer protection legislation and services, has led to a dual 
structure which persists to this day, with two national Directions Générales (General Directorates): one in 
charge of Alimentation (Food), the other of Consommation, Concurrence et Répression des Fraudes (Consumer 
Affairs, Competition and Fraud Suppression). The term of “food safety” as such is absent, and the mandates 
of both directorates are broader, with safety only one of several issues. The Food DG looks at production and 
supply as well as safety, at all that is “upstream” (primary production, processing, storage and handling etc.) 
but also au trade and catering). The Consumer DG looks at consumer complaints, competition, intellectual 
property, labelling, and safety only at the consumer stage (catering, retail). The division of responsibilities is 
not “obvious” in that both DGAL and DGCCRF look at the consumer stage - the former from a sanitary safety 
perspective, the latter from a consumer protection and fraud prevention one. In practice, however, though 
inspectors report to the national DGs in terms of professional competence, career, guidelines, their 
operational management is at the local (département) level. Thus, actual inspections and control measures 
are conducted by inspectors that report to local directorates at the administrative level of the département 
and thus report to a local director and to the Préfet, who heads all state services in each département.  
Since January 2010, as a result of the Révision Générale des Politiques Publiques (RGPP – General Review of 
Public Policies177), both groups of inspectors have been part of the same joint local directorates, called 
Directions Départementales de la Protection des Populations178. They continue, however, to have different 
                                                           
176 Initially under the Ministry of Agriculture, the Répression des Fraudes was later merged with services in charge of price controls 
(later price monitoring), competition, consumer protection. After having been part of the Ministry of Consumer Affairs, the service has 
been assigned to the Ministry of Finance since 1983. See: Historique des Directions et des Services du Ministère de l’Économie, des 
Finances et de l’Industrie - CAEF - Août 2004 available at: http://cadastre.pagesperso-orange.fr/Fichiers/historique_direction.pdf  
177 See 2012 report on the RGPP (assessing results, outcomes, lessons) by the General Inspectorate of Public Administration – available 
at: http://www.ladocumentationfrancaise.fr/rapports-publics/124000520/index.shtml  
178 In some (less populated) départements, these have been merged with social assistance services too and are called Directions 
départementales de la Cohésion Sociale et de la Protection des Populations. See: http://www.economie.gouv.fr/dgccrf/coordonnees-
des-DDPP-et-DDCSPP and https://fr.wikipedia.org/wiki/Direction_d%C3%A9partementale_de_la_protection_des_populations  
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cultures, qualifications, guidance from the centre, keeping a “technical” reporting line to their respective DG 
and using different information systems depending on which DG their work relates to. The unusual experiment 
to conduct mergers at the local level while leaving central structures separate179 needs to be evaluated further, 
but actually overcoming the cultural differences between different corps is likely to take a long time and be 
rather difficult, and it is less than clear that this challenge is really being addressed. A vision of food safety 
controls, and a corresponding effort on developing guidelines and training, are both lacking180. 
 
Former Soviet Union 
Such a division between several services, each looking at food safety from a different perspective (and, often, 
along with other issues), is quite frequent – as the idea of “food safety” as a unified problem appeared 
relatively late, and with institutional structures already well established. In the Former Soviet Union (FSU)181, 
for instance, supervision of food safety issues has for decades been divided between the Sanitary and 
Epidemiological Service (SES), the Veterinary Service, and inspectors controlling conformity with Standards 
(some elements of which relate to food safety). The SES embodied a “holistic” conception of health, not unlike 
the UK’s “Environmental Health” approach (but even broader in some ways) – the SES institution, and its 
inspectors (normally all medical doctors, most often epidemiologists), would be responsible for environmental 
issues, epidemiological control, and food safety. While in principle the Veterinary Service should be 
responsible for all food of animal origin, there is, in such a system, a vast area of overlap between Veterinary 
and SES – as soon as meat, dairy or eggs leave the farm and enter the processing and trade chain, SES claims 
responsibility, but Veterinarians do not relinquish it. On top of this, Standards inspectors control nearly every 
food product for conformity with their mandatory standards. In addition to problems of overlap and conflicting 
responsibilities, such systems also feature strong “cultural” rivalries between veterinarians and medical 
doctors (not unlike, again, what has been seen in the early development of food safety control in the UK, but 
with veterinarians having achieved a somewhat stronger position in the Soviet/post-Soviet systems).  
While this dual system of SES and Veterinary control (or in fact triple control, including Standards) has to a 
large extent remained the norm in most Former Soviet republics (e.g. Russia182, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan183, 
Uzbekistan, Tajikistan, Azerbaijan, Belarus), some have initiated reforms that are at varying stages of 
                                                           
179 See short overview in Blanc (2012) pp. 29 et 66 
180 Interviews with senior officials in the President’s Office and both DGs, 2012-2013. 
181 All this section is based on the author’s direct experience working on this topic in these countries since 2004, and numerous 
interviews with senior officials in all relevant institutiona (SES, Veterinary, Standards, line ministries, ministries in charge of economic 
development and administrative reforms). In addition, the reader can refer to the following published sources: Gotsadze et al. (2010) 
provides a comprehensive overview of reforms in the FSU and Central and Eastern Europe (CEE), but with a health (not a food safety) 
focus – IFC (2009 b) describes in some detail the Ukrainian system, and how it contrasts with accepted practice in the EU (see e.g. pp. 
23-25 and 44-47) – World Bank Group (2014), module 8, has four relevant case studies: Armenia (pp. 5-6), Lithuania (pp. 17-18), 
Moldova (pp. 19-22) and Ukraine (pp. 27-29) - Josephson, Dronin and Cherp (2013) provides information on the early history of the 
SES that is relevant for food safety, even though the book focuses on environmental issues. 
182 Some consolidation has taken place in Russia, but a fundamental duality remains: Rosselkhnadzor on the one hand (Russian Federal 
Service for Agricultural Surveillance, in charge of veterinary and phytosanitary safety) and Rospotrebnadzor (Russian Federal Service 
for Consumer Rights and Human Wellbeing Surveillance, which merged the SES functions with consumer protection and standards 
supervision). See the respective websites for overview of functions: http://www.fsvps.ru/fsvps/main.html?_language=en 
(Rosselkhnadzor) and http://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/en/deyatelnost/san_epid.php (Rospotrebnadzor) 
183 Consolidation of the SES and Veterinary Service was attempted in 2012 by the Government (see IFC 2012, pp. 32-33), but rolled 
back after a few months and fierce lobbying of the former SES (author’s interviews with officials, 2012-2015) 
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implementation (e.g. Ukraine184, Armenia185), and some have completed complete transformations including 
the creation of unified food safety agencies, as part of their entry into the EU (Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania). 
In September 1922, in order to fight what they considered a dramatic epidemiological situation186, Soviet 
authorities created the first sanitary and epidemiological centre – and in 1931-32, the Government set up 
what became a nationwide network of SES187. The system was successful in eradicating epidemic typhus and 
cholera188. While in 1933 the inspection function was separated from the Sanitary and Epidemiological 
Centres, they were merged again at the beginning of the 1950s, and the structure remained essentially 
unchanged until the end of the Soviet Union and, to a large extent and for the majority of post-Soviet states, 
until today. Interestingly, the Soviet SES developed a kind of early and rough “risk-based classification” of 
establishments189, with some being designated as “of acute epidemiological risk”. However, this classification 
remained set in the conditions which presided to the SES’s creation – thus, alongside hospitals, hairdressers 
and beauty parlours are considered “high risk” all over the Former Soviet Union190. 
This early approach to risk-based prioritization, however, has not resulted in a real “risk based approach”. 
Rather, contemporary SES (or successor institutions) and (to a lesser extent due to generally lower staffing 
levels) Veterinary Services are characterized in most FSU countries by complete “risk aversion”, and efforts to 
achieve “total control” of every establishment and product on the market. We will come back to what this 
means in terms of inspections’ depth, and effectiveness. It is worth noting that it reflects both an ideological 
vision (that each and every risk should be prevented by the state), and vested interests (considering the extent 
of corruption in inspections)191. This has led, in several countries, to deep and comprehensive reforms. While 
the Baltic States have all set up unified Food Safety inspections (following very strict EU guidance during the 
accession process), Georgia in 2003-2004 took a different, radical approach.  
Reforms in both the Baltic States and Georgia were a response to somewhat similar problems (though they 
were certainly even more acute in Georgia): ineffective controls, high administrative burden, significant levels 
of corruption192. In Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, new institutions were set up, with mandates covering all food 
safety inspections – and sometimes an even broader food safety responsibility193. Old institutions were shut 
down, merged or split, staff was profoundly retrained (and partly renewed), and methods entirely 
transformed. This resulted in a new institutional framework that proved considerably more effective, and far 
less corrupt (it is always difficult to assert that corruption does not exist at all, hence our cautious wording). 
                                                           
184 As in Russia, the Veterinary and Phytosanitary Services were merged in an Agriculture Inspection. In Summer 2014, the new 
Government of Arseniy Yatsenyuk took a decision of principle to create a wholly new, consolidated inspectorate, that would include 
all of food safety, as well as non-food products market surveillance, but this institution is not yet operational (author’s own interviews 
with officials, 2015). 
185 In Armenia, a unified Food Safety Service exists, but there remain some “grey areas” of overlap on hygiene issues with the Public 
Health Inspections, and methods and approaches have not really been reformed. 
186 Typhus, spread by body lice, was a particularly deadly disease towards the end of WWI and in the Revolutionary War period. Lenin 
is quoted as saying “either the lice conquers socialism, or socialism conquers the lice” (quoted by Josephson et al. 2013, p. 90) – see 
also this page at the University of Kansas Medical Center: http://www.kumc.edu/wwi/index-of-essays/typhus-on-the-eastern-
front.html  
187 See Josephson et al. 2013, p. 90 and http://www.rospotrebnadzor.ru/en/region/history.php  
188 Ibid. 
189 Which was not necessarily unusual for the Soviet Union – the Fire Safety Service had a similar classification, which emphasized a 
combination of inherent fire risk, potential for life loss and potential for economic loss (in which it differed strongly from contemporary 
“western” approaches, which emphasize only life loss potential – but the Soviet State was an economic operator as much as a State) 
(author’s interviews working with Fire Safety Services in Former Soviet Republics since 2004). 
190 Though typhus is spread by body lice and not hair lice, all hygiene-related establishments were critical to epidemiological progress 
in the 1930s. The situation, however, has changed considerably over 80 years – but not the classification and targeting. 
191 On all this see Blanc 2011 b and 2012 b. 
192 On Georgia, see World Bank Group (2012). 
193 E.g. in Lithuania where the State Food and Veterinary Service covers all food safety inspections, as well as the network of food 
laboratories, a rule-making function for veterinary issues, and the scientific risk assessment function (author’s interviews and 
discussions from 2011 to 2015 – see also SFVS website at: http://vmvt.lt/en/about.sfvs/) 
86 
 
The new setup played a strong role in transforming the food processing sector, with a number of 
establishments closing as the costs of putting their operations in conformity was prohibitive194. The new 
system was found to satisfy EU requirements and thus fulfil one of the conditions for EU accession. In fact, the 
Baltic states provide examples of full implementation of the EU Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) 
recommendation for unified food safety inspectorates, something which in practice has remained the 
exception (due to the historical path dependence we have been researching here, in no small part). In Georgia, 
by contrast, the reform essentially shut down the previous inspecting bodies, drastically reduced their staff 
and activities, and in effect was a major deregulation effort. Only from 2006, with the process of negotiation 
(and, after signature, the implementation) of a Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement (and thus 
with both EU pressure and EU assistance) was a new National Food Agency (NFA) set up. This Agency barely 
conducted any inspections, however, for the first years of its operations. The NFA only started ramping up its 
staffing and inspections significantly after 2012, with a new government in charge195. We will come back to 
this example and its impact in further sections, for it provides a very interesting experiment of essentially 
shutting down food safety inspections for several years – and, this much we can say already here, it did not 
result in the disaster that critics predicted.  
 
Netherlands 
In the late 19th and early 20th centuries, the Netherlands was relatively slow to introduce food safety 
legislation, and controls, compared to a number of other countries in Western Europe. According to Koolmes 
(2000) this is because of the prevalence of “liberal doctrines of free trade and the restriction of state 
interference” (p. 58)196. As he shows, there was very little control in practice, including regarding meat 
slaughter, processing and sale, which exposed the population to contamination hazards (ibid., pp. 55-56). 
While legislation was adopted in 1908 to control meat exports, it was not before 1919 that it was extended to 
cover the internal meat market (Theves 2002, p. 56). 
The development of regulations and inspections in food led, however, to a similarly fragmented structure, as 
we have seen in other countries. First, because of a duality between consumer products inspections, and 
veterinary inspections. Second, because of a Dutch specificity, the delegation of regulatory conformity 
inspections in some areas of food safety to institutions of a private nature (COKZ, NCAE197). Simplification and 
closure of several private sector “product boards” (product- en bedrijfschappen) which were in charge of 
supervision in different agricultural areas has been going on in recent years, but this delegation of powers 
remains a specificity of the Dutch system198. In addition, some inspections (of hygiene in catering, in particular) 
are done by the local authorities, independently of national food safety bodies. While there are efforts to 
introduce coordination and information sharing, and these have been going on for several years, the 
duplication remains199.  
                                                           
194 We will come back to this question of costs in the last part of this research. 
195 Interviews with government officials conducted in 2014. 
196 As we have seen above, there was a similar delay in adopting OSH regulations and controls, possibly due to similar reasons. 
197 COKZ (Centraal Orgaan voor Kwaliteitsaangelegenheden in de Zuivel, Central Body for Quality Issues in Dairy) is tasked with 
conducting regulatory food safety inspections (based on national and EU legislation) in dairy production/processing. NCAE 
(Nederlandse Controle Autoriteit Eieren, Netherlands Eggs Control Authority) is tasked with the same for egg production/processing. 
NCAE is a subsidiary of COKZ, and took over egg inspections from CPE (Controlebureau voor Pluimvee, Eieren en Eiproducten, Bureau 
of Control of Poultry, Eggs and Egg Products) in 2012. They work on the basis of an official delegation of powers and competences (and 
funding allocation) by the state. For details, see websites: http://www.cokz.nl/SitePages/over-COKZ.aspx 
http://www.ncae.nl/pages/over-ncae.aspx.  
198 The model appears to enjoy strong legitimacy since, when CPE functions were taken back, they were not given to the state 
inspectorate, but to another private sector entity (NCAE). 
199 See e.g. Werkprogramma samenwerkende rijksinspecties 2014 (Work Programme for State Inspections Cooperation 2014), avaialble 
at: http://www.inspectieloket.nl/organisatie/publicaties/Werkprogramma_samenwerkende_rijksinspecties_2014.aspx.  
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National (state) food safety inspections in the Netherlands have been considerably consolidated in the past 
10-15 years (starting ca. 2000200), resulting in a novel institutional structure. The Nederlandse Voedsel- en 
Warenautoriteit (NVWA - Netherlands’ Food and Consumer Product Safety Authority), under the Ministry of 
Economy (and an additional reporting line to the Ministry of Health), was established in two steps in 2002 and 
2006. In 2002, services controlling meat and livestock (Rijksdienst voor de keuring van Vee en Vlees, RVV - 
State Service for Supervision of Livestock and Meat) and those supervising consumer products (Keuringsdienst 
van Waren, Consumer Products Supervision Service) were both put under the VWA as “umbrella 
organisation”. Then, in 2006, they were fully merged, and what was now the NVWA underwent an internal 
reorganisation so that its internal structure matches better the modern approach to food and consumer 
safety.  
This followed previous efforts at consolidation and mergers, over more than two decades. In 1980, the RVV 
was formed merging local meat inspection services and the veterinary services from the Ministry of 
Agriculture. In 1988, provincial and municipal products inspection services were merged into a State 
Inspection, that itself was consolidated in 1995 with other services in charge of food, alcohol legislation 
supervision etc. In the late 1990s and early 2000s, the “consumer products” and “veterinary and meat” sides 
were themselves gradually merged. At the same time, there remain specific inspection functions that are 
outside of the NVWA’s mandate - eggs, milk and milk products, the control of which is delegated to institutions 
of a private nature (COKZ, NCAE). Simplification and closure of several private sector “boards” (schappen) 
which were in charge of supervision in different agricultural areas has been going on in recent years, but this 
delegation of powers remains a specificity of the Dutch system. 
Thus, not unlike in the UK, the original situation involved control mostly implemented by local authorities, a 
gradual emergence of the food products control function, and a separation between control of products and 
of production (in particular animal health). Consolidation was a process that was slow and complex. A feature 
of particular interest (and again underlining how much variation there can be, and how little of these 
structures is “obvious”) is that in the Netherlands the NVWA groups inspection and control of both food and 
non-food products, which is quite unusual (though not unheard of201) internationally.  
 
The role of international institutions and international integration 
In sharp contrast with OSH, food safety is an area where international institutions and structures (of a variety 
of nature and scope) have a very important influence – not only on the formulation of norms but, at least in 
some cases, on the ways in which inspections are organized, and the manner in which they are conducted. 
This, of course, is linked to inherent characteristics of food safety issues. First, food is a tradable good – and 
not only tradable, but in practice largely traded across borders. Second, some food-related pests, parasites 
and diseases can spread rapidly – regardless of whether they affect humans, plants or animals. Third, the 
development of food safety regulations and regulatory practices has been strongly underpinned by the 
development of science regarding food-borne human pathogens, as well as plant and animal diseases, 
providing a common basis for rules and enforcement across the globe. As a result, while there remains 
considerable differences in both contents of rules and practices, there has been several growing and 
concurring trends: harmonization of regulatory requirements, adoption of generally applicable principles, 
                                                           
200 While the author has had the opportunity to see internal Government documents laying out the consolidation process starting in 
2000, it is not entirely clear when the initial decisions were taken, and the documents are not published.  
201 A couple countries, such as Bosnia and Herzegovina (2004) and Mongolia (2003) created “unified inspectorates” covering most 
inspection functions (Croatia was one of the first, but with a narrower scope). Ukraine (2014) decided to create a body similar to 
NVWA. But these remain exceptions. (Sources: World Bank Group (2010), author’s interviews and experience in Mongolia 2008-2015, 
Bosnia 2010). In France, there is a partial combination in the functions of the DGCCRF, but it has only narrow food safety competence, 
and mostly looks at consumer products. In the UK, non-food products safety is controlled by the Trading Standards inspectors (which 
are part of local authorities’ services) – they also control labeling, including for food, but no substantial food safety issues.. 
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endorsement of “best practices” – and, at least in the EU context, increasing harmonization of practices. There 
are a number of institutions involved in this process – in particular a group of UN agencies (Food and 
Agriculture Organization – FAO – and World Health Organization – WHO), the World Trade Organization 
(WTO), two structures with a specific status but related to the UN and WTO (the World Animal Health 
Organisation, OIE, which is recognized as competent organization by the WTO – and the International Plant 
Protection Convention, a convention ratified under the auspices of FAO) – and the European Union (EU). We 
will limit ourselves to considering WHO and FAO, WTO and EU – as regulations and inspections relating to 
animal health (epizootic diseases) and plant health (phytosanitary issues) are, though important, further from 
our core focus in this research (and would entail detailed considerations of border control and quarantine 
regimes). 
 
FAO, WHO and the Codex Alimentarius 
While FAO is primarily concerned with food security202, in the sense of ensuring a continuous and sufficient 
supply of food to populations around the globe203, it has some activities related to food safety, i.e. ensuring 
that food for human consumption is safe to eat. Limited funding resources means that operational projects 
implemented by FAO to support the development of food safety in developing countries are relatively rare 
and small in size. Likewise, while FAO has developed a number of important guidance documents on food-
related legislation and inspections204, these do not have as much influence as, for instance, the EU’s (even 
when considering non-EU members). As for WHO, it is “the directing and coordinating authority on 
international health within the United Nations’ system205” and, as such, responsible for a very wide range of 
issues – in particular, coordinating responses to major epidemics and pandemics, e.g. the recent Ebola 
outbreak. Considering limited means and the vast number of issues WHO is responsible for, its activities in 
food safety are limited, even though it runs a few projects on this topic in some developing countries206. In 
fact, the main way in which FAO and WHO are active, and significant, in food safety regulation is through the 
Codex Alimentarius.207 
The Codex Alimentarius208 (or, shortly, Codex) is primarily “a collection of standards, codes of practice, 
guidelines and other recommendations. (…) Some deal with detailed requirements related to a food or group 
of foods; others deal with the operation and management of production processes or the operation of 
government regulatory systems” (FAO – WHO 2006, p. 10). The Codex is developed by the Codex Alimentarius 
Commission, which was created in 1961 by the 11th FAO Conference, and met for the first time in 1963209. The 
main aims of the Codex are to be a reference guide to define (a) what particular food names actually mean 
(contents, definition of foods), (b) what are acceptable (safe for human health) residue levels of specific 
contaminants, (c) how to conduct sampling and testing procedures, (d) what are safe methods for the 
                                                           
202 It defines its mandate thus: “Our three main goals are: the eradication of hunger, food insecurity and malnutrition; the elimination 
of poverty and the driving forward of economic and social progress for all; and, the sustainable management and utilization of natural 
resources” - http://www.fao.org/about/en/  
203 But FAO is not responsible for emergency food relief, which is the mandate of the UN World Food Programme (WFP).  
204 See in particular for legislation http://www.fao.org/food/food-safety-quality/capacity-development/food-regulations/en/ and for 
inspections http://www.fao.org/food/food-safety-quality/capacity-development/inspection/en/. Main publications include the New 
Model Food Law (FAO 2005 – see: http://www.fao.org/3/a-a0274e.pdf) and the Risk Based Food Inspection Manual (FAO 2008 – see: 
http://www.fao.org/3/a-i0096e.pdf).   
205 See: http://www.who.int/about/what-we-do/en/  
206 Direct author experience and observations in several dozen countries since 2001. 
207 For details on the Codex Alimentarius work and its effects e.g. in EU law, see for instance Everson and Vos 2008, Matthee 2009. 
208 Interestingly, the name was taken from a much earlier codification exercise regarding food, the Codex Alimentarius Austriacus (see: 
https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Codex_Alimentarius_Austriacus), which was developed in the last decades of the Austro-Hungarian 
Empire. Much like the modern Codex standards, its norms were not directly enforceable, but could be referenced in case of litigation.  
209 See: http://www.codexalimentarius.org/about-codex/codex-timeline/en/  
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preparation and handling of specific foods and (e) how to organize and conduct controls of food safety (both 
internal controls and regulatory inspections)210.  
While Codex “standards211” are not mandatory for the countries that participate in the Commission (186 in 
total, plus the European Union as such), they provide an importance reference point, in several ways. First, 
they provide a basis for standards, regulations and practices that can be adopted by member countries – and, 
in fact, they frequently form the basis of modern food safety regulations. Second, they are recognized by the 
WTO (in the SPS agreement, see below), and thus they are used to adjudicate trade disputes. In particular, 
having stricter requirements than those foreseen in Codex would have to be justified in case of a dispute.  
Nonetheless, while generally OECD and EU members have regulations that are mostly aligned with Codex, this 
is far from the case everywhere – be it because Codex standards would be too complex, too costly to comply 
with, set the bar too high – or because there are vested interests which benefit from using older standards 
(e.g. Soviet or post-Soviet ones), or simple path dependence and refusal to change212. The development and 
increasing influence of Codex standards is important for our topic because it has driven, or at least supported, 
a growing approximation not only of rules being enforced, but also of methods, in particular of what gets 
checked during inspections, and how. In particular, the Codex General Principles of Food Hygiene (introducing 
the HACCP approach) and the standards for inspection and certification practices are significant in this respect. 
While Codex standards are not necessarily driving the development of new practices (but rather codifying 
them), they constitute an important factor of diffusion of risk-based inspection approaches, at least in terms 
of targeting of controls, and of focus of attention during controls (but not as strongly when it comes to risk-
proportionality in determining regulatory instruments, and enforcement actions).  
 
The WTO Sanitary and Phytosanitary (SPS) Agreement 
In 1995, the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), which had been in effect since 1948, gave birth 
to (and was replaced by) the World Trade Organization (WTO). Thus, from a multilateral agreement, world 
trade regulation moved to an international organization, i.e. a stronger structure, with more robust regulation 
and litigation mechanisms213. During the Uruguay Round of the GATT, along with the main treaty creating the 
WTO, were negotiated two key agreements on product market regulations and their effects on trade: the 
Agreement on Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT), and the Agreement on the Application of Sanitary and 
Phytosanitary Measures (SPS)214, both of which entered into force in January 1995. These two agreements 
marked a major turning point215 in the way states regulate their product markets (both food and non-food) 
because, for the first time, international agreements applicable to the vast majority of the world’s nations (161 
countries as of April 2015) lay out what are the acceptable practices in terms of restricting free market access, 
what level of protection and methods are acceptable – and do so in a way that is backed by the possibility of 
litigation. While the conflicts that reach the main headlines (such as the UE-US conflict on poultry that we 
briefly discussed above) are mostly between the most developed economies, and point to areas of acute 
                                                           
210 For more details on what Codex covers see FAO – WHO (2006) pp. 11-12. 
211 We put the word in quotation marks because, even though they are officially called thus, they differ strongly from the definition of 
“standard” used e.g. by the International Standardization Organization and the WTO Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreement. 
212 Broadly speaking, there are two cases of non-adoption of Codex standards: low-income, low-capacity countries, which lack 
resources to translate and, even more, implement them (and, in some cases, non-adoption is wise, as the standards may just be 
impossible to implement in practice) – and countries, where existing rules are in fact costly and complex, and less adequate than Codex 
ones (either because they are less effective, or because they harm trade), but where regulators and/or incumbent businesses benefit 
from them (a case that is observed in many post-Soviet countries – see e.g. IFC 2009 b).  
213 See WTO website: https://www.wto.org/english/thewto_e/thewto_e.htm. 
214 For more in depth considerations of the balance between risk prevention and trade in the SPS agreement, see Prevost 2009. 
215 GATT rules with a similar purpose existed earlier, but weaker and less specific. In addition, the WTO has considerably expanded 
compared to the GATT membership. See WTO (2010) p. 14. 
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disagreement but rarely to deep and far-reaching differences in how regulatory systems are organized, the 
more substantial effects of the TBT and SPS agreements are often felt in developing countries and transition 
economies, during or just after the accession process, where they can result in very important transformations 
of the regulatory framework. 
From our perspective attempting a review of food safety inspections experience, the SPS Agreement is the 
relevant one216. The WTO defines the problem to which the Agreement intends to respond thus: “How do you 
ensure that your  country’s consumers are supplied with food  that is safe to eat — “safe” at the level you  
consider appropriate? And at the same time,  how can you ensure that unnecessary health and safety 
regulations are not used as an  excuse to protect domestic producers from foreign competition?” (WTO 2010, 
p. 9). This means that, from the onset, the WTO SPS perspective is one of balancing the expected benefits of 
regulation (safe food, in this case) against its costs (in this case, barriers to trade protecting domestic 
companies from competition217). What is important and interesting from our perspective is how the SPS 
Agreement seeks to regulate this: by emphasizing the notion of risk, and using it as the foundation to 
determine the legitimacy of SPS “measures”218.  
In the SPS Agreement, international standards form a “baseline”, which allows to avoid a complex cost-benefit 
assessment model: implementing the international standards (as adopted by Codex, OIE and IPPC) is accepted 
as the baseline option, doing less (i.e. being having a higher tolerance of risk) is accepted in the sense that it 
restricts trade less (and thus does not harm the WTO’s purpose), however doing more needs to be justified – 
using “risk” as the fundamental criterion. As the WTO puts it, “WTO member countries are encouraged to use 
the standards developed by the relevant international bodies whenever they exist. However, members may 
use measures which result in higher levels of health protection, so long as their measures are based on an 
appropriate assessment of risks and the approach is consistent, not arbitrary” (WTO 2010, p. 9). The 
Agreement clearly articulates that risk assessment must be the foundation for adoption of “measures”, that 
science must be the basis for risk assessment, and that in any case the “measures” must be non-discriminatory 
(treat domestic and foreign producers equally) and their necessity must be demonstrated: “regulations must 
be based on scientific findings and should be applied only to the extent that they are necessary to protect 
human, animal or plant life or health; they should not unjustifiably discriminate between countries where 
similar conditions exist” (ibid.). The Agreement goes further than just a general requirement to base 
“measures” on risk, however, it also “clarifies which factors should be taken into account when risks are 
assessed” (ibid., p. 10). First, “measures” should be based on an assessment of “the risks to human, animal or 
plant life or health, taking into account risk assessment techniques developed by the relevant international 
organizations”. Then, “Members shall take into account available scientific evidence” as well as “relevant 
economic factors” such as “the potential damage” and “the relative cost-effectiveness of alternative 
approaches to limiting risks” (SPS Agreement Article 5, quoted in WTO 2010, p. 30).  
                                                           
216 The TBT Agreement is very important for other types of inspections, those concerned with non-food products safety, as well as with 
labeling (all together commonly called “Market Surveillance”). The labeling component has some implications for food, of course, but 
from a food safety perspective the fundamental agreement is the SPS one. What we write here of the SPS Agreement’s effects is 
largely, mutatis mutandis, applicable to the TBT Agreement and non-food products regulations and inspections, with ISO and other 
international standards playing a somewhat comparable role to the Codex, OIE and IPPC standards under SPS, and the same overall 
approach of minimal level of trade restriction and risk-based approach to regulatory intervention (there are also important differences, 
e.g. the TBT’s reliance on the notion of “technical regulation”, which is not applicable to the SPS field). See WTO (2010) pp. 16-17 for 
the scope of the two agreements. 
217 Many have argued against considering free trade as an unalloyed benefit, and thus necessarily seeing barriers to trade as costs (see 
e.g. Chang 2007), but from the WTO perspective, in any case, limiting competition is a negative (and a majority of economists would 
generally support this view). 
218 The Agreement does not refer to “regulations” in order to avoid any peculiarities in various legal systems, but the neutral 
“measures”, which covers any form of SPS-related restrictions to trade. 
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Interestingly, what the SPS Agreement emphasizes is the risk-based approach, but not the specific level of risk 
that should be acceptable. This, as befits an international agreement, is left to the states that are party to it to 
decide upon: “the SPS Agreement allows countries to give food safety, animal and plant health priority over 
trade, provided they can demonstrate that their food safety and health requirements are based on science. 
Each country has the right to assess the risks and determine what it considers to be an appropriate level of 
food safety and animal and plant health”. Once this level is set, “there are often a number of alternative 
measures which may be used to achieve this protection (such as treatment, quarantine or increased 
inspection)” (WTO 2010, p. 20). The SPS Agreement thus aims at ensuring that WTO member states select the 
least burdensome, most efficient, most trade-friendly way to achieve the goals they have set themselves, i.e. 
the level of risk-mitigation they deem appropriate.  
Risk assessment must also be demonstrated and justified in case of challenge or litigation: “Countries’ SPS 
measures must be based on an appropriate assessment of the actual risks involved. If asked, they must make 
known what factors they took into consideration, the assessment procedures they used and the level of risk 
they determined to be acceptable” (ibid., p. 11). The Agreement emphasizes that countries do not have to 
accept international standards “as a floor or ceiling” (ibid., p. 19) – but they have to justify variations 
(particularly if their requirements are more stringent, more restrictive).  
The SPS Agreement has relatively little details on the question of inspections specifically – in any case it covers 
only the measures imposed to imports (i.e. primarily border controls). It states in its Annex C that “any 
requirements for control, inspection and approval of individual specimens of a product are limited to what is 
reasonable and necessary” and that “any fees imposed for the procedures on imported products” have to be 
“equitable in relation to any fees charged on like domestic products or products originating in any other 
Member and should be no higher than the actual cost of the service” (ibid., pp. 43-44). Thus, it prescribes 
general principles of “reasonableness” (proportionality), and non-discrimination. Nonetheless, the Agreement 
is fundamental in that it sets binding limits on the way in which SPS regulations can be imposed, and mandates 
that they be based on a risk-based approach. Such a requirement means that aspiring members often need to 
revise their applicable regulations and, in so doing, end up changing the basis on which inspections are 
conducted, and pushing their inspection bodies towards a new way of doing things. 
Of course, compliance with the SPS Agreement is far from universal. Disputes are relatively numerous (43 
disputes stating the SPS Agreement as basis, as of July 1, 2015219), but mostly involve major countries (the US, 
China, India, Canada, South Korean) and the European Union. The way in which the SPS Agreement influences 
changes in regulations and practices, however, is often less visible, and has to do with the WTO accession 
process. When applying, and until accession is ratified, countries (particularly those with a relatively weak 
bargaining position) often have to make considerable changes – or, if these changes have not been made, they 
sometimes happen post-accession, reacting to the threat of litigation220. In this way, gradually, the SPS 
Agreement pushes a growing number of countries to adopt food safety regulations that are based on risk 
assessment and risk proportionality221. 
                                                           
219 See: https://www.wto.org/english/tratop_e/dispu_e/dispu_agreements_index_e.htm?id=A19.  
220 No detailed account exists of the process, but this is what happened in relation with mandatory state certification of food products 
in Ukraine (which was not in conformity with the SPS Agreement requirements). Though it remained in place in spite of ratification of 
the WTO accession treaty (which foresaw its cancellation), in 2008, the threat of litigation was used as one of the drivers to push for 
the elimination of this mandatory certification, which eventually happened in 2009 (on paper – and in practice in 2011-2012) (see 
World Bank Group 2014 a, module 8, pp. 27-29 – also based on author’s direct experience of involvement in the negotiations regarding 
elimination of this requirement). 
221 A last point worth noting is that the SPS Agreement, by using internationally accepted standards as “baseline”, avoids the need for 
complex cost-benefity analysis, which is often a major hurdle in implementing “better regulation” or “smart regultion” programmes. 




The EU: towards the Single Market, the “Hygiene Package” and the 
role of the EC’s Food and Veterinary Office (FVO) 
Of all the international institutions we have reviewed, the European Union (and its predecessor, the European 
Economic Community) have (and have had) the strongest impact on how food safety inspections are 
structured and conducted (as well as what they aim at). Arguably, the EU may in fact currently be the most 
important institution worldwide when it comes to food safety regulation222 – more important than its member 
states, and possibly (through the influence of its model) more influential than any other state as well. The 
primary reason for this influence is the sheer size of the EU market: over 500 million of “high income223” 
consumers, and the largest exporter and importer of food (raw and processed) worldwide224. Being the largest 
food market (by value), the EU’s regulation mechanically carry the most weight. Their influence is further 
increased by two factors: the large number of countries having entered (or aiming at entering) agreements 
with the EU and/or joining it225, and the level of development of the EU’s food safety policy (including its 
inspections and enforcement component), which has led it to be in some ways considered as the “model” to 
follow by others – a fact that comes from its having had to solve a number of issues in order to build a “single 
market”, as we will see below.  
To understand better how this came about, and what the EU “model” exactly consists of, we will consider 
successively its early history, the turning points that allowed to move from limited mutual recognition and 
narrow areas of Community action to full harmonization, and the main elements of today’s EU food safety 
regulations and inspections. 
 
The early history: the EEC’s gradual intervention in  food safety 
issues 
When the 1957 Rome Treaty created the European Economic Community (EEC), with six members at the time, 
its primary objective was the establishment of a customs union between its members, but its overall goals and 
scope went beyond. In its Article 3, it foresaw as activities of the Community “the elimination(…) of customs 
duties and of quantitative restrictions on the import and export of goods, and of all other measures having 
equivalent effect” (emphasis ours), as well as “the abolition (…) of obstacles to freedom of movement for 
persons, services and capital” and “the approximation of the laws of Member States to the extent required 
                                                           
While this does not quantify (or attempt to quantify) costs and benefits, it forces to consider them, and prevents the imposition of 
additional burden with no clear benefit. 
222 Emphasizing the arguably – in the author’s experience, this is probably the case, and a vast number of countries are taking the EU’s 
food safety system at least as reference point (though not always as model) – we would certainly not endeavour to prove that it is 
indeed the most influential. It is in any case one of the most influential. 
223 In the sense of international income classifications used e.g. by the World Bank, OECD etc. It does not of course mean that everyone 
has a high income inside the EU. 
224 EU 2007, p. 28. 
225 As of July 2015, 5 official candidate countries (which have to approximate entirely the EU acquis, including all the food safety 
legislation and enforcement systems), 2 potential candidate (which are trying to approximate as much as possible to be able to apply 
officially in the future), 3 European Free Trade Area members (Iceland and Norway, members of the European Economic Area, and 
Switzerland, which has bilateral agreements – all three of which have approximated their regulations to a very large extent), and a 
large number of Association Agreements and Free Trade Agreements in force (which include various levels of approximation – 17 
countries, counting only those with an Association Agreement or “extended/deep” Free Trade Agreement – plus Georgia, where the 
Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement has provisionally entered into force), and ma number of countries targeted by the 
EU Neighbourhood Policy, which includes a large approximation component. See http://ec.europa.eu/enlargement/countries/check-




for the proper functioning of the common market226”. The Treaty had other elements, e.g. foreseeing a 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP), a common transport policy, competition regulations, coordination of 
economic policies etc. – but its core was what became known simply as “the Common Market”, which was for 
decades the EEC’s nickname.  
If the EEC had been only a customs union (and not an endeavour towards “ever closer union”, as per the Rome 
Treaty’s Preamble), there would have been no need or impetus for harmonization of technical rules – a 
customs union is not a single market, it just means there are no duties to be imposed, and no quantitative 
restrictions. What made the EEC different was that it also targeted “other measures having equivalent effect” 
to quantitative restrictions, in order to ensure the common market was not distorted by what would now be 
called “technical barriers to trade” in the WTO’s vocabulary227. Going further, the Treaty established four 
fundamental freedoms of movement – of goods, people, services and capital – which were to be the 
foundation for much of the developments to come. – and it created a litigation mechanism, and a European 
Court of Justice (ECJ) which had the power to make jurisprudence. 
In the first decade and more of the EEC’s existence, there was relatively little done on food safety regulations. 
The focus was increasing food production, something the CAP (which entered into force in 1962) aimed at 
doing228. Unsurprisingly, given the important and visible cross-border impact of animal health issues, 
regulations started from animals and meat. The first significant pieces of regulation date from 1964: “Council 
Directive 64/432 on animal health problems affecting intra-Community trade in bovine animals and swine, 
and Council Directive 64/433 on health conditions for the production and marketing of fresh meat. The new 
rules harmonised regulations across Member States, such as laws on testing for tuberculosis. Intra-Community 
trade” (EU 2007, p. 15). It was not before 1971 that “the EU established harmonised hygiene requirements for 
the treatment of poultry meat in slaughterhouses, storage and transportation” (ibid., p .20), followed in 1972 
by a Fresh Meat Trade Directive229. Then, “the EU also laid down health rules for imports of cattle, swine and 
fresh meat, and made the inspection of meat for Trichinella spiralis mandatory” (ibid.), but that only came 
about in 1977. In parallel to these directives in the sphere of competence of the Agriculture Directorate 
General (DG) of the Commission, environmental regulations led to the adoption in 1976 of the first Maximum 
Residue Levels (MRLs) for pesticides in food (ibid., p. 22). 
Limited awareness and perception of risks explains to some extent (as for national regulations) this relatively 
slow development. Changes in the food supply and to the perception of risks were one of the drivers in 
regulatory changes, as we have seen in other contexts: “At domestic level, a rise in home refrigeration and an 
increase in consumer purchasing power saw a change in shopping and eating habits in the EU. In order to meet 
the rising demand for easy-to-prepare, processed food, large-scale manufacturing grew and the chain of 
production expanded. While this enabled the needs of the mass market to be met, it also meant that there 
were more instances in which food safety problems could arise” (ibid., p. 16). The regulations, however, 
remained sector-specific, “vertical” in nature, not looking at food safety in a comprehensive way. Consumer 
issues were handled by a separate DG from agriculture. When regulations were adopted, they tended to be 
highly prescriptive, mandating the exact characteristics a product had to comply with.  
 
Turning points: “Cassis de Dijon”, the “New Approach”, crises 
and the construction of the “Single Market” 
                                                           
226 See full treaty text at: http://ec.europa.eu/archives/emu_history/documents/treaties/rometreaty2.pdf.  
227 And clearly the TBT and SPS Agreements owe much to the development of EEC law and jurisprudence over several decades. 
228 Notwithstanding the many issues raised by the CAP, particularly in the last 30 years, it clearly contributed to the major increase in 
food production in Europe in the past decades. 




Several important regulatory, institutional and judicial decisions in the 1970s started paving the way for 
deeper and broader changes: in particular the 1974 Dassonville ECJ case, the adoption of a directive on food 
labels in 1979, and the creation of the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) in the same year. With 
Dassonville, the ECJ drew radical conclusions from the Rome Treaty and, in particular, the clause about 
“measures with equivalent effect” to quantitative restrictions – and severely curtailed the power of Member 
States to adopt measures restraining free trade across internal EEC borders, stating that “all trading rules 
enacted by Member States which are capable of hindering, directly or indirectly, actually or potentially, intra-
Community trade are to be considered as measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions230”. 
With the food labels directive, the EEC started using new measures to facilitate cross-border trades: 
information regulations rather than standardization of contents and processes. By setting up the RASFF231, the 
Commission implicitly acknowledged the limit of regulations, and the need to be able to identify and respond 
to problems rapidly and effectively. 
The Cassis de Dijon case 
Even though changes were evidently gradual and parts of long-term trends, some important “turning points” 
can be identified – the first being the ECJ’s Rewe-Zentral AG v Bundesmonopolverwaltung für Branntwein 
(120/78) case232, better known as “Cassis de Dijon”, after the product that was at issue in the dispute. With 
Cassis de Dijon, the ECJ significantly changed its own Dassonville jurisprudence, in a way that simultaneously 
enabled regulation, but put requirements on its contents and effects that significantly shaped further 
European regulatory efforts in food (and in product markets more generally).  
Since Dassonville meant that “nearly any national measure which qualifies as a “trading rule” could be 
scrutinized by the ECJ”, while it “formed an “effective tool to cull the dead wood of centuries of accumulated 
legislation” it also threatened rules that “often served a social purpose” and “interfered deeply into the 
sovereignty of Member States, maybe a little too much for what the Member States could handle”, thus 
threatening a backlash (Purnhagen 2014, p. 7). In Cassis de Dijon, while the ECJ found for the plaintiff and 
struck down the regulation233 (which prevented fruit liquors of less than 25% alcohol content to be marketed 
in Germany), it put forth a reasoning that clarified the parameters that would define legitimate regulation. It 
first determined that, if they are “necessary in order to satisfy mandatory requirements”, “obstacles to the 
movement within the community resulting from disparities between the national laws relating to the 
marketing of the products in question must be accepted.” The Court then listed some of these “mandatory 
requirements”: “the effectiveness of fiscal supervision, the protection of public health, the fairness of 
commercial transactions and the defence of the consumer.”. This meant that the Court accepted in particular  
                                                           
230 From Procureur du Roi v Benoît and Gustave Dassonville, ECJ case 8/74. 
231 “The RASFF network has been in place since 1979 and was enhanced by the General Food Law in 2002. Members of the network 
are the Member States, the European Commission, the European Food Safety Agency, Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. RASFF 
enables the rapid exchange of information between national competent authorities on all foodstuffs and animal feed, specifically when 
a national authority has identified a risk to human health and taken measures, such as withholding, recalling, seizure or rejection of 
the products concerned. Thanks to the system, Member States can identify if they are also affected and respond appropriately, 
ensuring coherent and simultaneous actions across the EU and protecting the safety of consumers. To keep the public fully informed, 
the EU publishes weekly and annual reports containing information on all notifications on its website.” (EC 2007, p. 20) 
232 Which was decided in 1979, making this is a crucial year for European food safety regulations history. 
233 Quoting the decision: “The concept of measures having an effect equivalent to quantitative restrictions on imports (…) is to be 
understood to mean that the fixing of a minimum alcohol content for alcoholic beverages intended for human consumption by the 
legislation of a member state also falls within the prohibition laid down in that provision where the importation of alcoholic beverages 
lawfully produced and marketed in another member state is concerned”. 
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the “defence of the consumer” and the “protection of public health234” as justifying restrictions to trade 
(Purnhagen 2014, p. 9). 
The decision sought to avoid both total and careless de-regulation, as well as endless possibilities to regulate 
and break down the common market (ibid., p.10). It performs a balancing act between “removing obstacles 
to trade in Member State law in order to ensure the benefits gained from comparative cost advantage” and 
recognizing and addressing “negative externalities resulting from de-regulation” (ibid., p. 11). To this aim, the 
decision formulated two key principles that then went on to form the basis for further development of 
European regulation and of the common market (and then “single market”): 
- The “information paradigm”, i.e. whenever a market failure has been identified, “preference should 
be given to an information-related rule wherever that seems sufficient to cure the problem” (ibid., p. 
12) 
- The “principle of mutual recognition” (or “principle of equivalence) which grants “any producer the 
right to circulate a product, once lawfully marketed in one Member State, freely in any Member State 
(…) Disparate regulations may hence generally not hinder the free circulation of such a good, even if 
they have not yet been harmonized” (ibid., p. 14). 
The exception to the second principle is when regulatory measures are needed for one of the “mandatory 
requirements” (fiscal fairness, public health, fair trading and consumer protection) – but even then, the first 
principle applies and, whenever possible, an information requirement should be used instead of a stricter 
standardization, “content related” one – so, in any case, proportionality applies (ibid., p. 14). In addition, 
underpinning the emphasis on information rather than content regulations, is a view that has been called the 
“confident consumer”, one that refuses to “take the ignorant consumer as a yardstick since such an approach 
would ultimately require the prescription of uniform products” (ibid., p. 29-30).  
Cassis de Dijon is a decision that is well known and has been abundantly studied by scholars of EU law. What 
interests us here is that its principles have far-reaching implications, not only for regulatory issues, but for 
their enforcement – and that these principles help define some of the most fundamental differences between 
the EU regulatory approach and others, in a way that makes the EU less risk averse, i.e. more “risk 
proportional”. In addition, these principles can be seen at work also in the WTO Agreements we discussed 
above. 
By mandating mutual recognition except when a real risk to some essential issues can be demonstrated, the 
decision opens the way to a more selective, risk-focused regulatory approach. By emphasizing the use of 
information provisions whenever possible, rather than prescriptive content-focused regulations, it leads into 
risk-proportional regulation, where instruments are differentiated based on the level and type of risk at issue. 
Finally, by relying on a vision of the “confident consumer”235, it embraces a certain level of “risk acceptance”, 
                                                           
234 Neither were relevant in the case, since mandating a higher alcohol content clearly was not beneficial for public health, and since 
the alcohol content was clearly displayed, nor was consumer protection affected. On this last point, the decision strikes down the over-
reliance on mandatory standards when there is no overwhelming public benefit: “standardization of products placed on the market 
and of their designations (…) in the interests of a greater transparency of commercial transactions and offers for sale to the public (…) 
cannot be taken so far as to regard the mandatory fixing of minimum alcohol contents as being an essential guarantee of the fairness 
of commercial transactions, since it is a simple matter to ensure that suitable information is conveyed to the purchaser by requiring 
the display of an indication of origin and of the alcohol content on the packaging of products.” 
235 This is a vision which can be taken both in a normative and positive sense. Purnhagen (2014, p. 26) writes: “the early protagonists 
of an information paradigm for internal market (…) were certainly not naïve as to the realities of consumers’, investors’ or other market 
players’ individual capacity to process information and to reach rational decisions on that basis. Steindorff, for instance, made it clear 
that his concept had to be understood as a normative one when he wrote that the internal market “demanded” a circumspect 
consumer”. At the same time, EC/EU and Member States’ institutions have made considerable efforts to significantly increase, over 
time, the information level (and information processing ability) of consumers – thus taking the “informed consumer” as a positive goal, 
not just a normative view. 
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and at the same time ipso facto makes consumer education and empowerment important activities, including 
for regulators236. 
The ECJ decision did not come in isolation, but rather had its effects coalesce with the results of ongoing trends 
affecting European regulations. In particular, what later came to be called the “Old Approach” to product 
market regulation, which relied on “vertical”, product-specific, detailed and content-oriented rules and 
standards. As Purnhagen (2014) puts it: “this purely centralized regulator model was subject to heavy criticism 
on several accounts. For some, this traditional harmonization approach was ill-suited to achieving the 
objective of market integration, as these Directives regularly covered only one of a wide range of aspects in 
the respective product sectors. For others, the “Europeanisation”-approach resulted in the use of this 
command-and-control-regulation to an extent which had never been exercised before even in national law. In 
their view, “it produced ‘Europroducts’, which alienated the consumer.” Either way, there was widespread 
agreement that the classical standard setting approach envisaged by Art. 100 EEC (now Art. 114 TFEU) was 
not suitable for the achievement of the goals set by the respective Directives (p. 8). One can just add that this 
is a very moderate account of the extent of the backlash that EEC attempts at product standardization started 
to receive in the late 1970s and in the 1980s, particularly in food. All over Europe, complaints of Brussels 
bureaucrats wanting to standardize sausages, vegetable and the like abounded237. There was a double 
pressure to change the approach: making it more effective (both in terms of trade, and of safety), and more 
acceptable (to consumers, producers, opinion-makers etc.). 
 
The “New Approach” 
In 1985 was adopted Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 “on a new approach to technical harmonization and 
standards”. This term of “New Approach” came to designate the way in which the EEC (and later the EU) has 
developed its product market regulations since then – a term normally used for non-food products regulations, 
but an approach which also permeates the food safety sphere.  
The first change was breadth: developing “general rules which are applicable to sectors or families of 
products238 as well as types of hazard239”. The second was the affirmation that mutual recognition would apply 
to “the results of tests”, and the decision to “establish harmonised rules on the operation of certification 
bodies” – thus clarifying the practicalities of mutual recognition, and moving towards harmonization of control 
and certification240.  
The Resolution established a set of fundamental principles, most importantly that “legislative harmonisation 
is limited to essential safety requirements (or other requirements in the general interest) with which products 
put on the market must conform”. Standards are to be developed by “organisations competent in industrial 
standardisation”. The standards’ “technical specifications are not mandatory and maintain their status of 
voluntary standards” – while the authorities must “recognise that products manufactured in conformity with 
                                                           
236 This reliance on the “confident consumer” is a very stark difference between the EU food safety regulatory system, and what can 
be found in post-Soviet countries (and more broadly former Communist countries), and this difference has made approximation of 
systems difficult. The (broadly speaking) “post Communist” regulatory approach is one that firmly assumes the consumer to be helpless 
and constantly under threat, and sees as the only solution a full standardization of products. Even when regulations have been 
approximated to the EU’s, this has continued to create challenges in transforming practices.  
237 In this respect, the “Old Approach” in food was far closer to the post-Soviet model, where standardizing everything, including 
sausages and yoghurt, is the norm, and consumer choice as well as producer diversity are severely restricted. 
238 Cf. Purnhagen (2014), p. 34: “the ‘new approach’ was the first systematic regulation to be applied to several product groups”. 
239 This quote and subsequent ones are all from Council Resolution 85/C 136/01 accessible at: http://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-
content/EN/TXT/?uri=URISERV:l21001a.  
240 The Resolution also asserted what one could call an early “better regulation” goal: “keep a constant check on the technical 
regulations which are applied so as to withdraw those which are deemed obsolete or superfluous” (a kind of “sunset clause” aim, 
which has been inconsistently applied). 
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harmonised standards are presumed to conform to the essential requirements established by the Directive”, 
a producer can opt to produce goods without adhering to these standards, in which case “he has an obligation 
to prove that his products conform to the essential requirements”. Crucially for implementation, and for our 
research, the Resolution was also concerned with the means of realization of its aims, and building trust in the 
system – it stated: “the public authorities must ensure the protection of safety (or other requirements 
envisaged) on their territory. This is a necessary condition to establish mutual trust between Member States.” 
Moving from the “Old Approach” to the “New Approach” did not only require a change of concepts and 
principles – it required a constitutional, legal basis. The combination of market pressure (by consumers and 
producers alike) and change of legal paradigm after Cassis de Dijon enabled this transformation. Whereas early 
European regulations “stipulated classical command-and-control mechanisms, which regulated the product’s 
lifecycle (…) by the setting of detailed, obligatory substantial and procedural standards”, the “change in 
approach of the ECJ (…) provided the basis for the introduction of more conceptual and systematic EU product 
safety regulation” (Purnhagen 2014, pp. 33-35). The default assumption was from then on that goods could 
be freely traded and sold across all the EEC as long as they did not “form a hazard to the health and safety of 
consumers” (ibid., p. 34) – and, through its preference for information rather than content rules, the ECJ 
pushed for “lighter” regulation. 
As indicated, the “New Approach” is significant also by the emphasis it puts on the effectiveness of post-
market control. Growth in market volumes and complexity, even before 1985, led to “an increasing realization 
that only pre-market measures (…) would not suffice and could not ensure European product safety” (ibid., p. 
34). There was a fear that “if it was left to the Member States to establish post-market measures, the result 
would be a divergence of the marketing of hazardous products. Such divergence would be contrary to the goal 
of the single-market integration, which enabled the free movement of goods only to the extent that they did 
not impose a hazard to consumers” (ibid.).  
To address this problem, the EEC took a dual track, which is highly relevant for the study of inspections and 
enforcement: while it undertook to make “market surveillance” more uniform (to the extent possible) and 
effective241, in line with the “New Approach” Resolution, it also decided to considerably strengthen the liability 
of economic operators. Thus, it attempted to draw on two compliance and safety drivers at once: more 
effective direct controls by the state, and stronger economic incentives through liability. As a result, in 1985 
was also adopted the “Product Liability Directive” 85/374/EEC – “within this Directive, the Council understood 
post-market control in a wide sense, covering not only classical post-market administrative supervision, but 
also, and in line with the ‘regulation through litigation’ - approach, rules on product liability” (ibid., p. 36).  
While the “New Approach” stricto sensu applies only to non-food products, the same evolution and thinking 
also came to be applied to food safety regulations. Several important “horizontal” directives were adopted 
(under the auspices of the Industry DG) in the 1980s and early 1990s: “Methods of Sampling and Analysis” in 
1985, “Official Control” in 1989, “Hygiene of Foodstuffs” in 1993 – while, at the same time, DG Agriculture 
continued to develop a number of “vertical” directives covering milk, eggs, fishery products, game etc. The 
logic of the Cassis decision applied as much to food as to non-food products. Some additional factors came in 
to push for a more complete transformation of the food safety sphere, which we will now consider. 
                                                           
241 “The General Product Safety Directive also introduced classic regulations on administrative market surveillance. Besides some action 
towards pre-market regulation, the Directive obliges Member States to supervise the safety of products and empowers them to take 
specific measures. Inter alia, these measures include the issuance of warnings and the withdrawal of products. It also introduced a 
notification system to the Commission and a Union-wide system of withdrawal of products in case of urgency, which has been affirmed 
by the ECJ. The European institutions’ political agenda to widen the “new approach” also to enforcement came fully to light when the 
Commission issued a 1994 Communication to ensure the uniform enforcement of Union legislation across all Member States.” 




Food safety crises and the construction of the “Single Market” 
Over the 1980s and 1990s, a series of food safety crises and “scares” contributed to a growing awareness of 
food safety issues and an increase in the demand of regulatory protection by consumers, at the same time as 
the European construction moved from the “Common Market” to the “Single Market”. This, combined with 
the new foundation for regulation provided by the Cassis ruling and the perspectives opened by the “New 
Approach”, led to a completely transformed European food safety framework. 
First, food safety crises and public “scares”. The beef hormone case unfolded from 1980 until 1985, resulting 
in a complete ban (EU 2007, p. 26). Outbreaks of botulism, salmonella and E. coli were recorded over the 
decade, and made a significant impression on the public (ibid.). Clearly, however, the most significant in terms 
of its regulatory impact was the Bovine Spongiform Encephalopathy (BSE) crisis, and the cases of variant 
Creutzfeldt-Jakob Disease (vCDJ) it caused in humans242. This crisis cast doubts simultaneously on the science 
used as basis for regulations and inspections, on the credibility of the authorities and the reassurances they 
issued, on the regulatory requirements, on the controls conducted to ensure safety – and led to border 
closings and embargoes, a significant breakdown of the market integration process which ran contrary to the 
whole European project.  
As these successive crises unfolded, the development of the European project entered a new phase with the 
ratification of the 1986 Single European Act. This first major revision of the Treaty of Rome had as main 
objective the creation of a “Single Market”, to be fully operational by 1 January 1993243. The move from the 
“Common Market” to the “Single Market” was not just semantics, but substantial. In the “Common Market” 
setting, free trade was the objective, but national markets still functioned separately. Physical border posts 
(including customs) were still operational. Goods were still exported from one country to another. In the food 
safety perspective, this had very important consequences. Whereas food markets were to a significant extent 
segmented until December 1992, they made one from January 1993. This meant that no additional 
requirement whatsoever could be imposed (except in emergency circumstances, such as came to be the case 
during the BSE crisis) on food shipments from one European Community Member State to another. Until 1992, 
for instance, veterinary controls in England were applied specifically to meat destined for exports, while (as 
we have seen above) controls for the internal market were significantly looser. From 1993, there was no longer 
an “internal” and an “external” market for England, only a single, unified European market – and thus new 
procedures (and bodies) had to be introduced for England to guarantee the same level of inspections as other 
Member States. 
Establishing a single market meant that the European Community (and in particular its operational branch, the 
European Commission) had to guarantee consumers that the same level of safety would be ensured (or even, 
preferably, a higher level of safety, given the weaknesses in existing systems laid bare by the successive crises). 
This does not mean that an identical level of safety was objectively reached – nor that the choices made were, 
with certainty, the most effective – though both may be the case244. It means, however, that citizens, traders 
                                                           
242 We write here “caused” even though there have been some doubts and questions remaining on the transmission mechanism. We 
also indicate the crisis as being most significant for its regulatory impact. This is not to say the impact on public health was minor, but 
it was considerably smaller than feared at some point. Worldwide, the total number of vCJD cases (and fatalities) is 229 as of April 
2015 – see the following website for background and data: http://www.cjd.ed.ac.uk. See also Blanc et al. (2015) p. 30.  
243 There were other important elements e.g. in relation to political cooperation, but these are not relevant for this research. 
244 In order to assess such claims, one would need to have very detailed and reliable data, allowing to correct for a number of external 
factors, so as to evaluate the impact of the changes introduced. As we have discussed above (in the section on the United States), the 
performance of the EU food safety system overall appears high. In addition, it includes (as we will discuss below) a significant 
component of monitoring aiming at ensuring that the performance of all Member States is adequate and comparable (if not identical, 
which is a difficult goal to achieve) in practice.  
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and customers had to be confident that this level of safety was ensured, in order to provide appropriate trust 
for the market to function. 
With hindsight, it is likely that either the full consequences of the changes required by the “Single Market” 
were not perceived, or that political agreement for the institutional changes required could not be secured at 
the time. Indeed, while efforts were made at harmonization in the run-up to January 1993, no permanent 
structure existed to ensure that practices remained both adequate and roughly equivalent, except for 
veterinary control (and even then, its resources were limited). While the European market was now as 
integrated as the US market245, and while European food safety legislation was to a large extent harmonized 
(possibly more than in the US)246, there was no equivalent to the FDA and FSIS. We have briefly referred to the 
discussions, which took place in the US in the years leading to 1906, on which institutional model would be 
appropriate for food controls, including the view that controls at state borders by state regulators would be 
sufficient – and, eventually, the creation of federal agencies with a mandate over interstate commerce. The 
EC/EU situation was and is different – the single market does not make differences between interstate and 
other commerce (more integration), but the principle of subsidiarity247 means implementation should as much 
as possible be done at the Member State level or lower (less integration).  
The BSE crisis248 led to the creation of a new institutional framework249. First “in 1997, the Food and Veterinary 
Office (FVO) was established as a successor of the former “veterinary inspection unit” to carry out inspections 
to “ensure compliance with EU food safety and animal health rules” (EU 2007 p. 33). Then, in 1999, “within 
the European Commission, the previously dispersed food units merged to form a part of the Directorate-
General for Health and Consumer Protection. This enabled a separation of tasks between those responsible 
for ensuring food safety, animal health and welfare and plant health, and those in charge of agriculture and 
food markets” (ibid.). With the Food and Veterinary Office reporting to this new DG (called in short “SanCo”), 
the EU (which superseded the EC with the Maastricht Treaty) now had a new, and original, institutional setup. 
One “quasi-regulatory” institution with a mandate covering all the food chain, all food products, everywhere 
in the EU – and an implementation body, not conducting inspections of food businesses and premises directly, 
but rather inspecting and auditing the way Member States’ “competent authorities” do so. Finally, in 2002, 
was adopted Regulation (EC) 178/2002 called “General Food Law” which “introduced the “farm to fork” 
approach, i.e. the application of good food safety practices and controls at each and every point in the food 
chain and the necessity for food to be traceable right back to its original source” and also “provided for the 
creation of the European Food Safety Authority” and overhauled the Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed 
(EU 2007, p. 38). The European Food Safety Authority (EFSA) was the last piece in the institutional puzzle, in 
charge of scientific risk assessment (and thus evaluation of “novel foods” and the like), and the strengthening 
of RASFF improved the inter-operation of national food safety systems. 
                                                           
245 Not necessarily in volumes and percentage of trade, but in freedom of movement for goods, animals etc. 
246 While Member States have retained (at least in some cases) some additional requirements (which, as per ECJ jurisprudence, end 
up in many cases applying only to their own businesses), EU food safety law covers all aspects of food safety, and all types of products 
– which is a significantly higher level of integration than the US case. 
247 As well as strong objective factors such as the difficulty of creating control bodies that would have to function in all EU languages, 
and of achieving acceptance by the public for controls performed directly by “Brussels”. Both obstacles are daunting enough, even 
were subsidiarity to be weakened. 
248 Additional crises and scandals took place over the 1990s, which also contributed to the changes, e.g. the discovery of dioxin in 
chicken feed produced in Belgium in 1999 (and subsequent food chain contamination)– see 
http://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pubmed/11896663  




As a result, the EU has an institutional structure for food safety which has some similarities with the UK’s250, 
in the way it is “two tiered”: a top-tier agency (FVO) ensuring some level of consistency and uniformity in 
practices, and bottom-tier agencies actually performing controls with, for some Member States, a middle-tier 
of national “Competent Authorities” who co-ordinate and supervise controls that are performed by local 
authorities (as in the UK).  
 
Key characteristics of the EU food safety regulatory system – 
and consequences on inspections 
The contemporary EU food safety regulatory system, beyond the 2002 General Food Law, relies essentially on 
a set of regulations adopted in 2004, which are known collectively as the “Hygiene Package”, and have been 
regularly updated since then. The “Hygiene Package” generally replaces and supersedes previous “vertical” 
legislation, and embodies the principles affirmed in the 2002 Food Law. The four regulations are: 852/2004/EU 
on General Food Hygiene, 853/2004/EU on Specific Hygiene Rules for Food of Animal Origin, 854/2004/EU on 
Official Control of Food of Animal Origin Intended for Human Consumption, and 882/2004/EU on Official Food 
and Feed Control251. The “Hygiene Package” is complemented by a number of “horizontal” directives and 
regulations that have remained in force (or been added/revised after its adoption), e.g. 1996/23/EC 
(monitoring of residues in live animals and animal products). The new regulations did not only supersede 
“vertical” legislation, but also earlier attempts at “horizontal” regulation, which we briefly discussed above – 
and, in so doing, brought a greater level of integration in controlling the entire food chain. For instance, in 
contrast to directive 1993/43/EEC, which was the previous attempt at regulating general food hygiene, 
regulation 852/2004/EU covers also primary production, “from farm to fork” (a.k.a. “from stable to table”), in 
a way that the previously existing division between the Agriculture and Consumer DGs did not allow. 
It is not relevant for our work to enter here in the details of these regulations, but important to highlight their 
most important elements. First, the regulations embody the “farm to fork” principle by requiring from all 
operators to ensure traceability of their products “one step up and one step down” (at least to the immediate 
supplier and customer) They apply to the entire food chain – they also apply across all sectors and sub-sectors, 
and to all kinds of operators (producers, processors, traders, transporters, food service). Second, they rely on 
the full liability of “Food Business Operators” (FBOs), as they designate all establishments and entities dealing 
with food – and this liability is seen as a fundamental tool to ensure compliance with the regulations (by raising 
the potential costs of non-compliance, since FBOs are responsible for any harm caused) - as well as secure the 
legitimacy of the system (since victims are compensated). Third, the regulations internalize the impossibility 
of “zero risk” – they foresee the conditions in which a recall is mandated, and the ways in which it should be 
performed, in adequate detail. They do so in a way that provides real incentives for FBOs to proactively initiate 
a recall if they detect a problem – since their liability is engaged in case they do not perform the recall, but can 
be at least to some extent mitigated if they do so in a timely manner. Fourth, they require of FBOs not only to 
comply with hygienic requirements or Maximum Residue Levels (MRLs), but also to put in place and effectively 
implement permanent self-control systems, in order to ensure that food is constantly and consistently safe at 
every stage – a requirement that is based on the Hazard Analysis and Critical Control Points (HACCP) 
approach252. Fifth, they openly and clearly formulate risk as an organizing principle – on the basis of which 
                                                           
250 Which one could see as ironic. It should be noted that the FVO was set up before the UK FSA. The similarity is partial, since the split 
of responsibilities is different: the FSA does some controls directly (Meat Hygiene) and includes scientific risk assessment, whereas the 
FVO relies entirely on Member States for controls of Food Business Operators (FBOs), and scientific risk assessment is done by EFSA. 
251 In the narrow sense, the “Hygiene Package” designates only regulations 852, 853 and 854, but regulation 882 is very closely linked, 
and generally considered as part of the “package” by many professionals. It was adopted in the same year, and with the same approach. 
252 A few remarks are needed on this “HACCP requirement”. First, flexibility is foreseen for small operations, in particular if no clear 
“Critical Control Points” can be identified, and “Good Hygiene Practices” (which otherwise are a pre-requisite for HACCP) can be 
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regulatory instruments have to be chosen, regulatory resources allocated, enforcement responses decided 
upon. Sixth, they apply this risk-based approach not only to inspections of already operating businesses, but 
to the pre-operation stage – under the “Hygiene Package”, only FBOs producing/processing food of animal 
origin are subject to mandatory approval before start of operation, all others can start operating after a simple 
registration (notification). Seventh, and crucially for us, they regulate also official controls. 
Regulation 882/2004/EU on official controls253 is of particular importance for us, in more ways than one. In its 
approach, because it squarely defines risk as the fundamental criterion on which food safety controls should 
be organized. In its reach, because it is a regulation that governs how national inspection bodies should work 
– and seeks to do so in a way that provides confidence that official controls are essentially equivalent all over 
the EU’s territory. In its details, finally, because it demonstrates a level of attention to the fineries of 
inspections and enforcement, to the questions of risk assessment, planning, quality control, staffing levels and 
training, funding level and sources, methods and tools. This makes it a rather unique document, in that it is 
vanishingly rare to see national legislation on inspections being this detailed and comprehensive254. 
 
Risk – the foundation of official controls’ planning and implementation 
Point 13 of the Regulation’s preamble prescribes that “the frequency of official controls should be regular and 
proportionate to the risk, taking into account the results of the checks carried out by feed and food business 
operators under HACCP based control programmes or Quality Assurance Programmes, where such 
programmes are designed to meet requirements of feed and food law, animal health and animal welfare 
rules”. The Regulation mandates the use of risk-based planning, specifically through “multi-annual national 
control plans in accordance with broad guidelines drawn up at Community level. These guidelines should 
promote coherent national strategies, and identify risk-based priorities and the most effective control 
procedures255” (Preamble, point 34). In its Article 1, the Regulation then goes on to state that the aims of 
official controls are “preventing, eliminating or reducing to acceptable levels risks to humans and animals, 
either directly or through the environment” and “guaranteeing fair practices in feed and food trade and 
protecting consumer interests” – thus, it keeps the old duality of purpose (safety, and market rules) that we 
                                                           
accepted as sufficient. The level of flexibility shown in practice varies considerably between countries [author’s own observations 
discussing with senior food safety officials in 6 different EU countries: UK, France, Italy, Latvia, Lithuania, Poland], and European 
Commission guidance on this topic is often not known, and in any case not mandatory as it is only a guidance document (i.e. “for 
information purposes only” – available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food/biosafety/hygienelegislation/guidance_doc_haccp_en.pdf). 
Second, in primary production, the application of all principles of HACCP is not mandatory but the introduction of GHP is compulsory 
and the elaboration of related hygiene guidelines are suggested. Finally, what the regulation requires is application of HACCP principles, 
not the obtention of a HACCP certificate from a conformity assessment provider. 
In primary production, the application of all principles of HACCP is not mandatory but compulsory the introduction of GHP and the 
elaboration of related hygiene guidelines are suggested. 
253 “Official controls”, in the context of this Regulation, include: “audit” (systemic check of whether activities comply with planned 
arrangements in particular internal quality/safety controls), “inspection” (thorough verification of compliance of operations/products 
with legal requirements), “monitoring” (planned sequence of measurements/observations to obtain a representative view of the 
compliance level). While the first two target individual FBOs, the third one is aimed at producing statistical information to assess the 
regulatory system’s effectiveness. 
254 The OECD Best Practice Principles of 2014 cover most of these issues (though in limited details, due to the nature of the document), 
but in all national-level legislation studied by the author (covering well over 20 countries), nearly no law was covered that would cover 
all these aspects (some draft laws being developed with World Bank Group support, e.g. in Mongolia, would do so, but have not yet 
been adopted). Though it is practically impossible to prove an absence, we can safely say that Regulation 882 is one of the very few 
examples of legislation covering all these aspects (and doing so in significant detail). The European Commission is now trying to 
somewhat replicate this approach in the field of non-food products safety with the new “Product Safety and Market Surveillance 
Package” (still under consideration) - 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumers_safety/product_safety_legislation/product_safety_and_market_surveillance_package/i
ndex_en.htm.  
255 Which means not only should planning be risk-based, but the choice of instruments be linked to risk as well.  
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have observed elsewhere, but clearly puts risk prevention or mitigation first. Then, in its Article 3, the 
Regulation goes on to define more specifically the risk factors that should be taken into account: “identified 
risks associated” with specifics of the product or operation (inherent risk), “operators’ past record as regards 
compliance”, the “reliability” of internal controls and external information “that might indicate non-
compliance”256. Article 54 further directs that “when deciding which action to take [in case of non-compliance], 
the competent authority shall take account of the nature of the non-compliance and that operator's past 
record with regard to non-compliance”, which outlines a risk-proportionate enforcement approach not unlike 
the UK HSE’s – and Article 55 also prescribes that sanctions should be “proportionate”. In short, risk, risk 
assessment, risk proportionality are the foundations of the entire Regulation. 
 
Regulating official controls and ensuring coherence and equivalence across all the EU 
This is, of course, the very purpose of the Regulation: ensuring as much uniformity of food safety controls all 
over the EU. While mitigating risks is the main aim, and risk is the foundation for organization and 
implementation, uniformity is the direct operational objective. The Regulation attempts to achieve it through 
a number of prescriptions on methods, capacity and means. First, procedures: “official controls should take 
place on the basis of documented procedures so as to ensure that these controls are carried out uniformly 
and are of a consistently high quality” (Preamble, point 14). Second, coordination at all levels: “competent 
authorities should ensure that where different control units are involved in carrying out official controls, 
appropriate coordination procedures are in place and effectively implemented” (Preamble, point 15). The 
same is mandated between “central level” and “regional or local level” in countries where it is relevant (point 
16), between different competent authorities including those in charge of “environmental and health 
protection” (article 4), across Member States (Preamble point 22) etc. Third, the Regulation requires 
competent authorities to have adequate human capacity (numbers and competence), equipment and access 
to laboratories (with a number of additional prescriptions specifically for laboratories), and legal powers. 
Adequate resources are required by point 32 of the Preamble, as well as Article 26. Staff numbers and 
competence are covered repeatedly, e.g. in Preamble points 11 and 12 and Article 4. Equipment and 
laboratories access are in Preamble point 11, Article 4, Article 16 etc. The requirements on laboratories are 
covered in details in Article 12 and in Title III (Reference Laboratories) of the Regulation. Legal powers are in 
Article 4, and Title VII (Enforcement Measures). 
In order to ensure that these different aspects are all being adequately complied with, and with a particular 
focus on the planning and implementation of controls, the Regulation foresees a whole system of “control of 
the controllers”. In this two-tier system257, the Commission controls Member States’ Competent Authorities, 
in particular their implementation of the “multi-annual national control plans” – which should “enable the 
Commission inspection services to verify whether the official controls in the Member States are organised in 
accordance with the criteria laid down in this Regulation” (Preamble, point 36). Member States should also 
submit annual reports to the Commission (Preamble, point 37).Title VI, Chapter I covers “Community 
Controls”. The “Commission experts shall carry out general and specific audits in Member States” (Article 45), 
it shall “establish an annual control programme” (ibid.). 
 
                                                           
256 And Article 16 mandates an essentially similar approach for checks of imports. Article 46 prescribes that the frequency of third-
countries controls should also be risk-based. 
257 Or three-tier, when national Competent Authorities themselves supervise local authorities which conduct the actual controls. 
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A comprehensive understanding of inspections issues 
As we have briefly indicated, the Regulation attempts to cover all of the issues relevant to inspections’ 
effectiveness. We have already mentioned the sections dealing with resources, staffing, laboratories, powers. 
The Regulation also covers the question of fees, to be used as one of the sources of funding for official controls 
– and, in so doing, it builds on previous EC/EU legislation starting from 1985, which enabled to raise fees for 
veterinary controls258. The Regulation also emphasizes the importance of training, and it empowers the 
Commission to organize EU-wide training to ensure effectiveness and consistency (cf. Article 32 for reference 
laboratories, Article 51 for control staff)259. Thus, the Regulation covers every aspect of inspections: goals, legal 
powers, risk assessment, planning, tools and methods, resources (incl. staff and equipment), sampling and 
testing, decision making, reporting, training, coordination, exchange of information – as well as crisis 
contingency planning, emergency response, recalls etc. 
 
Tentative conclusion 
The EU has tried to not only transform the methods of its food safety regulatory system (with a strong 
emphasis on risk), but to put a lot of focus on improving inspections and making them more coherent and 
consistent. This has led to a rise in the FVO’s importance, including through its audits260 of Member States261, 
and its work on assessing candidate countries’ readiness (and advising them on reforms to get ready). To the 
extent that evidence is available, this appears to have been a real success, in the sense that the overall 
performance of the system is high (in spite of the limitations in assessing how high, and how well it compares, 
that we discussed above) – and that it has allowed a far greater integration of the EU market, and 
accommodated an increase in trade volumes and complexity. Success on consumer trust and confidence is not 
perfect, but real, particularly considering how difficult the situation was in the 1990s. New Member States 
have been “brought up” from (in some cases) very problematic situations up to levels of food safety that are 
generally in line with the older EU Members – as evidenced by FVO audits and EFSA monitoring.  
There are, however, important limitations that prevent us from drawing strong conclusions on the 
effectiveness of the different systems. First, there is insufficient epidemiological data to assess if the system 
performs indeed better now than in the past, or (as some claim) than the US’s (and, if so, to what extent) – 
and in any case, there are very serious attribution issues. It is unclear how strong is the link between food 
safety data, and improved (or assumed to be improved) controls. Second, while the inspection regime 
foreseen by EU Regulation 882/2004 is strongly risk based in terms of what aspects of operations should be 
regulated, risk focused in terms of inspections planning, and (to a large extent) risk proportional, it fails to 
incorporate a really comprehensive approach to compliance. This means that food safety controls based on 
the implementation of this regulation, while risk-based, are not necessarily “smart” in terms of incorporating 
several complementary instruments, or a responsive enforcement approach.  
Indeed, throughout the directive, when compliance is mentioned it is primarily from a deterrence angle 
(requirements to have dissuasive sanctions: Preamble point 41, article 55). The FVO harmonization efforts are 
                                                           
258 Veterinary inspection fees are important because they play a strong role in the EU’s capacity to have far more systematic slaughter 
inspections than the US (see above on this) – the fees are foreseen in Preamble point 32, and covered in details in Article 27, which 
distinguishes between areas where fees are mandatory (detailed in Annexes IV and V, essentially: veterinary control of slaughter, and 
imports) – and other areas, where Member States may impose fees. The Regulation also sets a minimum level for mandatory fees, and 
guidelines for fee-setting overall (including proportionality to complexity/size, possibility to reduce fees when risk is low etc.). 
259 In practice, this has resulted in the Better Training for Safer Food programme – see EU 2007, pp. 17 and 38. 
260 See audit programme here: http://ec.europa.eu/food/food_veterinary_office/audit_programmes/index_en.htm and audit reports 
here: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/index.cfm  
261 EFSA is playing the main role in monitoring – see: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/panels.htm, 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/salmonella.htm etc. But the FVO is also active in some areas, see e.g. 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/specialreports/pesticides_index_en.htm  on pesticides. 
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conducted from this perspective as well: ensuring inspections are well targeted, and technically competent – 
but not that there are serious efforts made to support understanding of requirements and actual compliance 
levels. To the extent that compliance promotion efforts can make a real difference in economic, social and 
safety outcomes (something which, as we will discuss further in this research, there are serious grounds to 
consider), this is a major shortcoming. 
 
2.3. Conclusions and relevance for our research 
 
This historical overview has served to show the sheer diversity and path dependence of institutional 
structures. Even in a field as “science based” as food safety, where official guidelines from the EU (and 
recommendations from agencies such as UN FAO) push towards an institutional model (single agency or at 
least greater integration), there is very significant diversity, and often fragmentation262. There are also all kind 
of “national peculiarities” (delegated functions to private sector bodies in the Netherlands, importance of local 
authorities in the UK, etc.). This means that efforts to make inspections more risk-focused, “smarter” etc. take 
place in an institutional context that is rarely “optimal”, and that in any case was generally not really 
“designed”, and emerged as a result of many historical accidents. When real consolidation takes place, it is 
often either in the context of dramatic external and internal pressure (“transition crisis” and EU pressure for 
Baltic states), or over several decades (Netherlands). This both creates an apparent challenge to reform and 
efficient improvement efforts, as well as an opportunity to examine whether different institutional set ups 
have a major incidence on results, or whether it is possible to improve the way inspections are organised and 
conducted regardless of these. 
At the same time, though, we have observed a number of trends, from which we can try and extract some 
lessons – which, though they do not have the strength of statistical observations or demonstrations, can 
nonetheless shed some lights on the origins and development of inspection functions, and their relationship 
to the question of risk.  
A first common aspect across countries and regulatory areas include the fact that inspection mandates and 
agencies emerged not so much in relation to quantified, scientifically determined risk – but far more in 
reaction to risk perceptions, breakdowns in trust, emergence of new hazards that generated strong reactions 
                                                           
262 Modern food safety approaches, as advocated for instance by UN FAO and mandated by the EU legislation on the topic, emphasise 
the importance of “farm to fork” traceability, and thus of a control system that ensures integration of information and findings along 
the entire food chain. Considering that distinct agencies under separate ministries typically have difficulties effectively sharing 
information and coordinating their actions, the European Commission (and in particular the Food and Veterinary Office, part of DG 
SanCo) has been pushing candidate countries very strongly to create “unified” food safety agencies or inspectorates. As is wont to 
happen, this pressure has been more or less strong and effective depending on the relative size and/or negotiating positions of 
candidate countries - and countries have reacted to it in different ways (resisting or embracing it) depending on their own contexts. 
Thus, Poland entered the EU with fragmented food safety control (trade inspection, hygiene, veterinary service), as well as Slovenia 
(health and veterinary service - in the meantime, a new unified Food Safety Inspection has recently been created), whereas Lithuania 
and Estonia created very strongly integrated institutions (Lithuania gathering all control functions related to food safety and animal 
health, adding a large swathe of the regulatory powers, the laboratory network etc.). Absent strong external pressure, it is far more 
rare to see countries radically transforming their own administrative structures, given the organisational inertia and status quo bias, 
and lobbying power of large regulatory enforcement agencies. Thus, in many countries of the Former Soviet Union, there still are at 
least three agencies (not counting those in charge of plant protection) looking at food safety: the sanitary and hygiene, veterinary and 
standards services (as most of these countries still make widespread use of mandatory standards in the food sphere). Some countries 
(e.g. Armenia) have gone towards establishing a single food safety agency, but this has usually been in the context of international 




of “dread” (in line with the findings in Slovic 1987) , and also as a result of active “lobbying” by what we could 
call, following Helsloot and Schmidt (2012), “risk experts”.  
A second element we have found consistently is path dependence. Creating fully new institutions, revising 
mandates or resources radically, are all very rare. Even when reforms, mergers etc. do occur, they usually do 
so on the basis of whichever structures, legal framework and practices existed. Path dependence applies not 
only to structures, mandates and resources, but to regulatory approaches, and in particular to inspection and 
enforcement methods and objectives. We will come back to this question in more depth because of its 
importance in our research perspective. 
The third tentative finding from our historical review would be a gradual, incomplete but real tendency to 
some convergence in structures and methods, at least in some areas, e.g. food safety, where international 
integration (and competition) is stronger. This convergence appears to incorporate a growing emphasis on risk 
as a fundamental criterion for determining the appropriate enforcement response, focusing inspection 
resources – and, to some extent, even the adequate level of regulation. This qualified (and far from universal) 
finding, however, appears to run contrary to some recent research on risk and regulation, and requires further 
discussion. 
 
a. Understanding path dependence, and its limits 
The importance of path dependence has been well perceived by many authors. In trying to understand 
different “risk regulation regimes”, Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001) consider several explanatory factors, 
which they group under the notion of “context”. They thus look at the extent to which the actual features of 
different regulatory regimes263 can be explained through three key elements: “market failure”264, opinion-
responsive regulation, and the interplay of the different interests, lobbies and experts. They find, overall, that 
even though these different context elements appear to explain some features in some cases, there are 
important variations and discrepancies that appear difficult to explain within the chosen models. They then 
turn their attention to “inherent” aspects of these different regimes, and path dependence265. The authors 
find that the “historical points of departure” influence successive developments, and how “context” elements 
(e.g. “interest-group activity”) play out (p. 140). The difficulty of “introducing radically new legislation or 
standards” means that “incremental adjustment and patching” is frequent (p. 140-141).  
There are several ways in which such path dependence functions. One is, as indicated, the fact that radical 
changes to laws, standards, rules and institutions are difficult, and correspondingly rare. Another is that the 
“regulatory community” has in a way an “inner life”, and definitely develops over time a certain culture and 
view of what is appropriate or not (ibid., p. 141-142) – something which our examples above clearly also 
validate. More broadly, the entire “context” explanation is, in a way, a form of “path dependence” vision to 
an extent, because many “context” elements have themselves been shaped by historical evolution, in 
particular how responsive (and with which types of response) the government is to public risk perceptions, 
and also how interest groups, lobbies and experts view their interests, play them out and influence policy. 
                                                           
263 Though the authors call them “risk regulatory regimes” we would suggest that they would be more accurately termed “hazard 
regulatory regimes”, in keeping with the difference between “hazard” and “risk” exposed e.g. by BRDO (2012). 
264 We will not discuss here the question of whether it was pertinent in the first place to adopt this list of “context” elements, but 
clearly ‘market failure’ is primarily a justification for regulatory intervention (from a purely economically rational standpoint), and not 
an explanatory factor for the actual features of regulation.  
265 Defined here as the idea “that policy and administrative routines tend to be heavily influenced by their historical point of origin, 
with inertia leading to persistence of original form, patterns of development that are path-dependent and often characterized by 
sudden abrupt changes rather than smooth adaptation to changing context” (Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin 2001, p. 69). 
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There are, however, powerful elements that come to (at least partly) counterbalance path dependence. The 
first is the occasional discontinuity occasioned by sudden high-profile accidents – even though the strength of 
this factor is unequal266. The evolution of science and techniques is a second, sometimes very powerful driver, 
e.g. by making hazards visible or understood, and/or by giving the tools necessary to detect and control them 
– as we have seen for instance in the food safety case, at repeated points. Supra-national factors also clearly 
play a significant role (though exactly how significant is not easy to determine), at least in some areas – as we 
have seen in the food safety sphere, where the EU has pushed quite profound transformations in institutions 
and methods, and the WTO also introduced new requirements (and litigation mechanisms to try and enforce 
them). Clearly, these unifying forces are not able to overcome all specificities and historical inheritances – 
otherwise we would see far more unified food safety inspectorates, for instance. But the creation of the FSA 
in the UK, the FSMA in the US (and new discussions on potentially merging several agencies), both testify to 
the reality of such forces. Likewise, the creation and successive development of the HSE demonstrates that 
evolutions in the society, economy and techniques can lead to quite significant changes – but the ways in 
which these changes are different and happen at different paces in varying countries shows the importance 
of historical and context factors. 
Assessing the significance of path dependency in terms of effectiveness and efficiency of inspections and 
enforcement is complex. In some instances, it may relate to issues which end up not being binding constraints 
in terms of methods, practices etc. – such as the exact split of institutional mandates between several 
agencies, or whether central or local government is in charge. While these aspects clearly influence the choice 
of methods and approaches, they do not generally prevent change e.g. the adoption of a more risk-based or 
compliance-promoting model. Where path dependency is more significant is when  
 
b. Is there (and can there be) a convergence towards risk-based approaches? 
In the above case studies and ‘snapshots’, as well as in the conclusion, we have suggested that there was to 
some degree a trend towards a ‘convergence’ of sorts, at least in some regulatory areas – and that this 
convergence appeared to be in the direction of more “risk-based” inspections. We saw that the prescriptions 
about risk that can be found in the EU “Hygiene Package”, the US FSM Act, or the WTO SPS agreement, were 
generally consistent with each other – and also corresponded to the definition of risk that is most commonly 
used in regulatory inspections: the combination of the likelihood of hazard, and its potential severity and 
magnitude267. We did not, however, look closely as to whether (and to which extent) references to ‘risk’ e.g. 
in WTO and EU documents were in fact matched by reality of practice. Thus, while there is undeniably a claim 
of increasingly risk-based practices (at least in food safety), it does not follow that this claim is fully backed up 
by practice, and even less that it is applicable to other regulatory areas. 
Some authors have, in fact, radically challenged claims of ‘convergence’ and questioned whether they are, in 
fact, “universally applicable foundations for improving the quality, efficiency, and rationality of governance 
across policy domains”, as some of their proponents have claimed (Rothstein, Borraz and Huber 2013). They 
point out that, as of 2013, “no comparative research has sought to explore whether the emergence of risk-
based approaches to governance in the UK has been mirrored in other member state contexts, nor for that 
matter, at the level of the EC” (ibid., p. 218) – an important gap, which that article and subsequent work aimed 
at contributing to filling, and which this present research also intends to help address. In their short overview 
                                                           
266 What has been “termed ‘tombstone-ability’ – the capacity of a risk to produce deaths or suffering victims through dramatic 
catastrophes (…) seems likely to augment the force of public opinion in shaping regime content” but “only one of the observed 
elements of regime content that was way out of line with the opnion-responsive hypothesis involved a ‘tombstone-able’ risk” (ibid., p. 
140). 
267 See BRDO 2012 and World Bank Group 2013 a. 
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of the cases of France and Germany, in counterpoint with the UK, the authors find (somewhat unsurprisingly, 
one could add) that “the emergence of risk as an organizing concept of governance varies across countries” 
(p. 231). More importantly, they find considerable barriers to the adoption of risk-based approaches in France 
and Germany. In both countries, a combination of cultural and legal factors appear to make such approaches 
really problematic, and to result in risk-based regulation remaining very limited in scope and depth.  
In France, they find that the idea of risk-based regulation268 runs contrary to several key organizing principles 
of public policy: “the culturally established commitment or “promise” by the French state to provide security 
for its population”, “the priority given to maintaining “public order;” a principle that is defined in 
administrative law, has been interpreted by the courts, and (…) underpins a core role of state officials in 
preventing any event that could create disorder and undermine the authority of the Republic”, the “principle 
of equal treatment for all (…) [which] can conflict with risk-based approaches to setting priorities and allocating 
scarce resources” and “the concept of the “general interest”, which civil servants are expected to represent 
and defend, under the supervision of the Conseil d’Etat” – a role which risk-based approaches, because they 
result in “more open and deliberative styles of decision making”, could threaten (ibid., pp. 222-223). In 
Germany, they find that barriers to the use of risk-based approaches come from both “the juridified character 
of German policymaking” and “the fragmented federal system that distributes competences – depending on 
policy domain – across at least three levels” (ibid., pp. 225-226). On the courts’ side, the problem is the 
difficulty they have found to balance “the state’s “duty of protection” from dangers (Schutzpflicht)” with the 
need to accept “some degree of “residual risk” (…) [and their] great difficulty in using “probability-x-impact” 
frameworks to define the boundary between unacceptable “dangers” and acceptable “risks.”” The federal 
system, in turn, results in the “presence of multiple decision makers with varying philosophical approaches to 
governing risks and often contradictory interests in the distribution of risks, costs, and benefits” (ibid.).  
The authors go on to show examples of how these resistances have limited their introduction “even where 
risk-based approaches have been internationally mandated” – for instance, “in the case of EU-mandated risk-
based food safety inspection”. In France, “local state services complement the assessment of food safety risks 
posed by businesses with an additional “fudge” risk factor that takes into account the “sensibilities” of the 
département (…). Such factors can undermine the value of risk-based approaches in protecting public health 
if the field-services or the préfet decides that inspection resources should be directed towards maintaining 
public order or protecting their own reputation” (ibid., p. 224). Generally, French state authorities “in 
situations of uncertainty or under pressure from social movements (…) prefer to be risk averse or invoke the 
precautionary principle, even if it means facing later criticism for over-reaction” (ibid.). In Germany likewise, 
“even internationally mandated risk-based approaches to governance can fall foul of constitutional 
arrangements for their implementation. One example was resistance by Länder to EU rules on risk-based food 
safety inspection on the grounds that they contravened constitutional expectations” (ibid., p. 226).  
There are several reasons why we do not think that these views seriously rebut our perspective on risk-based 
approaches. First, we are focusing on inspections and enforcement, not on policy- and rule-making – and this 
is clearly the area where (in spite of shortcomings) there has been the strongest “push” for more risk-based 
approaches (at least in food safety) at the EU level. Second, we would take a somewhat different view of the 
same situations that Rothstein, Borraz and Huber describe – namely, that of the “half-full bottle”. If one 
compares the practices in France and Germany to an ideal of risk-based approaches, or even to the practice 
in the UK (which is not “ideal”, but clearly far more strongly risk-based), then clearly the assessment will be 
that France and Germany are “resisting risk-based approaches”. If one, however, compares the current 
                                                           
268 Defined by the authors as premised on the “idea that governance cannot, and indeed, should not, aim to eliminate all potential 
harms or more generally, “adverse outcomes” (…).Rather, in an adaption of Paracelsus’ maxim – the likely dose makes the poison – 
“risk based” approaches pay attention to both the probability and impact of potential adverse outcomes” (ibid., pp. 215-216). 
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practices in France and Germany with that of a couple of decades earlier in the same countries, there is some 
evidence of changes in the direction of gradually more use of risk-based approaches, at least in some areas. 
Thus, taking again the example of food safety, even though inspections in France and Germany are in some 
areas probably not in full conformity with EU regulations and guidelines (and we would certainly agree, as we 
will discuss in later sections, that they are less risk-based than in the UK), such partial non-conformities are a 
normal part of “real regulatory enforcement”. Considering how much power and clout the EC FVO wields, and 
of how frequently it audits national systems, it is unlikely (to say the least) that France and Germany could get 
away with completely avoiding implementation of EU Regulation 882 – rather, there are problems “at the 
margin”, and indeed the margin can be somewhat too wide.  
This brings us, in conclusion, to two points: the effectiveness question, and the challenge of overcoming 
“national cultural and institutional resistances”. On the first, an earlier paper (focusing on environmental 
regulations and their enforcement) by Rothstein, Irving , Walden and Yearsley (2006) concluded that “case 
studies suggest that they have the potential to improve regulatory understanding and efficiency and overall 
outcomes. (p. 1063). Subsequent sections of this research will consider other evidence, but we have already 
seen some pointers suggesting that “risk-averse” systems are not immune to problems, e.g. the E. coli 
outbreak originated in Germany, whereas Rothstein et al. (2013) have found resistance from local authorities 
in Germany to implementing EU-directed risk-based approaches – in all likelihood in the belief that their own 
system would be more effective, a belief that we now have strong evidence to find mistaken. If indeed there 
are significant differences in effectiveness between risk-based approaches and others, then the question of 
how to foster the adoption of these approaches becomes a very important one. From such a perspective, the 
findings from the 2013 paper suggesting that France and Germany present strong inherent factors making the 
adoption of risk-based approaches very difficult can cause concern. Without discussing this question in depth 
here, it is worth pointing to the limitations of these barriers. Indeed, clearly, introducing risk-based approaches 
may be more or less difficult in different countries, and face in some cases very strong resistances – and 
possibly fail. But there are many examples of reforms in a more risk-based direction taking place in countries 
where cultural and institutional resistances were considerable, e.g. in Lithuania, one of the cases we will 
consider in later sections. There are also examples in the very countries taken as examples of “risk resistance” 
that show that there are limitations to these cultural and institutional factors, and more complexity than first 
meets the eye. On building safety regulation, for instance, France has a system that is far more risk-based, and 
far less reliant on state inspections, than the UK – and this system is very much uncontroversial, showing that 
the demand for more state protection is neither constant nor universal. This system, however, draws on very 
deep roots, going back all the way to the 1804 Civil Code, and again showing the importance of long-term 
perspectives269. Going into the details of this example is beyond our scope here – it is enough, however, to 
suggest that what is claimed by actors to be insuperable obstacles to new approaches is sometimes little more 
than a smoke-screen to shield existing practices from review. If France can have far less state inspections and 
far more acceptance of risk in one sector than the UK, it means there is nothing absolutely and permanently 
“determined” in the relative acceptance of risk-based approaches in different countries. Clearly, national 
political and regulatory cultures are important, as illustrated e.g. in the case of the US by Scholz (1994). But 
cultures are transient, evolve and change.  
 
                                                           
269 A full explanation of the system can be found in World Bank Group 2013 (b) pp. 82-87 and Helsloot & Schmidt 2012 (b) pp. 57-60 
and 115-130. In short, state inspections of compliance with building safety norms are close to non-existent in France. Rather, there is 
a 10-year liability for all operators involved in construction, backed by mandatory insurance for builders and developers. In addition, 
the stringency of third-party controls required (and of state approvals) is linked to the risk level of the building (or part of the building), 
and insurance premia are also risk-proportional.  
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c. Conflicting directions – steps “forward” and “backward” 
 
A last remark is needed: just as inspections are not an unalloyed good (or bad), evolution of institutions and 
practices does not follow a uniform path. Bardach and Kagan (1982) show how the powers of the inspectors, 
if left unchecked, are in some ways even more prone to abuse than policemen’s, because of the lower limits 
on “searches and seizures” (p. 32-33). Inspections can thus tend to abuses of power, but they can also be 
threatened by ineffectiveness and capture by influential regulated entities (ibid., pp. 42-44).  
In the US, what was perceived as capture by “criminal” businesses led to a very strong backlash in the late 
1960s and early 1970s – a consumer advocacy report championed by Ralph Nader compared the consultations 
and cooperative meetings of the FDA with businesses to a situation where the Justice Department would hold 
regular meetings with the mafia (p. 44). The “reform agenda” in response involved “new regulators, preferably 
at the federal level”, “more comprehensive and explicit regulations”, sharply curtailing “administrative 
discretion and leniency” and enhancing “deterrence by increasing the severity, speed, and consistency of 
sanctions” (p. 45). The “new-style protective regulation”, worried about capture, prescribed an “explicitly 
legalistic enforcement style” (p. 72), and resulted in blurring the difference between inspectors and police, 
with a “young regional FDA enforcement official” being quoted as saying: “We’re a law enforcement agency, 
not a service agency” (p. 73). This whole evolution was to lead, in turn, to what Bardach and Kagan called 
“regulatory unreasonableness”, and a considerable backlash against regulation and inspectors270. 
The development we are trying to investigate in this research is precisely the next phase of this “back and 
forth” – the attempt to develop approaches that would strike an appropriate balance between the twin pitfalls 
of excessive discretion and legalism, of ineffectiveness and unreasonableness. Risk-based approaches are 
promoted as being the way to reconcile apparently contradictory concerns, but we can see that they are not 
the product of a seamless evolution, and that conflicting views and perspectives exist, and carry regulation 
and inspections in different directions, depending on the relative strength of different actors and factors over 
time. 
 
Having now completed this historical introduction, we will turn our attention to the theoretical underpinnings 
of risk-based inspection approaches, before moving to consideration of data in order to assess comparative 
effectiveness. 
  
                                                           
270 See also p. 123 for a more positive take by the same authors on the contributions made by the “stricter” approach of the 1970s. 
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3. Theoretical underpinnings: costs and effectiveness, compliance drivers, 
discretion issues, risk and regulation 
 
The starting point of most discussions of the law is 
compliance, since the purpose of creating laws and 
empowering legal authorities is to establish and maintain 
social order by regulating public behavior. (…) 
At the time that Why People Obey the Law was written, 
the conception of the relationship between community 
residents and legal authorities was a reactive one, with 
obedience to legal rules viewed as the key behavior that 
legal authorites wanted from those in the community. 
Since that time it has been recognized that authorities 
need the more active cooperation of those in the 
community. 
Tom R.  TYLER– Afterword to Why People Obey the Law (2006 edition) 
 
Good policy analysis is not about choosing between the 
free market and government regulation. Nor is it simply 
deciding what the law should proscribe. (…) 
Participants on both sides frame the deregulation debate 
as a kind of “Live Free or Die” policy choice. Even lovers of 
liberty might reasonably ask whether third alternatives do 
not exist. 




After having sketched out the historical emergence and evolution of the regulatory inspection function (or at 
least of some regulatory inspection functions), and before we consider current examples of purported “risk-
based inspections” (and compare them to other practices), it is necessary to summarize and discuss the 
theoretical underpinnings and research findings that can shed light on both “regulatory inspections” and 
“risk”. 
We will consider prior research mostly from three perspectives. First, an introductory section where we will 
summarize perspectives on the uses and appropriateness of regulation, and on the question of its costs and 
effectiveness271, since risk-based inspections are touted as a way to improve both. Before we look at what 
data can indicate of practical results, it is thus needed to look at the context against which risk-based 
inspection reforms are implemented – how relevant regulation is both to economic issues, and to its purported 
social welfare goals. Second, we will look at theories seeking to account for regulatory compliance, and how 
                                                           
271 Considering here not only “regulation” as a whole, but also to some extent specific regulatory instruments – the distinction being 
here that “regulation” is a set of rules, to which economic operators are subject, and “regulatory instruments” are specific procedures 
and processes through which these rules are administered, implemented, enforced etc. 
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well they seem to fare in experimental research. Indeed, given that the primary justification given for the 
existence of inspections is generally the aim to increase compliance, understanding better what drives 
compliance is vital to attempting to better assess inspections’ effectiveness, and the ways in which it might be 
improved. Discussing compliance visions will also enable us to briefly touch on the question of regulatory 
discretion, which is a fundamental element of risk-based approaches (and one that is, at times, hotly debated). 
Third, and finally, we will attempt to summarize at least some of the considerable amount of research that has 
developed on the interaction of risk and regulation. While we may not purport to be exhaustive on this count, 
these insights will be crucial to put risk-based inspections in perspective, and help clarify the meaning of risk 
and challenges associated with risk-based approaches.  
 
3.1. Regulation: uses, costs and effects – a brief overview 
 
a. The uses and abuses of regulation – introduction 
The very word “regulation” has a wealth of meanings, and is far from uncontroversial. It can be (both in English 
and its different translations) understood to mean in a legal sense any sort of secondary legislation (decrees 
or other norms issued by the executive), or at the other extreme a complex system ensuring a cybernetic 
equilibrium, be it is in economics or social science. Over the past couple of decades, the word has acquired 
also a specific use in relation with economic activities, but even this field sees several competing meanings – 
with “regulation” either used for the oversight and control of prices and services imposed on monopoly or 
quasi-monopoly privatized (or quasi-privatized) utilities (and providers of fundamental consumer services), or 
for the entire set of rules (technical, fiscal, related to starting or closing an activity, etc.) applicable to economic 
operators.  
It is this latter sense, which is sometimes called “non-economic regulation” (to distinguish it from regulation 
of utilities etc.) that is relevant to our research. Within this field, we in fact focus mostly on a specific subset 
of regulations that relate to safety and health in the broadest sense, including environmental protection, and 
the protection of other public interests – including product market regulations, as well as regulations relating 
to the construction and operation of business premises272. While the use of “regulation” in a specific sense (or 
rather, at least two specific senses) in the economic sphere has gained international acceptance273, it is not 
necessarily uncontroversial. Why, some ask, should laws, decrees and other norms that apply to businesses 
(or to private citizens acting in an economic capacity, e.g. as “sole traders”) be treated differently from other 
laws, suggesting in some ways that they are “less legitimate” or “less mandatory” than other rules274?  
                                                           
272 Unfortunately, no satisfactory single term currently exists to cover this sub-set of business regulations – “technical regulations” has 
a specific WTO TBT meaning, “health and safety” is often understood to mean only/mostly “occupational safety and health”, etc. 
Moreover, some of these regulations do not directly relate to safety, but to other public interests, e.g. consumer information etc.  
273 See e.g. different OECD publications, where “regulation” and “regulators” are understood in subtly different ways: in the OECD Best 
Practice Principles for the Governance of Regulators (2014, available at: http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/governance-
regulators.htm) and the OECD Best Practice Principles for Regulatory Enforcement and Inspections (2014, available at: 
http://www.oecd.org/gov/regulatory-policy/enforcement-inspections.htm). Interestingly, the OECD treats the use of “regulation” in 
the specific economic sense as fully obvious, but very rarely attempts to define it. One such attempt is in an early document in the 
OECD’s “Regulatory Policy” workstream, the 1995 Recommendation of the Council on Improving the Quality of Government Regulation, 
which refers to the “framework of responsibilities and constraints established by government regulation” – in this (very broad) 
meaning, “regulation” covers all the rules (creating obligations or prohibitions) that apply to economic operators.  
274 See e.g. the views of Carson as summarized by Hawkins (2002): “prosecution as a last resort in Victorian times can be seen as 
evidence of a process of ‘convetionalization’ of occupational safety and health offences. Hist contention is that such offences were 
suffused with a sense of ambiguity which led to matters formally enacted as criminal becoming regarded as merely quasi-criminal and 
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Engaging in depth with this debate would take us far beyond the scope of this research, but some level of 
clarification is nonetheless needed to give our work a sound basis. First, we will try and articulate very briefly 
why it can be held as legitimate to handle “regulation” distinctly from other legislation. Second, we will 
summarize some of the prevailing views on why and how regulation should be used. Finally, we will attempt 
to sketch out why, in our view, the attempt to oppose “smarter regulation” because it would show undue 
leniency towards businesses is misguided, but rather the principles and tools of “smarter regulation” should 
also be used in matters that do not pertain to businesses but to citizens’ private lives, as they are sound ways 
to make public policy in general more proportionate and effective. 
 
i. Questions around the legitimacy of treating “regulation” specifically 
 
Historical introduction – economic freedom and regulation 
When considering the legitimacy and appropriateness of treating “regulation” as a distinct field, the historical 
perspective cannot be avoided. The significant restrictive rules that affected economic activity in pre-modern 
times, including various duties, tolls and levies, monopolies, restriction on entry, product-related rules etc., all 
corresponded to a situation where economic activity275 was regarded as part of a broader social order, a 
collective undertaking where each member of society had to carry tasks according to its assigned place. In the 
medieval tri-partite vision, alongside those in charge of prayer and of fighting, were the many assigned to 
labour – and, among them, each had his or her role. Movement was very much discouraged, as a form of 
challenge against the God-assigned order, and the established powers, both spiritual and secular. In such a 
world, rules restricting certain trades to guild members, setting down exactly how products should be 
manufactured, limiting trade etc. were but manifestations of the social order, as necessary and as little 
disputed as the rules of monastic orders. They cemented the cohesion of the community, and the various 
duties and levies both ensured the funding of the praying and fighting orders, and protected local producers 
against competition, again fully in line with the broader social vision276. The gradual changes in world view, 
social order and economic structures that took place over the 15th to 18th centuries brought about a complete 
reversal277, with the notion of freedom, specifically of individual freedom – and, alongside the political one, of 
economic freedom. In the new social order, such as it emerged in France and Britain after the French 
Revolution and the more than two decades of wars that ensued, political freedom was far from always 
ensured, but economic one was secured to a large extent. “Laisser faire, laisser passer” became, if not always 
the norm in practice, at least the position that best reflected dominant ideology.  
In such a context, regulation of economic activities can of course exist as a “left-over” of the previous social 
order (e.g. the persistence of regulations on certain professions such as notaries in France, even after the 
Revolution), or can arise as the result of conflicting values (e.g. the demand for more social justice, or concerns 
about keeping “order”), but it can also be developed in a way that is internally coherent with the primacy of 
individual (economic) freedom. Indeed, as the 1789 Déclaration des Droits de l’Homme et du Citoyen puts it, 
“freedom consists in being able to do everything that does not harm others: thus, the exercise of each man’s 
natural rights has no other bounds than those that ensure that other Members of Society can enjoy these 
same rights” (article 4). This means, in an economic perspective, that regulation that limits economic freedom 
                                                           
not as ‘real crime’ at all” – a situation “revealed, for example, in the fact that offenders were not dealt with as part of the usual criminal 
justice system, but by regulatory bodies” (p. 19).  
275 Which, of course, was not considered under this name at all. The words “economy” and “economics” in their modern meaning only 
started being used in the late 18th century. 
276 See Duby (1978), which remains the fundamental work on this topic. Many other works have covered this topic since then, e.g. 
Arnoux (2012) – but Duby’s work remains valid. 
277 See in particular Gauchet (1985), but also Mercier (1960), Muchembled (1988) et al. 
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can be legitimate when the effects of economic activity would harm the freedom of other people, including 
by endangering their health, or affecting their property (as, in the view of the Déclaration’s authors, there can 
be no freedom without safety of body and property). Within this framework, considering “regulations” as 
distinct from other fields of legislation is logical – because it limits specific (economic) freedoms. Such 
specificity, however, is not different in nature from that which should apply to other areas of legislation that 
limit other fundamental freedoms (e.g. press and media law). Thus, the internal coherence of an individualistic 
and liberal world view (and legal order) makes it legitimate to consider economic operations’ regulation 
specifically, but not more so than a number of other legal domains, which also impinge on freedoms. 
Clearly, that “regulation” has come to be named and handled in a specific way, different from other “freedom 
infringing” areas of legislation, is due to the centrality of the issues it impacts on for modern societies: wealth, 
distribution of income, labour relations, economic and political power, growth and employment etc. This 
manifests itself both in terms of regulatory capture due to the power of influence wielded by economic 
operators, but also in terms of regulations developed with a specific “anti-business” intent, supported by 
political and social forces critical of the existing economic order. Regulation is, thus, a particularly contentious 
area of legislation.  
In line with its contentious nature, regulation has been (and still is) criticized from a variety of corners, with 
the different perspectives reflecting to some extent ideological preconceptions, but also to a large extent the 
diversity of regulatory questions, and the complexity of regulatory interactions. Hawkins (2002) provides a 
very condensed summary of what he calls “the debate about command and control regulation” (pp. 13-15). 
Because this summary is both clear and comprehensive, we will just refer readers back to it for details, and 
present only the key elements here. First, while “command and control regulation is generally justified in 
instrumental terms” (Baldwin 1995 et al.), its effectiveness is often far from optimal, and many authors have 
linked this to the “capture” of the regulators (Bernstein 1955 et al.), to a regulatory life-cycle where the 
“energy of the regulatory body is sapped” (ibid.), or to the interplay of “interest groups” (Posner 1974). Others 
have suggested that the problem may be in the nature of command and control itself, that tend to lead to 
costly, inefficient, short-term solutions (Sinclair 1998), to complexity, rigidity, costs and delays (Bardach and 
Kagan 1982). Designing “perfect” or “optimal” rules seems impossible, and rules tend to fail on both sides, 
creating high costs with limited effectiveness (Baldwin 1995). As for the practice, negotiation is often the rule 
in enforcement (Hawkins 2002, Hutter 1997), with some authors lamenting the lack of more vigorous 
enforcement (Tombs and Whyte 2008, Pearce and Tombs 2009). Others suggest that more “responsive” or 
“smarter” enforcement can lead to regulation that is more efficient and more effective (Ayres and Braithwaite 
1992, Gunningham and Grabosky 1998).  
What is of great interest here, in our view, is that in fact these challenges (and potential solutions) are in no 
way exclusive to regulation of economic operators (or of “businesses”). They are, in fact, to varying extents, 
applicable to any set of rules that have an instrumental purpose278 - i.e., they tend to be far less effective than 
their proponents envisioned, create important costs and side-effects, be difficult to enforce – and it may be 
that “smarter” enforcement methods allow to improve their effectiveness. The specificity of regulation may 
well reside primarily in the fact that, because of the centrality of economic issues in our societies and of the 
strength of the different interest groups involved, a real discussion has arisen around them, including on the 
question of their implementation and enforcement, which may well hold lessons for other areas of legislation. 
 
Distinguishing between different categories of norms, and different uses of legislation 
                                                           
278 See Hawkins (2002) pp. 3-13 for a discussion of “instrumental” vs. other (in particular “symbolic”) uses of the law. 
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The question of whether it may be acceptable to differentiate enforcement approaches (inspections 
frequency, enforcement decisions etc.) based on the level of risk (and other factors) is tied to the nature and 
status of the legal norms being enforced. This, in turn, relates to the possible distinction between different 
types of laws and norms – and between different uses of legislation. 
Types of norms and levels of obligation 
One way to attempt and make sense of the distinction between regulation of economic activities and other 
parts of legislation is to consider the difference between several types of laws or norms – in the perspective 
of the old question of a “natural law”, and to the possibility (or lack thereof) to distinguish between norms 
that would correspond to an “overlap” between natural and positive law, and other norms that would only 
belong to positive law, but not carry greater weight, i.e. obligate but not “in the fullest sense” (Finnis 1980 
quoted in Hemma 2015). 
The idea of a “natural law” is as problematic as it is old, and long-debated. It can be understood to have a huge 
variety of meanings, and is tightly linked to a series of religious, philosophical or ideological perspectives 
(Goyard-Fabre 2002, pp. 7-8). Recent controversies and judicial decisions in the United States around 
homosexual marriage, which featured references to “natural law” among opponents, and reference to 
“fundamental human rights” among supporters, show the difficulties and ambiguities that abound in this 
notion. Nonetheless, just as the philosophical discussion around the idea of a natural law should not be 
avoided and can yield real fruits (ibid., pp. 14-15), the distinctions it enables to introduce can shed some light 
to our topic. 
Rather than going back all the way to Aquinas and different interpretations of classical natural law theory, we 
will draw on a few modern authors, whose ideas bear clear relevance to this research. First, as indicated above, 
Finnis distinguishes between “obligation” and “full obligation”: the “essential function of law is to provide a 
justification for state coercion (…). Accordingly, an unjust law can be legally valid, but it cannot provide an 
adequate justification for use of the state coercive power and is hence not obligatory in the fullest sense” 
(Hemma 2015). This view does not really conflict with legal positivism (Finnis does not challenge the validity 
of positive laws), but introduces a nuance into the strength of the obligation they impose. Laws that 
correspond to an overlap between fundamental moral norms and positive law have, in this view, a power of 
obligation “in the fullest sense”. 
Second, Dworkin considers “that there are some legal standards the authority of which cannot be explained 
in terms of social facts. In deciding hard cases, for example, judges often invoke moral principles that (…) do 
not derive their legal authority from the social criteria of legality contained in a rule of recognition” (Dworkin 
1977, p. 40, quoted in Hemma 2015). Dworkin uses as an example the famous Riggs v. Palmer 1889 decision 
by the Court of Appeals of New York, wherein the Court decided that a murderer could not benefit from his 
victim’s will, even though there was no positive law to back their decision – drawing on “a requirement of 
fundamental fairness that figures into the best moral justification for a society's legal practices considered as 
a whole” (ibid.). Further to this, and in the same perspective, Dworkin introduces a fundamental distinction 
between “two kinds of legal argument. Arguments of policy "justify a political decision by showing that the 
decision advances or protects some collective goal of the community as a whole" (Dworkin 1977, 82). In 
contrast, arguments of principle "justify a political decision by showing that the decision respects or secures 
some individual or group right" (Dworkin 1977, 82). On Dworkin's view, while the legislature may legitimately 
enact laws that are justified by arguments of policy, courts may not pursue such arguments in deciding cases. 
For a consequentialist argument of policy can never provide an adequate justification for deciding in favor of 
one party's claim of right and against another party's claim of right. An appeal to a pre-existing right, according 
to Dworkin, can ultimately be justified only by an argument of principle” (Hemma 2015). This distinction is of 
great importance for us, in that a large part of the norms subsumed under the “regulation” moniker are clearly 
expressions of policy choices, but not of fundamental rights and principles.  
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Third, Fuller’s vision of “procedural morality” in law posits that “law's essential function is to "achiev[e] [social] 
order through subjecting people's conduct to the guidance of general rules by which they may themselves 
orient their behavior" (Fuller 1965, 657)” and this “implies that nothing can count as law unless it is capable 
of performing law's essential function of guiding behavior” (Hemma 2015). In order to perform this function, 
“a system of rules must satisfy the following principles: (P1) the rules must be expressed in general terms; (P2) 
the rules must be publicly promulgated; (P3) the rules must be prospective in effect; (P4) the rules must be 
expressed in understandable terms; (P5) the rules must be consistent with one another; (P6) the rules must 
not require conduct beyond the powers of the affected parties; (P7) the rules must not be changed so 
frequently that the subject cannot rely on them; and (P8) the rules must be administered in a manner 
consistent with their wording. On Fuller's view, no system of rules that fails minimally to satisfy these principles 
of legality can achieve law's essential purpose of achieving social order through the use of rules that guide 
behavior.” (ibid.).  
Connecting these views to our field of research is easy, and enlightening. First, most matters covered by 
regulation simply do not relate to fundamental issues of morality (whichever way, and on whichever basis one 
construes them), and thus fail in Finnis’s perspective to “fully obligate” (they do obligate, but in a “lesser” 
way). Second, most norms pertaining to regulation are adopted in order to advance policy choices, and do not 
relate to fundamental rights and principles – and thus fail to carry the same weight, even though they are 
legally binding. Third, the principles identified by Fuller as necessary for the law to achieve its purpose form 
the foundation of many “better regulation” or “smart regulation” principles, showing the link from these 
newer approaches to longer-standing visions of good legal practice. These (and in particular the first two 
points) form important theoretical justifications for practices that we will consider further in this research, and 
which involve a level of discretion in the enforcement of regulation279. 
Nor are these purely theoretical, but rather jurisprudential practice shows the relevance of these distinctions. 
In international law, for instance, the notion of Jus Cogens (peremptory norm) refers to norms for which no 
exception or variation is admitted, for their moral strength (viewed as applying to all humanity, throughout 
moral systems) gives them particular weight280. By contrast, other norms arise through convention, and do not 
carry the same peremptory strength. The whole tradition and practice of Common Law is likewise built on the 
idea that some fundamental practices can be identified, and built upon, even in the absence of a positive 
norm. Such idea is not absent from Civil Law countries either: in France, the “principes généraux du droit” 
(general principles of law), which apply primarily (but not only) to administrative law, can lead to courts ruling 
against administrative norms and decisions based on principles rather than positive law281.  
From this perspective, as a result, it appears legitimate to challenge the view, which we have seen held in 
many countries, that risk-focus and risk-proportionality would be somehow illegitimate because they would 
conflict with the absolute obligation created by law, and the absolute duty for the executive to enforce it. 
                                                           
279 The inspiration for this section was provided by a presentation by Donald Macrae at the International Seminar on Regulatory 
Discretion held in The Hague in December 2013 – in which he presented a vision of a “hierarchy of norms” – the most fundamental 
ones expressing values (and carrying the most weight, being the most “peremptory”), a second category being the foundation of order 
(e.g. driving rules), and thus having to be strictly complied with in spite of them being purely conventional – and a third category 
corresponding to the bulk of regulation, and expressing policy. We have tried here to provide a theoretical underpinning for this 
distinction which, in our experience, is extremely valid in practice. The presentation can be accessed at: http://www.ial-
online.org/uploads/2014/01/The-Hague-131205-session-2-presentation-1-Macrae1.pdf.  
280 For illustrations, and discussions of the effects of what the author sees as “excessive” application of the criminal law to regulatory 
issues, cf. Malcolm (2014 a) – “Unlike malum in se offenses, most criminal regulations do not prohibit morally indefensible conduct. 
Regulations allow conduct, but they circumscribe—often in ways that are very hard for the non-expert to understand—when, where, 
how, how often, and by whom certain conduct can be done” (p. 1). 
281 These principles are “identified” drawing on “ideological conceptions of the national consciousness” and a “mass” of national, 
international and other texts (Frier and Petit, quoted in Tifine 2010, 2nd part, chapter 1, section IV).  
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Rather, as these authors suggest, there are meaningful distinctions to be made between different types of 
norms, which carry different levels of obligation. 
 
Legislation and regulation – the different uses of law 
Another important distinction is between the different purposes of legislation and regulation, which are 
essentially distinct in spite of their important overlaps – and between the different uses of law. As Voermans 
(forthcoming) puts it, “with ‘legislation’ we mean the authoritative, and constitutionally controlled form in 
which law is cast and the procedure leading up to the enactment of it (the decision). With regulation we mean 
a public intervention in a market or in society. (…) Legislation and regulation coincide in a lot of instances. A 
lot of regulation is cast in the form of legislation. (…) But not all regulation needs to be cast in the form of 
legislation (…), and not all legislation is regulation”. While the distinction is essential, and shows that there is 
no full overlap between the two notions, what matters even more to us here is that the two have a different 
focus and purpose. To quote Voermans again, “the focus of and underlying notion of regulation (…) is on 
government intervention in markets, i.e. on acts private actors cannot perform with private capital, on 
interventions beyond regular market mechanisms (…)  Legislation on the other hand focuses not primarily on 
markets but – to use a big word – on the human psyche, especially morale and social relations: the oughts of 
our existence.”  
The scope of legislation is thus much broader than that of regulation – which, to the extent that it is cast in 
the form of legislation, can be seen as a specific subset of the broader field of all legislation. Beyond their 
different focus, the two also have different goals. Regulation “predominantly functions as a market 
intervention aiming for a correction” (Voermans, forthcoming), and this holds true regardless of whether one 
considers normative or positive theories of regulation. Normative ones will consider the instances in which 
regulation could be seen as appropriate from an economic perspective, in particular to address market failures 
and inefficiencies, but also issues of distribution, fairness etc. in some instances (Veljanovski 2010, pp. 22-24). 
Positive ones will look at how regulation is produced in practice – interest groups at play, effects on wealth 
transfers between different groups, etc. (ibid., pp. 23-26). In all cases, the focus is market relationships and 
economic issues. By contrast, legislation “serves other and broader functions”: it “provides both the basis and 
the framework for government action”, “works as a safeguard against government action by enshrining rights 
and obligations” and provides “legal certainty”. It also can “serve as an instrument to further government 
policies (instrumental function)”, “offers the basic framework for the operation of a bureaucracy” and  
“communicates and reaffirms public morals, values and public goods (symbolic function)” (Voermans, 
forthcoming).  
In spite of the apparently clear differences, there exists a tension because legislation increasingly has been 
used over the past century and a half to make “continual improvements in the life of the community by means 
of explicit legal innovations” rather than (as was hitherto its most common function) being predominantly a 
“benign instrument of codification through which hitherto scattered and inaccessible common law could be 
systematized and made accessible for everyone” (ibid.). To the extent that legislation is an instrument for 
polciy objectives, and that some of these policy objectives affect economic issues, there is a significant overlap 
with regulation. While regulation primarily focuses on affecting economic activities to achieve specific goals, 
legislation more broadly seen has a number of other fundamental roles – expressing moral values, and 
ensuring the functioning of the constitutional order. As Voermans (ibid.) puts it, “from a constitutional point 
of view (and the symbolic function which is closely related to it) the only right measure for the quality of 
legislation is its ability to express law” and “the extent to which the criteria,  emanating from constitutional 
principles, are met” – whereas regulation treats legislation as a means to other ends, and assessing its quality 
thus requires to take an instrumental perspective.  
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To the extent that a significant part of regulation is enacted by legislation, and that the purposes and criteria 
are fundamentally different, there can thus be cases where different perspectives will result in conflicting 
views on enforcement. Reducing legislation to an instrumental perspective is inherently problematic – 
Voermans (ibid.), referring to Tamanaha (2006), reminds that “instrumentalism may in the end undermine 
important social and symbolic functions pertaining to legislation”. In an interesting twist, there are strong 
reasons to believe that the more “social and symbolic functions” of legislation themselves have important 
economic value – for instance, “European legislation also creates trust, security, legal protection and all kinds 
of other, more or less imponderable, benefits for the internal market” meaning that the “pricing” of costs and 
benefits may be “extremely difficult” (Voermans, forthcoming). 
There is thus no easy solution to our issue – from an instrumental perspective (befitting “regulation”), it may 
make sense for enforcement to be responsive and risk-proportionate, but this may conflict with other values 
expressed by legislation. Voermans (ibid.) reminds rightly about the relevance of a political perspective: 
because “Better regulation” and “Better lawmaking” policies are “essentially political programmes resting on 
political perceptions as to the overriding values of legislation and regulation”, their effect and success has to 
be “weighed politically”. In other words, there can be no politically neutral consensus on the right approach, 
but rather one can look at the adequacy of a given approach (or programme) to a clearly stated political 
objective. 
A last point of note is that importance of trust – Voermans (ibid.) repeatedly emphasizes how essential the 
function of building trust is for legislation. Not only was this the key role of legislation in enabling markets 
before regulation with specific “transformative” goals came about – but it is a role that has remained crucial. 
In fact, enabling trust is one of the fundamental functions of modern regulation, as we have seen above e.g. 
with respect to food safety legislation. A criterion that may therefore be common to both a “regulatory” and 
a “legislative” perspective is whether enforcement practices actually are effective at reinforcing trust between 
market actors, or not.  
 
ii. Justifications of regulation – why, when and how to regulate 
 
If regulation is indeed primarily the expression of policy preferences, and not of fundamental principles or 
rights (though it is the latter in some cases), some guiding principles are needed in order to define why, when 
and how to regulate. In such a perspective, regulation is a policy tool – as any tool, it is not all-purpose or “one 
size fits all”, and can produce damage as well as positive results. Thus, such principles are essential. It is fair to 
say that, at least for authors who place themselves within the framework of a broadly “liberal” market 
economy, the most broadly accepted foundation for regulation is what is called market failure. Even 
considering authors that advance a different view of society and the economy, the following principles may 
remain applicable insofar as they also relate to the best choice of instruments, and not only to the goals being 
pursued (even in a radically redistributive perspective, for instance, regulation may not be the best option, as 
compared to taxation and spending, for instance).  
Anthony Ogus, in Regulation. Legal Form and Economic Theory (1994), did far more than give a specific account 
of how regulation had evolved and acquired more prominence as a public policy instrument in the 1980s – he 
attempted to give a comprehensive account of regulation’s foundations, purposes and forms from a normative 
perspective. This perspective can be complemented, in particular for a concise summary of the positive 
perspective on regulation, with Veljanosvki (2010).  
Understanding the role and limitations of regulation in a market economy is crucial in order to the 
consideration of inspections and enforcement – because they cannot be considered fully separately from the 
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rules they are meant to enforce. Inspectorates define priorities, give guidance and instructions to their 
officials, and in many cases adopt and publish guidance documents for the public, or even secondary 
legislation. We have observed in many cases how these were often based on a vision of regulation as an all-
purpose instrument, that could be used in any circumstance, for any type of problem, and was expected to be 
effective in all of them (and, consequently, inspections and enforcement would likewise be appropriate to 
solve this problem). By contrast, a more precise and limited vision of what regulation can really achieve, and 
of when it is appropriate, is fundamental to define priorities and methods in a more targeted, focused and 
differentiated way, which is what risk-based and compliance-focused approaches generally seek to achieve. 
In this perspective, we will thus briefly summarize some of the key normative perspectives on the proper role 
and instruments of regulation. 
 
Why and when to regulate 
In a market-based context, regulation comes as an exception to free economic activity. In an “ideal” market, 
parties should be left fully free to contract – but the need for regulation arises primarily from “imperfections” 
in the market, what is broadly termed “market failures”, which mostly arise when “negative externalities” 
(negative effects of economic activities, beside and beyond their main purpose, affecting third-parties) are 
significant (and not addressed), or when “transaction costs” (costs needed for information gathering, 
negotiation, transaction) are too high (Ogus 1994 pp. 17-19282). In theory, and again in an ideal (and clearly 
unreal) market setting, negative externalities could be dealt with through private contracting283 - in practice, 
however, this is often impossible, either because transaction costs are too high, because some externalities 
are not “priced” (some goods are entirely free and there are major problems involved in “privatizing” them to 
allow for contracting to resolve externalities – e.g. this is the case of air), because the benefits are highly 
concentrated and the harm diffuse (making collective action unlikely and costly), to name just the main 
problems (Ogus 1994 pp. 19-22). 
Situations where negative externalities of economic activities are significant, and where private contracting 
cannot provide an adequate response, are at the root of most of the regulations for which we consider 
inspections and enforcement in this work. In some cases, it is possible to avoid using “command-and-control” 
regulations by relying on tort law (Ogus pp. 20-21) and private law more generally, but “the courts have 
jurisdiction to enforce rights only ex post”, meaning “after the damage has been inflicted” – and in some cases 
the infringer may “avoid the sanction by insolvency” (ibid., p. 28). In any case, in many cases relying on private 
law will be inadequate because potential plaintiffs “will only seek to enforce rights where the expected 
benefits exceed the expected costs” and “thus externalities which affect large numbers but which impose only 
a small loss on each (…) will not be ‘internalized’ by private law instruments and serious misallocations will 
remain uncorrected” (ibid., p. 27). This is not mentioning the serious problems arising when the right-holders 
are in a situation where they are ill-equipped to avail themselves of the judiciary (poverty, lack of legal literacy, 
etc.) – and assuming an unbiased judiciary, of course. In short, there are situations where “market failure” is 
                                                           
282 See also ibid. pp. 41-42 on “coordination problems” i.e. issues where in principle negotiated agreement would be possible, but the 
number of actors and interactions makes it absurd, e.g. the driving code. While the driving code rules to a large extent are purely 
conventional (e.g. whether to drive on the left or right side of the road), having each pair of drivers negotiate them is simply impossible 
(and even absurd). A regulatory intervention is far more “optimal”, and in fact clearly necessary (and this corresponds to what we 
described above as essential conventions allowing the proper functioning of society). 
283 And this is what radical (right-wing) libertarians like Nozick (or, earlier, Hayek) would advocate: no regulation, only private contracts. 
We will not discuss here the many problems that plague such views, but essentially the problem of transaction costs is the first that, 
even in a purely market-oriented worldview, makes the full reliance on private law inadequate. Akerlof (1970) provides a perfect 




accompanied by “private law failure”, which builds “on public interest grounds a prima facie case for 
regulatory intervention” (ibid., p. 28). 
In practice, there frequently are problems caused by unaddressed negative externalities and high transaction 
costs – because the assumptions for perfect functioning of the market are rarely met – these include fully 
rational, “utility maximizing behaviour” by all market actors, sufficient information for all actors “to make 
utility-maximizing choices”284, absence (or full correction by private law mechanisms) of negative externalities, 
and fully “competitive markets” (ibid., p. 24). In practice, these conditions are generally only partially and 
imperfectly met, at best. Thus, regulation can be needed, and can aim at addressing any or all of these 
problems and imperfections – prohibiting or constraining operations that create significant negative 
externalities, reducing transaction costs by establishing uniform requirements for products285. Regulation can 
also focus on specific market imperfections, e.g. mandate the disclosure of specific information in a 
standardized way, “nudge” people towards more utility-maximizing behaviour286, or intervene to limit the 
power of dominant market actors287.  
Thus, overall, regulation can be justified in a such a system when, absent regulatory intervention, there would 
be a problem of inefficient allocation of resources – for which, following Ogus, we would adopt the Kaldor-
Hicks criterion rather than the Pareto one288. Addressing market failures and private law failures, 
“inefficiencies” in economic terms, “infringements of rights” (including the right to life, in some cases), all 
require regulation, at least in some cases. But it does not follow that regulation always works as intended, or 
that the form and tools of regulation are indifferent. Ogus of course discusses the different ways in which 
regulation can fail its objectives, be driven by private interests from the onset, or “captured” during 
implementation (see in particular ibid. pp. 55-58 on “regulatory failure”). We have already discussed this 
question above, and will now focus on how to select appropriate instruments for regulation. 
 
How to regulate 
The types of regulation that are most commonly controlled through inspections are mandatory technical 
norms (that Ogus calls “standards”, a name which we avoid here because of its polysemy289), as well as 
                                                           
284 See Ogus (1994) pp. 38-41 on the problems of information often being limited, imperfect, costly or impossible to process. 
285 Of any kind: these can be uniform requirements for physical products (e.g. food),but also for financial ones (loans or insurance 
contracts), rental agreements etc. 
286 See Sunstein and Thaler 2008. While it is frequently understood that the “nudge” approach is an alternative to regulation, it is in 
fact often better understood as an alternative to “command and control” regulation. Behavioural economics insights are used to design 
regulatory requirements that require specific ways to disclose or present information, mandate some default options, etc. For more 
on the use of behavioural economics in regulatory policy see Lunn (2014) report to the OECD, and Alemanno and Sibony (2015). In 
particular, see Lunn pp. 39-41 on the application of behavioural economics insights to “regulatory delivery” (including inspections and 
enforcement). 
287 Be it in positions of monopoly/oligopoly, or monopsony/oligopsony – in practice, most regulation focuses on (quasi-)monopolies 
linked to natural resources, utilities etc. 
288 See Ogus 1994 pp. 24-25 – whereas a Pareto distribution is efficient if it is impossible to make any change without making at least 
one person worse off, and thus prohibits improvements that would benefit the vast majority if even the smallest minority stands to 
lose from them, the Kaldor-Hicks test allows for compensation. In this meaning, a policy is efficient if the overall gains it produces are 
sufficient to potentially allow to fully compensate all the losers and still produce an aggregate benefit. It is easy to understand that 
these two definitions of “efficiency” lead to radically different policy perspectives (and tend to correspond to radically different political 
sides, as well). 
289 The word standards can have at least three major meanings. In its technical sense (used in the WTO TBT agreement for instance), 
it is a document that provides requirements, specifications, guidelines or characteristics that can be used consistently to ensure that 
materials, products, processes and services are fit for their purpose . Standards are voluntary in nature, and developed by institutions 
(national, regional – CEN, CENELEC etc. – or international – ISO) that are normally acting on behalf of stakeholders (particularly 
businesses) and not of public authorities (which, however, often provide some funding to standardization bodies). On the other hand, 
in countries where many standards are mandatory, the standardization body is often a state agency. In its vernacular meaning, a 
“standard” is a norm, convention or requirement of any kind – but also can mean (as when one writes “the highest standards”) the 
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information obligations290. Information obligations can cover a variety of issues and fields, and include e.g. 
mandatory price disclosure (Ogus 1994 pp. 126-128), weights and measures291 and requirements on display 
of quantity (ibid., pp. 130-132), and rules on “identity and quality disclosure”, i.e name, description and 
composition of products292 (ibid., pp. 132-138) and warnings and instructions about use of the product being 
sold (ibid., pp. 141-144). 
Information requirements are not cost-free, and there can be a tendency on the side of regulators to impose 
too many of them, because they are mutatis mutandis significantly less restrictive than mandatory technical 
norms. Information requirements still allow economic operators to produce and market goods pretty much as 
they decide to, provided that they comply with rules in terms of labelling and other information. Nonetheless, 
the way they are worded and controlled can result in higher or lower constraints and costs for economic 
operators (and, in turn, in different economic effects). 
In spite of the importance of information obligations, and of their pervasiveness, they have been the subject 
of relatively less study (and debates) than mandatory technical norms, possibly because of the latter’s more 
“reassuring” character (what may be hazardous is forbidden, rather than just carrying warnings) and of the 
greater economic distortion they can impose (direct restriction on the possibility to bring products to market).  
Mandatory technical norms are one of a gradient of regulatory interventions, ranging from the least to the 
most restrictive. Ogus ranks such intervention types (ibid., p. 151) with information requirements as the least 
restrictive, prior approval as the most restrictive293, and “standards” (mandatory technical norms) in between. 
Ogus further differentiates between “target”, “performance” and “specification” standards (mandatory 
technical norms), and this is a distinction that is very important for inspection practices. We will not summarize 
here the detailed discussion of cost-benefit aspects of different types of interventions, and of cost-benefit 
analysis models (ibid., pp. 155-165), on which there is considerable literature294. The distinction between 
“target”, “performance” and “specification” norms is, however, central for inspection work (ibid., pp. 166-
171).  
While “target” norms “render unlawful the causing of certain harms” (p. 166), they do not specify how an 
economic operator should conduct its activities, nor do they deal with “intermediary outcomes”, which may 
arise between the activities and the harms that the norms aim at preventing. Thus, while they allow the 
greatest flexibility in economic operations, and thus could theoretically be the ones that impose the least 
                                                           
way in which something is done or executed, regardless of whether this is codified or not. There is often the assumption that when 
“standards” are spoken of, then “high standards” are expected, and that more or less automtically “standards” are “a good things” 
(hence: more standards are better). This has implications in policy discussions, where there is often an automatic bias for “more 
standards”. Finally, regulatory standards (the meaning Ogus uses) refer to mandatory technical norms (applying to anything from 
hygiene to occupational health, fire safety to environment). Given the potential for confusion, we prefer not to use the word at all 
here, and refer to mandatory technical norms. 
290 Other forms of regulation covered by Ogus, e.g. prior approval (licensing, permits etc.) and economic instruments (incentives etc.) 
also frequently involve different forms of inspections – they are nonetheless less “central” in the work of inspecting institutions.  
291 Which, as we have seen above, belong to the oldest areas of government regulation, as well as inspections.  
292 Such requirements can mandate that specific information be given, and/or regulate when and how the use of certain names, 
descriptions or claims can be allowed.  
293 In fact, information requirements could be further disaggregated between different types: disclosure rules vs. restrictions on the 
use of certain names and descriptions, for instance. Likewise, “prior approval” can cover a number of situations with varying degrees 
of restrictions, requirements, short or long procedures, need to obtain other “prior prior approvals” etc. And, of course, these 
requirements can be combined: the same business operator and product can be subject to prior approval, and then mandatory 
technical norms, and information requirements in addition (in fact, this is generally the case that “stronger” requirements come on 
top of “weaker” ones).  
294 See e.g. Radaelli and Dunlop (in press), and of course a number of previous publications e.g. by OECD. The question of cost and 
benefits is of course connected to the question of inspections and enforcement, in that the potential costs and effectiveness of 
inspections and enforcement should be considered when conducting RIA (or any other form of impact assessment). In practice, they 
often are not, or insufficiently, taken into account.  
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burden on the economy (and least distort allocation of resources), they often create difficulties. Depending 
on the level of discretion and authority granted to the regulatory agency in charge of enforcing these norms, 
the difficulties may be more on the side of economic operators, or of regulators. Where regulators have limited 
discretion and their authority is subject to strict judicial review, it may be difficult for them to enforce such 
norms, because of the difficulty to prove a causal relationship between specific economic activities and the 
harms covered by the norms, and/or the time lag may be too long for effective prevention. At the same time, 
such norms can also be very problematic for economic operators, because of high uncertainty (“the 
information costs to the firm on determining what quality of performance will ensure compliance” may be 
high because of uncertain causalities, third party activities also having an effect, etc.). Thus, while such 
standards are attractive at first glance from an economic efficiency perspective, and can be particularly 
conducive to innovation and technological flexibility, they carry potentially important costs and operational 
difficulties. 
“Performance” norms are somewhat less “uncertain”, while leaving a significant room for flexibility. They 
impose prescriptions (e.g. maximum level of certain emissions) on the direct outcomes of economic activities, 
while leaving the specifics of the operations open. Such norms have the advantage of providing regulators 
with more directly verifiable (and enforceable) indicators, and of burdening economic operators with less 
uncertainty. They also leave a fair amount of room for technological innovation (though less than “target” 
norms). However, because they focus on intermediate outcomes and not the final harms that the regulation 
aims at reducing, they can fail (partly or fully) in preventing or reducing such harms, if the causality between 
regulated outcomes and harms is less strong than anticipated, and/or any unexpected effects take place 
(involving third parties, side effects etc.). 
Finally, “specification” norms directly impose how certain economic activities should take place, which 
materials, products, processes, methods are allowed, which ones forbidden, etc. The relationship between 
“specification” norms and the harms they are supposed to prevent is indirect, and it can often happen that 
the norms cover a number of issues but fail to address the harm because some critical issues were left out 
(because of limited knowledge, or poor design, etc.). To address one given issue, “it is often necessary to lay 
down a series of specification standards” (ibid., p. 167), resulting in a large number of norms, but with 
compliance requirements being clearer (and enforcement simpler) than with “target” or “performance” 
norms. While “specification” norms thus bring greater certainty and predictability (and may make deterrence 
easier and stronger), they have “significant disadvantages”, in particular inducing high “technological rigidity” 
and making it more difficult to introduce new techniques, methods, processes (even when these would 
actually improve performance in terms of harm reduction). They also often, as indicated, fail at preventing 
harm because they do not address it comprehensively, but rather target only some of the precursors of harm, 
and may miss some critical ones. Such highly detailed and prescriptive norms are also, in most cases, the oldest 
type of norms295, and the most widespread296.  
From an inspector’s perspective, “specification” norms hold much appeal: they are clear and unequivocal, lend 
themselves to relatively easy enforcement decisions, make control work easier and faster, and both 
deterrence and advice are also easier (there is higher certainty of detection and sanction – and clearer 
                                                           
295 Norms on manufacturing in pre-modern times were, for instance, “specification” norms. Such were also the earliest occupational 
safety norms, even though we may find that some of the specifications were relatively vague compared to more modern standards.  
296 Pre-1970s, most countries were essentially using detailed specifications. Since then, a number of jurisdictions and regulatory 
agencies have introduced “target” or “performance” norms (e.g. the US EPA, UK HSE, EU “New Approach” directives etc.). Nonetheless, 
around the world, the bulk of technical norms tend to remain “specification” ones, e.g. in the post-Soviet space, or in some post-
colonial countries (though in this latter category the most frequent problem is the lack of technical norms, resulting in excessive 
enforcement discretion). Many of these specification norms end up being outdated, and/or exhibit contradictions between different 
regulatory areas or regulators. 
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recommendations to make). They also offer benefits to firms, particularly smaller ones, which have less 
resources (both human and financial) to investigate how to be in compliance with “target” or “performance” 
ones – specific norms can offer certainty and predictability297. They tend, however, to create major problems 
too. First, because of what Baldwin (1995) calls “errors of inclusiveness” – “because they discourage desirable 
activity (through over-inclusiveness) or they fail to rule out undesirable activity (through under-inclusiveness)” 
(p. 177). Such situations can arise because of initial rule-design mistakes, but even more frequently occur 
because rules have not kept up with technical and scientific changes – something which the vast number of 
rules needed in a “specification” approach makes it likely to happen. This can result in situations where rules 
directly impose using an inferior technology, not only from a business perspective but from a public welfare 
perspective – this is the case of a number of Soviet standards that are still in force in many post-Soviet 
countries, e.g. in hygiene and fire safety, and specifically mandate the use of certain materials, techniques, 
processes, that were “state of the art” in the 1960s (when the standards were adopted), but have long ceased 
being so (see International Finance Corporation 2008 on technical regulations in Ukraine, for instance). 
Baldwin (ibid.) extensively discusses the question of rule-design, and questions the possibility to find an 
“optimal” degree of rule precision (pp. 176-181). What he also emphasizes is the importance of considering, 
along with the rule’s design and contents, questions of “form, force and type of sanction” as well as “how such 
problems [of inclusiveness] may be dealt with during the compliance-seeking process” (p. 181). Rightly, 
Baldwin considers not “rules” in isolation, but rules along with their enforcement process. Having discussed 
the different explanations for over-inclusiveness298, and the problems involved in addressing them at the rule-
making stage, Baldwin suggests that “an alternative response is to write rules that devolve discretion down to 
enforcers so that issues of inclusiveness are dealt with by selective enforcement”, e.g. the famous example of 
UK health and safety rules based on the notion of “so far as is reasonably practicable” (p. 184). This, however, 
relies on “high levels of enforcer discretion”, raising the twin risks of capture or abuse. It is also far from certain 
that enforcers will, indeed, be selective, and this “depends on regulatory styles and traditions” (ibid.). In 
addition, it is also essential to consider which enforcement tools and methods will be used: “compliance-
seekers have at their disposal a number of alternatives to prosecution (e.g. persuading, advising, and 
promoting) and it cannot be taken for granted that the kind of precise rule that complements a prosecution 
strategy will be the best kind of rule to use in association with other techniques (p. 178).  
Other authors, from different perspectives, fundamentally concur with Ogus (1994) and Baldwin (1995). As 
Morgan and Yeung (2007) put it: “rules are not self-executing, and scholars have devoted considerable energy 
to understanding the challenges associated with the use of rules as a mechanism for guiding behaviour” (p. 
153). To a large extent, they add, rules are “indeterminate”, i.e. their application depends on subjective and 
contingent factors (ibid.). Black (1997), in particular, has written on the ways in which the inherent 
generalization and abstraction necessary to develop rules results in problems when applying them. Indeed, 
                                                           
297 At least when enforcement is fair and transparent, and there is not a maze of partly contradictory norms. In many post-Soviet 
countries, for instance, conflicting requirements between e.g. hygiene, occupational safety, construction safety etc. result in situations 
where economic operators cannot be in compliance with all. We observed such situations directly e.g. in Ukraine (conflicting 
requirements on materials to be used, and on location of garbage disposal, between sanitary and fire inspectors) and in Lithuania 
(labour inspector demanding that an escape door be locked shut to prevent undue entry, whereas fire safety regulations would 
mandate that it be free to open in case of evacuation need).  
298 Baldwin lists several possible causes for over-inclusiveness (pp. 182-183, building in particular on Bardach and Kagan 1982): first, 
“the informational costs of designing rules of optimal inclusiveness are considerable” leading to the tendency to “externalize costs on 
those who are regulated or on to enforcement officers”. Second, a tendency to “risk-regulation reflex” behaviour (see further in this 
work) that leads to “opt for an across the board solution” in response to “mischief at a particular location”. Third, pressure from 
interest groups. Fourth, the tendency to build on public outrage to a disaster and thus get rules adopted as soon as possible (again, a 
variation of the “risk-regulation reflex” problem). Fifth, a “regulatory ratchet”, through which new rules get added, but old ones are 
not removed .We would add to these problems of limits of scientific and technical knowledge, regulatory culture (risk aversion), and 
(as indicated above) the simple effect of time (rules getting outdated).  
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“the generalization which is the operative basis of the rule inevitably suppresses properties that may 
subsequently be relevant or includes properties that may in some cases be irrelevant” – and in addition “the 
causal relationship between the event and the harm/goal is likely to be only an approximate one”. Black adopts 
a squarely instrumental view: “legal rules, and particularly regulatory rules, perform social management and 
instrumental functions (…) and their success is measured in terms of the extent to which they ensure that the 
substance of policy is achieved. (…) Under-inclusion can represent ‘missed targets’; over-inclusion, excessive 
intrusion” (pp. 5-15). Overall, there is always an “imperfect correlation between proxy requirements and 
actual hazards” (Bardach and Kagan 1982, p. 71). 
The observation of inspections and enforcement practices suggests that the theoretical impossibility of 
designing “optimal” rules (that Baldwin 1995 appears to demonstrate299) is validated by experience. In fact, 
the impossibility may be even stronger than suggested in reality, because even very specific and precise norms 
end up not working uniformly in practice because of differences in enforcement methods. While some 
agencies and officers will register a violation and impose a sanction even for the slightest variations from the 
norm300, regardless of whether it corresponds to a real risk to the public welfare, and of the consequences of 
the sanctions301, others will apply a “risk proportionate” enforcement approach. 
Thus, there seems to be no escape from enforcement discretion if one is to avoid the twin pitfalls of under- 
and over-inclusiveness302. Ogus (op. cit., pp. 170-171) attempts to find ways to make standard-setting more 
“optimal”, but they all end with relying on regulators and their staff to administer wisely rules written in a 
more flexible language303. Trying to curtail discretion can lead to difficulties in fighting “creative compliance”, 
i.e. formal compliance with specific requirements that “covers” effective undermining of the regulation’s 
objectives (see Baldwin 1995, pp. 185-189). A recent report by the Scientific Council to the Netherlands’ 
Government (Wetenschappelijke Raad voor het Regeringsbeleid – WRR) underlined the same risk of “creative 
compliance” as a major concern, and called in response for increased regulatory discretion and less specific 
norms (WRR 2013). 
If only highly damaging (both for the economy and the regulation’s own objectives) rigidity can minimize 
discretion, and if even in such cases discretion can never really be fully avoided, then trying to understand 
better how to organize this discretion is indispensable. This is particularly true considering the very real and 
considerable pitfalls of unfettered, uncontrolled discretion – regulatory capture on the one hand, abuse and 
rent-seeking on the other (and corruption and ineffectiveness in both cases)304.  
                                                           
299 Ibid. pp. 179-181, building on Diver (1983). 
300 A case frequently observed directly by the author in post-Soviet countries (see International Finance Corporation reports, various 
years) – but also often reported by businesses in other countries, e.g. in France with labour inspectors (direct interview with the authors 
of a recent government review of regulatory inspections – see also Chapelle and Clément 2015).  
301 Taking the above examples: in Ukraine or Tajikistan, many inspectors impose sanctions for the slightest variation from the norms 
imposing a precise height from the floor for items such as electric sockets or fire extinguishers, even if the variation is less than 1 cm, 
and has absolutely no risk impact. In France were reported examples of labour inspectors filing a violation and imposing sanctions for 
every minor discrepancy from the legal work time, regardless of circumstances, significance etc. (and of the impact, which in one case 
was the withdrawal of a foreign investor from a locally significant business). 
302 As our examples above suggest, there may be no escaping discretion in any case. Even in systems (e.g .US OSHA) which try and 
minimize regulatory discretion (with a number of side-effects), discretion remains – if not in the hand of regulators, then in the hand 
of judges called upon to decide conflicts between regulators and businesses. 
303 Ogus (ibid.) suggests e.g. the reference to a “general principle” that “may be accompanied by guidelines”, or to “confer power on 
an agency to create formal differentiated standards for invidiual firms or groups of firms” – or to leave differentiation “to the 
enforcement stage”. All of these “solutions” are in fact different ways of establishing and framing discretion (and of assigning it to 
different organizational levels and operational stages). It remains that it means basically that regulatory discretion is unavoidable if 
one wants to have at least a “decent” combination of effectiveness and efficiency of rules. 
304 Ogus (ibid.) also discusses several of the issues arising around the enforcement approaches and practices. He shows that, in many 
cases, inspection officials will tend “in exercising their discretion” to “find it difficult to resist arguments for leniency based on grounds” 
such as financial difficulties, local unemployment etc., even when these are clearly not foreseen as factors in the regulation (pp. 
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A short coda is in order to this discussion of why, when and how to regulate: the question of who should do 
it. The importance we have found of regulatory discretion speaks strongly in favour of adequate 
professionalism of inspection and enforcement staff, and maybe also of officials in charge of improving 
regulatory implementation methods across the board. We will discuss the question of inspectors’ 
professionalism in the third part of this research, looking at practical examples. As for the idea of having 
officials who understand regulatory issues, and are tasked with coordinating and improving them, it can be 
found e.g. in Breyer (1992). Having shown the importance of expertise and professionalism issues in regulation 
(see e.g. pp. 49-50) Breyer, looking for solutions towards more effective and efficient “risk regulation”, 
proposes creating a “new career path” of civil servants with expertise in all major regulatory fields, and a 
“small, centralized administrative group charged with a rationalizing mission” (pp. 59-60). This would, in 
Breyer’s view, help build a more rational, “reformed”, “risk-based” mission for regulators (pp. 64-65). We will 
see in the third part that there have been experiments in this direction, for instance the creation of the UK’s 
Better Regulatory Delivery Office, and that they bear a close relation to attempts to use “risk-based 
approaches” more systematically. 
 
 
iii. Conclusion – the importance of implementation – learning from the regulatory field 
 
From the above, we can conclude several points of relevance for the rest of the research. First, regulation has 
costs as well as benefits, and it has limitations – and this applies also to various types of regulation or 
regulatory instruments. Within this framework, “optimizing” regulation’s effectiveness and efficiency appears 
to require leaving a significant space for discretion in enforcement – thus how to structure this discretion is an 
important question. This is what we will focus on in the rest of this research.  
Second, regulation can legitimately be treated as a specific field, and there are sound reasons to apply strict 
scrutiny to limitations of economic freedom and their potential adverse effects, but not more so than would 
be true for a number of other legislative fields. Rather, the specificity of regulation has emerged to a large 
extent as a result of the interplay of conflicting actors, and the salience of economic and social issues it relates 
too. There may thus not be real legitimacy to treat regulatory issues differently than we would other fields of 
legislation that impinge on fundamental rights or freedoms – but maybe there are ideas and lessons that have 
been developed in the study of regulation that have emerged there more strongly (precisely because of 
conflicting interests, salience of issues etc.), and that could be applicable to other fields. We will see when 
discussing compliance theories that much can be learned from non-regulatory fields (e.g. interactions between 
citizens and the police). It may well be that much could in turn be learned from “better regulation”, “smarter 
regulation” and “risk-based inspections” that could be applicable to interactions between the state and 
citizens, civil society organizations, the media or other stakeholders, in a variety of fields. This could be the 
case of the requirement to analyse costs and benefits, demand extended consultations and discussions before 
                                                           
211.212 – note that the 2014 UK Regulators Code now explicitly mandates that all regulators should have regard to economic impacts 
when taking their decisions – see: https://www.gov.uk/government/publications/regulators-code). We have seen, on the other hand, 
many countries where regulatory officials did not pay any attention to such issues in most cases (see above Ukraine, France etc. 
examples). Ogus also mentions how command and control regimes correspond to “power, prestige and job satisfaction” for regulators 
(p. 256), something which is even more true in countries where corruption issues are significant. Again, these different (somewhat 




issuing new rules, focusing on key risks and leaving more room for voluntary compliance when risks are low, 
modulating enforcement responses based on risks etc. 
As Voermans (2015) has shown, the lack of consideration of issues such as compliance drivers and methods to 
assess, understand and improve compliance levels is one of the roots of implementation problems for 
European legislation (see pp. 357-359 in particular). This is an interesting case where considering the best 
practices in regulation and regulatory enforcement could greatly benefit a broader field of legislation, and a 
“higher” institutional level (since EU legislation applies primarily to Member States, and not only or firstly to 
individuals). Thus, the lessons learned in studying regulatory practices, and in particular regulatory 
enforcement and inspections, could be found to have broader relevance – to other legislative and policy fields, 
and to a variety of actors and institutional levels. 
Finally, a short point is in order to clarify the exact place of inspections and enforcement within the context of 
justifications for regulation. There are several ways in which inspections and enforcement are relevant when 
considering the need for and legitimacy of regulation, and in deciding on the most appropriate method. First, 
when the potential costs of a given regulation are assessed (both for the state, the duty holders, and the 
economy at large), it is essential to consider the specific costs of the “enforcement” stage, and for this to 
decide between different inspections and enforcement approaches (including the “none” option)305. Second, 
when the expected effectiveness of a given regulation is envisioned, the inspections and enforcement stage is 
equally important (and, again, there are several options with different expected results). Third, inspections 
and enforcement can also be considered independently, when a regulatory framework already is in place and 
there is no discussion of its being revised. In such circumstances, different inspections and enforcement 
choices (in terms of institutions, resources, approaches, “on the ground” methods etc.) will present very 
different costs, expected outcomes, and also levels of restrictiveness and intrusiveness, and thus can be 
subject to the same kind of analysis as would be done of regulations themselves in terms of both legitimacy 
and adequacy. 
 
b. Costs and effectiveness of regulation and enforcement – theory and evidence 
 
In a number of ways, costs and effectiveness questions are central to regulatory discussions, and regulatory 
inspections and enforcement issues are no exception. We have exposed in the first section the ways in which 
regulatory inspections were explicitly set up in order to address perceived problems, meaning that, given this 
utilitarian purpose, effectiveness is a central consideration. Furthermore, as we will highlight in the third 
section (covering experiences of risk-based inspections and reforms), claims to reduce costs (to private 
businesses, citizens, the economy at large etc.) of inspections (and, by extension, of regulation) are central to 
the drive for more risk-based inspections. At the same time, effectiveness problems are also important to the 
risk-based inspections discussion, and have given the impetus to many changes in rules and practices. There 
are only few research undertakings that have focused specifically on assessing inspections’ effectiveness, and 
even fewer that have looked seriously at costs (a topic on which, on the other hand, there is a certain amount 
of publications from governmental and inter-governmental institutions). We will consider these in the third 
section, but for now we will briefly review the broader accounts of regulation, under which inspections and 
enforcement are generally subsumed, to see what they can tell us about these issues. 
In fact, assessing effects (positive or negative) of regulation is easier said than done. Even though regulations 
have been given far more prominence in public discussions and research over the past couple of decades, 
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there is little solid proof or undisputed evidence that they make a considerable difference – be it to economic 
growth, or to the public welfare they aim at supporting. While this may sound provocative or even contrarian, 
and the parallel progress of regulation and welfare over the past couple centuries may seem to be proof 
enough, there are in fact a number of studies that cast doubt on causal relationships around regulation. If 
regulations themselves are of limited relevance, then one may argue enforcement and inspections are also 
matters of secondary importance. We cannot pretend to make a comprehensive review of the literature on 
these topics, but will try and cover them briefly to show some of the main findings and problems, and look at 
reasons the issue may matter regardless of the “inconclusiveness” of economic studies. 
 
Regulatory reform and growth – context and specific and content of reforms matter 
First, the impact of regulations on economic growth, competitiveness or jobs, is indeed disputed. On the one 
hand, Djankov,  McLiesh and Ramalho (2006) write that “our results indicate that government regulation of 
business is an important determinant of growth” and that “relationship between more business-friendly 
regulations and higher growth rates is consistently significant in various specifications of standard growth 
models, and more consistently so than other determinants commonly used in the growth literature”. They 
conclude that “Our results also have significant implications for policy [and] suggest that countries should put 
priority on reforming their business regulations when designing growth policies”. Many other economists, 
however, beg to differ – both with the findings about the significance of regulatory issues, and about the policy 
prescriptions pushed by Djankov et al. (which all link to the Doing Business report, a project which Djankov 
long headed).  
From a general perspective, there is consensus that “institutions” (part of which are regulations, and 
regulatory inspections and enforcement) are one of the components of growth. There obviously are many 
other components, including geography, demography, social and cultural factors, technology – but institutions 
have an important role, and interact with many other factors. Rodrik (2003) shows the ways in which good 
institutions supports growth in several ways (by directly impacting productivity, and through its effects on 
trade) in the following chart (Introduction, p. 5 – figure 1.3). 
 
Rodrik, looking at the case studies gathered across the world, writes further that “institutions that provide 
dependable property rights, manage conflict, maintain law and order, and align economic incentives with 
social costs and benefits are the foundation of long-term growth. This is the clearest message that comes 
across from the individual cases” (ibid., p. 10). However, there is far less of a “standard prescription” of what 
exactly these “institutions” should entail than there is in Djankov et.al. Indeed, as Rodrik indicates further, 
“good institutions can be acquired, but doing so often requires experimentation, willingness to depart from 
orthodoxy, and attention to local conditions (…) Perhaps nowhere has this been clearer than in China. Qian’s 
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discussion of China focuses on what he calls “transitional institutions”—institutions that can differ greatly from 
off-the-shelf, “best practice” institutions (…) [and] can have the virtue of being more suited to the realities on 
the ground on both economic efficiency and political feasibility grounds. Qian shows that the Chinese 
leadership experimented and purposefully crafted imperfect, but feasible institutional arrangements (…) 
[which] succeeded because of their high ratio of economic benefits to political costs” (ibid., p. 13).  
A particular area of focus for reform is that of product-market regulations, and this is an important one for our 
research, as many inspections relate to product-market rules (e.g. food safety, non-food products market 
surveillance etc.). The findings are generally quite consistent that improvements in this area have a strong 
positive impact on productivity. These productivity-boosting effects of making product-market regulations 
more flexible are visible not only in the sectors directly affected, but “downstream”, i.e. liberalizing 
production/intermediary goods has effects on the productivity of all the sectors that use these outputs: 
“Regulations that bridle access to otherwise competitive markets and unnecessarily constrain business 
operation can be a drag on productivity growth. While most analyses of this issue have focused on the effects 
of these regulations on the productivity of the firms or sectors directly concerned, the main point of this paper 
is that such regulations can also have powerful indirect depressing effects on the productivity of other sectors 
through input-output linkages” (Bourlès, Cette, Lopez, Mairesse, Nicoletti 2010, p. 28). 
In short, regulatory issues (and particularly product-market regulations, which have a strong link with 
inspections) are relevant to long-term growth prospects, among a number of other drivers – but exactly in 
what way, and what improvements are most important, is likely to depend significantly on the broader country 
context. What, then, of the importance of such issues to developed countries, and to economic recovery in 
the current crisis (one dare not yet say “post-crisis”) context? While the European Commission (EC) (EC 2014) 
and the OECD (OECD 2015 a) frequently emphasize the importance of “structural reforms” (which include 
employment law, tax administration, product-market regulations etc. – and which as a result cover reforms in 
a number of inspections), the prominence of discussions of these structural reforms in a “crisis recovery” 
context is somewhat misleading. Even the EC and OECD take pains to remind readers that these reforms are 
not “quick fixes”: “Structural reforms to labour and product markets help to improve economic growth 
prospects and the ability of economies to adjust to shocks by expanding flexibility and improving the efficiency 
of how and where productive factors are used. The recent financial and economic crisis prompted EU countries 
to under-take considerable reforms, which are now starting to show tentative results. Their full benefits, 
however, may take years to materialise, which means that governments must avoid the temptation to give up 
on them now that the economic situation is somewhat more comfortable” (EC 2014, p. 1). The OECD states 
that: “overall, structural reforms implemented since the early 2000s have contributed to raising the level of 
potential gross domestic product (GDP) per capita by around 5%, with most of the gains coming from higher 
productivity” and that “further reform (…) could further raise potential GDP per capita by up to 10% on average 
across OECD countries” (OECD 2015 a, p. 106).  
The IMF take is somewhat similar, but more precise and grounded in more economic analysis. In its latest take 
on the issue (IMF 2015), it indicates: “The analysis illustrates that structural reforms in the euro area can 
increase its real GDP markedly, though it may take time for their full potential to be achieved. Structural 
reforms are critical to improving the long-term capacity of economies to grow through both more intensive 
use of resources and higher productivity”. Within these reforms, the “largest gains for euro area countries 
could come from product market reforms” (where inspections are an important aspect). However, the IMF 
cautions that “Weak demand conditions may dampen the already small short-term impact” (IMF 2015, Ch. 7, 
p. 22). Some independent analysts306 are far more critical of the idea that structural reforms are what is 
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skepticism of such reforms’ impacts.  
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urgently needed in a time of recession. They note that “a broad consensus has emerged: Peripheral euro-area 
countries need to urgently adopt structural reforms that increase competition in product and labor markets” 
(Eggertsson, Ferrero and Raffo 2013, p. 2). Their conclusions, however, show that, while “structural reforms 
can greatly reduce the competitiveness gap between the EMU core and periphery and boost income prospects 
in the region”, “the timing of such reforms is crucial. If undertaken during a crisis that takes monetary policy 
rates to the ZLB307, structural reforms can deepen the recession by worsening deflation and increasing real 
rates” (ibid., p. 32). In summary, “in a crisis that pushes the nominal interest rate to its lower bound, these 
reforms do not support economic activity in the short run, and may well be contractionary” (ibid., p. 1). While 
the authors consider all kinds of structural reforms (product markets and employment) together, and there 
may well be differences between the effect of these two types (with most of the demand depressing effects 
coming from employment reform), caution remains in order. 
Thus, to summarize these overall findings about the positive impact of regulatory reform on growth: it is likely 
to be significant (possibly major) in the long term, however its impact on the short term is more limited (and 
particular caution is needed in times of recession due to a shortfall in demand), and the exact contents of the 
regulatory reforms that will be effective is highly context- and country-specific. 
 
Regulations impact on competitiveness, growth and jobs – more complex than it may seem 
A related contention to the one that regulatory reform is “good for growth” is that “regulations” (or at least 
their abuse) would be “bad for competitiveness”. While this appears to be grounded in simple logic (if you add 
more hurdles and demands on businesses, their costs of operating should be higher, and this in turn should 
make them less competitive globally), findings again show that this is not as clear-cut as it may seem.  
A first problem is that, while regulations impose costs, it is not clear how high they are. Even the Australian 
Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business, which had a clear interest in showing the relevance of 
its own task, had to acknowledge that “while a number of studies have sought to estimate the economic costs 
of regulation in Australia, the limitations of such studies mean that the estimates should be treated with 
caution” (Banks 2006, p. 12). This same report, however, suggested that “the economic cost of complying with 
regulations is a key determinant of national competitiveness and the investment environment for businesses. 
These costs can be direct, such as capital and operating costs. They can also be indirect, that is, opportunity 
costs, where the principal(s) of the businesses are taken away from their strategic roles of driving innovation, 
securing investment and increasing productivity” (ibid., p. 11). Thus, the importance of improving regulations 
is predicated on their (negative) impact on innovation, investment and productivity – and, through these, 
competitiveness. 
It is, then, worth considering the literature on one of the most prominent areas of regulation, environmental 
rules, and their impact on competitiveness. A quick review of findings gives a picture that contrast sharply with 
the above emphasis on regulations as a serious problem: environmental regulations appear to have very 
limited, if any, negative impact – and some studies even suggest a positive long-term impact. We summarize 
a few interesting studies, not in the aim of reaching strong conclusions, but in order to show the complexity 
of the topic, and the many factors that may influence findings. From our perspective, these apparent 
contradictions are interesting because they may point to the importance of (too often neglected) 
implementation questions in order to understand the impact of regulations. 
The finding that environmental regulations have (at worst) little negative impact on competitiveness is 
relatively constant through repeated studies over a decade. One of the earliest studies (Jaffe, Peterson, 
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Portney and Stavins 1995) concluded that “there is relatively little evidence to support the hypothesis that 
environmental regulations had had a large adverse effect on competitiveness, however that elusive term is 
defined” (p. 157). The conclusion is not entirely one-sided, though, and they add that “long-run social costs 
(…) may be significant, including adverse effects on productivity” – but studies looking at “exports, overall 
trade flows and plant-location decisions” show impacts that are “either small, statistically insignificant, or not 
robust to tests of model specification” (ibid., p. 158). The authors, however, have interesting insights on why 
this may be so – i.e. why indeed these impacts may be small in reality, and why there may be measurement 
issues. We will come back to these a bit later. 
More recent reviews report roughly similar findings. A review prepared for the United Kingdom’s ministry in 
charge of the Environment (Department for the Environment, Food and Rural Affairs – DEFRA) in 2006 provides 
with nuanced, interesting points (SQW Limited 2006). On trade, it writes that “the evidence seems consistently 
to be that the costs imposed by tighter pollution regulation are not a major determinant of trade patterns 
even for those sectors most likely to be affected by such regulation. However, there is some evidence that 
regulatory stringency may exercise an influence once account has been taken of the factor intensity of the 
different industries and the relative factor abundance of countries. Thus, for a country in which a specific 
production factor is relatively scarce and an industry intensively uses this factor, then even a modestly 
stringent environmental regulation will induce a decline in exports” (p. iii). At the firm-specific level, the report 
finds that “there is a modest productivity penalty in the short term associated with increased stringency of 
regulation. But, they also provide evidence of a countervailing innovation push over the longer term – 
especially in larger firms with a track record of innovation” (ibid., p. iii). In macro-economic terms, the 
conclusion is that “regulations are unlikely to increase competitiveness (…) and may adversely affect it” but 
“the adverse effect can, to varying degrees, be offset” – through tax incentives, multilateral agreements with 
“competing nations and regions” or (more interestingly for our research) by ensuring that “businesses are 
made aware of the regulations” and prompting “them (through advisory and grant support) to invest in 
improved operating practices” (ibid. p. ii).  
A more recent research paper supports further the same views (Dechezleprêtre and Sato, 2014). The paper 
states that “environmental regulations can reduce employment and productivity by small amounts, in 
particular in pollution- and energy-intensive sectors, at least during the transitory period when the economy 
moves away from polluting activities and towards cleaner production processes. Job effects are more likely to 
occur within countries, where relocation barriers are low, than across borders” and that “over the longer run, 
when macroeconomic adjustments, geographical and sectoral reallocation are factored in, job effects are even 
smaller than in the short run” (p. 3). The authors add that “ There is little evidence to suggest that 
strengthening environmental regulations deteriorates international competitiveness. The effect of current 
environmental regulations on where trade and investment take place has been shown to be negligible 
compared to other factors such as market conditions and the quality of the local workforce. However, the 
impact could increase in the future if efforts to control pollution diverge significantly across countries” (ibid.). 
The authors go on to add that “benefits of environmental regulations often vastly outweigh the costs”.  
A last research paper is worth quoting on the economic impact of environmental rules. In this paper (Bivens 
2012), the author argues that “when significant economic slack persists even when the interest rates 
controlled by the Federal Reserve are held at zero, the overall effect of cost-raising regulatory changes is 
almost surely expansionary” (p. 2). In other words this suggests that (at least from a macro-economic 
modelling perspective), when the economy is in recession (producing below its output potential), i.e. suffering 
from a lack of demand, raising regulatory demands can act as a kind of “stimulus”, because the need to invest 
in order to comply with the new rules would generate a form of additional demand. Since the economy is not 
capacity-constrained in such a setting, but demand-constrained, the new rules can have a positive economic 
impact (rather than a slight negative). As a result, “the effects of some specific regulatory changes (…) are 
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surely positive for job creation”. This is in line with what has been called the “Porter hypothesis”, formulated 
by Michael Porter and co-authors in a number of important papers (see e.g. Porter and van der Linde 1995, 
Esty and Porter 2005). Quoting Esty and Porter (2005, p. 425), “our findings suggest that the environment 
need not be sacrificed on the road to economic progress. Quite to the contrary, the countries that have the 
most aggressive environmental policy regimes also seem to be the most competitive and economically 
successful. Moreover, we find preliminary evidence that countries that adopt a stringent environmental 
regime relative to their income may speed up economic growth rather than retard it.” 
 
Making sense of apparent contradictions 
This short “review of reviews” leaves us with what can be a counter-intuitive result for many: regulations (in 
this case, environmental, but there is reason to think that the same mechanisms may apply to many other 
types of regulation) seem to have at worst a very limited impact on competitiveness, trade and macro-
economic results – and may even have in some circumstances (persistent economic slump) a positive impact 
on jobs and for some firms (and with the right type of context, support etc.) a positive impact on adoption of 
latest technologies and thus competitiveness. It may seem somewhat conflicting with the previous findings, 
which suggested that regulatory reform (product-market regulations mostly) would have a positive impact on 
growth and competitiveness. 
The solutions to this apparent puzzle may lie in at least three directions: differences in the nature of industries 
affected, flaws in studies and data and a difference between the “level of regulation” overall (i.e. the 
substantive requirements embodied in the rules) and the specifics of regulation i.e. how it is worded, which 
instruments are used to implement it, and how control and enforcement are handled (and support provided, 
or not). The second and third point, in particular, are highly significant for our research.  
First, for some industries, the cost of compliance may be far higher than for others – and/or international 
competitive pressures may be higher. As Jaffe, Peterson, Portney and Stavins (1995) put it “for all but the most 
heavily regulated industries, the cost of complying with federal environmental regulation is a relatively small 
fraction of total cost of production” (p. 158) – but this means that for some industries the effects may be far 
stronger. The same authors add that “although U.S. environmental laws and regulations are generally the most 
stringent in the world308, the difference between U.S. requirements and those in other western industrial 
democracies is not great” – and that “even where there are substantial differences” in environmental 
requirements, U.S. and multinational firms “are reluctant to build less-than-state-of-the-art plants in foreign 
countries”, at least after the Bhopal disaster. They further contend that “even in developing countries where 
environmental standards (and certainly enforcement capabilities) are relatively weak, plants built by 
indigenous firms typically embody more pollution control (…) than is required” (ibid.). These last points raise 
several concerns, since it is far from clear that these different points are all true across the globe now, if they 
ever were. Certainly, the major changes in the global economy in the past couple decades, and in particular 
the relocation of a substantial part of manufacturing activities to China and other countries combined with 
persistant reports of “less-than-optimal” compliance with a number of safety and environmental standards in 
these countries, suggest that the findings of some studies may not hold true anymore. Given that many 
reviews of evidence incorporate studies that are years or sometimes decades old, this may weaken their 
findings. 
Second, data limitations are significant, and may explain the variations in findings (and in other words mean 
that many “findings” are no such things, but rather illusions caused by inadequate data). Quoting once more 
from Jaffe et al. (1995): “in many of the studies, differences in environmental regulation were measured by 
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environmental control costs as a percentage of value-added, or some other measure that depends critically 
on accurate measurement of environmental spending. Even for the United States (…) compliance expenditure 
data are notoriously unreliable. The problem is even more pronounced in other OECD countries (…) Thus, we 
may have found little relationship between environmental regulations and competitiveness simply because 
the data are of poor quality” (p. 158). As we have purported to show on the section on practical data 
limitations, the quality of much of the data on regulatory issues, compliance burdens etc. is of very poor 
quality, be it due to the difficulty or unwillingness of respondents to answer correctly, or because of lack of 
quality control etc. In any case, it seems that we may face another case of the tendency of many studies to 
draw major conclusions from calculations based on faulty data. Looking at the broader picture of both 
quantitative and qualitative findings, and at longer time periods, international comparisons of “growth 
trajectories” etc. may thus be the best we can do at this stage to compensate for these data problems. 
Finally, and this is the most significant for this research, the (apparent) contradictions in findings may be to a 
significant extent due to the lack of attention of most studies to the major distinction between the underlying 
technical requirements (what businesses are supposed to achieve, substantially) and the procedures, 
processes and regulatory instruments associated with these requirements (what permits and licenses have to 
be obtained, through which processes, how controls are conducted, what avenues exist for redress etc.). 
Quoting Jaffe et al. (1995) one last time: “only two of the studies we reviewed controlled for differences in 
“regulatory climate” between jurisdictions. If the delays and litigation surrounding regulation are the greatest 
impediments (…) these effects will not be picked up by studies that look exclusively at (…) standards or (…) 
spending” (p. 158). The DEFRA study (SQW Limited 2006) likewise noted “that there is not a great deal by way 
of empirical work on the different forms that regulation can take and the effects of their form of 
implementation on firm behaviour” (p. 41). Further, it adds that “Regulation design, stringency and efficiency 
can influence the relationship between environmental regulation and competitiveness. Stringency may well 
be less important than the design of regulation itself” (p. 46-47). The same study also suggests that 
“awareness” of regulations may play a role in mitigating possible adverse effects (p. 37), but does not go in 
any further details.  
What these points all suggest is that existing studies may have focused far too much on either the underlying 
requirements themselves (“standards”), regardless of their enforcement context, or on the estimated costs 
(with the associated problems in data quality). It may thus well be that researchers have been ignoring one 
major direction of inquiry: how regulations are “delivered”, and what effects this has – and in particular, what 
role inspection methods play in this. We will see in the next section that such attention to regulatory 
instruments appears to be very fruitful in the case of licensing. 
 
The specific effects of regulatory instruments – the example of licensing 
Looking at the effects of “regulation” in general is, in our view, inherently problematic, since it assumes that 
the ways in which regulations are implemented are largely indifferent (and it also assumes, more or less, that 
regulation is indeed implemented – which can be a heroic assumption indeed). Rather, there is evidence that 
specific regulatory instruments can have different effects, both positive and negative – but there is still only 
limited research on this, and on the comparative costs and benefits of different instruments.  
From an economic perspective, the most significant research has been conducted on licensing, mainly by 
Morris Kleiner309 and under his direction – and this research has recently gained a higher public profile, and 
                                                           




been taken up and summarized in a report of the US Council of Economic Advisers310. This research is primarily 
done from an economic perspective, and considers what the costs of licensing are in terms of employment 
effects, and its effects in terms of increased health, safety etc. Kleiner et al. look at what is called in the US 
“occupational licensing”, i.e. the licensing of professional occupations (generally licenses given to individuals), 
and not to the entire range of license types – of buildings, economic operators311 etc. Kleiner et al. do not 
question the scope of licensing by looking at the actual level of risks (even though this is one possible 
approach), but rather use economic models to capture the comparative effects of licensing and other, “milder” 
regulatory instruments, such as certification of practitioners (which is similar to licensing, but voluntary – i.e. 
consumers can choose between certified and non-certified practitioners), or registration (which is a 
significantly weaker instrument, only resulting in a catalogue of practitioners, but not necessarily indicating 
competence).  
To compare these, Kleiner et al. look at (a) comparable types of activities, some of which are licensed, and the 
others not, in the same jurisdiction – (b) identical activities in different jurisdictions, some of which require a 
license, and others not – (c) identical activities in the same jurisdictions before and after a change in legislation 
which altered the licensing regime. The studies then compare different outcomes that can be linked to 
licensing (or its alternatives): effectiveness in terms of achieving social welfare goals on the one hand, and 
employment and income effects. If licensing is seen to produce significantly better outcomes, e.g. better 
dental health where dentists are licensed (or where licensing requirements are more strict), it may balance 
the costs that it imposes. Conversely, if the economic effects (reduced employment, higher “rent” for licensed 
professions) are very significant, and the benefits marginal, this may lead to questioning the appropriateness 
of licensing. 
The potential (and purported) positive effects of licensing stem both from its direct “screening” effect 
(expected to improve quality, health and safety) and from its market information effects (increasing consumer 
trust and thus potentially increasing consumer demand for specific goods and services where it may otherwise 
remain low because of information asymmetry)312. The two aspects are complementary. The former (safety) 
that is generally put forward as the main justification for introducing (or tightening) licensing requirements. 
                                                           
310 See Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers and Department of Labor (2015), available at: 
https://www.whitehouse.gov/sites/default/files/docs/licensing_report_final_nonembargo.pdf. 
311 “Licenses” or “permits” (two terms which come from different latin words both meaning that something is allowed) are regulatory 
instruments that are used for a number of issues, in many different ways and for a variety of purposes. One can at least distinguish 
licenses applying to buildings, premises and equipment (construction permits, licenses/permits for specific machinery, facilities etc.), 
licenses applying to operators (banking, tourism, television, mobile phone operators etc.), and licenses applying to individuals (doctors, 
hairdressers, taxis etc.). Licenses may be open-ended or time-limited, they may be issued in unlimited numbers or submitted to a 
numerus clausus, they may or may not require a number of documents, qualifications, fees etc. Their goals may combine safety and 
protection against risks with economic objectives (managing scarce resources), etc. Finally, some forms of entry regulation can be 
understood by some (e.g. Kleiner) as equivalent to licensing, even though no actual license is issued. This is the case of what many EU 
countries call “regulated professions”, whereby the exercise of some professions does not require a specific license to be issued but 
requires some qualifications including e.g. a state-sanctioned diploma, a certain number of years of exercise etc. For clarity, we would 
advocate to distinguish such regulated professions from licensed occupations – both are restrictive regulatory instruments, but 
somewhat different. The same goes for self-regulated professions, e.g. doctors or lawyers in a number of EU countries, which are not 
officially called “licensed”, even though the effect is similar. 
312 Kleiner 2006: “existence of licenses may minimize consumer uncertainty over the quality of the licensed service and increase the 
overall demand for the service” (p. 1). Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers and Department of Labor 2015: “Even 
when health and safety are not an issue, increasing consumer information through regulation can be beneficial. If consumers are 
unable to distinguish between high- and low-quality providers before purchasing a good or receiving a service, low-quality providers 
can remain in the market without being recognized as such, reducing the average quality in the market and reducing the incentives for 
other providers to invest in quality improvements.12 Furthermore, if consumers are sufficiently concerned about getting a low-quality 
provider, then informational uncertainty may depress demand for goods and services. Consumers who would otherwise purchase a 
product if they knew it were high-quality might forgo their purchase if the quality were uncertain. Licensing is one possible way to 
address these problems through forcing providers to meet certain quality benchmarks, and creating greater incentives to invest in 
increased training and skill development” (p. 11).  
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Arguments in favour of licensing invariably put forward risks and safety justifications – licenses being 
supposedly necessary to avoid a number of catastrophes (see Kleiner 2006 p. 1). In the original emergence 
and spread of the licensing system in the US, consumer demand for information on the quality (safety) of 
service for critical professions appears to have played an important role (ibid., pp. 22-23). However, the 
resulting “licensing map” does not necessarily suggest a strong match between licensing requirements and 
hazards: to take a typical example, a taxi driver needs one, but not the manager of a chemical plant, even 
though the latter most likely has a stronger potential “risk level”. Consumer information and addressing 
information asymmetries may appear to be a better match with actual licensing practices (a company has time 
and means to screen applicants when hiring a manager, not so with someone hailing a cab on the street, or 
with a patient urgently looking for a doctor). Remains to be seen whether the beneficial effects of licensing 
are actually observed in practice. 
Kleiner, in 2006, used one example of licensed occupation that, with hindsight, shows perfectly the limitations 
of licensing’s effectiveness as a regulatory instrument. Quoting work by Wheelan on occupational licensing in 
Illinois, Kleiner pointed out, as a good example of “capture” of licensing, the parallel rise in the secondary 
mortgage market and increasing level of regulation on mortgage brokers (ibid., pp. 46-47). Given what we 
have seen in the meantime, it is clear (with hindsight) that mortgage brokers licensing did essentially nothing 
to ensure the adherence to strict standards of practices. A more systematic look at the evidence likewise 
suggests that regulatory capture is a stronger predictor of actual licensing patterns than public interest. 
Quoting the Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers and Department of Labor’s report, “with 
the caveats that the literature focuses on specific examples and that quality is difficult to measure, most 
research does not find that licensing improves quality or public health and safety” (Department of Treasury, 
Council of Economic Advisers and Department of Labor 2015 p. 13). Similarly, Kleiner (2006) had already found 
that “the analysis of studies of licensed occupations finds that the impact of regulation on the quality of service 
received by consumers is murky, with most of the studies showing no effects on average consumer well-being 
relative to little or no regulation” (Kleiner 2006 p. 63). Crucially, in spite of being (as acknowledged by the 
Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers and Department of Labor’s report) fragmentary and 
partial, studies have focused in a number of cases on examples where strong public safety and health effects 
were claimed (e.g. dentistry), and found them to be at most very limited, and often wholly lacking. Economic 
impacts, however, tend to be strong – and to support a “capture” view of licensing, with economic welfare for 
the whole of the population (or country) decreased, but rents for the licensed professionals increased. Indeed, 
“there is compelling evidence that licensing raises prices for consumers” (Department of Treasury, Council of 
Economic Advisers and Department of Labor 2015, p. 14) – and “monopoly power [of licensed occupations] 
may reallocate income from lower-income customers to higher-income practitioners” (Kleiner 2006 p. 59), 
meaning that licensing has in many cases a negative distributional impact (increasing inequality). In addition 
to price and income distribution effects, “licensing affects who takes what job. If licensing places too many 
restrictions on this allocation of workers, it can reduce the overall efficiency of the labor market. When 
workers cannot enter jobs that make the best use of their skills, this hampers growth and may even lessen 
innovation” (Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers and Department of Labor 2015, p. 12). 
Considering the evidence on employment effects, Kleiner (2006) finds that “within an occupation, the 
employment growth rate is approximately 20 percent higher in states that do not require licensing, but 
impacts differ widely based on the methods and occupations” (p. 149). On balance, there appears to be a 
substantial redistribution effect from the general population to the licensed occupations (estimated by Kleiner 
at $116-139 billion – ibid.) and significant lost output due to misallocation of resources (estimated at $34.8-
41.7 billion – ibid.). 
Thus, while licensing appears to have at best limited positive impacts on public safety and market trust, it has 
clearly demonstrated negative impacts on income distribution and on resource allocation. What is important 
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is that these are not effects of what is too often, and indiscriminately, called “regulation” – but of a specific 
type of regulatory instrument. The choice of regulatory instruments, and of their characteristics, is thus 
important, independently of the content of substantive regulations that economic operators have to abide by 
in terms of practices, safety etc. Interestingly, the Department of Treasury, Council of Economic Advisers and 
Department of Labor 2015 report contrasts licensing with inspections – noting that licensing board tend to 
conduct only limited oversight of the license holders after issuance, but that inspections can constitute an 
effective (and possibly less burdensome and economically harmful) regulatory instrument in place of licensing 
(pp. 43-44). This is an argument that, as a reform practitioner, we have seen discussed in a large number of 
countries, e.g. in Greece and Ukraine in recent years313. While having merit at first glance (periodic inspections 
are more likely to help in verifying and supporting sustained compliance than a licensing check administered 
before start up, and with permanent validity), this leaves aside the question of whether inspections are really 
effective, and how to make them more so. This shows once again the importance of conducting more research 
on the specifics of regulatory instruments, and not only on “regulation” considered as an indistinct block. 
 
Regulations, inspections and corruption 
In developing countries and emerging markets in particular, but also in high-income economies, regulations 
can, in a number of instances, be associated with corruption. Inspections, being one of the main points of 
contact between regulators and regulated businesses, are often associated with corruption in regulatory 
dealings. While we cannot do justice do this important topic within this research, of which it is not the focus, 
we will attempt to indicate a few of the ways in which the link with corruption makes the improvement of 
inspection practices particularly relevant. First, however, let us give a somewhat more precise meaning to the 
highly loaded and polysemic term of “corruption”. 
In its broadest sense, corruption can be understood as any way in which the regulatory, legal or administrative 
process is made to serve a purpose that is fully different from its stated aims, and to function in a way that is 
in contradiction with its official rules. In a somewhat narrower meaning, which is the one of interest here (and 
the most commonly accepted one), corruption is when a process or rule is subverted in order to serve specific 
private interests, for private gain (financial mostly, but possibly political etc.). Money does not always need to 
change hands, and corruption in inspections certainly does not always mean that bribes are given during the 
inspection visit. Corrupt behaviours can involve gifts, employment, expectations of future “tit for tat”, or any 
variety of favours, from the business side. From the regulator’s side, they can involve turning a blind eye on 
violation, interpreting rules leniently, harassing competitors, or simply doing one’s job normally (in cases 
where regulators abuse their powers systematically against those that refuse to “pay up” or “play the 
game”)314.  
Regulations and regulatory processes are not the only locus of corruption, of course, and poorly structured 
rules and institutions are definitely not the only (or the main) cause of corrupt behaviours. They are, however, 
one of the most important areas of corruption (along with police interactions), because both of the large 
number of rules and regulatory instruments, and because they affect economic activity, and thus present 
strong opportunities for rent-seeking behaviours (both for regulators and regulated entities). Corruption in 
inspections generally presents important differences with, for instance, corruption in rule-making. The latter 
                                                           
313 There is a lot of evidence that the problem of the right use and design of licensing, and more broadly of regulatory instruments, is 
essential to developing countries and emerging markets. There is rather little academic literature on this topic, and not always recent 
(see e.g. Ogus and Zhang 2005, Zhang 2009). Practical reform work done by the World Bank Group has highlighted repeatedly the 
importance of the topic, but literature produced is mostly focused on “how to reform” rather than on an analysis of the pro and contra. 
See nonetheless World Bank Group 2006 and  
314 See Ogus (2004), Introduction and section Definition and Typology of Corruption, for a discussion of the different meanings and 
types of “corruption”.  
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usually involves high-level capture by major firms, aimed at keeping competition out and/or building captive 
markets, and (at least in middle- and high-income countries) is likely to involve more “revolving door” offers 
for officials than outright bribes. Inspections, by contrast, offer opportunities for “decentralized” corruption, 
involving front-line inspectors, small and medium firms, a variety of “gifts” and favours. In some countries, 
corruption is essentially the default setting: inspectors go from firm to firm, bribes or gifts are expected, and 
in their absence enforcement will be ruthless, if needed “making up” violations where there are none.  
Unfortunately, the topic is notoriously difficult to investigate, since reliable data on corruption is, nearly by 
definition, hard to come by. Survey data, for instance, can be very misleading in countries where businesses 
have reasons to believe that being open about corrupt behaviours could end up creating problems for them 
(which means the majority of countries). That said, some evidence exists, as gathered for instance in successive 
surveys by the International Finance Corporation in post-Soviet countries315. Even though inspections-related 
corruption, much as petty corruption more generally, is primarily a problem for developing countries, some 
high-profile scandals should warn against complacency in high-income, developed countries – for instance the 
crane inspections scandal in New York City316. It is also worth remembering that corruption can manifest itself 
in misuse of administrative power not for private gain, but for the “profit” of the institutions themselves, as 
has been abundantly demonstrated in recent years in the United States by the accumulation of fines intended 
not to deter crime but to fill municipal coffers, and by the abuse of the “civil forfeiture” programs to the “quasi 
private” benefit of local police departments317.  
Clearly, corruption is linked to a multiplicity of factors: prevailing cultural norms, income levels and distribution 
patterns, strength or weakness of institutions, social structures etc. It remains nonetheless that rules and 
regulations, as well as regulatory practices, also have their importance in creating or sustaining corrupt 
behaviours. Simply put, if rules are impossible to comply with because they are obsolete, excessively 
demanding considering available resources, overly complex and prescriptive, or any combination thereof, 
corruption will be the way through which the economy manages to somehow function in spite of the rules 
(much as smuggling is the “natural” consequences of duties that exceed an “economically optimal” level, and 
smuggling thus rises when duties go over a certain point). Similarly, procedures that are excessively long, 
opaque, burdensome, and leave too much unchecked, arbitrary power to regulatory officials will tend to lead 
to abuses of power and corruption, with regulators tempted by rent-seeking, and businesses seeing it as the 
easier (or the only) way out318. 
Little research exists at this stage on corruption specifically in the context of inspections and enforcement, and 
as we pointed out already data is often unreliable and makes this a difficult topic to investigate with precision. 
There is, nonetheless, a body of work on regulation and corruption, that shows the relevance of the issue. 
Djankov et al. (2001) have shown, in particular, how excessive business entry regulation, disconnected from a 
clear purpose in terms of social welfare, can result in increased corruption and serious economic harm. They 
write that “in principle, the collection of bribes in exchange for release from regulation can be efficient [from 
                                                           
315 See successive surveys from 2003 onwards in Tajikistan, Ukraine, Kyrgyzstan in particular. 
316 See the official account of this scandal by the City of New York’s Department of Investigation available at 
http://www.nyc.gov/html/doi/html/about/cases_bribery.shtml - and newspaper articles e.g. in the New York Times: 
http://www.nytimes.com/2008/06/07/nyregion/07crane.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0 and a recent article covering a broader scandal 
in construction-related inspections http://www.nytimes.com/aponline/2015/02/10/us/ap-us-bribery-investigation.html.  
317 See e.g. the following posts and articles: http://marginalrevolution.com/marginalrevolution/2014/08/ferguson-and-the-debtors-
prison.html on the excessive use of fines as a budget funding mechanism – as well as the following: 
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-ferguson-crisis-20140821-column.html 
https://www.themarshallproject.org/2015/04/29/david-simon-on-baltimore-s-anguish  http://www.governing.com/topics/public-
justice-safety/gov-ferguson-missouri-court-fines-budget.html and on “civil asset forfeiture” and its abuse:  
http://www.vox.com/2014/10/14/6969335/civil-asset-forfeiture-what-is-how-work-equitable-sharing-police-seizure.  
318 See Ogus (2004), section The Benefits of Corruption for a discussion of some of the ways in which corruption enables inadequately 
(in particular: excessively) regulated economies to function nonetheless. 
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an economic perspective]” but “in practice, however, the creation of rents for the bureaucrats and politicians 
through regulation is often inefficient, in part because the regulators are disorganized, and in part because 
the policies they pursue to increase the rents from corruption are distortionary” (p. 3). Indeed, looking at a 
“cross-section of countries” they “do not find that stricter regulation of entry is associated with higher quality 
products, better pollution records or health outcomes, or keener competition. But stricter regulation of entry 
is associated with sharply higher levels of corruption, and a greater relative size of the unofficial economy” (p. 
4). Overall, the research data shows that “better governments regulate entry less” and that “entry is regulated 
because doing so benefits the regulators” (p. 5). Djankov et al. further conclude that “the regulation of entry 
produces the double benefit of corruption revenues and reduced competition for the incumbent businesses 
already affiliated with the politicians” (p. 20) and that “entry is regulated more heavily by less democratic 
governments, and such regulation does not yield visible social benefits. The principal beneficiaries appear to 
be the politicians and bureaucrats themselves” (p. 27). In addition, in another paper (2006), Djankov et al. find 
that “results indicate that government regulation of business is an important determinant of growth and a 
promising area for future research. The relationship between more business-friendly regulations and higher 
growth rates is consistently significant in various specifications of standard growth models” (p. 4). Thus, abuse 
of business entry regulations appears to result in increased corruption, no visible social benefits, and reduced 
growth319. 
Even though business entry regulations are clearly not the focus of our research, these results can serve as a 
useful proxy for the relevance of investigations of how regulatory inspections are organized and conducted. 
Indeed, entry regulations, much like inspections, are primarily procedures, more than substantive regulations. 
What Djankov et al. have shown is that regulatory instruments, when excessively burdensome and 
indiscriminate, can have serious negative consequences on both the rule of law and economic growth. 
Similarly, abusive inspections can be expected to also lead to important negative results. In fact, investigating 
regulatory practices, and inspections and enforcement in particular, in more details can be expected to be 
particularly beneficial in terms of improving growth strategies. As Rodrik (2003) puts it (summarizing research 
by Kaufmann, Mastruzzi and Zavaleta), high-level reforms are often not enough, as shown in the case of 
Bolivia, where “the authors identify petty corruption, uncertain property rights, and inadequate courts as the 
source of problems”. He emphasizes the need to “unpack “institutional quality” and show how aggregate 
indices or country averages can be misleading” (p. 14). 
 
Preliminary conclusion 
Concluding on the relevance of regulations, regulatory reform, and specifically of the improvement of 
regulatory instruments such as inspections to the complex issues of economic growth, social welfare and the 
rule of law is, to say the least, difficult. On the one hand, clearly, regulation and regulatory instruments are 
only one factor among many, and their short- and medium-term effects, at least, often pale in comparison 
with more immediate drivers (e.g. macro-economic policy). On the other hand, however, there is a converging 
body of research and evidence that points to their significance for long-term growth prospects, and to the 
harmful effects of “bad” (excessive, non-targeted, prone to arbitrary etc.) regulation. The limitations of data, 
as well as the complexity of the phenomena considered, means that absolute conclusions may be out of reach 
– but there seems to be enough ground to consider that making inspections work more effectively, efficiently 
and transparently is a worthwhile undertaking. 
Supporting this view is one more angle that we have only alluded to so far, which is the relevance of inspection 
issues to trade. As we have shown above in the case of the US and the EU in particular, access to major markets 
                                                           
319 On regulations having negative effects in terms of “barriers to entry”, see also the pioneering work of Stigler (1971). 
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for important products such as food is increasingly subject to an exporting country’s inspection systems being 
audited and found to be adequate (see also World Bank Group 2014 a). In other fields, countries have found 
themselves under pressure of potential boycotts, loss of trade preferences etc. because of glaring 
shortcomings in their occupational safety and labour law inspections (e.g. Bangladesh after the Rana Plaza 
disaster, or Jordan after labour abuses were revealed in the mid-2000s). Increasingly, a well-functioning 
inspection system is a pre-condition (or an important factor) for a country to avail itself of its trade 
opportunities. In all these areas, risk-based approaches are touted as an important way forward, making their 
study of real relevance to public policy  
The point is not to come up with a “ready-made”, “cookie cutter” approach, but to understand better the 
details of how inspections work, and with which results. As Rodrik (2003) writes, it is crucial to “go beyond 
simply asserting that “institutions matter” (…) [and] provide a richer account of where good institutions come 
from, the shape they take, and how they need to evolve to support long-term growth” (p. 12). Such work can 
support what has been called (Rodrik quoting Qian) “transitional institutions” (and, we would add, 
“transitional practices”) that can be “more suited to the realities on the ground on both economic efficiency 
and political feasibility grounds” (ibid., p. 13).  
The challenge, however, is to move from this recognition that “institutions matter” and that what matters are 
the details of how these institutions function, and with which effects. In this research, and particularly in the 
section covering practical cases, we will be attempting to look into the details of practices – but assessing the 
impact of these different practices is more difficult. As the brief selection of cases presented above shows, 
assessing the full economic impact of specific sets of regulations is a very difficult undertaking (assuming that 
it is even possible), and would require essentially an ad hoc study for each case, which would go far beyond 
the scope of this research. As a result, the only viable option for us was to select some proxy indicators for the 
economic impact of specific inspections and enforcement systems and practices.  
As we have outlined above, the economic impact of regulation includes, crucially, trust (cf. Voermans, 
forthcoming, and the discussion e.g. of the history of food inspections). Unfortunately, quantifying the level 
of trust and its evolution would require specific surveys of market actors, that are not generally available. In 
order to look at the evolution of trust levels, a follow-up research would be required, looking for existing 
surveys and other data to try and construct indicators that can be compared over time and across jurisdictions. 
We were not able to attempt this within this research, but rather limited ourselves to anecdotal evidence 
suggesting higher or lower degrees of trust between jurisdictions, which we will consider in the overall 
conclusion. While this will obviously be inadequate to draw any strong conclusions, this may enable us to point 
towards directions for further research, and also have some preliminary indications of whether risk-based 
approaches appear adequate to provide the required level of trust. 
Another side of the economic impact of regulation is (Djankov 2001, Kleiner 2006 etc.) more negative: barriers 
that limit market entry and reduce competition, procedures that give rise to corruption in various forms, costs 
that reduce profitability and productive investment etc. Many of these effects are, once again, difficult to 
measure – even though they may be the most significant. This is the case for instance of effects on 
competition, market entry, jobs etc. that were researched e.g. by Kleiner (2006). Direct administrative costs, 
by contrast, are relatively easy to capture. They are a key part of all Regulatory Impact Assessment (RIA) 
models that have been introduced since the late 1970s and have gained increasing acceptance since the late 
1990s (cf. Blanc et al. 2015 pp. 48-49, OECD 1997, Radaelli 2007). One of the most widespread methods to 
measure direct administrative burden from specific regulatory procedures is what is called the “Standard Cost 
Model” (SCM), which is used in a number of countries (in the OECD and EU, but also developing countries), by 
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the EU itself, as well as by international organizations such as the OECD or the World Bank Group320. The SCM 
approach has been applied to inspections in various ways – either by relying on very detailed time 
measurements but a limited set of respondents (e.g. the “domain-focused” inspections burden measurement 
conducted in the Netherlands in 2007-2010)321, or covering a larger (representative) sample of respondents 
but with far less detailed measurements (e.g. the calculations based on business surveys conducted by the 
World Bank Group e.g. in Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine, Mongolia in the past decade)322. 
Unfortunately, administrative burden measurements are not an optimal measure. In many cases, they may 
count as a “burden” an inspection visit which, if conducted in a way that is transparent and focuses on 
compliance support, may in fact be experienced as a net positive by the business. In other cases, it may be 
that inspections appear to create relatively low burden in terms of what the SCM measures (primarily lost 
work time), but in fact create major barriers to business development through uncertainty, corruption etc. 
Administrative burden measurements, even though very frequently conducted, are clearly not measuring 
what matters most – and governments touting their success at decreasing burden sometimes miss the issues 
that most limit business developments. They are, however, far easier to conduct than other measurements, 
and are relatively frequently available.  
In conducting this research, we have chosen to settle on an indicator that is simpler than aggregate 
administrative burden (as estimated through SCM calculations), but that in our experience is more reliable 
than an SCM based on a small sample323, and can be an acceptable proxy for many other aspects of inspections: 
the overall number of inspections per business (combining both coverage – the percentage of businesses 
inspected in a given year – and frequency – the number of visits per inspected business). First, a high number 
of inspections is a very strong component of administrative burdens. It is very rare to have a country where 
very frequent inspections do not result in high burden – it would require extremely short inspection visits and, 
even in such cases, the aggregate burden remains significant324. Second, a high number of inspections is often 
indicative of an approach that relies primarily or exclusively on deterrence, and not on compliance promotion, 
and thus of inspection visits that are indeed perceived generally as a burden by businesses. Clearly, this 
indicator is not sufficient to indicate proof of negative economic impact, but there is sufficient evidence to 
suggest that it is generally an acceptable proxy for it325. We hope that, based on the preliminary findings of 
this research, there will be sufficient indications of the relevance of further research to support additional 
work, that would consider more closely the question of economic impact – being mindful of the fact that, 
                                                           
320 See International working group on Administrative Burdens (2004) and Lundkvist (2010) as well as SCM Network (undated). 
321 These studies were not compiled in one general report, nor is there a general page presenting them. There were both baseline 





2010/voortgangsrapportage-april2010.pdf . All reports include the methodology. 
322 See section 4.1.b for a presentation of these surveys. Reports see e.g. World Bank Group 2009 (Mongolia), World Bank Group 2012 
(Kyrgyzstan). Both reports include methodology and calculations. 
323 As inspections are not a universal procedure that every business has to go through, but rather can affect some businesses and not 
others. See e.g. Blanc (2009) on the limitations of SCM exercises for inspections when relying on a very small sample, and see 4.1.c for 
an illustration of how inspections can be concentrated on a limited sub-set of enterprises, meaning that having an unrepresentative 
sample could bias the results very strongly (example of Italy).  
324 This was the case e.g. in Kenya, where a 2010 survey conducted by the World Bank Group that around 90% of businesses were 
inspected each year, on average more than 5 times a year. The visits were mostly very short, so a strict SCM-type burden measurement 
would have given relatively low figures (though not very low) – but the burden was quite high in fact, because many visits were 
associated with corruption or harassment (report unpublished). 
325 See also LBRO (2010) for business perspectives showing both that inspection visits, when done in a supportive way, can be seen as 
more positive than burdensome, but also that very frequent visits are seen as a problem, and indicative of a poor business climate. 
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given the complexity of the phenomena observed and the interactions, full certainty of effects may not be 
achievable.  
 
3.2. Promoting compliance: models, drivers, methods and issues 
 
a. Models of compliance – deterrence, cooperation, responsive regulation – and beyond 
 
i. A brief overview of compliance models 
 
Introduction – the limits of compliance 
Attempting to improve the effectiveness of regulation in achieving its intended effects, understanding the role 
of inspections and enforcement in this perspective, as well as the relative merits of different inspection 
approaches, all require to understand the links between rules and compliance, and the drivers that push 
people to comply. Of course, understanding and analysing compliance is not the same as explaining how 
outcomes in terms of public welfare are achieved, for there is not necessarily a direct link from compliance to 
public welfare (and there are in fact many situations where even perfect compliance will be insufficient to 
achieve the regulation’s stated goals). We have discussed briefly above the question of the optimal precision 
of rules, which appears to be an impossible quest: only “target” technical norms would seem to give the 
“certainty” that what is required from the business corresponds to the intent of the regulation, and 
compliance ipso facto is equivalent to the desired result – but these norms leave business in complete 
uncertainty as to how to reach the desired result, and usually put inspectors in a difficult situation too, because 
of time-lags, third party effects etc. Given that in practice the vast majority of technical norms are 
“performance” or “specification”, or a combination thereof, there is generally an imperfect match between 
compliance and intended regulatory outcomes. This mismatch is highest when regulation was inadequately 
drafted (because of haste or incomplete knowledge), and tends to increase as technological changes 
accelerate, or when third party effects increase (for whichever reason). This partial disconnect between 
compliance and outcomes (safety, public welfare etc.) is consequential for inspections, and one of the reasons 
some advocate for risk-based inspectors’ discretion to be able to respond with more flexibility to the situation 
as it develops326 – which, in turn, raises concerns from a rule-of-law perspective.  
In fact, it has been demonstrated that even “target” rules are not immune to being “gamed”, and emptied of 
their meaning – because it is impossible for rules to “target” everything that would be meaningful (not to 
mention the problems inherent in data collection). Bevan and Hood (2006) have thus shown how the 
“governance by targets and measured performance indicators” introduced by Tony Blair’s “New Labour” 
government in Britain in the 2000s did not necessarily produce the expected results. Reported performance 
data appeared to show “notable improvements in reported performance by the English NHS” (National Health 
Service). In practice, however, there is substantial evidence that the system was gamed and that 
improvements were often “offset (…) [by] reductions in performance that was not captured by targets”. While 
the authors rightly point out that none of the alternatives to this target system is “problems-free”, their work 
                                                           
326 See e.g. WRR 2013 (op.cit.) 
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clearly shows that we cannot expect that achieving targets automatically equates achieving the regulatory 
goals327.  
No form of rules appears to be immune to some form of gaming or evasion, e.g. through “creative compliance” 
that “uses formalism to avoid legal control” (McBarnet and Whelan, 1991). Indeed, “the combination of 
specific rules and an emphasis on legal form and literalism can be used artificially, in a manipulative way to 
circumvent or undermine the purpose of the regulation”. We would add that, in our experience, such 
formalism that defeats the true intent of the regulation can just as easily be wielded by abusive officials (be 
they motivated by corrupt rent-seeking, or “simply” the enjoyment of arbitrary power) as by evading 
businesses. The proportion of creative compliance versus enforcement power abuse will depend on the 
characteristics of the country and of the regulatory interactions, but both are inherently possible in a system 
of rules, and quite difficult to fully avoid.  
Going “beyond compliance” thus seems to be necessary in order to really achieve the full purpose of public 
policies, the full intended effects in terms of public welfare. Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2003) have 
devoted a large part of their research on the different degrees of “greening” of polluting industries to precisely 
this question of what could drive businesses to exceed regulatory requirements and engage on more 
significant and comprehensive pollution-abatement. At the same time, the authors point out why, in spite of 
its obvious limitations, so many still look to regulation (and enforcement) as the foundation for improvements 
(in the environmental field and elsewhere): “until the past decade or so, politicians, environmentalists, and 
scholars, observing the ongoing degradation of the environment in industrial societies, understandably 
assumed that the opportunities for such “win-win” investments were few and far between (…) and hence it 
has been assumed that legal coercion is necessary” (p. 21). 
Indeed, even though rules cannot be designed “perfectly”, and thus compliance with rules cannot fully ensure 
that regulatory goals are reached, rules and compliance still appear as a necessary foundation – necessary, 
though not sufficient. There remains a significant degree of causality between compliance and safety or other 
public welfare goals (as long as regulations are at least somewhat competently drafted and up-to-date), and 
in practice the shortcomings of the different types of rules will be somewhat alleviated by combining them 
(“specification”, “performance”, “targets” – as well as systems-based “to ensure genuine and long-term (…) 
improvements” – Tilindyte 2012 p. 17). This all matters to us because the primary purpose of regulatory 
inspections is, precisely, to increase compliance328. Of course, for inspections to be effective at this task, the 
drafting of the rules definitely matters329 – but so do a number of other factors that we will now discuss.  
 
Models of compliance - foundations  
                                                           
327 Of course, the targets-based management of public health service provides that the authors study, while it is in some ways a form 
of “regulation”, is quite distinct from the types of regulation we focus on in this research. What is relevant from our perspectives is 
that this shows that even targets-based rules cannot be automatically assumed to deliver the intended substantial outcomes. 
328 Or at least one of the primary purposes. There is also, in a different perspective, an “expressive interest of justice” (Hawkins 2002 
p. 7), which demands as much as possible detection and punishment of rules violations – and detection requires inspections. The 
instrumental view of inspections and regulations corresponds to utilitarian values. Different sets of values (e.g. putting fairness and 
the rule of law first) will put a greater emphasis on the need to enforce regulations regardless of whether this is effective at achieving 
these particular regulations’ purposes (cf. Morgan and Yeung 2007 p. 200, Ashworth 2000, Yeung 2004). We will return later to this 
question of values.  
329 Diver (1983) has proposed a set of “subcategories of potential costs and benefits” of different types of rules: rate of compliance 
(precise rules perform best), over- and under-inclusiveness, costs of rulemaking and cost of applying a rule (again precise rules tend to 
work better). The details of these criteria show how much depends on implementation, i.e. inspections. Thus, regardless of the type 
of rules chosen, and as long as they are more or less “fit for purpose”, effectiveness will largely depend on the enforcement stage. 
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Many of the views held on public policy issues are based on assumptions, foundations, that are rarely even 
perceived, let alone questioned. Academics are not exempt from such “blind spots”, with fundamental 
assumptions often remaining unchallenged for long periods of time. A common view underpinning 
(consciously or not) public demands for “more inspections”, “more checks”, “more enforcement” in relation 
to perceived risks (after an incident or in view of an “emerging risk”) is that people comply with rules only if 
they are under supervision and there is a realistic threat of punishment for violations. This view is held even 
more widely and strongly in regard to businesses, which are seen by many as purely profit-driven – “amoral 
calculators”. Business operators and owners are thus commonly held to be likely to comply if the costs of non-
compliance are high, and punishment close to certain. The specific mistrust of businesses is often associated 
in the political field with radical left or anti-capitalist views, but the overall belief that people comply only 
under pressure and supervision is quite frequent in more conservative perspectives, so overall this view of 
people as reluctant to comply, and of regulation as requiring very strong enforcement to function, is held very 
widely and across the political spectrum (with different points of emphasis – but a shared foundation). 
Interestingly, such a perspective is also that of the compliance model proposed in 1968 by Gary Becker –which 
happens to be the first of the modern compliance models to have been formalized and still remains very 
influential330.  
This view, anchored in a pessimistic view of human nature (and understandably given credibility by the fact 
that crime and violations seem to be always recurring, and by human proclivity to estimate probabilities from 
negative experience and not from statistics – see e.g. Bennear in Balleisen, Bennaer, Krawiec & Wiener, in 
press), has been further reinforced by successive works attempting to model compliance based on neoclassical 
economics331. In these models, compliance is strictly based on maximisation of expected utility. The costs of 
compliance are weighed against the potential gains of non-compliance, minus the costs of possible sanctions 
multiplied by the probability of detection332. This model offers a convenient formalisation of the commonly 
held “pessimistic” view described above. The question is whether this model in fact describes observed 
behaviour accurately. 
Defining this first compliance model is relatively easy – but there are several possible typologies of the other 
models. Scholz (1994) proposes a tripartition of what he calls “enforcement techniques and strategies” (that 
each correspond to a vision of what produces compliance): “deterrence strategy”, “educational strategy” and 
“persuasive or cooperative strategy” (p. 425). He notes that the first is the “most familiar and best 
understood”, “based on the assumption that regulated entities are amoral, and will not obey regulations 
unless given an incentive to do so”. On the second, he writes that it “assumes that at least some 
noncompliance stems from the difficulty certain firms have with understanding regulations and implementing 
effective internal controls to prevent noncompliance” – an “educational strategy” does not “shy away from 
coercion” but rather uses it “to focus attention rather than to punish noncompliers”, and it acknowledges 
potential negative side-effects of sanctions (“distracting” from some “recurrent problems”, fostering 
resistance etc.). Finally, the third approach “assumes that firms perceive enforcement agencies as one of 
several important actors that the firm must deal with over the long haul” and that “firms develop principles 
to govern their relationships with all actors” (ibid.). Thus, while the first approach is squarely grounded in a 
deterrence model, the second corresponds to a model that introduces (and holds as fundamental) the issues 
of understanding of rules and of capacity to comply. The third approach is one that seeks to go beyond 
                                                           
330 In our view, the influence of Becker’s model (in spite of its limitations, which we will discuss below) can be traced both to its 
congruence with the commonly held “pessimistic” view of compliance, and its alignment with fundamental neo-classical economic 
assumptions (full rationality of market actors), and thus its being the most frequently taught compliance model in economics faculties. 
331 For instance, in the field of tax compliance, the works of Becker (1968), Allingham and Sandmo (1972) and Srinivasan (1973). 
332 This means that a maximal sanction of 1,000 EUR combined with a detection probability of 10% will result in an expected cost of 
100 EUR – if the benefit from non-compliance is higher than 100 EUR, the person or business will choose not to comply. 
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compliance considerations – it should reduce the “inherent economic inefficiency of the regulations being 
enforced and the costs of monitoring and prosecution” (p. 441), and most importantly “maximize goal 
achievement rather than compliance” (p. 442). But the persuasive strategy also corresponds to a compliance 
model that sees firms as far more complex than the deterrence vision: “the persuasive strategy assumes that 
desired behavioral changes will only occur if they reflect the self-interest of the firm, just as the deterrence 
strategy does [but] the primary difference between the two (…) is that persuasive techniques appeal to a 
broader range of motivations (…), particularly the firm’s concerns over its long-term relationships with the 
agency and other organizations such as unions, suppliers, purchasers, and the general public” (ibid.). Through 
his comments (pp. 425-448), Scholz suggests that all enforcement strategies have strengths and weaknesses, 
and that combining them has clear advantages but is far from easy because of contradictions between at least 
some of them (deterrence vs. education). Overall, he appears to be closest to a compliance model 
corresponding to the “persuasion” strategy – firms as rational actors with relatively complex calculations of 
costs and benefits, with deterrence being applicable to some situations and education to others, and a well-
designed set of complementary strategies being optimal (thus suggesting that both “ignorance and lack of 
capacity” and “amoral calculations” drivers are relevant, either in the same firms or in different ones). 
Another perspective is that put forward by Kagan (1994) of “legal enforcement style” – combining two 
perspectives, “the way officials assess compliance or noncompliance with regulatory standards” and “what 
officials do once they have decided that the regulated enterprise’s actions constitute violations” (p. 387). 
Kagan then summarizes the different “styles” in a chart where the “enforcement style” can range from 
“inactive/unresponsive” to “active/responsive” and from “retreatists” to “legalistic” through “conciliatory” 
and “flexible” (p. 388). Kagan then attempts to connect these “enforcement styles” to “regulatory outcomes”, 
which themselves can range from “excessively lenient” (ineffective) to “excessively stringent” (effective but 
with considerable negative side-effects, inefficiencies)333, through an optimal “welfare-maximizing” range (pp. 
388-389). These classifications are primarily based on a vision of intra-agency dynamics (attempting to 
understand why enforcement styles differ based on a combination of “legal design”, “task environment”, 
“political environment” and “agency culture” – pp. 390-391) – and on an economic perspective (looking for 
economically efficient outcomes, while acknowledging that “it usually is very difficult to determine whether 
agency enforcement decisions produce” them – p. 389). The underlying model for compliance is one which is 
based on rational calculations – a somewhat sophisticated vision of deterrence, including economic 
considerations for the viability of the approach (p. 398), and incorporating the “tit-for-tat”, “responsive” 
approach to deterrence formulated first by Scholz (1984). The foundation remains one where enterprises are 
to be motivated for compliance through rational calculations, and the reason to not select a “strong” 
deterrence approach is only overall public welfare maximization, not the idea that that strong deterrence 
could be less-than-fully-effective at maximizing compliance. 
In their influential work Responsive Regulation (1992), Ayres and Braithwaite334 put forward a preferred model 
of enforcement as well as a vision of why businesses comply that is significantly different from the “deterrence 
model” and its variations. The authors formulate the fundamental debate as being “between those who think 
that corporations will comply with the law only when confronted with tough sanctions and those who believe 
that gentle persuasion works in securing business compliance” – with “most, although by no means all, 
regulators (…) in the compliance camp” and “most regulation scholars (…) in the deterrence camp” (p. 20). 
They add that many academics (of whichever ideological persuasion) “interpret this state of affairs as evidence 
of how captured the regulators are” (ibid.). Instead, they suggest that one can “strike some sort of 
                                                           
333 The emphasis on deterrence has effects on inspectors’ practice that lead to consequences in how they inspect, seeing the inspection 
more as a “case to be won” than as “problems to be solved”, which tends to lead to poor cooperation, and can make actual detection 
and solving of real hazards less likely – see Bardach and Kagan 1982, pp. 80-81. 
334 Itself building on Scholz (1984), Braithwaite (1985), Braithwaite and Grabosky (1986) etc. 
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sophisticated balance between the two models”, the question becoming “when” to use which approach (p. 
21). The motivations for mixing or balancing the two approaches comes, however, from a somewhat different 
perspective than Scholz’s (cf. supra) – indeed, while Ayres and Braithwaite also use the game theory 
perspective as a foundation for “tit-for-tat” enforcement (p. 21 and pp. 60-81), they combine it with a greater 
attention paid to the “mixed motives” for compliance335. Based on empirical work, they propose “alternative 
motivational accounts” to the vision of “the firm (…) [as] a unitary actor concerned only with maximizing 
profit” (p. 22). First, corporate executives value “a good reputation” and care “deeply about the adverse 
publicity”, viewing “their personal reputation in the community and their corporate reputation as priceless 
assets” (ibid.)336. Second, “corporate actors are not just value maximizers – of profits or of reputation”, but 
also act according to values (ethics, social responsibility etc.). In practice, “there is evidence of economically 
irrational compliance with the law” (pp. 22-23). The authors are realistic about the strength of values-based 
motives, and recognize that they will often not be stronger than profit-based motives, but insist on the need 
to recognized that, in a significant proportion of cases, they are (pp. 23-24). Third, another key aspect that 
Ayres and Braithwaite emphasize is that “firms are not monolithic” and that “not all of the relevant actors 
have the same interest in profit maximization as those at the top may have” – there can be, in any organization, 
“law-abiding constituencies” (p. 33). Overall, they propose a model of compliance that emphasizes complexity 
and multiplicity: several drivers, several groups, several motives inside a same person or company. Depending 
on the business being considered, and on the situation, various combinations may arise, and the resultant 
profile may be more or less profit-maximizing, more or less ethical – and Ayres and Braithwaite see it as 
“responsive” enforcement’s purpose to reinforce the compliance-maximizing forces and weaken the others, 
meaning that theirs is also a view of dynamic compliance drivers. Crucially, this includes the possibility that 
some enforcement actions that would make sense from a deterrence perspective would be counter-
productive by decreasing intrinsic (values-based) compliance forces337 
The emphasis on the complexity of factors leading to compliance, and the view of corporations as multiple 
rather than unitary, are further developed in the work of Gunningham, Kagan and Thornton (2003)338. They 
emphasize the importance of “endogenous” factors within corporations: “more generally, “new 
institutionalism” theories of organizational behavior reflect findings, as summarized by Mark Suchman and 
Lauren Edelman, that: ‘institutional factors often lead organizations to conform to societal norms even when 
formal enforcement mechanisms are highly flawed. Frequently cited institutional influences include historical 
legacies, cultural mores, cognitive scripts, and structural linkages to the professions and to the state’” (pp. 22-
23)339. More fundamentally, they propose a new, broader concept, instead of a narrow and unilateral causality 
                                                           
335 Which, in turn, is also reflected in Scholz’s later work (1994), where he includes the complexity of motivations in grounds for the 
“persuasive strategy”. 
336 Though Ayres and Braithwaite do not directly qualify this claim, they also do not suggest that it is universally true. We would add 
that it clearly is not, the financial crisis that started in 2008 having revealed the depth of inadequate corporate behaviours in the 
financial sector, and the apparent weakness of the “adverse publicity” driver for many of its executives (though on the other hand the 
many op eds written by banking executives, e.g. in the US, seems to show that adverse publicity is still something that they strongly 
resent – it may just not be enough to overcome other drivers).  
337 A point also noted by Scholz (1994) when noting that deterrence strategies can contradict education ones. 
338 Itself building on earlier work such as Gunningham and Grabosky 1998, Gunnigham and Johnstone 1999. 
339 A note here is needed: in this book, the authors specifically look not only at what makes firms comply with regulations, but also 
what makes them go beyond, i.e. improve environmental performance above and beyond regulations. That said, many of the factors 
at play are essentially similar when it comes to complying with or when it comes to exceeding mandatory norms. They build a typology 
of reasons for firms to go beyond compliance (p. 24) – it includes “win-win measures” (“sometimes the firm [invests in nonrequired 
methods] because [they] are more cost-efficient than those required by the rules, and sometimes because they feel it is “good 
business” to develop co-operative and mutually trusting relationships with regulatory officials” - p. 21), “margin of safety measures” 
(ensuring that compliance is always guaranteed even when there are variations in production conditions), “anticipatory compliance 
measures” (avoiding costly upgrades/retrofits when regulations change by building equipment “one or two steps ahead”) and “good 
citizenship measures” (which improve the image of the company e.g. with consumers). To some extent, all these different cases 
correspond to a broad vision of “profit maximization”, based on a far larger consideration that the narrow cost of compliance vs. 
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of “drivers”: “in the course of our field research, we came to regard the concept of “drivers” as somewhat 
impoverished. It implies the existence of independent, unidirectional, and unambiguous pressures, whether 
from regulation, communities, or markets, which impact upon corporations with sufficient force that they 
react to them. Yet we found that these external factors, rather than being independent, often gain their force 
through mutual interaction; that far from being unambiguous, the responses they demand are often unclear; 
and hence that they do not operate unidirectionally” (p. 35). By contrast to the over-simplifying notion of 
“drivers”, “the concept of a license to operate (…) captures the complexity of the relationship between the 
regulated enterprise and key stakeholders in a way that the concept of “drivers” does not” – it “encapsulates 
the extent to which various stakeholders can bestow or withdraw privileges from a company” and “that 
business is dependent upon” these stakeholders’ relations – it also means that the relationship “is an 
interactive one” – it includes “the regulatory license, the economic license, and the social license” (p. 36)340. 
Among the different forces at play, the authors find a combination of different dimensions, which correspond 
to their vision of three different “licenses”: “the external pressures that push enterprises toward improved 
environmental performance can be divided into three broad categories: economic, legal and social” (p. 35). 
This tri-dimensional vision already represents a considerably higher level of complexity than the narrowly 
economic one, and a model that appears better suited to a diverse reality. 
Other authors have researched and underlined the importance of a fourth category of “driver” or “pressures”: 
psychological factors. As Hodges (2015) puts it: “the science of cognitive and behavioural psychology has 
undergone revolutionary development in the past few decades” – but, he adds, “the findings have not been 
noticed by many legal theorists” (p. 2). In fact, both among legal scholars and economists, there is a significant 
group of authors who have built research and models on the basis of these advances in psychology – but it 
remains true indeed that the majority of scholars tend to ignore them and to rely on far cruder models and 
visions of human motivations. By contrast, “psychology posits decision-making that is based on multiple 
factors other than costs and benefits” (regardless of whether one speaks of monetary benefits, or “immaterial” 
ones such as reputation etc.) (ibid.). One of the most important compliance models based on psychological 
insights is commonly called procedural justice, and has been developed and exposed in particular by Tyler 
(1988, 1990, 2003 et al.)341. Importantly, this approach does not negate other insights on economic or social 
drivers of legal compliance, but rather subsumes them in a more comprehensive vision – while suggesting that 
“psychological” and “social” factors (ethics, legitimacy, procedural justice) may be stronger than “economic” 
(deterrence) ones342. 
The compliance model developed by Tyler views legal compliance as driven by a combination of motives: 
rational calculation (deterrence) being one, along with moral values, social norms, legitimacy and procedural 
                                                           
probability of detection and potential sanction calculation that is at the core of the “deterrence” model, but still mostly predicated on 
the same “amoral” logic. 
340 The authors use of the word “license” also corresponds to their studying a population of businesses that is, in fact, subject to 
precisely this form of regulatory instrument (prior approval). Their study population is made of generally large companies, large 
facilities, with a very high environmental impact – and correspondingly strong regulatory attention. Even though this means that not 
all of their findings or lessons are applicable to other fields, their view of the complexity of compliance (and “beyond compliance”) 
factors appears relevant far beyond this study population and aligns well with the findings of other research. 
341 The notion of “procedural justice” can be found already in Rawls’s Theory of Justice (1971). The development of this notion in a 
legal compliance perspective is due e.g. to the work of Leventhal (Fairness in Social Relationships, 1976) as well as Thibaut and Walker 
(Procedural Justice, 1975). Tom Tyler has been one of the researchers leading the development of this notion specifically applied to 
the question of “why people obey the law”. E. Allan Lind was another early proponent of this vision, which is now supported and used 
by a growing number of scholars – and practitioners. 
342 The distinction between “psychological” and “social” is not necessarily an easy one – just as biology and physics, the two attempt 
to describe and explain the same reality, but at different levels of detail or “granularity”. We will qualify as “psychological” the factors 
that are related primarily to the internal views and thinking mechanisms of the individual, as “social” those that primarily involve group 
values and behaviours, and as “economic” those that (while of course anchored in psychological mechanisms and social values too) 
correspond to (neo-)classical economics’ emphasis on “amoral calculations” and pure rationality. 
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justice (which, in turn, reinforces legitimacy). Procedural justice is a term that corresponds to authorities 
treating those subject to them in a fair manner, irrespective of the outcomes of the decision-making process343 
- and this “fair process” is defined as one that combines consistency (of treatment, criteria etc.), impartiality 
(or at least perceived best efforts to be impartial), ethical behaviour (including civility of persons in a position 
of authority) and adequate representation (i.e. giving a “voice” to the person affected by the procedure)344. 
Within this model, legitimacy (of authorities and rules) is seen as the real foundation of compliance (see Tyler 
1988 pp. 19-70), and procedural justice as the instrument through which such legitimacy and compliance can 
most effectively be increased. The central importance of procedural justice in this model lies therein that it 
appears to be the factor that can be most easily strengthened, as well as individually possibly the most potent 
one. Indeed, deterrence appears very costly, and relatively weak. Moral values are built from childhood, and 
difficult to alter. Social norms (prevalent behaviour in a given group) are a complex product of various 
influences, and thus usually can only be altered gradually. By contrast, legitimacy of public authorities (and of 
the rules they impose) appears strongly influenced by procedural justice345 – which also has its own positive 
compliance effect. Thus, procedural justice appears overall as the most important factor in increasing 
compliance. It is also relatively easier for authorities to influence since it depends directly on how they behave 
in relation with those affected by their actions (citizens, businesses etc.). These findings rely on several 
decades of research on criminal matters, and on interactions between citizens and authorities (police and 
courts in particular), as well as some more recent (and so far less extensive) research on regulatory dealings 
(Lind and Maguire 2003) and public services interactions (van den Bos, van der Velden, and Lind 2014). At its 
core, the model states that deterrence does play a role in fostering compliance (i.e. deterring crime), but that 
it tends to have an effect that is quite limited, except if considerable resources are expended so at to make 
the probability of detection really high. On the other hand, process-based factors appear to play a crucial role 
in determining sustained attitudes in respect with laws and regulations, and with public authorities.  
Tom Tyler summarizes deterrence’s impact and limitations as follows (2003): “studies of deterrence (…) point 
to factors that limit the likely effectiveness of deterrence models. Perhaps the key factor limiting the value of 
deterrence strategies is the consistent finding that deterrence effects, when found, are small in magnitude. 
(…) A further possible limitation of deterrence strategies is that, while deterrence effects can potentially be 
influenced by estimates either of the certainty of punishment or its severity, studies suggest that both factors 
are not equally effective. Unfortunately from a policy perspective, certainty more strongly influences people's 
behavior than severity, and certainty is the more difficult to change. (…)To influence people's behavior, risk 
estimates need to be high enough to exceed some threshold of psychological meaningfulness” (p. 302). This 
means that, in practice, deterrence is impossible to achieve in most cases: the resources required would be 
far too high (in a world of limited resources, society cannot commit enough resources to deterring violations 
in each and every regulatory field), and the intrusion on privacy and limitations of individual freedoms would 
be far too high. Tyler cites murder as a key example: on this topic, society has allocated enough resources that 
indeed there is a real deterrence effect – but achieving similar intensity of enforcement in all other fields is 
                                                           
343 The fairness of outcomes corresponds to distributive justice – which is often difficult to assess independently or objectively, meaning 
that the perception of distributive justice tends to vary from one person to the next and (when there is a conflict) may tend to be zero-
sum: what one perceives as a fair outcome is seen as unfair by the other. By contrast, procedural justice can be perceived by both 
opposing parties as high, since it relates to characteristics of the process, and not to the outcome. 
344 See e.g. Tyler 1988 pp. 136-139. 
345 We are simplifying here (on purpose and to make its main points clearer to the reader) the complex model developed and 
extensively tested by Tyler (1988). In this model, Tyler tests a number of cross-relations between different factors or drivers, and there 
is evidence of multiple influences on legitimacy, including not only procedural justice but also (perceived) distributive justice. This 
influence, however, is consistantly found to be weaker than that of procedural justice (a finding strongly confirmed by van den Bos, 
van der Velden, and Lind 2014) – and, in addition, consistantly increasing perceived distributive justice is very difficult, given the 
conflicting views of it that co-exist (see previous note). Thus, procedural justice appears not only as the strongest, but also the most 
realistically “improvable” driver of legitimacy. See Tyler 1988 (pp. 106-109 in particular) as well as Bottoms and Tankebe 2013. 
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impossible. In addition, deterrence approaches “are not self-sustaining and require the maintenance of 
institutions and authorities that can keep the probability of detection for wrongdoing at a sufficiently high 
level to motivate the public” (p. 304). 
By contrast, process-based approaches aim at increasing the legitimacy of rules and authorities by improving 
the level of fairness as perceived by citizens. The focus is not primarily on “distributive justice” (i.e. having 
outcomes that are deemed fair) – although this also has been found to have a significant impact on compliance, 
it is significantly less strong than the process effect, and in addition it is in practice impossible to reach 
decisions that would satisfy everyone. Rather, the emphasis is on “procedural justice”. In the words of Tyler 
(2003), who has been one of the key proponents of this approach for several decades: “The procedural justice 
model involves two stages. [First,] public behavior is rooted in evaluations of the legitimacy of the police and 
courts. (…) In other words, people cooperate with the police and courts in their everyday live when they view 
those authorities as legitimate and entitled to be obeyed. [Second,] the antecedents of legitimacy. The 
procedural justice argument is that process-based assessments are the key antecedent of legitimacy (…). In 
this analysis, four indicators – summary judgments of procedural justice, inferences of motive-based trust, 
judgments about the fairness of decision making, and judgments about the fairness of interpersonal 
treatment-are treated as indices of an overall assessment of procedural justice in the exercise of authority” 
(p. 306). Crucially, a considerable body of research has shown that the effect of procedural justice appears 
significantly stronger than that of deterrence346. 
The procedural justice effects are found in many fields and settings (mediation decisions Lind et al. 1993, 
dismissal from employment Lind et al. 2000 etc.). What also matters is that procedural justice, and the 
legitimacy it fosters, are long-term drivers of compliance, and largely self-sustaining (at least they do not 
require an increase in resources – but a change in behaviours and approaches)347. The changes involved in how 
authority is exercised are, however, significant compared to what is the practice in many cases. Quoting Tyler 
(2003) again, the key conditions needed to achieve a procedural justice effect are: “that decision making is 
viewed as being neutral, consistent, rule-based, and without bias; that people are treated with dignity and 
respect and their rights are acknowledged; and that they have an opportunity to participate in the situation 
by explaining their perspective and indicating their views about how problems should be resolved” (p. 300-
301).  
The validity (or lack thereof) of different compliance models is in no way a purely “academic” question – since 
it provides the foundation for different inspections and enforcement approaches. A “classic” deterrence-based 
approach (where increasing probability of detection or severity of sanctions are seen as equivalent) will lead 
to the use of punitive sanctions or damages (in tort cases), whereas a deterrence-based view that takes into 
account research suggesting that people react more to probability than to severity will try and increase 
inspections coverage and at the same time refine targeting (e.g. by doing at least some basic “risk-based” 
targeting, looking for higher probabilities of violations if not magnitude of potential effects). By contrast, an 
approach that takes a more complex, multi-factor view of enforcement will be quite different. It will consider 
alternative approaches to promoting compliance (in particular education, guidance, opinion-forming), it will 
pay attention to the importance of ethical behaviour of inspectors and “procedural justice” more broadly. It 
will also look at the potential adverse effects of excessively frequent, burdensome inspections, or of 
enforcement seen as disproportionately severe. Indeed, if their negative procedural justice effects were to be 
higher than their deterrence effect (something which is a distinct possibility in such a model), then the net 
compliance effect of more inspections and stricter enforcement may well be negative. We will come back 
                                                           
346 See Tyler 1988, 2003 – Hodges 2015 et al. 
347 On this point, see e.g. Tyler 1988 p. 107 (procedural justice acting as a “cushion of support when authorities are delivering 
unfavourable outcomes”, as well as Tyler 2003 p. 283 etc. 
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further in this research on the evidence concerning different compliance models, but we can already say that, 
evidence notwithstanding, these different models have very concrete “real-life” effects, as different 
inspectorates across the world base their operations on very different visions. 
 
ii. Mapping the foundations of compliance – economic, psychological, social, cultural 
 
In summary, theoretical accounts of compliance and research-tested models have gradually moved away from 
a narrow, deterrence-based vision to a more complex, multi-factor model – or one could also say that such a 
complex vision has long existed, but has gradually gained ground against a once-dominant deterrence model. 
Indeed, the deterrence model appears overly simplistic – applied to business regulation, “it assumes that all 
businesses make all decisions based solely on objective economic rationality, weighing all costs and benefits 
in financial terms. It is further assumed that an organisation can be treated as a single entity, and that it can 
control the behaviour of every person and decision that is taken” (Hodges 2015, p. 3). Rather, firms are made 
up of many individuals, and human decisions and behaviour are shaped by their “cognitive development and 
“moral understanding”, their “sense of justice”, as well as “exemplars of a social norm or custom” (ibid., pp. 
15-16). Crucially, decisions are more often taken on the basis of the “fast heuristic approach”, which “involves 
impulsiveness and intuition”, than using the “slower system that is capable of reasoning [and] is cautious” 
(ibid.)348. Thaler and Sunstein have shown the importance of heuristic biases (1998, pp. 19-39) in our decisions. 
For all these reasons, effectively promoting compliance appears to require an approach that combines a 
number of drivers or dimensions. 
We have seen that the number and categorization of such drivers varies between authors. Hodges (2015) sees 
“three primary motivations for explanations of law-abidingness in humans”: “fear of detection and 
punishment”, “fear of humiliation or disgrace” and “internalized sense of duty” – the latter being in turn 
influenced by “internalised moral values”, “processes by which the rules are made and applied” and the 
alignment (or lack thereof) of “the rules and culture of the group(s) to which the individual belongs (…) with 
the norms that are sought to be applied by society” (pp. 16-17)349. In addition to these, we would also 
underline the importance of capacity to comply: both the knowledge and information aspect (emphasized e.g. 
by Scholz 1994, cf. supra) and the material side of compliance (technical capacity and feasibility, and cost of 
compliance)350. 
                                                           
348 Cf. Tversky, A. and Kahneman, D. (1974), “Judgment under Uncertainty: Heuristics and Biases” 185 no 4157 Science 1124-1131 – as 
well as Bennear in Balleisen et al. (in press), and Sunstein and Thaler (2008) pp. 19-39.  
349 See also Kagan, Gunningham and Thornton 2011 (p. 37): “Sociolegal explanations of law-abidingness among regulated business 
enterprises, as well as among individuals, point to three basic motivational factors: fear of detection and legal punishment; concern 
about the consequences of acquiring a bad reputation; and a sense of duty, that is, the desire to conform to internalized norms or 
beliefs about right and wrong” 
350 See e.g. Winter and May 2001. This aspect is also covered under the “economic” side of the “license to operate” concept outlined 
by Gunningham, Kaghan and Thornton (2003) – see also Ogus (2004) on how corruption can help an economy to function in spite of 
excessive, inefficient regulations. Note that Ogus takes a limited example (procedural regulations). In our experience, the effect is even 
stronger when substantive regulations are “impossible to comply with” given prevailing technical and financial conditions: rather than 
most businesses just shutting down, either implementation of the rule has to be scaled back by the regulatory authorities, or corruption 
will enable businesses to function nonetheless, but at a significant cost (and profit for corrupt officials) – in both cases, compliance will 
be non-existent (or close to it). For an example of non-implementation of an unrealistic rule, see the example of the constantly pushed-
back full implementation of accessibility rules for handicapped people in France, Eliakim (2013) (chapter “Maintenant, ils regrettent…). 
For a similar example on lifts regulation in France, see Blanc et al. (2015) p. 8 and Eliakim (2013).  
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Drawing on these different streams of research and scholarship, and on inspections and enforcement practice, 
we would propose to categorize the different foundations351 of compliance in four groups352:  
- Enabling conditions: knowledge and understanding of rules, financial and technical ability to comply 
without putting the business viability in jeopardy 
- Economic incentives: deterrence (probability of detection primarily, amount of potential sanctions as 
a secondary aspect – and also risk of reputation loss), potential economic benefits of compliance 
(increased reputation leading to improved market position, or compliance investments resulting in 
higher productivity, reduced losses or any other economic benefit)353 
- Social and cultural drivers: group conformity (other members of the group and/or “models” behave in 
a compliant way), group ethical values (values of the cultural group the person belongs to are aligned 
with the values of the regulation and/or values of the cultural group posit legal compliance as an 
absolute good) 
- Legitimacy and interactions – individual psychological drivers: legitimacy of authorities (influenced by 
social and cultural drivers, but also directly by personal, individual experience), procedural justice (or 
lack thereof) experienced in interactions with authorities, regulators. 
Evidently, these categories are only useful as a device to help clarify and make sense of the complexity of 
compliance. “Enabling conditions” have economic aspects, “legitimacy” and “values” are both social and 
psychological, etc. Rather than four separate categories functioning in isolation, it is useful to see these as part 
of a circle of “contextual elements”, all of them interacting with one another. Visually, one can represent it as 
in the following scheme. 
 
An illustration of the “compliance foundations circle” 
                                                          
351 A term that is broader than “drivers” in that it also includes elements that are rather “pre-requisites”, “enabling” factors.  
352 Of course, many different categorizations are possible. Parker and Lehmann Nielsen (2011) for instance propose: “four main 
conceptual themes or sets of independent variables of interest in explaining compliance: motives, organizational capacities and 
characteristics, regulation and enforcement, and social and economic environments (or institutions)” (p. 5). We consider that having 
“regulation and enforcement” as one of the variables is too broad, for instance, and consider “institutions” in their different aspects 
under several headings. Each typology will have different strengths and weaknesses, and will depend on the focus of the author(s). 
 
353 The complexity (often under-estimated) of this group of “economic or material motivations that influence businesses to comply (or 
not) with regulatory dictates” is underlined by Simpson and Rorie (2011, p. 59): “our discussion acknowledges the importance of micro 
and macro distinctions and the linkages between organizational members and the company as a whole”. 
• Conformity (“everyone 
does it”)
• Ethics (“this is the right 
thing to do”)
• Legitimacy of 
authorities
• Procedural justice in 
interaction with 
regulators
• Dissuasion (control, 
enforcement)



















It is worth emphasizing that this is not a scientifically-grounded typology, where the different categories would 
be very tightly defined. Rather, their relative porosity reflects the inherent complexity of the behavioural 
processes that result in compliance, and the many interactions between all the factors at play. The intent is to 
have a typology that is above all practice-oriented: if indeed the factors described are found to be significant 
(and we will discuss below the question of their respective importance), then an effective and efficient 
inspection and enforcement approach has to try and address all of them comprehensively, paying attention 
to potential side effects, trade-offs, and attempting to find the “optimal” mix of tools354.  
In sharp contrast with some theories’ pretentions to definitely “explain” human interactions, we think it 
behoves scholars to be modest and accept the limits of humans’ ability to understand themselves355. Whether 
these limitations are inherent or temporary, we clearly are nowhere near reaching the same success in 
understanding and transforming behaviours as we have had in regard to natural, physical phenomena. 
Accepting and understanding to some extent the complexity of forces at play and of interactions may be a first 
step. In this perspective, breaking down artificial barriers between different theories is a first, useful step. In 
agreement with Hodges (2015), we see the combination of procedural justice studies, behavioural economics, 
as well as the more sophisticated analyses of “deterrence” effects as different aspects and angles of the same 
attempt to make sense of human behaviours. Whether one looks at “compliance”, at “beyond compliance”, 
or targets “behaviours” more broadly – the drivers, conditions, foundations are all essentially the same. 
 
b. Challenges in understanding compliance, and promoting it 
 
i. Determining the relative strength of compliance drivers: a difficult quest 
 
Considering that there are several competing compliance models, and different perspectives on the relative 
importance of compliance drivers or factors, and that these different models and drivers suggest sharply 
diverging enforcement approaches, attempting to assess the relative strength of these different drivers is very 
important. It is also very challenging – at least if one wishes to have definitive certainty, or close to it. Many 
studies have attempted to test the effect of different approaches, in particular deterrence, but also (for a 
smaller number) procedural justice, education etc. Tyler (1988 et al.), in particular, has attempted to 
disaggregate the effects of different drivers, while testing a procedural justice model of compliance. Still, we 
would argue that none of the studies is fully conclusive, and that it is hence not surprising that many yield 
partly or fully conflicting results. All of these studies have their limitations: they cover typically one (often 
small) jurisdiction, and one legal or administrative field. There may be a number of reasons why the effects 
found differ between locations, topics, groups affected etc. There are also considerable issues with data 
                                                           
354 As Parker and Lehmann Nielsen (2011) put it, “understanding and explaining ‘compliance’ (…) requires mapping, understanding and 
testing the interactions of a complex range of factors and processes” (p. 8). There are, of course, many different ways to consider and 
categorize existing research on and scholarly accounts of compliance. Parker and Lehmann Nielsen see the field as divided between 
“objectivist research aimed at building and testing theories” that look at “what ‘procudes’ compliance” – and “interpretive 
understanding of organizational responses to regulation, and of the processes by which compliance is socially constructed” (p. 3). If 
we had to choose, we would locate our work in the first group – but the authors quickly add a note that there is “creative dialogue” 
between the two, and that many scholars “use both styles” (p. 4). 
355 Tyler’s Why People Obey the Law (1988), precisely because it attempts to capture all the different (and possibly conflicting) drivers, 
is a good example of such modesty and inclusiveness. 
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quality, reliability, representativeness in many studies – and with the meaningfulness of respondents’ 
responses to “qualitative” questions. 
We are not the first to point the limitations and difficulties of data on compliance. For instance, Kagan, 
Gunningham and Thornton (2011) write that “the regulatory agency databases that researchers use to 
measure noncompliance vary in quality, while researchers who rely on those databases often differ in what 
they treat as significant noncompliance” – but we think this is an understatement of the problem. Lehmann 
Nielsen and Parker (2011) go somewhat further in stating that: “to the extent that data are available from 
individuals inside firms or from records collected by regulatory agencies, the data will be filtered and biased 
according to what those who collected it saw as relevant and important to compliance and what they see as 
socially and politically desirable to share with the researcher” (p.6). Similarly, the conclusions drawn by May 
and Winter (1999, 2011) on different “enforcement styles”, and their respective effects on compliance, while 
very interesting, are subject to caution given the limitations of the data they use (which they partly 
acknowledge). Their 1999 study relies on surveys asking respondents to rank enforcement styles on a set of 
criteria (which already can incorporate a significant amount of respondent bias, as with every “qualitative” 
questions) – and then combines this with questions where inspectors are asked to assess the effectiveness of 
their own actions. As the authors write, “we relied on municipal inspectors’ reports of the effectiveness of 
their enforcement efforts” (2011, p. 234). While the authors do grant that there may be concerns with the 
objectivity of such a data source, they still consider it as fundamentally valid356, and draw important 
conclusions from their research, in particular that “the effects of formalism [in enforcement style] were 
positive and somewhat stronger when awareness of rules was low. In such circumstances the use of formalism 
gives regulatees more certainty about what is expected from them” (p. 235). While the conclusion may well 
be valid, it remains a distinct possibility that more “formal” inspectors may also, for a variety of reasons, 
consider their own actions to be more successful – and thus, different perspectives may build an inherent bias 
in the data. 
We would argue that self-reported levels of compliance, whether reported by businesses themselves or by 
inspectors, are highly problematic. The former may have an imperfect understanding of what full compliance 
would be, and a reluctance to report fraud and violations. The latter have a number of incentives to report 
compliance levels that may differ from reality (not necessarily better – policy priorities may also mean that 
reporting worse compliance than actual makes career sense), and also of course never have a full view of the 
level of compliance in any given business, even one that they inspected – and by definition have no information 
on non-visited businesses. While one may assume that the “imperfect information” issue may be relatively 
constant, and thus not skew evaluations of relative effectiveness357 (or skew them only in a limited way), the 
same is not true of pressure from inspectors’ management, policy makers etc. May and Winter (2011) in fact 
acknowledge the importance of superiors and politicians in how inspectors’ enforcement style varies, for 
instance, even though they also find this effect to be variable and often limited (pp. 230-232) – there is no 
                                                           
356 See May and Winter (1999): “Our measure of the effectiveness of enforcement actions in bringing about compliance is based on 
assessments made by the main municipal inspectors. Each was asked to rate on a 10-point scale the “total effect of the municipal 
supervision of farmers’ pollution of water resources in relation to making farmers comply with regulations governing livestock.” The 
end points for the scale ranged from “no effect” to “has caused all farmers to comply.” Municipal inspectors generally report high 
degrees of effectiveness of their actions (…) Inspectors have some incentives to provide rosy estimates of their effectiveness; if nothing 
else, to look good. However, the Danish Environmental Protection Agency regularly requires the municipal inspectors to make reports 
about farm inspection for which inconsistent reports over time are evident. (These reports are one source of our data.) Given these 
considerations, we presume that the inspectors’ reports of enforcement effectiveness provide reasonable measures of relative 
differences among municipalities. However, we recognize that they may not provide accurate assessments of absolute levels of 
enforcement effectiveness or of compliance” (pp. 635-636). The authors cite other studies that report inspectors’ own assessment of 
compliance to be accurate. Clearly, it is possible that these are indeed accurate – but it is far from certain. Inspectors may well have 
understood how to “game the system” and consistently report “better than actual” outcomes (cf. Bevan and Hood 2006). 
357 Although more qualified and professional inspectors tend to be better at detecting violations, as May and Winter (2011) also note. 
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reason to assume that this influence does not also extend to reporting of compliance levels. In fact, extensive 
research in the field of crime and law enforcement has repeatedly shown major issues with the way police 
forces register and report crime levels (including under-registration of crimes that the police would be unlikely 
to be able to solve, so as to increase the rate of success – or systematic enforcement against petty crime in 
order to make “activity” statistics look up, thus making it appear as if there were a surge in some violations, 
etc.)358. There is no reason to believe that such problems are not also present in regulatory enforcement. 
Indeed, Bardach and Kagan (1982) have shown that, when inspectorate management emphasizes a “looking 
tough” approach and penalizes inspectors who appear to have lower activity and enforcement numbers, this 
mechanically produces a more legalistic, more “aggressive” enforcement practice (pp. 76-77), with 
considerable side-effects (what the authors call “unreasonableness”), without this reflecting on the real, 
underlying level of compliance and safety. 
For all these reasons, we believe it makes sense, in order to assess the effectiveness of inspections and 
enforcement approaches and styles, to look at actual outcomes and not at whichever compliance levels are 
reported. Obviously, there are major issues also with this approach (in particular, the difficulties in attributing 
variations in extremely complex phenomena to different causes), and we will come back to this in the third 
section. In the meantime, and in spite of the limitations outlined above, considering the evidence from existing 
research is a crucial step in order to provide a sound foundation for inspection practices. We will attempt to 
do this briefly, focusing on the most significant results, and assessing whether some trends can be more or 
less reliably identified.  
Two fields of law and regulation have been the object of most studies of compliance and its possible drivers: 
tax regulations, and interactions with police and courts (“law and order” issues broadly speaking, and not only 
criminal justice). While there is no comparable set of quantitative studies on other areas (environmental or 
occupational regulations compliance, for instance), there is good reason to assume that findings from these 
two spheres can extend to other fields too. Indeed, in neoclassical compliance models, the cost-benefit 
calculations are assumed to extend to any kind of regulation as well. From our perspective, taxes and “law and 
order” issues have the benefit of covering very different types of regulations – complex for tax and simpler for 
“law and order”, applying only to individuals for the latter and also to businesses for the former, etc. That they 
have been most studied is a function both of their very strong relevance to society (very fundamental fields of 
state regulation), and of the relative ease with which compliance and non-compliance can be measured 
(quantitatively in tax, and with simple questions in terms of law and order – whereas environmental or 
occupational regulations, for instance, would entail many different questions and compliance could be partial, 
with difficulties in rating it). While neither of these fields is the core focus of this research, there is reason to 
think that findings in these spheres can be transposed to others359.  
 
Evidence from tax compliance studies 
If we thus accept that we can generalize the findings from tax compliance and “law and order” studies to other 
fields of regulation, there is a significant amount of evidence against the view of people and businesses as 
complying only on the basis of fear and rational calculations. To quote from an important study reviewing and 
                                                           
358 There is a vast amount of literature on this issue – the reader can refer e.g. to Skogan 1975, Smith 2006. 
359 Tyler (2011) himself considers the application of his findings to business regulation writing (p. 78): “deterrence mechanisms of the 
type being widely used are usually less effective than is generally believed, and are particularly unlikely to be optimal approaches to 
regulating the actions of those who work in business settings. In contrast, research findings suggest that efforts to build a value based 
climate of rule following are a promising approach that is likely to lead to more widespread voluntary acceptance of, and deference 
to, workplace rules and policies. (…)Studies find that the primary factor shaping legitimacy, morality and rule adherence is the 
procedural justice that employees experience in their workplace”. We will come back to this question of the “ethical” workplace, which 
is also the focus of Hodges (2015). 
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summarizing several decades of research on tax compliance (Kirchler 2007) “empirical research consistently 
shows that the rational model is not working as neoclassical economics had intended360”. Kirchler, in this study, 
goes through all the conflicting evidence put forward by a number of studies in different countries, some in a 
laboratory setting, some based on surveys, some others looking at actual tax data. Most show a stronger effect 
from audit frequency, a few from higher fines (though from a model perspective they ought to be equivalent), 
some show no effect or an adverse effect (more audits and/or higher fines leading to decreased compliance) 
– and in all cases the effects are small. Among the most interesting findings from our perspective are that 
“oppressive tax enforcement and harassment of taxpayers seem to increase tax resistance, as does discontent 
with the delivery of public service361” – and that another study362 “yielded neither a significant audit probability 
effect nor significant effects of fine and tax rates, whereas trust in the legal system and direct democratic 
rights proved to be highly significant determinants of tax morale. These findings prove that perceived 
procedural justice as described above is a crucial determinant of citizens’ voluntary cooperation, whereas in a 
system perceived as treating citizens unfairly, cooperation must be enforced by coercion”. 
Overall, Kirchler summarises the key findings as follows: “there are many explanations of why probability of 
audits and fines does not have the predicted high effect on tax compliance. First of all, the assumption that 
taxpayers are trying to avoid taxes if it is in their benefit must be doubted. Various studies in different countries 
use different methodological approaches to show that a vast majority of citizens are willing to pay taxes and 
do not seem to undertake economic decisions under uncertainty in order to maximise income. Most taxpayers 
seem to take for granted the legitimacy of the tax system and its overarching objectives”. Even to the extent 
that audit probability and fear of punishment do play a role, their effects are mediated by the values of the 
taxpayers: “individuals generally make poor predictions of the probability of audit and magnitude of fines from 
tax evasion. Moreover, there is consistency between their sense of a moral obligation to be honest and the 
tendency to overestimate the chance of being caught”. In short, and even though there appear to be 
differences linked to other elements of the context (country, tax rates etc.), it seems clear that the probability 
and severity of punishment are not the primary drivers of tax compliance – but rather, that the moral values 
of taxpayers, and their views on the legitimacy of the tax system and its rules, are the fundamental drivers, to 
which inspections and enforcement only come as an addition363. 
 
Evidence from research on citizens, police and courts 
Several decades of research on criminal matters, and on interactions between citizens and authorities (police 
and courts in particular), paint a similar picture to what we have seen for tax. Of course, deterrence does play 
a role in fostering compliance (i.e. deterring crime), but it tends to have an effect that is limited (or even very 
limited), except if considerable resources are expended so at to make the probability of detection really high. 
On the other hand, process-based factors appear to play a crucial role in determining sustained attitudes in 
respect with laws and regulations, and with public authorities.  
                                                           
360 Full quote: “In 1992, Fischer, Wartick and Mark reviewed a bulk of studies directed at learning more about the relationship between 
probability of detection and compliance behaviour. It appears that the reviewed studies, which employed different methods, generally 
point in the same direction and strengthen the confidence that increasing the probability of detection will result in less non-compliant 
behaviour. However, the effect is, if anything, very small. Similarly, while the effect of fines is significant in many studies, their impact 
on tax compliance in general is small, if not negligible (Andreoni, Erard and Feinstein, 1998 )”  
361 Quoted by Kirchler from Fjeldstad and Semboja ( 2001 ) - study on tax behaviour in Tanzania.  
362 On tax morale in Switzerland by Torgler (2005). 
363 Quoting one last time from Kirchler (2007): “Based on the rather small effects of variables considered in the neoclassical economic 
approach (i.e., audit probability, fines, marginal tax rate and income), several studies conclude that it is important to consider also 
citizens’ acceptance of political and administrative actions and attitudinal, moral and justice issues as they are central to psychological 
and sociological approaches (Lind and Tyler, 1988 ; Pommerehne and Frey, 1992 ; Pommerehne and Weck-Hannemann, 1992 ; Tyler 
and Lind, 1992 ; Weck-Hannemann and Pommerehne, 1989 ).” 
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Tom Tyler, summarizes deterrence’s impact and limitations as follows (2003): “studies of deterrence (…) point 
to factors that limit the likely effectiveness of deterrence models. Perhaps the key factor limiting the value of 
deterrence strategies is the consistent finding that deterrence effects, when found, are small in magnitude. 
(…) A further possible limitation of deterrence strategies is that, while deterrence effects can potentially be 
influenced by estimates either of the certainty of punishment or its severity, studies suggest that both factors 
are not equally effective. Unfortunately from a policy perspective, certainty more strongly influences people's 
behavior than severity, and certainty is the more difficult to change. (…)To influence people's behavior, risk 
estimates need to be high enough to exceed some threshold of psychological meaningfulness.” This means 
that, in practice, deterrence is impossible to achieve in most cases: the resources required would be far too 
high (in a world of limited resources, society cannot commit enough resources to deterring violations in each 
and every regulatory field), and the intrusion on privacy and limitations of individual freedoms would be far 
too high. Tyler cites murder as a key example: on this topic, society has allocated enough resources that indeed 
there is a real deterrence effect – but achieving similar intensity of enforcement in all other fields is impossible. 
In addition, deterrence approaches “are not self-sustaining and require the maintenance of institutions and 
authorities that can keep the probability of detection for wrongdoing at a sufficiently high level to motivate 
the public.” 
By contrast, process-based approaches aim at increasing the legitimacy of rules and authorities by improving 
the level of fairness as perceived by citizens. The focus is not primarily on “distributive justice” (i.e. having 
outcomes that are deemed fair) – although this also has been found to have a significant impact on compliance, 
it is significantly less strong than the process effect, and in addition it is in practice impossible to reach 
decisions that would satisfy everyone. Rather, the emphasis is on “procedural justice”. In the words of Tyler 
(2003), who has been one of the key proponents of this approach for several decades: “The procedural justice 
model involves two stages. [First,] public behavior is rooted in evaluations of the legitimacy of the police and 
courts. (…) In other words, people cooperate with the police and courts in their everyday live when they view 
those authorities as legitimate and entitled to be obeyed. [Second,] the antecedents of legitimacy. The 
procedural justice argument is that process-based assessments are the key antecedent of legitimacy (…). In 
this analysis, four indicators – summary judgments of procedural justice, inferences of motive-based trust, 
judgments about the fairness of decision making, and judgments about the fairness of interpersonal 
treatment-are treated as indices of an overall assessment of procedural justice in the exercise of authority.” 
Crucially, research has shown that the effect of procedural justice is significantly stronger than that of 
deterrence. 
The procedural justice effects are found in many fields and settings (mediation decisions Lind et al. 1993, 
dismissal from employment Lind et al. 2000 etc.). What also matters is that procedural justice, and the 
legitimacy it fosters, are long-term drivers of compliance, and largely self-sustaining (at least they do not 
require an increase in resources – but a change in behaviours and approaches). The changes involved in how 
authority is exercised are, however, significant compared to what is the practice in many cases. Quoting Tyler 
(2003) again, the key conditions needed to achieve a procedural justice effect are: “that decision making is 
viewed as being neutral, consistent, rule-based, and without bias; that people are treated with dignity and 
respect and their rights are acknowledged; and that they have an opportunity to participate in the situation 





Refining the models: responsive regulation, smart regulation, and their challenges 
 
Responsive regulation: the original vision 
Confronted with the limitations and contradictions of simple models of understanding and fostering 
compliance, scholars (and practitioners) have been developing more complex models, attempting to combine 
several approaches in a coherent framework. The first, and arguably the most famous, is the responsive 
regulation model that was formulated in 1992 by Ayres and Braithwaite (relying on earlier work, and later 
further developed by Braithwaite and others, in particular Grabosky). The fundamental idea of responsive 
regulation is that different approaches are needed (and warranted) for different businesses, that these 
different approaches need to be seen as part of a pyramid of escalating severity, and that the regulators need 
to be responsive, i.e. change approaches as business behaviours change. In addition, they argue that the 
overall “enforcement pyramid” needs to be publicized so that regulated entities know exactly what to expect, 
and thus have an additional incentive to comply, so as to remain at the “bottom of the pyramid” (Cf. Ayres 
and Braithwaite 1992, pp. 35-41). 
The foundations for this model, precisely, combine different compliance drivers, and recognize that different 
businesses (and different employees within them) may be at different points in the pyramid (corresponding 
to different drivers being strongest), and that their position may change over time (in particular in reaction to 
regulatory enforcement actions). The bottom of the pyramid corresponds to pure persuasion, while successive 
moves up the pyramid correspond to increasingly strong deterrence (and, ultimately, incapacitation) (p. 35). 
Of course, the precise list of actions will depend on the context, and in particular on the legal tools available 
to the agency. 
The shape of the pyramid is meant to convey the idea that “most regulatory action occurs at the base of the 
pyramid where attempts are initially made to coax compliance by persuasion” (ibid.). The same pyramid model 
is suggested for enforcement strategies – meaning that, at a strategic level, governments and regulatory 
agencies should tailor (and communicate) their strategies in the same way. The specific regulatory instruments 
included in this pyramid can vary (the authors present an example ranging from self-regulation to “command 
regulation with non-discretionary enforcement” at the top, on p. 39) – but the general benefit is that “clear 
communication in advance of willingness by the state to escalate up the pyramid gives incentives to both the 
industry and regulatory agents to make regulation work at lower levels of interventionism”, in the hope of 
avoiding the “cost of increasingly inflexible and adversarial regulation” (pp. 38-39).  
In order to work effectively, responsive regulation requires that regulatory agencies have at their disposal a 
broad range of potential responses (including varied sanctions of increasing severity), that allow them to have 
an enforcement approach that can be as “finely graded” as possible. By contrast, if an enforcement agency 
has only very severe sanctions available, the threat to “cooperate or else” will not be credible because 
regulated entities will know that this (exceedingly drastic) sanction will usually not be used. When the different 
sanctions available do not fit well with the range of severity of possible offences, there will be situations where 
there is “no politically acceptable way of punishing these offences” (pp. 36-37)364. We would add, writing from 
experience in very different jurisdictions, that this last point is true for democratic polities, and even (within 
these) for polities with a strong voice for businesses. There are a number of situations where such exceedingly 
severe sanctions will be used, and where the effect will be that not only will violations be deterred, but 
                                                           
364 There are ways to introduce “nuances” in practice with what appears at first to be a limited “response kit”. For instance, Hawkins 
(2002) shows how British HSE inspectors developed rather sophisticated techniques of persuasion to address the limitations of their 
available range of responses – with formal enforcement including only improvement notice, prohibition notice and prosecution. 




legitimate investment and economic activity, with serious consequences for growth and employment. Ayres 
and Braithwaite also suggest the idea of what they call a “benign big gun” (pp. 40-41), where enforcement 
agencies have sanctions reaching very high (until full incapacitation), so that (using the pyramid approach) 
they can use the threat of this power to, in fact, push most regulatory interactions to the bottom end of the 
pyramid. The combination of responsiveness, gradation and very high “top of the pyramid” would thus 
function optimally.  
The responsive regulation approach incorporates earlier findings and ideas on “tit-for-tat” (in particular 
Scholz’s work – cf. pp. 20-23), but goes significantly further. Indeed, “tit-for-tat” is premised on assumptions 
of rational behaviour, and can be formulated through a game-theoretical analysis (cf. pp. 21, 60-81). Ayres 
and Braithwaite’s vision, by contrast, incorporates a complex view of compliance motives (what they call 
“mixed motives” – cf. pp. 22-35), and thus modifies the “tit-for-tat” vision into the “compliance pyramid”. The 
pyramid acknowledges that different motives work (to different amounts) for different people (and in 
different situations), and seeks to rely as much as possible on voluntary (values-based) compliance, while 
keeping deterrence (calculation-based) in the background. Being particularly open about the potential for very 
high escalation, but mostly not using sanctions, i.e. “speaking softly and carrying a big stick” is the core of their 
approach. But the vision they lay out in their 1992 book (as distinct from the many summaries produced later 
on by other scholars) has many other aspects. In particular, it envisions a strong reliance on “tri-partism” (cf. 
pp. 54-100), whereby the role of “public interest groups” (trade unions, NGOs and civil society organizations) 
would come into play to avoid regulatory capture, and ensure more optimal outcomes than a simple two-way 
relationship would (cf. pp. 86-97). They also discuss at length the potential for “enforced self-regulation”, and 
the different ways in which it can be structured, as a potential application of the “pyramid” approach (pp. 101-
132). While these are very interesting directions for reflexion, and they are connected to our area of research, 
their relevance to our concerns is at this point marginal, and we will not discuss them further365. 
 
From “smart regulation” to “really responsive regulation” 
Already, through their vision of “tri-partism”, Ayres and Braithwaite started to consider the importance of 
other actors in the question of compliance and of public welfare outcomes. Gunningham and Grabosky 
developed this further into an approach they called “smart regulation” (1999), a term which quickly became 
used in a confusing variety of ways. Their understanding of the notion was “an emerging form of regulatory 
pluralism that embraces flexible, imaginative and innovative forms of social control which seek to harness not 
just governments but also businesses and third parties” (Gunningham 2010, p. 131). Their fundamental insight 
is that there are many influences that shape business behaviour, far beyond regulation (and simple cost-
benefit calculations related to narrowly-defined compliance), such as “international standards”, “trading 
partners and the supply chain”, “financial markets”, “peer pressure”, “internal (…) culture” and “civil society” 
(ibid.). This is an approach that we see as very relevant, and indeed we will try and show in our examples from 
the practice (in the third part) that “risk-based” inspection systems tend to also try and leverage all or at least 
several of these different factors. Nonetheless, we will not discuss these in depth, as our focus in this research 
is specifically on the regulatory enforcement aspect. 
                                                           
365 We will just note three more things about Ayres and Braithwaite’s work. First, the “tri-partism” vision, while it is clearly very context-
related (i.e. rooted in Australian conditions) is very interesting – and has clearly been influential in further research (see next paragraph 
on smart regulation). Second, “enforced self-regulation” can be linked to other models such as third-party conformity assessment in 
product-market regulations, or to the vision of “ethical regulation” by Hodges (2015) etc. It definitely warrants further research. Finally, 
the authors also call attention at the opening of the book to the relevance of their research not only to OECD countries but, for instance, 
to post-Soviet countries (p. 7). We very much agree, in spite of all the practical difficulties, as we will further develop in the third part 




A number of criticisms, or remarks, have been done concerning the original responsive regulation model (and 
Braithwaite himself has introduced a number of additions to it). To our mind (and contrary to the way in which 
these remarks were sometimes done, which suggested that something was fundamentally amiss in the original 
design), they do not reflect any essential flaw in the design of responsive regulation, but rather point to specific 
points in detailed implementation, which could not possibly be all addressed in the original work, which was 
rather short and conceptual. One of the most important points is the difficulty to “ratchet down” enforcement, 
“rebuilding trust” after an escalation (Gunningham 2010, p. 127 – quoting Haines). Other points relate to the 
fact that, in many situations, the ideal “pyramid” model will not be (or not be fully) applicable. For instance, 
interactions may be too rare (or too rarely repeated), or several regulators may be involved (with different 
approaches) (ibid., pp. 128-130). The second problem (several overlapping regulators with inconsistent 
approaches) is indeed a frequent problem – in our view, however, it does not suggest anything wrong with 
the responsive regulation model, but with the institutional setup (as there are many other reasons why 
overlapping, uncoordinated regulators covering the same issue are not an optimal setup)366. The first problem, 
however, is quite rare in fact in our experience. While indeed some very small agencies, or agencies covering 
very specific issues (such as fisheries inspections used as example by Baldwin and Black 2008), may have very 
rare interactions with regulated entities, it remains that the inspectorates which “matter” in the experience 
of businesses (and, generally, in the perceptions of the public) have typically rather large staffing levels, and 
relatively frequent interactions with businesses. In addition, if and when there are violations or problems 
found, re-inspections are relatively frequent, and thus the problem of “too rare repeat interactions” is not, in 
our experience, a very serious challenge to the responsive regulation model. 
Another view, which is more relevant in practice, is that in many instances it would be sub-optimal to rely only 
on the pyramid, for a variety of reasons. The first is that interactions, while not being necessarily so rare that 
the pyramid is inapplicable, can be relatively infrequent (e.g. for small, low-risk businesses), and thus the 
pyramid is a less-optimal approach than segmentation, whereby regulators select “the most appropriate 
regulatory tool from a variety of options” for a given target group or entity (Gunningham 2010, p. 130). 
Likewise, there may be case where interactions’ frequency is not the issue, but where “the classification of 
regulated enterprises into one of a variety of motivational postures” is “relatively straightforward”. In such 
cases, a “target-analytic” approach can be more efficient than a “tit-for-tat” one (ibid., p. 128). Again, we see 
here nothing actually contradicting what Ayres and Braithwaite outlined, particularly if one considers that they 
specifically suggested having a pyramid of enforcement strategies and not only one of enforcement responses 
to a given entity. Such selection of tools based on profiling can perfectly fit the perspective of an enforcement 
strategies pyramid. 
Developing a number of these criticisms, concerns and additions, Baldwin and Black have written two papers 
on “really responsive regulation” and “really responsive risk-based regulation” (2008 and 2010, respectively). 
These are important contributions, and try and integrate a number of different strands of scholarship and 
practice – responsive regulation, risk-based regulation, Sparrow’s “regulatory craft” approach, and close 
consideration of practical challenges of regulatory agencies. Here again, we would argue that the way the 
authors present several points as criticisms or contradictions of the original responsive regulation framework 
somewhat overstates the real differences – which are more about nuances, practical applications, and 
consideration of implementation challenges. Nonetheless, they make a number of very important points. First, 
they rightly point out that the pyramid needs to be combined with a risk-proportionate response: “ 
                                                           
366 See Blanc (2012) pp. 22-25 
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in some circumstances step by step escalation up the pyramid may not be appropriate. For example, where 
potentially catastrophic risks are being controlled it may not be feasible to enforce by escalating up the layers 
of the pyramid and the appropriate reaction may be immediate resort to the higher levels” (p. 6)367. Second, 
they emphasize the fact that “tit-for-tat” may be wasteful when it is clear which approach is appropriate (or 
not) for a group of regulatees (p. 7 - again, this is a point which the pyramid of enforcement approaches would, 
in principle, cover). Third, they point out the problem of regulatory regimes where inspection and enforcement 
activities are “spread across different regulators with respect to similar activities or regulations” (p. 8) – a point 
which, as we noted above, is very important in practice, but says little about the model, and more about 
institutional problems that require a solution (because incoherent and inconsistent enforcement would be a 
problem with or without responsive regulation).  
Baldwin and Black go on to make a certain number of recommendations to achieve “really responsive” 
regulation. These are sound recommendations, that mostly relate to the attention to implementation. They 
include paying attention to “the constraints and opportunities that are presented by the institutional 
environments within which the relevant regulators act” (p. 19) and attention to the “logics of different 
regulatory strategies and tools” (which involve “different understandings of the nature of behaviour or of an 
institutional environment, and in turn have different preconditions for effectiveness” – p. 20). They stress the 
crucial importance of “responsiveness to the regime’s own performance and effects”, and thus of developing 
adequate tools for “performance evaluation and modification” (emphasis ours – p. 21)368. On this basis, they 
develop a set of key questions covering the five challenges of “detection, response development, 
enforcement, assessment and modification” (p. 26). While this is a very interesting grid to assess regulatory 
responses, much of it goes beyond the scope of this research, were we really focus on the enforcement phase 
(and, to some extent, on response development). Detection problems (cf. p. 30-31) are also very relevant for 
inspections issues, and we will to some extent discuss them in the third part. We would, however, suggest that 
they are in many cases somewhat less acute than Baldwin and Black suggest. First, because the example they 
use (fisheries regulation) is particularly extreme, and detection is far easier in many of the more “common” 
regulatory functions and regulated sectors. Second, because if detection issues are really so considerable for 
a given type of inspections that they make it essentially impossible or ineffective, then this issue should be 
considered at an earlier stage of regulatory design, i.e. when identifying the problem and coming up with a 
regulatory solution. If inspections cannot realistically work, then maybe they were never the right tool in the 
first place369.  
In conclusion, one could say that the responsive regulation model, with a number of additions and nuances, 
has given a solid basis for further theoretical and practical developments, by formulating a coherent 
framework which allows differentiated approaches based on context, target group, interaction history etc. 
“Smart Regulation” and successive contributions have brought more attention to multiple stakeholders and 
tools, and to implementation challenges. “Meta Regulation” (Cf. Gunningham 2010 pp. 135-139) has 
suggested to develop Ayres and Braithwaite’s vision of “enforced self-regulation”, looking at systems put in 
place by firms themselves, and verifying their effectiveness. All of these additional models and contributions 
                                                           
367 Nothing, in the original Responsive Regulation model, suggests that no other factors should be taken into account – and, to us and 
to many practitioners, it is clear that they should be combined (as they are in OECD 2014) with risk proportionality. This articulation is, 
however, missing from the original model which, as we have seen, was rather short and conceptual in most areas. 
368 While we will return several times to the question of measuring effectiveness, discussing the challenges of transforming practices 
and institutions on the basis of performance evalutions would go beyond the scope of this research. 
369 For radically different approaches of fisheries regulation see e.g. Eythórsson 1996 or Runolfsson 1997. Measuring the performance 
of different approaches, which Baldwin and Black see as a very problematic, could arguably be done through looking at fish stocks 
evolution rather than at compliance. It is worth considering, in cases that appear extremely problematic, whether the reliance on 
command-and-control regulation, enforcement and compliance is possibly not the right approach. 
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consolidate the view that it is most effective to rely on a combination of tools and approaches, based on the 
specifics of the regulated entities and the regulations being enforced, on the context, and on prior history.  
The challenges raised by Baldwin and Black (2008, 2010) also remind us of the importance of first thinking 
through whether command-and-control regulation, and subsequent enforcement efforts, have any chance of 
success at solving the problem at hand, and are likely to be an effective and efficient response – regardless of 
the specific inspection approach taken. In many cases, the answer may simply be negative, and other policy 
interventions will be more adequate370 (see Ogus 1994 for an overview of other regulatory tools, and all the 
literature on Regulatory Impact Assessment for discussions of other policy options). Using methods that come 
from beyond the narrow “regulatory” field may also bring major benefits from this perspective. Increasingly, 
the “causal pathway” methodology371 is being used in the regulatory and enforcement area, to determine 
what are the mechanisms that cause the unintended effects (increased risk, decrease in public welfare) that 
regulation is meant to address. The models allow to consider whether regulation is really likely to be useful 
and, if so, which intervention mechanisms may be most helpful (see BRDO 2013 for a practical application of 
this methodology).  
 
Diverging data, diverging conclusions 
In spite of some meta-studies (like Kirchler 2007) seemingly indicating some more-or-less clear trends, the 
data on compliance effects of different approaches is, in fact, disputed. As Simpson and Rorie (2011) put it, 
there are “several general traditions in this regard, each with its own logic and empirical base” (p. 59), which 
is a way to say that different streams of research seem to come up with data that cannot fully be reconciled. 
For instance, while we have quoted above Tyler at length, and his findings on the strength of procedural justice 
effects (confirmed by a number of other scholars), some research seems (at least at first glance) to question 
his confidence (in the possibility to found compliance primarily on “procedural justice” (“studies find that the 
primary factor shaping legitimacy, morality and rule adherence is the procedural justice that employees 
experience in their workplace”, 2011 p. 78). Similarly, it is not certain that Hodges’s (2015) confident assertion 
that “public enforcement based on a policy of deterrence does not “in fact [have a] significant deterrent effect” 
(p. 26). 
In the interest of presenting the evidence in a clearer way, we have of course somewhat over-simplified the 
different perspectives, and it behoves the topic’s complexity to add some important nuances. First, a 
distinction is often made between “general deterrence (premised on the notion that punishment of one 
enterprise will discourage others from engaging in similar proscribed conduct) and specific deterrence 
(premised on the notion that an enterprise that has experienced previous legal sanctions will be more inclined 
to make efforts to avoid future penalties)” (Gunningham 2010, p. 122)372. In addition, evidence “shows that 
regulated business firms’ perceptions of legal risk (primarily of prosecution) play a far more important role (…) 
than the objective likelihood of legal sanctions” in determining general deterrence’s effectiveness (ibid.). Thus, 
there is maybe not a sharp distinction to be drawn between “rational” motivations (calculations) and other 
drivers – since even so-called “rational” deterrence estimates are based on perceptions rather than on 
objective data, and perceptions appear to be strongly interrelated with values-based thought processes. 
                                                           
370 A point very similar to that made by Ashworth (2000) on the excessive use of criminal law for problems where it is inadequate. 
371 Which is also widely use in a number of domains (political science, ecology, epidemiology etc.) – see a theoretical summary on 
Cornell Evaluation Centre website: https://core.human.cornell.edu/research/systems/theory/causalpathways.cfm  
372 The “evidence of a link between past penalty and improved future performance is stronger”, suggesting that specific deterrence is 
more powerful than general one – but research shows also that “action falling short of prosecution” can achieve substantial effects, 
i.e. that it is more the warning effect rather than the punishment which matters (Gunningham 2010, p. 124). 
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Indeed, research suggests that many respondents struggle to “disentangle normative from instrumental 
motivations” (ibid., p. 123). 
The effect of deterrence may also vary over time, or be complex rather than linear. As Gunningham writes, “it 
is plausible (…) that the deterrent impact of tough enforcement may be weaker today, than it was in past 
decades, at least in industries that have been subject to substantial regulation for a considerable period and/or 
are reputation sensitive” (ibid.). This is clearly hypothetical, and may be true in some cases – while there is 
also some evidence that, possibly in other regulatory fields and/or countries, new regulation that is primarily 
implemented through “tough” enforcement tends to fail, and more “persuasion-grounded” efforts fare better. 
There also is evidence of weak deterrence effects in completely different contexts from Gunningham’s. This 
all suggests that there may be specific contexts where the effects are stronger or weaker, which cannot 
however just be explained by one variable, but rather by a combination of many factors. 
 
One study, many findings, complex interpretation 
In a study of Chinese farmers, the findings of which were published in a series of papers in 2015, Yan, van Rooij 
and van der Heijden attempted to observe directly the actual level of compliance, and to assess the strength 
of different drivers through interviews. They took a very comprehensive and “non-partisan” view of 
compliance drivers, looking at the whole range: ability to comply (physical/economic capacity, legal 
knowledge), deterrence, procedural justice, prevailing social norms, and internalised moral duties (2015 b pp. 
2-3). Their findings, though founded on a study of only a bit over 100 farmers, are highly interesting – and 
require careful interpretation. 
In a first paper (2015 a), the authors simply crossed the different types of behaviour (compliant/non-compliant 
for three different norms on pesticides) with the different drivers of compliance (ranked as positive or 
negative), and examined correlations. They had several conclusions: first, that deterrence was overall limited 
in effectiveness, not because of an absence of correlation between probability of detection and compliance, 
but because high probability of detection seemed to be closely correlated with a high level of other (voluntary 
compliance) factors. In other words, the farmers most frequently inspected (the large farmers, as the authors 
found) were also those that were anyway the most likely to comply even without inspections and enforcement 
(pp. 7-8). Second, that “apart from deterrence, operational costs and benefits, personal norms, social norms, 
and, less clearly, legal knowledge all play a role in compliance” (and that this role is significant) (p. 13). By 
contrast, the authors found no “clear relationships between the general duty to obey the law, procedural 
justice and compliance”, leading them to add that “these variables are not crucial aspects of voluntary 
compliance, and thus enforcement does not have to take them into account” (p. 11).  
It is worth, however, pointing out a few points from the authors’ data, which may support different 
interpretations. First, across the board, compliance (and apparent responsiveness to “drivers”) is strongest for 
the type of regulation that is the most directly understandable and, arguably, has the greatest safety effect: 
the prohibition of some hazardous types of pesticides. Rules on disposal and time interval before marketing 
are far less well respected (a point the authors note, but do not necessarily pay enough attention to). Second, 
procedural justice is overall quite consistently low: most respondents have a feeling of negative procedural 
justice. It may simply be that, in a context where interactions with authorities are nearly uniformly marked by 
“rough handling” and top-down commands, farmers simply fail to register the very few exceptions as being 
significant. This does not ipso facto mean that they would not respond to a sustained experience of a different 
approach, or that this type of authoritarian behaviour has no negative effect (e.g. possibly on the overall 
respect for laws etc.). Finally, the authors’ conclusion that the targeting used by Chinese inspectors (who 
primarily inspect the larger farms, which are found to be the ones most likely to be voluntarily compliant) is 
wrong can also be disputed. Their view is that this results in deterrence failing to have an impact on those 
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most likely to be non-compliant, and write “as a matter of principle, enforcement should be targeted especially 
at those types of farmers and those types of rules for which voluntary compliance is less likely” (p. 13). We will 
come back further below to the question of defining “risk” and of what targeting makes more sense – but from 
a practical perspective, targeting the highest-impact farmers is far from being irrational. Furthermore, the 
authors have no way to be sure that (a) frequent inspections of larger farmers have not played a role in them 
understanding rules better, and being generally more supportive of voluntary compliance and (b) inspections 
and enforcement would be the most appropriate tool to target smaller farmers and increase their knowledge 
and voluntary compliance (in fact, it is possible that inspections would increase costs, through time lost and 
sanctions, and thus further decrease their financial capacity to comply – for instance). 
Their second article drawn from the same data (2015 b), but with a different analytical methodology (“crisp 
set Qualitative Comparative Analysis” – csQCA)373, yields conclusions that are somewhat different, and very 
interesting. The most striking result is the absence of equivalence between the conditions of compliance, and 
that of non-compliance: “our data also point to a non-symmetrical relation between the deterrent effect of 
sanctions and compliance. The analyses of necessary conditions pointed out that (experienced) deterrence is 
not a necessary condition for compliance, but that the absence of (experienced) deterrence is a necessary 
condition for non-compliance (…). Our data further indicate that deterrence (as part of a set of compliance 
conditions) does play a marginal role in affecting compliance (in one path for one compliance behaviour), the 
absence of deterrence does, however, play a considerable role in affecting non-compliance (in five out of six 
paths for both non-compliance behaviours). This finding challenges our thinking about the assumed 
compliance–non-compliance dichotomy in the literature—it indicates that compliance is not necessarily the 
inverse of non-compliance” (p. 14). This suggests that, while deterrence may indeed be of little importance 
for active compliance (voluntary compliance drivers being sufficient), in order to “drift” into non-compliance, 
the absence of a significant deterrence effect is an important “trigger”. The authors interpret it thus: “deciding 
to comply is not the same as (also) deciding ‘not to violate’—if we decide to stick to speed limits, we likely do 
not (also) decide to not hit the pedal to the metal (building on insights from behavioural economics, cf., 
Kahneman 2011). What we observe is not a reassurance and reminder function for compliant decision making 
from deterrence, but the lack of deterrence as a reminder and reassurance that violation goes unnoticed or 
unpunished (…). This reasoning is in line with Ian Ayres and John Braithwaite’s (1992) responsive regulation 
model, which assumes that most compliance will occur without active deterrence” (p. 15). Looking more 
closely at the conditions for non-compliance, one finds “the absence of a deterrent effect of sanctions, a non-
positive cost-benefit analysis, the absence of (experienced) descriptive social norms, and the absence of (an 
experience of) procedural justice” but with “relatively low coverage scores” (i.e. weaker effect) for deterrence 
and procedural justice. The conditions for compliance, by contrast, include (different combinations in different 
compliance paths) “law as a source of moral authority”, “descriptive social norms to comply”, “positive cost 
benefit analysis”, “legal knowledge”, “capacity to comply”, and “general duty to obey” – with “law as a source 
of moral authority” being present in every path. 
 
Complex processes, nuanced conclusions 
What all the evidence summarized above suggests is first that interpreting results and compliance processes 
finely may be vital: deterrence may well be superfluous for the majority (of voluntary compliers), but would 
                                                           
373 As the authors explain: “QCA differs from other methods in its focus. ‘The key issue [for QCA] is not which variable is the strongest 
(i.e., has the biggest net effect) but how different conditions combine and whether there is only one combination or several different 
combinations of conditions (causal recipes) of generating the same outcome’ (…). QCA is grounded in set theory, a branch of 
mathematical logic that allows the study, in detail, of how causal conditions contribute to a particular outcome. A particular strength 




be needed (and need to be targeted) for those who are “on the brink”. Second, the fundamental drivers appear 
to be social and personal norms and ethics: accepting the law as source of moral authority, following social 
norms, feature as the strongest drivers. Third, capacity to comply is also crucial: financial and physical, as well 
as (to a lesser extent) legal knowledge – but also cost-benefit analysis. In other words, norms that are realistic 
given prevailing conditions, well explained and communicated, and tailored so as to be economically viable, 
stand the best chances of success (a relatively unsurprising finding, one may add, but still an important one). 
Finally, the variables that correspond most closely to traditional “enforcement” (both deterrence and 
procedural justice) appear, in fact, the weakest (and this second paper puts procedural justice alongside 
deterrence, somewhat nuancing the conclusions of the first one). What fundamentally matters is whether 
citizens (including those that work in businesses) adhere to norms that make them comply – not whether they 
are checked frequently, and how. Inspections and enforcement work at the margin. Precisely because they 
work at the margin, we would add, means that they should use each and every tool at their disposal (including 
procedural justice) to be more effective – because affecting social and individual norms is, at best, a long-term 
undertaking374. In fact, all these findings (including the importance of information) all match what many 
practitioners know and do, at least in what one could call “smart inspections” regimes, as we will discuss in 
the third section. 
Thus, the overall importance of “enforcement” aspects for compliance may be relatively weak compared to 
deeper, longer-term factors – and in addition the respective strength of different aspects and factors is, as we 
have seen, not so easy to ascertain, and/or varies according to circumstances. In addition, different 
approaches carry some trade-offs, that are in evidence in a number of studies.  
 
Charting a course in spite of uncertainties 
There may be some ways to move forward, and try and make sense of inspections and enforcement methods, 
in spite of these uncertainties. This requires first to understand how context may cause differences in results, 
then to acknowledge the limitations in methods and findings – and finally to suggest alternative sources of 
evidence. 
 
Context and typologies 
The models of compliance we have outlined above seem to a significant extent to be contradictory, and 
conflicting research findings do not lead to an easy way to decide upon their validity or to reconcile them (even 
though some models do seem to be more strongly validate than others). This creates difficulties for our 
research object, since the question of compliance drivers is essential in order to provide a foundation for the 
choice between different enforcement approaches. A way to make sense of these contradictions, and to end 
up with a model that somewhat reconciles different drivers and perspectives, is to consider context and 
typologies. Context, because one of the reasons different models appear to be validated (or invalidated) by 
different studies may be that some compliance drivers are stronger (or weaker) depending on the broader 
circumstances where they apply. Typology, because it may also be that different drivers apply to varying 
                                                           
374 Simpson et al. (2013) reach a somewhat similar conclusion in their assessment of crime-control strategies for corporate 
environmental crime: “First, both informal sanctions and command-and-control strategies lower the likelihood of corporate crime. The 
risk of corporate offending increases when there is not a credible legal threat or when one’s duty to behave ethically is not reinforced 
by colleagues or through fear of informal sanctions. Second, the deterrent capacity of these control mechanisms does not negate 
certain corporate or individual risk factors, which remain significantly associated with noncompliance. This suggests that current policy 
levers do not fully mitigate offending risks and may indicate that a one-size-fits-all policy is shortsighted.” (p. 267) 
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extents and with varying strengths to different types of people (or of groups of people). This is what we will 
now attempt to consider. 
As Kirchler (2006) puts it, the research on tax compliance has come into its own “as a research area within 
economics and economic psychology”, and studies have “considerably increased” over a few decades, but 
there is serious concern “since the results obtained in different studies are heterogeneous” (p. 1). The way he 
suggests to make sense of these (apparent, at least) contradictions is that “some heterogeneity in results can 
be reconciled by considering the relationship between the authorities and the taxpayer”. In other words, the 
drivers of compliance may be different (or at least have different relative salience) in a “cops and robbers 
climate” and in a “service for clients climate” (ibid.). In a climate of distrust, the primary driver will be 
deterrence, based on rational calculations – so compliance will occur only if detection and sanctions are really 
credible. In a climate of trust, social representations, norms and fairness perceptions will be the main drivers 
(pp. 1-3). From this, Kirchler proposes a model of three-dimensional representation of compliance, whereby 
the dimensions are compliance, power of authorities and trust in authorities (pp. 8-9). An enforced compliance 
approach will tend to succeed only if it can maximize power, a voluntary compliance one if it can maximize 
trust – and there is a significant amount of trade-off between the two, because “sharp undifferentiated 
control” and “severe punishment” tend to result in a sharp reduction of taxpayers’ willingness to comply 
voluntarily (p. 6). In other words, different findings e.g. regarding the effectiveness of deterrence activities, or 
of procedural justice aspects, may reflect at least in part different contexts375, in which ongoing relationships 
between administration and taxpayers have shaped certain attitudes and expectations376.  
Clearly, such aggregate differences also cover different types of compliance profiles within a given society – 
linked both to individual and social differences, resulting e.g. in differences in perceptions of fairness (p. 16). 
This results in different profiles, “motivational postures” as V. and J. Braithwaite have called them – ranging 
from “commitment” through “capitulation”, “game playing” and “disengagement” through “resistance” (p. 
17). As Kirchler points out, such findings strongly support the “responsive regulation” approach, which allows 
to tailor the type of response to the type of regulated person or entity, and to minimize the use of deterrent 
enforcement (thus minimizing the negative responses which weaken voluntary compliance). 
Another possible typology, proposed by Elffers and Hessing (1997) and taken up by Voermans (2014) 
distinguishes “conformist compliers” (“those who comply with rules only because they fear punishment”), 
“identifiers” (“comply with rules because they want to belong to a social group for which compliance is the 
norm”) and “internalisers” (“who comply with rules because they have made these rules part of their own 
world view”)377. These different types require different responses: sanctions are superfluous for the third 
group, and have an indirect effect on the second (serves to “maintain the social norm” by showing that 
infringements are punished). For the first group, sanctions can be effective but need to be “certain, quick and 
severe”, which is difficult to achieve – and may be counter-productive, as we have seen that systems which 
deploy an excessively harsh deterrence approach tend to weaken voluntary compliance.  
                                                           
375 This perspective is very important because it also suggests that it may be difficult to move from one approach (cops and robbers) 
to the other (trust-based). This is certainly what our experience in post-Soviet states suggests. Years of outright hostility from inspectors 
towards businesses have yielded a situation where gaming the system is the norm, trust is non-existent, and moving to a better 
situation is extremely difficult. The situation in these countries also strongly validates Kirchler’s concerns about how to “control the 
controllers” in systems based on distrust. Indeed, inspectors in such countries tend to abuse their powers routinely – and this is a risk 
in any system where regulated subjects are seen as suspects, and controllers vested with very strong powers (and few checks and 
balances). 
376 Taking also into account, as Kirchler emphasizes, that “perceptions” and “representations” (what people think about the authorities, 
the tax system etc.) are in practice more important than “what actually is” (p. 13) – and that what is fundamental is the overall 
“aggregate” of “knowledge, attitudes, norms, perceived opportunity, fairness considerations and motivational postures”, i.e. “tax 
morale” (p. 17). 
377 Voermans (2014) p. 57. 
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Gunningham (2010) lends additional support to such views by indicating the complex, intertwined workings 
of “normative” and “instrumental motivations”: many business operators “wrestled with the temptation to 
backslide when legally mandated improvements proved very expensive” and “many acknowledged that, in the 
absence of regulation, it is questionable whether their firms’ current good intentions would continue 
indefinitely – not only because their own motivation might decline, but because they resented others ‘getting 
away with it’” (p. 123)378. He also warns against the other downside risk, which may materialize when 
excessively harsh and “across the board” deterrence approaches are used – fostering a “culture of regulatory 
resistance”, and “being counter-productive as regards corporate leaders who respond badly to an adversorial 
approach” (even as it may be “effective when applied to the recalcitrant and perhaps to reluctant compliers”) 
(p. 124). 
It is difficult, of course, to estimate how many businesses or operators may belong to each category. Bardach 
and Kagan (1982), suggested a rule of thumb of 20% of “bad apples” and 80% of “good apples” (p. 65), founded 
on several studies and testimonies. In particular, they reported that a “study of housing code enforcement in 
New York City found that 65 percent of recorded violations were attributed to 12 percent of all multiple-
dwelling buildings” (ibid.). They also quoted the reflection of the WWII head of the Office of Price 
Administration in the US, Chester Bowles, that “20 percent of the regulated population would automatically 
comply (…) simply because it is the law of the land, 5 percent would attempt to evade it, and the remaining 
75 percent would go along with it as long as they thought the 5 percent would be caught and punished” (pp. 
65-66). The authors’ conclusion is that “the absolute and relative proportion of good apples is large, almost 
certainly constituting a sizable majority (…) with respect to most regulatory domains”. They note that “the 
absolute number of bad apples is also large” but that “ready recourse to coercion” and “uniform, specific 
regulatory prescriptions” that may be necessary for “bad apples” can, when applied to “good apples”, lead to 
a “considerable amount of unreasonableness” and unintended adverse consequences (p. 66).  
Building on these different but concurring views, it is worth adding that these typologies need not be 
understood as categories in which businesses, or people, can be ascribed permanently. Depending on the 
circumstances, the type of rule being considered379, the administration with which one is dealing, the same 
person may have very different behaviours, and could be categorized in one or the other group. This is even 
more true when considering a complex entity such as a business, where different workers and managers may 
be significantly different. If this perspective is correct, then indeed different findings may simply reflect 
different situations, and the “optimal” enforcement strategy would be one that seeks to combine all different 
drivers380, with careful attention to the risks of negative interactions between them, e.g. of deterrence 
weakening voluntary compliance. “Responsive” and “smart” enforcement would appear to fit best with such 
a perspective. 
 
Limitations of methods 
Science in general is difficult and, by definition, provisory and uncertain (radically so if we take Popper’s 
definition of science as being characterized by “falsifiability”). Social science and psychology are made even 
more difficult by the complexity of their objects, and the considerable difficulties involved in measurement. 
                                                           
378 See also ibid. the risks when excessively “persuasion-based” enforcement strategies “degenerate into intolerable laxity” (p. 125). 
379 As we have seen above in Yan, van Rooij and van der Heijden (2015 a), compliance levels differed strongly for three different types 
of rules, and this could not be explained fully by differences in probability of detection. Illustrations of this point are easy to come by, 
and it is frequent to find that the same person will have different attitudes concerning different parts of the traffic rules, or between 
the tax code and the prohibition of theft and murder, for instance. 
380 A related perspective is that of Badarch and Kagan (1982), whose model is fundamentally deterrence-based, but who acknowledge 
the number of adverse, unintended consequences of “pure deterrence”, and seek how effects could be achieved at lower costs, and 
with less adverse effects on compliance through deterrence-induced “resistance” (see pp. 96-97). 
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Kirchler (2006) points out many of these issues in relation with tax compliance: difficulty to measure evasion, 
different definitions of concepts, etc. He finds, in particular, significant problems with surveys, because of lack 
of correspondence between “respondents’ self-reports of tax evasion and officially documented behaviour”. 
He also points out the limitations of models, which inherently tend to reduce complex phenomena to a limited 
number of variables (p. 17-18). A recent major study looked at the “reproducibility of psychological science” 
and found that a large proportion of original findings could not be replicated (only 36% of replications resulted 
in a statistically significant effect that was similar to the original one – while in a number of other cases the 
results appeared to be somewhat similar, but not fully statistically significant etc.)381. As the authors 
emphasize, “how many of the effects have we established are true? Zero. And how many of the effects have 
we established are false? Zero. Is this a limitation of the project design? No. It is the reality of doing science, 
even if it is not appreciated in daily practice. Humans desire certainty, and science infrequently provides it. As 
much as we might wish it to be otherwise, a single study almost never provides definitive resolution for or 
against an effect and its explanation.” Accepting and understanding these limitations is essential (and, we 
would add, not always understood, both by scholars and by those who use their results). This is a very complex 
field of research, and one that is only a few decades old. Studies generally have a number of limitations, 
including size. Thus, rather than expecting total certainty, we should draw from this wealth of findings a 
nuanced view, with more frequently convergent results suggesting that some effects may be stronger or more 
reliable than others382. 
Putting too much faith in the result of one or a few studies is one risk. Putting too much faith in explanatory 
theories and models is another one. As Ariel Rubinstein, one of the founding fathers of game theory, himself 
wrote: “there are those who believe that the goal of game theory is ultimately to provide a good prediction of 
behavior (…) I am not sure on what this vision is based”. He adds, “then there are those who believe in the 
power of game theory to improve performance in real-life strategic interactions. I have never been persuaded 
that there is a solid foundation for this belief” (p. 634). He suggests, by contrast, that “the object of game 
theory is primarily to study the considerations used in decision making in interactive situations.  It identifies 
patterns of reasoning and investigates their implications on decision making in strategic situations.  According 
to this opinion, game theory does not have normative implications and its empirical significance is very limited.  
Game theory is viewed as a cousin of logic. Logic does not allow us to screen out true statements from false 
ones and does not help us distinguish right from wrong” (ibid.). This is an important reminder. Ayres and 
Braithwaite, in Responsive Regulation (1992), had an entire section (pp. 60-81) devoted to a game theory 
perspective of “tit-for-tat” and tri-partism. While they acknowledged the limitations of the model, Rubinstein’s 
words should serve us to take such models in general with caution383. They can be useful as explanations of 
what the authors think, and of logical interactions, but putting too much confidence in their explanatory or 
predictive power is fraught with dangers. Once again, we are led to a posture that is one of modesty: no 
explanation or model is likely to have all the answers, and trying to combine different perspectives may be a 
safer and sounder approach.  
                                                           
381 Open Science Collaboration (2015) – full text available at: http://www.sciencemag.org/content/349/6251/aac4716.full#corresp-1. 
Since the authors first screened the studies for which replication would be attempted, and only took those that cleared a number of 
quality hurdles, the percentage from all studies (taken at random) would be even lower.   
382 A good example of how scope and duration may produce interesting results that may not be visible otherwise is provided in Wittberg 
(2006). In the experiment he relates, the Swedish tax administration undertook a long-term campaign to strengthen “tax morale” 
through education, and regular (large scale) surveys to measure changes. The results appeared to be strongly positive – meaning that 
the fundamental social norms that are one of the foundations of compliance could be gradually changed (and that this could be 
measured). But such experiments have so far been very rare. Having more will require a substantial amount of time. 
383 One particular obvious weakness of game theory is its reliance on rationality – examples of real-life negotiations, such as those 
involving Greece and the Eurozone in the first half of 2015, show by contrast that actors are driven to a very large extent by ideological 
considerations and a variety of values. Had rational interest been the sole mover, and actors been entirely rational, the outcome of 




Looking for evidence 
Caution about the strength of studies’ results makes it more difficult to develop conclusions that may serve 
for further development of evidence-based policy making, and of evidence-based inspections and 
enforcement approaches in particular. If evidence is inconclusive, then deciding between competing views is 
hard. As we have seen, evidence is certainly not fully inconclusive. There appears to be many studies finding 
compatible or partly similar results, and ways to reconcile many of the apparently contradictory findings. Still, 
for all the reasons listed above, the foundation for evidence-based inspections, if it were limited to these 
different studies and models, would not appear to be as solid as we would wish it to be – and making any 
conclusions about, for instance, the effectiveness of risk-based inspections would be difficult. 
What we will undertake to do in the third section of this research (after concluding this theoretical section by 
looking at research on risk and regulation) is, precisely, to look for such complementary, alternative evidence 
basis. As Kirchler (2006) and others have pointed out384, the past decades have seen a number of inspections 
agencies (in the tax field as in others) transform their approach, moving for instance from a strict deterrence 
approach to a more “compliance-based” or “responsive” one. Some agencies have moved strongly in the 
direction of more risk-based inspections. Others, in the same or in nearby jurisdictions, have not done so.  
For all these reasons, we believe there is value in looking for evidence in a different way – not only through 
focused studies (which yield more details and better attribution, but have a number of problem, as we have 
seen), and rather by comparing practices and aggregate outcomes of different inspection systems. A first 
possibility is to consider changes over time in the same jurisdiction - and a second one is to compare across 
different jurisdictions. The first approach is possible when there is a clear change (or at least a strong inflexion) 
in practices over a well-defined period of time, and when data on practices outcomes is available for the same 
period. The second is feasible when two or more jurisdictions, which are otherwise sufficiently similar, present 
sharply contrasted inspections practices, and have data of good quality and adequate for comparisons. We 
will see when considering concrete cases (in the third section) that it has proven more feasible to find examples 
of the second case than of the first – but at this point we will limit ourselves to a few clarifications of method. 
When attempting to compare practices and outcomes between countries, or across time, the two parts of the 
comparison pose radically different problems. Outcomes, on the one hand, are relatively easy to define, at 
least for some of the major inspection functions: for instance reducing as much as possible occupational 
injuries and deaths, or deaths from food-borne diseases. The (considerable) problems stem from data 
reliability (often problematic, because of under-detection or under-reporting)385, and even more strongly from 
attribution: how much can the level of a given indicator in a jurisdiction, and its evolutions, be attributed to 
inspections practices, which generally have only a minor influence compared to economic, technical, social 
and cultural factors? Practices, on the other hand, pose far less problems of attribution – even though they 
may be shaped by a number of factors, our main concern here are not the causes, but the practices 
themselves. Measuring them is, to some extent, difficult, because data on targeting is not public in most cases, 
and because the “qualitative” aspects can of course vary considerably between different inspectors, localities 
etc. We will see that in practice this potential difficulty can be to an extent overcome because the differences 
between different jurisdictions are in certain cases so considerable that, at least in first approximation, the 
underlying nuances can be discounted. Remains attribution as the main problem. 
Here, there is certainly no perfect solution, and moving forward requires a set of assumptions. First, that while 
there are many factors influencing outcomes such as occupational safety and health, if all major known factors 
                                                           
384 See in particular studies in Elffers, Verboon and Huisman (2006) and in Parker and Lehmann Nielsen (2011).  
385 And also, frequently, from different data definitions, but these can often be overcome. 
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are relatively constant, and only inspections practices are known to be different (either across jurisdictions, or 
because they have changed), then one can tentatively posit that the differences in inspections practices may 
be the explanatory factor. When comparing across jurisdictions, this means taking as much as possible 
countries that are similar in most relevant respects (economic profile, social and political structure, 
technologies, even natural conditions, etc.)386. When comparing across time, it means making sure that none 
of these major factors have changed – and, because in most cases they have indeed changed (in particular 
technology, economic structure etc.), comparisons across jurisdictions are more frequently possible. An 
alternative, sometimes interesting approach is to take jurisdictions that are significantly different (thus making 
the comparison clearly imperfect), but have extremely contrasted inspections practices, and outcomes that 
are also different but in the opposite direction from what certain models would predict. This may yield 
important lessons about the need to refine or qualify such models. 
There is, of course, a major limitation as to what such comparisons can yield. Even if we were to have series 
of data long or large enough to calculate correlations (which is not the case, and we will thus not attempt such 
calculations), correlation is not causation. We cannot be claiming to prove, in any way, causation. Rather, what 
we are attempting to do is to find whether there is additional evidence that either aligns with what certain 
models and studies propose (and thus could strengthen their findings), or on the contrary lead to question or 
nuance some of them. What we hope for, is that the accumulated evidence may, without yielding certainties 
in any way, at least suggest fruitful directions for both research and practices. 
 
ii. Compliance promotion and discretion – legal questions 
 
Instrumental and expressive visions of the law – can tensions be resolved? 
These considerations on compliance promotion and the relative effectiveness of different approaches were 
made from a strictly utilitarian, instrumental perspective. Such an approach is well summarized by Hodges 
(2015), who writes: “the purpose of regulation is to affect behaviour and performance. The purpose of 
‘enforcement’ should be to address issues of behaviour and performance, not simply to impose sanctions in 
the expectation that they will affect behaviour” (p. 26). Hodges himself acknowledges that there are other 
principles and issues at play when considering enforcement (and tort law). Enforcement should “censure” 
certain actions: “it remains important for an ethical society, which supports people having respect for the 
prevailing moral norms, that certain behaviour should be declared to be socially unacceptable and to ‘deserve’ 
the imposition of criminal sanctions by the state (alone)218 as retributive censure for a wrongful act, and that 
some sanctions should be proportionate to the seriousness of the unacceptable acts” (p. 26). And tort can 
have a role for “securing compensation” (p. 3) – even though Hodges concludes it is highly inefficient at this 
task and should be generally replaced by administrative compensation systems (p. 7).  
The difficulty is first, of course, that it is not that easy to define which are the cases which are serious enough 
to “deserve” criminal sanctions – but there are approaches to this aim, combining risk assessment and intent 
of the actions, and we will discuss them in the third section. The challenge to such a viewpoint is more 
fundamental, and comes from those putting forth a fully different vision of the law, one which is anchored in 
different values. Hawkins (2002) refers to such approaches as reflecting an “expressive” conception of laws. 
Ashworth (2000) is one of their exponents, and defines it thus: “my conception of the criminal law gives 
                                                           
386 An example that we use in the third section is comparing Britain and Germany. Evidently, there are major differences between the 
two, but there also are major differences within them, between different regions and localities, which in some cases may well be 
greater than the differences in averages between the two countries. Economic structure, social patterns, etc. are all indeed different 




primary place to its censuring function (…) which should be exercised in as fair and non-discriminatory a 
manner as possible”. Scholars which consider the expressive value of laws as fundamental tend to take 
exception to the “responsive regulation” approach (and later approaches building on its fundamental vision 
of a need to differentiate the regulatory response). Yeung (2004), for instance, writes that: “the Ayres and 
Braithwaite model (…) overlooks the constitutional values of proportionality and consistency, which are 
themselves rooted in the right to fair and equal treatment”. What she identifies as the key tension between 
her perspective and the responsive regulation approach is that the latter adopts as “reference point the goal 
of effective future compliance, rather than the nature and seriousness of the defendant’s violation”. By 
contrast, Yeung (and others) consider that individual rights (to a fair treatment etc.) should take precedence 
over effectiveness considerations. She suggests that, in fact, the responsive regulation enforcement pyramid 
may conflict with “the requirements of procedural fairness” (which in addition would mean that, even from a 
utilitarian and instrumental perspective, the approach would have problems since it could weaken one of the 
compliance drivers).  
How much should we be concerned about such values-based concerns? We would argue here that some of 
the tensions can be decreased by looking more closely at how a compliance-focused enforcement approach 
works – but that not all tensions can be removed, as some fundamental divergences will remain. Looking more 
closely at Ashworth’s arguments, he in fact makes the case for his approach in the realm of the criminal law – 
not for all types of regulations. While in a specific context such as the UK’s many regulatory offences are indeed 
“criminalized” by statutes (but in fact rarely prosecuted, cf. Hawkins 2002 et al.), in most other countries the 
majority of regulatory offences is covered by lesser administrative penalties (reflecting differences between 
common law and civil law countries, to a large extent – even though administrative sanctions are being 
gradually introduced in the UK as well, cf. Tilyndite 2012 et al.). Ashworth states that he does not “suggest 
that the prevention of harm is irrelevant to criminal law: it remains significant as a fundamental justification 
for having a criminal law with sanctions attached”. He further suggests that the problem may be the over-
reliance on criminal law, whereas there are “a range of initiatives in social, criminal and environmental policy” 
that could be used for the “prevention of harm”. His recommendation is that “the aim should be to produce 
a set of criminal laws that penalise substantial wrongdoing and only substantial wrongdoing, enforcing those 
fairly and dealing with them proportionately”.  
These statements by Ashworth are not necessarily in contradiction with Voermans’s assertion that “rules and 
regulations that are not systematically observed are – in the end – pointless and futile. The overarching aim 
of all regulation is to have an effect on (social, economic, or institutional) behaviour” (2014, p. 42). The main 
difference may be that legal scholars who consider consistency and proportionality to be too fundamental to 
suffer “modulations” as part of a responsive approach would contend that inadequate criminal laws should 
be repealed, rather than enforced in a “flexible” manner. Proponents of an instrumental approach, by 
contrast, may contend that perfectly designed laws and regulations will never exist (even assuming that best 
efforts are made to improve them, the impossibility to achieve an “optimal precision” of rules has, as we have 
seen, been rather convincingly demonstrated). In such a universe of imperfect rules, where discretion is 
unavoidable, we should seek to structure discretion in a way that is as effective as possible. Effectiveness is 
indeed doubly important: first because effects are precisely what the rules are adopted to achieve, and second 
because if they are ineffective “the authority of the legal rules themselves may be compromised” (Voermans, 
ibid.). There is thus a values-based, rule of law case to be made for inspections and enforcement approaches 
that target improved compliance – because ineffective laws undermine the very idea of the rule of law387. 
                                                           
387 And, we would add, there are many examples of criminal legislation which have consistently and fully failed at their stated goals, 
and indeed produced major side effects that go counter to these goals, such as drugs criminalization – and remain nonetheless on the 
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Looking more closely, the is partly one of whether, and how, to apply discretion. If we accept that there is no 
“optimal precision of rules”, then discretion is unavoidable as rules will always require some interpretation, 
except if they are so narrow as to become essentially useless, and even counter-productive in many instances 
(cf. Diver 1983, Baldwin 1995). Even if one were to attempt and remove as much discretion from inspectors’ 
and other officials’ hands, judicial discretion would remain in considering cases. The question then becomes 
how to structure this discretion, how to “frame” it. As Bardach and Kagan (1982) put it, “while there are 
powerful (…) reasons for regulators to treat all regulated entities more or less “alike” (…) under certain 
conditions it may be possible to justify dissimilar regulatory treatment” to achieve “more reasonable 
regulation” (p. 92). 
There are, of course, scholars (and policymakers, judges etc.) who would contend that decisions can be made 
essentially “without interpretation” of the rules’ meaning, at least in most cases. A particularly famous 
proponent of this view is Justice Scalia of the US Supreme Court, who wrote in The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules that it is essential to avoid “uncertainty regarding what the law may mean” (Scalia 1989, p. 1179). While 
cautious to admit that there will always be cases where “legal determinations that do not reflect a general 
rule” cannot be avoided (pp. 1186-87), he nonetheless advocates for making decisions as much as possible 
that “adhere closely to the plain meaning of a text” (p. 1184). In spite of reading very pleasantly, and of some 
of its caution, we think Scalia’s “originalist” or “textualist” vision does not stand close scrutiny. Following Black 
(1997), there is good reason to think that rules are essentially “indeterminate” because of the limitations and 
nature of language, even before considering the questions of their anticipating situations while being unable 
to predict all future events, and of the social context through which their misleadingly “obvious” text has to 
be understood. Other scholars, commenting specifically on Scalia’s thesis, have shown its weaknesses. Strauss 
(2008) for instance writes that “he choice between rules and discretionary standards confronts legislators and 
regulators routinely. It also confronts judges, or at least Supreme Court justices. The Rule of Law as a Law of 
Rules is an elegant and appropriately cautious defence of the position that rules are, as a general matter, 
superior” but adds that “rules in constitutional law, like many other things in the world, are most often the 
product—the ongoing, unfinished product— of evolution” (p. 1013) – meaning that they cannot be derived 
from the “plain meaning” of the legal text. Solum (2002) takes a more radically critical view388 and writes: “The 
rule of law does not require a law of rules; nor does a law of rules guarantee the rule of law. The problem of 
judicial constraint is not that simple, and the strategies that are adequate to advance the predictability and 
uniformity of the law defy easy summary. The rule of law requires sound practical judgment by judges of 
integrity” (p. 23). 
Let us conclude this short discussion by acknowledging that tensions between conflicting views of the law, and 
of its enforcement, can certainly not all be reconciled. There will remain a side of the debate where the 
preference is for consistency and predictability, and which holds the discretion can be minimized, if not 
abolished. This does not mean that the instrumentalist vision of regulation advocates unbridled discretion, 
quite the contrary – but that it holds discretion for unavoidable, and thus considers that it is best addressed 
by embracing it, and trying to give it a transparent and predictable framework (to the extent possible). We 
would also argue that such a framework should also try and give some guidance on how to determine the facts 
themselves, for facts are often no more “obvious” than the meaning of legal texts389.  
                                                           
books. Thus, laws that are designed with a purely expressive approach, and without consideration for an instrumental perspective, 
tend to be deeply problematic. 
388 But definitely not because the author would be instrumentalist – he in fact writes about the “vice of instrumentalism” in judicial 
decisions (p. 23).  
389 The determination of facts is a problem more frequently addressed in a judicial perspective, but is in fact often a serious issue in 






Administrative discretion – theoretical overview 
In spite of the many real differences between different legal traditions and systems, we would argue here that 
to a first approximation all major jurisprudences allow for a degree of administrative discretion, and it is more 
a matter of how it is defined and bound, than of whether it exists. As Bardach and Kagan (1982) showed, even 
when an administrative agency purports to be enforcing very detailed rules strictly “by the book”, it is often 
impossible in practice, and “the needed flexibility, in such agencies, traditionally is attained by not enforcing 
the rules literally” (p. 37)390. Certainly, there are cases where officials and judges refer to fundamental legal 
norms that are country- or system-specific to justify or explain the refusal or reluctance to use certain forms 
of discretion (cf. Rothstein, Borraz and Huber 2013 for the specific example of France and Germany in relation 
to risk-based discretion). Similarly, we have heard from government lawyers in countries as distant as 
Mongolia and Ukraine that it was “impossible” to give discretion to inspectors to enforce certain norms and 
not others. The question of what discretion covers, and of what is allowed within it, is thus a relevant one. 
Unbound discretion leads to serious problems of lack of consistency (cf. Bardach and Kagan 1982, pp. 86-87), 
which are to be balanced against the benefits of flexibility. While we certainly cannot treat the issue here in 
its full depth and complexity, we will nonetheless attempt to set down a few markers. 
As Voermans (2014) writes, “the duty to implement and enforce laws is generally perceived as something 
required by the rule of law” but “although public authorities in the rule of law-based jurisdictions are under 
the obligation to implement law, and enforce it if necessary, they do not have total discretion in doing so. 
Implementation and enforcement activities generally need to have a basis in law as well, and the law itself 
sets conditions for implementation” (p. 46). In other words, the first limitation on discretion is one on how 
much the state authorities can do, how much power they can wield. This includes fundamental principles such 
as nulla poena sine lege priori (non-retroactivity of laws), lex certa (clear definition of what is prohibited) and 
proportionality (ibid.). While there are many countries where these principles (while they may exist on the 
books) are not respected in practice, there is no disagreement among scholars as to the legitimacy and 
appropriateness of these limits on discretion – what we could call “ceilings” on what state officials can do. 
Rather, what is cause for disagreement are the limits on how little the authorities may do without violating 
their duties, of what would be the “floor” on discretion. 
If one looks at practices, it is clear that there is essentially no case of absolute, full enforcement of any law – 
simply because means for enforcement are inherently limited. Even in the case of murder, for which Tyler 
(2013) points out that this is where deterrence can (at least in many countries) work most effectively (in 
principle) because elucidation rates are high (because society has agreed to allocate massive resources for 
each case), elucidations are clearly not 100%, and police resources are limited. This is even truer for other 
violent crime, and considerably more true for non-violent crime, and many regulatory issues. Thus, de facto 
the state exercises “downwards discretion” in not inspecting and enforcing “everything, all of the time” – 
because it would be impossible. One can also frequently observe that governments delay preparation and 
adoption of secondary legislation, in countries where it is absolutely needed for laws to function, in many 
                                                           
the naïve confidence of the “positivist” school having long been set aside (see e.g. Delfau 1978 on the evolution of historical thought, 
through positivism and away from it).  
390 Quoting a 1972 article by P. Schuck: “The inspector is not expected to enforce strictly every rule, but rather to decide which rules 
are worth enforcing at all. In this process, USDA offers no official guidance, for it feels obliged, like all public agencies, to maintain the 
myth that all rules are rigidly enforced” (in Bardach and Kagan 1982, p. 37). If such a picture has more general validity (which our 
experience suggests), then discretion is unavoidable, and trying to negate and repress it only makes it more arbitrary – acknowledging 
it openly allows, by contrast, to give it a clear, transparent, consistent foundation, for instance risk proportionality. 
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cases presumably because of lack of resources (both for drafting and for enforcement)391. If, in practice, “less-
than-complete” implementation of laws is commonplace, remains the question of whether it is legitimate. 
This, in turn, can be examined both through legal doctrine, and through the possibility (or lack thereof) to sue 
the government (or any agency reporting to the executive) for inadequate enforcement of a statute. 
At its root, the question is a constitutional one – and the very existence of an executive branch supposes that 
it has some power that is independent or at least distinct from the legislative one. In this sense, discretion is 
consubstantial to the existence of an executive power. Moving to specifics, however, the question appears far 
less clear-cut. It would reach far beyond the scope of this research to consider it seriously in a number of 
different constitutional and legal settings. What we will attempt to do is just give brief illustrations of why 
there is reasonable basis to consider that, in most contexts, there will be sufficient room for discretion in 
existing legal norms and principles to accommodate the enforcement practices that pertain to “risk-based 
inspections” and “smart inspections and enforcement”. Investigating in more depth to what extent, and 
through which legal means, this can effectively be done in each given jurisdiction will be a task for further 
research. 
In France, the question of administrative discretion corresponds to the “pouvoir d’appréciation” – which is 
foreseen by some laws, and not by others (or can be made necessary because several different principles are 
in conflict392). Administrative courts have the power to review administrative decisions (including, possibly, 
decisions “not to act”) – and the administrative jurisprudence of the Conseil d’Etat has established principles 
that define and limit (in some cases) the ways in which the executive branch and administrative bodies can 
exercise discretion. When the applicable law or other norm has vested the public administration with a “bound 
competence” (“compétence liée”) then there is no discretion – and the administrative courts will invalidate 
any administrative decision that did not strictly implement what the norm required. By contrast, when 
applicable law gives “discretionary power” (“pouvoir discrétionnaire”), the control by administrative courts 
will be more limited393. While in earlier times judges used to refuse to exercise strict review for decisions 
pertaining to an area of discretionary power, case law has moved towards a control of whether the public 
administration did not commit a “manifest error of judgement” (“erreur manifeste d’appréciation”), in other 
words a control that is not only of legality, but of opportunity394. Typically, administrative judges will defer to 
administrative decisions in cases that are highly technical. In some cases, judges apply a strict scrutiny, looking 
at whether the decision taken is overall proportional to the costs and benefits of the situation. In such 
situations (which, overall, are quite rare), judges in practice replace the administration’s discretion with their 
own395. In some instances, the Conseil d’Etat has done so in order to substitute a stricter or harsher decision 
to the administration’s relatively more flexible one396. From this short summary we can conclude that: (a) in a 
number of cases, administrative discretion indeed is present (basically, every time it is not excluded by the 
wording of the law) – (b) administrative case law takes into account cost-benefit and proportionality 
                                                           
391 This is relevant e.g. in France, where many laws simply cannot be enforced without the additional level of precision given by Cabinet 
decrees (and this duality is foreseen by the Constitution). Since most laws adopted by Parliament are the reflect of a strongly executive-
led majority, the frequently observed delays are not typically the reflection of political splits between Cabinet and Parliament, but of 
sheer overload (driven also by excessive legislative “production”). 
392 There is for instance a directly applicable constitutional principle of “reconciling the protection and valorization of the environment, 
economic development and social progress” (Tifine 2014, Second Part, Chapter 1, Section I – accessed on 30/8/2015 at 
http://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2013/08/21/droit-administratif-francais-deuxieme-partie-chapitre-1-section-
i/#.VeLnYtLS2zk)  
393 Cf. Tifine 2014, Second Part, Chapter 2, Section II, par. I – accessed on 30/8/2015 at 
http://www.revuegeneraledudroit.eu/blog/2013/08/17/droit-administratif-francais-deuxieme-partie-chapitre-2/#.VeLn4tLS2zk. In 
this latter case, in fact, a first type of error (“erreur de droit”) would be for the public administration to disregard the fact that it had, 
in fact, discretion.  
394 Cf. Tifine 2014, Second Part, Chapter 2, Section II, Par. II A 
395 Cf. Tifine 2014, Second Part, Chapter 2, Section II, Par. II B 
396 See e.g. Tifine 2014, ibid., sub-point (b) – and Eliakim (2013) (chapter Pour quelques centimètres de trop) 
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considerations, at least in a number of cases and (c) in some instances, administrative judges will overrule the 
public administration with their own discretion. Moreover, if we consider not administrative but criminal law 
instead (in the cases when regulations foresee criminal liability for some violations, which is decidedly less 
common in France than in the UK, for instance), the discretion not to prosecute is even clearer, and is a 
fundamental principle (“principe d'opportunité des poursuites”). When the public prosecutor is informed of 
facts that “constitute a violation”, the prosecutor decides “whether it is opportune” to either “initiate 
prosecution” or “initiate an alternative procedure”, or “to close the case” (Art. 40-1 of the Code of Penal 
Procedure)397. While there can be an appeal of this decision (to a higher ranking prosecutor), and while civil 
action is not excluded, this prosecutorial discretion is not limited – not initiating a prosecution is purely a 
matter of judgement. 
The oft-stated difference between “Continental” or “Civil Law” systems and “Anglo-Saxon” or “Common Law” 
systems, which in any event is generally a woeful over-simplification398, appears of little relevance to the 
matter of discretion, at least as far as the principles are concerned (the mechanisms of action and litigation 
being, evidently, country-specific). First, administrative discretion is grounded in the principles of comity and 
deference. The first “is the respect that a public authority ought to show for the work of another public 
authority”, and is in a way nothing else than “respect for the separation of powers” (Endicott 2015, p. 20). The 
second derives from comity will posit that “it takes some special reason for the court to interfere with [a given] 
decision maker’s answer to” the initial question at hand (ibid., p. 234). Deference requires to pay attention to 
the “legal allocation of power”, “expertise”, “political responsibility” and “processes”, four reasons for which 
the initial decision-maker may be in a better position to decide than the court (ibid., p. 234-235)399. In spite of 
this, however, there are situations when the “presumption of non-interference by courts” (ibid.) can be over-
ruled. This involves situation which are not defined as discretion but as arbitrary, abuse of power or unlawful 
exercise of power. Different criteria can be applied, which include: “fraud and corruption”, “bad faith or 
malice”, “use of a power for a purpose that is contrary to the statute” and taking into account considerations 
that are “irrelevant” to the purpose of the statute being enforced (ibid., p. 230). An alternative “check-list” 
includes: “error of law”, “irrelevance” (of matters considered in the decision), “absurd” decisions and “bad 
faith” (ibid., p. 239). The criteria are not unlike those used in France, including the “absurd decision” criterion 
which is similar to the “erreur manifeste d’appréciation”: “if the judges are able to say that no one in the 
position of the public authority could present the action in good faith as a genuine exercise of their discretion, 
then the judges can interfere (…) with no breach of comity” (ibid., p. 237). Deference applies to judicial review 
of decisions that are political in essence (e.g. budget decisions), which are either excluded (“non-justiciable”, 
e.g. an Act of Parliament400) or deserve “massive deference” – but it also applies to “administrative” decisions 
in the narrower sense, as long as the authority making them is vested with some discretion. The latter can 
arise from a number of situations: “express discretion” and “implied discretion” arise from the wording of a 
law that gives specific powers to a decision maker (either expressly giving discretion, or leaving the power to 
act or not open, i.e. giving it implicitly), while “inherent discretion” relates to a power that “is essential if the 
body is to carry out its role” and “resultant discretion” arises when the wording of a statute is sufficiently 
vague to require a substantial degree of interpretation (ibid., pp. 243-245). From a regulatory perspective, it 
is worth noting that courts “defer massively” to administrative authorities e.g. in matters of planning (ibid., p. 
                                                           
397 Accessed on 30/8/2015 at 
http://legifrance.gouv.fr/affichCodeArticle.do?cidTexte=LEGITEXT000006071154&idArticle=LEGIARTI000006574935&dateTexte=201
50830  
398 Of course, one should note that French Administrative Law is in fact very similar to Common Law in its approach: it is nearly entirely 
based on Case Law, and relies on sets of fundamental principles, rather than on written law. 
399 For an illustration of practical decision-making by courts on this basis, cf. Endicott 2015 p. 233.  
400 See on non-justiciability Endicott 2015 pp. 251-260 
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262) as well as towards prosecutors when it comes to the decision to prosecute or not (ibid., p. 266401). Hence, 
“typical” regulatory decisions (planning decisions by local inspectors, decisions to prosecute by HSE inspectors) 
are mostly covered by strong deference to the officials’ discretion. 
 
A concrete example of “discretion in dispute” 
We have seen that, in countries apparently as different as the UK and France, there are in fact quite similar 
principles at play when it comes to administrative discretion and possibilities of judicial review thereof. 
Deference is the norm, but there are exceptions to it, and principles for screening and reviewing are relatively 
close. This leaves us with apparently quite a solid basis for discretion, including the discretion not to act. Let 
us consider a final example, a more contentious one, to see if it can strengthen our findings. Recently402, 
President Obama decided to in a way sidestep Congress on immigration policy, due to the impossibility to 
forge a bipartisan compromise, and to act in this matter entirely on the basis of executive discretion. Not, 
however, the individual, prosecutorial “bottom-up” discretion of officials in charge of making case decisions, 
but structured, “top-down” discretion, through instructions from the Secretary of the Department of 
Homeland Security). The President (through his Secretary) did not, of course, instruct immigration agents to 
stop all actions against illegal immigrants – but he established “expansions of deferred action, with guidelines 
for when someone should be protected; and the new "clear guidance" enforcement memo, which lays out 
much clearer, and more restrictive, guidelines for when someone should be deported”403. This elicited of 
course sharp reactions from Republicans, and scholars on the conservative side of the ideological divide. This 
is, in several ways, an “extreme” case: first, because it corresponds to a very hotly debated issue, rife with 
ideology and electoral interests, and thus one where it can be expected that scholars on all sides will “push” 
their argument as far as they can. Second, because it relates to a “discretion-framing policy” that is particularly 
sweeping in its scope and strict in its guidance – and particularly in its guidance not to act. . 
Considering this, it is striking that, if we look at the arguments made against the policy, they are quite 
moderate and limited in substance (if not in tone). The Heritage Foundation’s John Malcolm (2014) thus starts 
by writing that the President has a “constitutional duty to enforce the law” that derives from the Constitution’s 
stating that “the laws be faithfully executed” (Art. II, sec. 3) – and that the Supreme Court “Court determined 
that the President must carry out all of the objectives and the full scope of programs for which budget 
authority is provided by Congress” (p. 2). He fully acknowledges prosecutorial discretion, but argues that this, 
“with respect to an executive’s enforcement duties is based on equitable considerations in an individual case 
or a small set of cases” – and “is designed to help achieve statutory objectives— which in this case would 
include promoting the integrity of the U.S. legal immigration system and deterring violations of our 
immigration laws—not to frustrate statutory objectives or to effectuate a change in policy” (p. 3). Thus, he 
argues, since prosecutorial discretion should be the exception (and aligned with the aim of the statute), the 
announcement that it will be used in a sweeping, systematic way (and in a manner that the authors sees as 
contradicting the statute’s finality) contradicts the law, and the Constitution. He goes on to acknowledge, 
however, the following: “this rationale may end up squeaking by in a court of law, assuming it is challenged by 
a plaintiff who is able to establish the legal requirements of standing” (p. 4). He adds in note the following 
explanation: “the Supreme Court held that the presumption against the reviewability of discretionary 
enforcement decisions can be overcome “where the substantive statute has provided guidelines for the 
agency to follow in exercising its enforcement powers” and that an agency might be subjected to a more 
                                                           
401 Endicott does point out that there were some variations in jurisprudence on the question of reviewing decisions to prosecute (or 
not), but the latest, prevailing jurisprudence is basically full deference. 
402 Starting from November 2014  




exacting standard of review if it “consciously and expressly adopted a general policy that is so extreme as to 
amount to an abdication of its statutory responsibilities.” Nonetheless, no court has ever invalidated as a 
violation of the Take Care Clause a non-enforcement policy premised on prosecutorial discretion” (ibid.). In 
other words, while in theory the Supreme Court considers that discretionary enforcement decisions could be 
reviewed, it would only be possible in an exceptional case (and would require that the plaintiff demonstrates 
standing, i.e. that they are being harmed by the discretionary action, which may not be easy). In short, even 
in the United States (where the Constitution as well as jurisprudence tend to limit the executive’s discretion 
in internal affairs), it appears that policies “framing” regulatory discretion would pass legal and constitutional 
muster, except in the most extreme of cases.  
Even Malcolm’s critiques, however little consequence they have in the end considering the case law he himself 
quotes, are not undisputed. Shoba Sivaprasad Wadhia, a scholar of immigration law and prosecutorial 
discretion issues, advances strong arguments against all of Malcolm’s views. She first describes in far more 
details the actual contents of the policy in debate, and notes that in fact the guidance specifically grapples 
with “the more complicated cases” and thus “permits the agency to go beyond a “one-size-fits-all” approach 
when applying its policy on prosecutorial discretion” (p. 106). She then emphasizes the economic impossibility 
of full enforcement: “the government has resources to deport approximately 400,000 individuals annually—
less than four percent of the deportable population” (p. 107) – which means that in fact full enforcement of 
the law is impossible, and that the practical choice is only between structured (and consistent) discretion and 
between individual (and inconsistent) discretion. She also demonstrates that the humanitarian basis for the 
new discretion policy has a long history, and that “One of the earliest documents used by the immigration 
agency (then called Immigration and Naturalization Service) was an Operations Instruction that allowed for 
“deferred action” (then called “non-priority status”) for noncitizens who could show one or more of the 
following factors: advanced or tender age; presence in the United States for many years; need for treatment 
in the United States for a physical or mental condition; and adverse effect on family members in the United 
States as a result of deportation” (p. 109) – i.e. criteria very close to today’s. Finally, she gives a very different 
summary of the case law, quoting the Supreme Court’s earlier recognition that ““[a] principal feature of the 
removal system is the broad discretion exercised by immigration officials. (…) Federal officials, as an initial 
matter, must decide whether it makes sense to pursue removal at all” (p. 112). She adds that the “Take Care 
Clause” in fact has been repeatedly understood by the Supreme Court to include “broad discretion” in 
enforcement (ibid.) – and that in fact the Immigration and Nationality Act specifically “prohibits judicial review 
for three specific prosecutorial discretion decisions (commencement of proceedings, adjudication of cases, 
and execution of removal orders), only reaffirming the delegation of prosecutorial discretion powers to DHS” 
(p. 113). It thus appears that, even in this most hotly contested field that is immigration law, prosecutorial 
(administrative) discretion is as essential as it is, essentially, enshrined in Constitutional law (and case law in 
particular).  
 
The legitimacy of discretion 
We have clearly not proven (if such a thing is even possible) that discretion in regulatory decisions, and 
particularly the discretion not to act, is possible and legitimate always and everywhere. There are evidently 
exceptions, limits, and ways in which this discretion is organized – and this will vary from one country to the 
next, with significant divergences between different legal traditions. What we think can be said with some 
confidence, however, is that regulatory enforcement policies (adopted by the executive branch) that organize 
how discretion will be exercised, including in providing guidance to individual officers on what violations can 
be “treated lightly”, are certainly not shocking innovations, or generally contrary to sound constitutional and 
legal principles (though they can be problematic in certain constitutional systems).  
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Accepting discretion as a necessary element of risk-based inspections and enforcement also does not need to 
mean that accountability is reduced. As things stand, in most countries, the majority of inspections and 
enforcement structures are usually accountable to the executive, and only through the executive to the 
legislative branch404. This is not changed by risk-based approaches, but rather they introduce an element of 
clarification regarding which criteria will be used to exert accountability. By publicizing a clear methodology 
to guide inspections focus, and to take enforcement decisions based on risk (such as the UK HSE’s Enforcement 
Management Model), an inspections agency clearly defines within which parameters it will exercise discretion, 
and how, rather than having the default situation of “atomized” discretion at the individual inspector level 
(which can, in practice, never be ruled out – an inspector can always decide s/he has not seen something, even 
if rules say it should be subject to a penalty every time, for instance). Moreoever, if inspection agencies define 
their goals and objectives in terms of public goods to be increased and/or risks to be reduced, they allow for 
far more meaningful accountability, since the executive (and, in turn, the legislative) can scrutinize whether 
the methods used have indeed allowed for maintained or improved outcomes, or not. 
It will be a task for future research to investigate how such policies can be designed, adopted and implemented 
in different jurisdictions – but we believe to have established sufficiently that they are possible and legitimate.  
In addition, there is sufficient evidence that minimizing discretion results in situations where efforts end up 
diverted to low-priority tasks, and/or in “minimal compliance” (Bardach and Kagan 1982, pp. 102-109). As they 
demonstrate, “going by the book” and treating every regulatory violation, no matter how small or 
inconsequential, exactly with the same attention, produces results that are not only “sub-optimal”, but can be 
downright negative, and undermine the very objectives of regulation. As they conclude, “such diversion leads 
managers and compliance specialists to denigrate the inspectors, to characterize them as ignorant and 
legalistic nitpickers, and to resist rather than cooperate with them” (p. 104). On this basis, we can now turn to 
consider the contents and practice of risk-based approaches that aim at making such discretion better framed 
– more consistent, more transparent, and more effective. Indeed, this last point is important – unbound, 
unmanaged discretion also has its pitfalls. As Bardach and Kagan show, the reliance on “traditional legal 
structure” and prosecutorial (and judicial) discretion largely resulted, in the years before the 1970s 
“tightening” of regulations and enforcement in the US, in a situation of “underenforcement” (p. 40). While 
discretion is important to “distinguish between serious and nonserious violations, between the basically well-
intentioned regulated enterprise (…) and the recalcitrant firm” (p. 39), there is also a serious downside risk of 
capture or simply excessively lenient approach (pp. 39-42). A well designed risk-based approach, we will argue, 
can offer a framework that allows the positive sides of discretion to operate, while avoiding or limiting its 
downsides. 
Finally, it is important to point out that the degree to which executive discretion (e.g. prosecutorial discretion, 
but also by extension prosecutorial discretion) is generally construed as legitimate depends on the legal 
tradition. Whereas both in the British and American tradition, and in the French and Roman one, there is 
deference to the opportunity principle (the executive and prosecutors may elect not to prosecute or otherwise 
enforce if it would not be opportune, i.e. would not support overall goals of public welfare etc.), the German 
legal tradition (and that of all countries that build on it) does not include this principle. There, by contrast, the 
principle of legality (Legalitätsgrundsatz) would suppose that every violation is equally prosecuted. While this 
does not really happen in practice, and thus the difference between legal traditions is not that stark in fact as 
it is in theory, it remains that the legitimacy of regulatory discretion will not be as easily established in 
countries where the legality principle is the norm as in others which embrace the opportunity principle. 
                                                           
404 Financial sector regulators, or other high-profile “independent regulators”, can be exceptions to this rule, but they are not the focus 






It is clearly difficult to conclude on a topic which presents such conflicting views and apparently contradictory 
findings. The large number of very valuable studies also makes it hard to do justice to the field. We will 
nonetheless attempt to do so, in order to provide an adequate basis for the consideration of evidence from 
the practice. First, we will return on the need to accept the complexity of compliance, and to look beyond 
simple models. Second, we will return to the “big picture”, and the consideration of outcomes. Finally, we will 
see that a “modest” vision of complementary, complex compliance factors is sufficient as a foundation for 
risk-based inspections, and that risk can in fact be a tool that allows to move beyond some of the apparent 
contradictions and challenges. 
 
i. A second look at “deterrence” studies 
 
Let us first look back at a couple of studies specifically considering “deterrence-based” compliance. Faure and 
Garoupa (2005) consider the limitations on deterrence in cases where fines may fail to be commensurate to 
the illicit gain for a variety of reasons, and where forfeiture (of illicit gain, or of wealth deemed to come from 
an “illegal source”, etc.) is introduced as a complement. Importantly, the authors underline that such 
“measures” also respond to the idea that “crime should not pay”, and not only to a deterrence logic (p. 280). 
They also see forfeiture of illegal gain as substituting itself to compensation payments in the case of “victimless 
crimes” (ibid.), and put in the perspective of “corrective justice” (pp. 289-290). They consider the legal 
frameworks for such practices, including the use of civil forfeiture in the US405, but considerations of 
effectiveness are based on models and assumptions followed by logical deductions – without any guarantee 
that they correspond to practice. The authors refer to “criminal lawyers” considering the deterrence model as 
particularly appropriate (p. 282), and to both economics and the principle of proportionality as requiring 
marginal deterrence, for which forfeiture of illegal gain can be a useful instrument, when combined with fines 
(the fines can be modulated based on the seriousness of the offence, while forfeiture provides a “baseline” 
bringing back offenders to the statu quo ante – p. 288). In fact, the authors themselves acknowledge that 
many criminals are (evidently) not being deterred (p. 283), but they do not really question the model. While 
many of their arguments of principle are convincing (e.g. regarding proportionality, ensuring crime does not 
pay etc.), these are values-based arguments. The effectiveness case for the deterrence side is unproven. 
In a 2015 paper, Bentata and Faure consider the evidence on the activity of Environmental NGOs (ENGOs) in 
France, through environmental cases litigation brought before the Cour de Cassation. They suggest that, in a 
context of limited inspections and enforcement resources (p. 5), ENGOs take up important cases (in terms of 
environmental damage) that would otherwise be left out – because the regulator is focusing on the higher-
risk, larger-size entities, and individual damage is too small to lead to private litigation. They further show (pp. 
6-7) that ENGOs focus on cases with a high impact on the environment rather than on “personal nuisances” 
                                                           
405 The civil forfeiture practice in the US has come under increasing criticism in recent times for the manyfold abuses it has led to, with 
weak rules of evidence and perverse incentives leading to police departments routinely abusing their powers. There is a growing, and 
increasingly bipartisan consensus that the practice should be ended – see e.g. concurring conclusions from the American Civil Liberties 
Union (https://www.aclu.org/issues/criminal-law-reform/reforming-police-practices/asset-forfeiture-abuse), the Cato Institute 





issues (ENGOs focus more on water issues, private cases on noise and soil, relatively speaking). ENGOs and 
enforcement through court cases thus appear as meaningful complement to state regulatory inspections (p. 
11), but again the question of effectiveness is not fully investigated. The authors show that, over time, 
defendants’ overall compliance rate with safety measures (as evidenced by court proceedings) has increased, 
following an increase in ENGO litigation, but this is at best correlation between two trends – and the fact that 
there is litigation suggests that this compliance was insufficient to ensure environmental protection. Thus, the 
ENGOs’ role appears potentially meaningful, but within a broader concept of deterrence which remains 
unproven, at least within the paper. 
Rousseau, in a 2007, considered closely a dataset on environmental inspections and enforcement in Flanders, 
which gives the possibility to look at correlations between compliance and inspections/enforcement more 
closely, particularly given the relatively long time-series, and the repeated inspections of each 
establishment406. The model used to investigate enforcement effects is squarely rooted in the “deterrence” 
vision (p. 2)407. Rousseau summarizes her findings as confirming the deterrence effect of increased inspections, 
but not that of sanctions. She discusses the fact that the agency uses sanctions relatively rarely, and that the 
level of fines remains far lower than what the legislation authorizes, i.e. the fully “enforcement pyramid” is 
not really being used (but the threat of the pyramid’s “top” is likely to be used – cf. pp. 8-11). On the 
interpretation of results, we feel like there are important points that could be seen differently from the author. 
First, she outlines factors increasing likelihood of inspection on p. 17 which, in fact, squarely show that the 
agency is using a risk-based targeting approach  - meaning that, if targeting is done well, one would precisely 
expect (i) a relatively high percentage of violations (which indeed is found) and (ii) some effect of inspection 
and enforcement visits (which, again, seems to take place). Thus, the findings may not really reflect the effect 
of inspections overall but of a targeted risk-based project. Second, and most importantly, the fact that the 
increased inspections programme seems to have an effect, but sanctions do not seem to have one, may 
suggest that the effect is not (or not entirely) linked to deterrence. It could very well be that the repeated, 
extended (longer duration of visits) interactions have allowed to increase the inspected businesses’ 
knowledge, and to build a trust relationship where persuasion has played a significant role. Finally, and 
relatedly, the fact that inspectors and courts do not use the full scale of sanctions available, and impose (when 
they do) sanctions that tend to be far lower than marginal abatement costs for major violations, again 
challenges the “deterrence” approach – this time in a “feasibility” perspective. One can assume that both 
inspectors and judges are not ignorant of the problem – but imposing massive financial sanctions on 
businesses, while it may increase the general deterrence effect (which may or may not a really important 
driver of compliance), would surely pose serious financial hardship to the sanctioned enterprises. This could 
in some cases put them out of business, or at least threaten their viability, and in the meantime make it even 
more difficult for them to invest in the required pollution abatement equipment. Thus, overall, while the 
finding that this specific inspections project was successful at increasing compliance appears robust, the 
reasons why it was so are probably more complex than suggested. 
                                                           
406 Two remarks are required. First, the group under consideration is a high-risk group, specifically targeted by the environmental 
inspectorate as part of a “project” – which translated into more than 3 inspection visits per entity and per year, on average (see p. 7), 
which is a very high number, and thus makes it difficult to assume that findings can be easily generalized. Second, the findings 
incidentally show the problems with the notion of “compliance”, because so many of the non-compliances are administrative rather 
than substantial (ibid.), i.e. are non-compliances without a direct environmental impact (and, for some, without even an increased risk 
of harm).  
407 The introduction includes a short literature summary. It includes a point on Nadeau’s 1997 findings that inspections and 
enforcement actions reduce the length of time spent in non-compliance, and that enforcement has a stronger effect. This is an 
extremely unsurprising finding, we would say, and very different from a conclusion on relations between enforcement actions and 
compliance overall. There is little doubt that, if you are inspected (maybe repeatedly) and sanctioned (again, possibly repeatedly), this 
is likely to push you to start putting yourself in compliance. The question is whether controls and enforcement actions are the most 




ii. Taking a more modest and nuanced approach 
 
While we have collected examples suggesting that the deterrence model is generally unproven, it is not to 
single out so much this factor, as because it has been the model used the most uncritically across many studies. 
Scholars investigating psychological drivers such as Tyler include deterrence, while suggesting that it may be 
weaker than e.g. legitimacy – but many deterrence-based studies barely acknowledge (and then proceed to 
ignore) other drivers. This conclusion by Parker and Lehmann Nielsen (2011) seems to us highly appropriate: 
“the range of factors that are hypothesized to influence compliance are so complex and interrelated that it is 
very difficult to holistically test them all, or even to clearly hypothesize how they interact and in what direction 
causation flows” (p. 6). Likewise, in their summary of contributions on “Effective enforcement of consumer 
law in Europe”, van Boom and Loos (2007) conclude to the importance of a multiplicity of complementary 
approaches. They challenge the idea that litigation against an infringing firm (even successful) necessarily leads 
to a change of behaviour (p. 6), and cover several examples of effective interventions based on information, 
informal pressure etc., rather than formal enforcement (p. 4). They also see merit, however, in systems which 
enable group action (with important nuances compared to US class actions – cf. pp. 5-10). Their concluding 
view is that self-regulation (with or without a state regulatory “backstop”) and public supervision and 
enforcement are complementary and not contradictory, and that group action can be a useful supplement to 
both (pp. 10-11), a view that would fit well with a view of complex (and evolving) compliance factors. 
In a 2007 paper, Voermans talked about the “aspirin-like effect of sanctions”, suggesting that (just like for 
aspirin or, say, homeopathy) many people will assert that “it helps”, without being able to explain why or how 
(and without, it goes without saying, scientific evidence thereof – cf. p. 59). He considers the problem of laws 
that “do what they are meant to”, of rules “that are functional”, as central (p. 57), but the question of what 
mechanisms lead from rules to behaviours as very much still unsolved. Indeed, while voluntary compliance is 
preferred, we know it does not always happen – conversely, while no one really doubts that enforcement has 
some kind of effect on compliance with rules, how, and how much, are other questions (p. 58). The assumption 
that more control and more enforcement will lead to better results has led to what he sees in the late 1990s 
and 2000s as a considerable increase in inspections and enforcement efforts, in particular on the part of local 
authorities – involving more professionalism, but also a number of new (previously unheard of) enforcement 
directions – all without much basis in evidence (p. 56-60). Rather than looking at the logic of motives behind 
compliance, these measures have followed an administrative logic – the more is done, the more it is expected 
to be effective. Voermans considers both large-scale, high-level data, and findings from psycho-social studies. 
Data first: quoting van Velthoven, he shows that the chances of being caught, and the potential fine, are so 
vanishingly small that it is impossible to plausibly explain widespread legal compliance based on deterrence 
(pp. 61-62) – even though, of course, in specific cases, targeted and focused deterrence may be effective on 
specific persons. Findings second: studies find that most people appear not to be motivated by the fear of 
sanctions (but by values), but that on the other hand they think others are motivated by calculation and fear 
(deterrence). One reading could be that we want laws and sanctions (and make them, if “we” sit in Parliament) 
for “others” – based on very much unproven conceptions of what drives behaviour. Another (not 
incompatible) reading is that compliance is complex, and that “we” may be in both positions, successively or 
at the same time: of complying because of values, or because of fear. Just as much as we cannot dismiss the 
fact that enforcement surely has some effect, it is clear that most compliance cannot be explained through 
deterrence. A vision of complementary compliance drivers, of varying importance according to contexts and 
groups affected, is the best we have. 
In addition, there are good arguments to be made that compliance should not be the only objective of 
enforcement activities and mechanisms, and that there are legitimate value-expression issues that should be 
178 
 
considered. We have seen how this is relevant in the case of illegal gain, for instance. Yeung (2013) stresses 
the importance of balancing the effectiveness considerations of “better regulation” approaches with 
“constitutional values, including transparency, accountability, due process and participation” (p. 3). She also 
cautions that many of the more “efficient” or “responsive” sanctioning and enforcement approaches proposed 
may conflict with key principles of criminal law (“censuring the wrongdoer”, sanctions entailing “serious 
consequences” and “moral stigma” – but also “procedural safeguards”). We have also noted above Yeung’s 
concerns about the tensions between proportionality and responsive regulation. All these are important, and 
valid – reminding that effectiveness cannot be the sole consideration. In fact, from a procedural justice 
perspective, we would argue that not properly considering these values would in the end probably harm 
effectiveness. This further reinforces the case for a complex and balanced vision. 
 
iii. Using “risk” to overcome (some) problems and tensions in models and theories 
 
As a transition to the next section, we would like to point out the way “risk” can be a powerful tool to overcome 
some of the tensions and problems in compliance theories and compliance-promotion models. As we have 
indicated above, risk-based targeting is quite possibly the reason why the environmental inspection project 
that Rousseau (2007) studied yielded rather convincing results. More generally, modulating inspections and 
enforcement approaches in relation to risk is an “ideal” complement to the responsive regulation approach, 
as Baldwin and Blanc (2007, 2010) have already noted. We see the relevance of “risk” as coming from two 
perspectives: a legal one, and an effectiveness one. 
On the legal side, risk can be an instrument on which to base the application of the key principle of 
proportionality, that Yeung for instance is worried can be harmed by a purely responsive approach to 
enforcement. In a risk-based approach, enforcement measures should always be proportional to the risk 
caused by the violation(s) found. The behaviour of the business operator, which is key in the responsive 
regulation approach, can be integrated as one of the risk dimensions, alongside the inherent hazardousness 
of the activity, and the severity of the violation. Thus, responsiveness remains, but on a foundation of risk 
proportionality.  
On the effectiveness side, whatever the combination of compliance factors and drivers, risk-based targeting 
can be a way to optimize the intervention. It should help minimize the intrusiveness of inspections and 
enforcement where they are little needed (thus rating well from a procedural justice perspective, and 
minimizing resistance to voluntary compliance), while intensifying contacts where they are most needed – not 
only from a deterrence perspective, but also from a “quality of the regulatory relationship” one (more time 
and attention on cases which need it, meaning also more advice and time to create trust where possible). At 
the same time, if the balance between different risk dimensions is properly done (i.e. targeting incorporates 
both probability of a violation, and potential severity of its effects), risk-based targeting can maximize the 
effectiveness of deterrence effects (by focusing this deterrence on where it will yield most results). Before 
considering practical cases, and how much these optimistic expectations hold up, we will now consider the 
existing literature on risk and regulation and what it can bring to our understanding of risk-based inspections. 
 
3.3. Risk and regulation – definitions, debates and issues 
 
a. Defining and measuring risk 
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If, as we have suggested above, risk may be a potentially useful instrument to overcome internal tensions and 
contradictions in compliance strategies, and to help give discretion a sounder foundation, we first need to 
have as much as possible a clear understanding of how to define, and measure, risk. Evidently, considering 
how polysemic the word is, and how widespread its use is in common language, narrowing down its meaning 
is not easy. Scholars who speak about “risk” in writings focusing on regulation and enforcement sometimes 
do it in a way that is very much open, not to say vague, and without a clear definition. Others, who research 
“risk” as their core subject, investigate its different meanings and perceptions among different groups, and 
the effects of these differences – and, in order to do so, they precisely need to leave the definition open (is 
“risk” what people perceive as such). By contrast, practitioners of regulatory enforcement have been working 
on building a definition that commands some consensus, in order to create a foundation for their work.  
Both of these aspects of risk are, of course, of interest for this research. The “open ended”, multi-faceted 
approach allows us to understand how extremely contrasted visions of what is “risky” or “dangerous” can 
coexist, and how they shape the emergence of regulations and regulatory bodies. Once we move to our 
assigned task of trying to assess risk-based inspections practices, however, we need to have a meaningful 
definition of what this means, one that is not “all-encompassing”. We will thus examine what it is that is called 
“risk” in the context of risk-based inspections. Because one of the important challenges is also how this risk 
should be measured and assessed, we will also briefly consider this question. 
 
i. Risk, hazard, compliance – from “risk as likelihood of violations” to the “two dimensions” of risk 
 
When considering research on regulatory enforcement, some of it appears to have a very narrow 
understanding of what “risk-based targeting” could be, equating it with targeting entities that are the most 
likely to commit violations. May and Winter (2012), for instance, write that “the enforcement literature is 
consistent in arguing that effectiveness is increased by going after the types of cases that historically have 
higher rates of violations” (p. 224). Though they add that there are also “other ways of identifying higher risk 
entities”, they do not list any. Equating “risk” with “likelihood to commit violations” is of course exceedingly 
simplistic, and assumes that all violations are equivalent in potential consequences – or that “risk” has no 
other meaning than “risk of violation”. Generally, looking at enforcement essentially from a “deterrence” 
perspective tends to lend itself to equating “risk” with “probability of non-compliance” (see e.g. Scholz 1994, 
pp. 426-427 for an example). 
Some other studies take the opposite tack, and suggest that “risk-based approaches” consider only the 
potential consequences of the damage, without really looking at probabilities of violations. This is how the 
following remark by van der Heijden et al. (2015 a) could be interpreted. Looking for an explanation of why 
Chinese inspectors seem to target precisely those that have the strongest voluntary compliance level: 
“another explanation may be that agents use a risk-oriented approach to enforcement, and prioritize those 
farmers and types of violations that could create the largest damage. Whilst such risk-oriented approaches 
make theoretical sense, there is a risk of an overly technocratic implementation and too strong a reliance on 
the heuristics underlying these approaches” (p. 13).  
By contrast Baldwin and Black (2010), who have closely studied how regulatory agencies define risk-based 
approaches, rightly start by clarifying that such approaches “walk on two legs”: “The key components of such 
[risk] assessments are evaluations of the risks of noncompliance and calculations regarding the impact that 
the noncompliance will have on the regulatory body’s ability to achieve its objectives” (p. 181). They also 
underline that risk-based approaches are a clear departure from regulatory visions based exclusively on 
compliance with rules: “the frameworks vary considerably in their complexity. All, however, have a common 
180 
 
starting point, which is a focus on risks not rules. Risk-based frameworks require regulators to begin by 
identifying the risks they are seeking to manage, not the rules they have to enforce” (p. 184 – emphasis ours).  
The summary offered by Baldwin and Black indeed matches the practice as we have also been able to observe 
it in many countries. A good example and summary is offered by BRDO’s 2012 Common approach to risk 
assessment, which distinguishes hazard from risk. Hazard (pp. 8-9) is the adverse effect that could arise from 
public welfare from given activities that are within to the regulatory body’s competence – and the severity 
and magnitude of this hazard need to be assessed as one dimension of the risk. The second dimension is the 
“likelihood of compliance” (pp. 9-10). The combination of these two dimensions allows to assign a level of risk 
to a given activity, establishment etc. Definitions used by the World Bank Group (2013 a) and the OECD (2014) 
make do without the reference to compliance entirely, and rather focus wholly on the notion of “adverse 
event”: “Risk should be understood here as the combination of the likelihood of an adverse event (hazard, 
harm) occurring, and of the potential magnitude of the damage caused (itself combining number of people 
affected, and severity of the damage for each)” (OECD 2014, p. 27). 
In other words, while It is relatively uncontroversial to point out that inspecting roughly every type or size of 
business establishment equally is unlikely to yield optimal resource allocation (cf. Kagan 1994, pp. 409-410), 
it is not as easy to agree on which criteria should be used to measure risk, as this first requires to agree on a 
definition of risk. Our own experience working with inspectorates in former Soviet countries shows this to be 
one of the most difficult and essential questions – getting agreement on the fact that risk-based targeting “in 
general” would be better than no targeting is relatively easy, but disagreements arise when trying to define 
what risk-based targeting means.  
 
ii. Several visions of risk – strengths, weaknesses and challenges 
 
As pointed out, the notion that “risk” is the combination of the likelihood and potential magnitude of damage 
caused by an adverse event is not self-evident, nor is it universally accepted, even though it corresponds to 
what inspectorates and regulators claiming to have a “risk-based approach” generally understand under this 
term. There are at least three ways to conceive risk from a practical perspective, in terms of business 
establishments or objects of inspections: 
- Probability of non-compliance with applicable regulations 
- Relevance of the type of establishment to a specific “risk type” that is seen as an important priority by the 
government or administration 
- Combination of likelihood and potential magnitude of hazards that can be caused by the specific type of 
establishment, be they measured through statistical work or through more “qualitative” experience and 
practical insights. 
These three ways of defining (and thus of assessing) risk all have their own legitimacy, but are unlikely to yield 
similar results. They tend to be dominant in different countries or institutions, and/or to be supported by 
different groups, linked not only to different worldviews but to different interests. Rothstein, Borraz and Huber 
(2013) showed how “risk-based approaches” (in the sense of “proportionality of regulatory response to the 
likelihood and potential magnitude of hazard”) have had difficulty to emerge in France. A different way of 
phrasing the same would be to say that, in France, “risk” conceptions tend to correspond to the second type: 
priority areas determined (based on a variety of factors) by the government and/or public administration. We 
will shortly discuss here some of the most salient issues pertaining to each of these visions of “risk”. 
 
Risk as “likelihood of non-compliance with regulations” 
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Focusing on the risk of non-compliance with regulations is the approach that may seem most correct from the 
perspective of an expressive use of the law, and supported by many regulators and scholars408. Laws are to be 
complied with, the executive branch (and its regulatory agencies) are there to implement these laws, and thus 
inspections should aim at identifying, punishing and deterring non-compliances of all kinds. “Risk” is thus 
nothing else than the risk of someone not complying with norms. It is worth nothing that this tends to be the 
prevalent understanding of “risk” in former Soviet countries, and when inspectorates there are required to 
adopt a “risk-based approach”, and if there is no further implementation follow-up to ensure they consider 
harm rather than violations, this is the one they generally follow. 
Such an approach, however, has practical results, if it is followed by an inspectorate. In the former Soviet 
examples we have observed, for instance, when developing criteria to classify establishments in different risk 
categories (and subsequently plan inspections prioritizing “higher risk” ones), inspectorates start by defining 
“high risk” as “more likely to infringe rules”. This is generally done without consideration to the importance or 
relevance of these rules, or to the magnitude of the potential negative impact of infringements. Since non-
compliance is seen as a risk per se, it does not matter what type of rule is infringed, or.to what degree. This 
results in considering smaller businesses as systematically higher risk (non-compliances, though often minor, 
are most frequent there, because of lower resources and expertise), and in a focus on high-volume activities 
such as trade, catering etc. – where, again, non-compliance tends to be frequent but usually minor in terms 
of effects on public welfare409. 
In theory, one could develop a more sophisticated risk-based planning approach from a “legal compliance” 
perspective, using the type of sanctions that can be incurred as a proxy for the seriousness of the offences. 
However, this would be complex to implement seriously (classifying all infractions recorded, analysing where 
the most severe are found, etc.). More importantly, one cannot assume that the legislator  had a full technical 
understanding of the field being regulated, and insight into what activities would potentially create the highest 
threats. Thus, the classification would likely remain sub-optimal in terms of achieving useful social 
outcomes410. Finally, simply because there is a vast number of regulations and potential infractions, it is not 
unlikely that most businesses would end up being “high risk”, because many (however minor) violations can 
be found in most establishments411. Since the purpose of a risk-based classification is targeting, this would 
defeat its purpose, as the “target” would be too broad. 
Experience in the FSU shows that this is indeed what happens when risk criteria are developed in this spirit 
(and this is made even more obvious because the regulations there lack focus and are over-detailed and over-
prescriptive ). In Ukraine or Kazakhstan, for instance, risk criteria for inspections developed by the 
Standardization agency ended up classifying the vast majority of wares as “high risk”, regardless of whether 
any injuries or deaths were ever recorded as a result of their use. 
                                                           
408 See May and Winter 2012, Scholz 1994 for instance – an approach that puts compliance with legal norms as the key objective is 
congruent with the centrality of equal treatment before the law expressed e.g. by Yeung (2004, 2013). 
409 Though Baldwin and Black (2010) rightly point out that, in some cases, there can be a “huge cumulative effect of particular types of 
compliance failures across firms” that the harm-based vision of risk may underestimate (p. 203). In the cases we have observed, 
however, the disproportion between the means employed and the pettiness of problems addressed was generally striking. 
410 On the limitations of rules see e.g. Baldwin 1995, Black 1997. 
411 This is a contentious and clearly unproven assumption but there are some pointers suggesting it may be correct. Even in the UK, 
where efforts are clearly being made to (a) reduce the overall “regulatory burden” (whatever one may think of whether this expression 
is appropriate) and (b) inform businesses about rules, regulatory agencies generally target bringing most businesses to be “broadly 
compliant” rather than “fully compliant”, an objective they consider to be as impossible as it would be relatively useless (again, 
considering the vast number of rules and the fact that many of them are of little significance). In former Soviet republics, we have 
repeatedly heard from both businesses and inspectors that, if an inspector wants to find violations, s/he will find them, considering 
the myriad of confusing norms. Hawkins (2002) as well as other scholars having studied in details “enforcement styles” all concur that, 




“Politically prioritized” risk 
Relying on risks as prioritized by political programmes (or by political, elected office-holders in general) can 
also claim to have a legitimacy, i.e. the political one (clearly a stronger claim in democratic regimes than in 
authoritarian ones). In this perspective, the executive branch is legitimate to prioritize hazards that it sees as 
more important. This is articulated in some EU countries (e.g. by some in France) to justify having inspecting 
agencies directly subordinated to ministers, and receiving direct instructions from them that “interfere” with 
their usual planning. The justification is that ministers (owing their positions to elections) are more responsive 
to citizens’ concerns, and that this responsiveness is essential412. 
In the former Soviet context, such “responsiveness to citizens’ concerns” is not absent, even where elections 
are not free – since even in authoritarian regimes, keeping the majority “not overly dissatisfied” is important 
for stability. Ministers or presidents frequently interfere with planning by inspection agencies – sometimes for 
reasons that correspond to real public concerns, but often for other reasons than safety (e.g. to increase 
government revenue, or target businesses associated with rival politicians, etc.). We saw, for instance, the 
President of Tajikistan ordering different agencies to inspect all gas stations, because (supposedly413) of some 
concerns (supposedly) with fraud, and with price increases. 
The problem is that very often, instead of responding to a “real” issue414, these are sequences whereby 
politicians “spin” some incident reported by the media, focus on it and proclaim a “strong” regulatory response 
as a solution – without the problem having been analysed, and without knowing whether inspections can in 
any way improve it. There is neither analysis of the real risk level , nor of the response’s adequacy. In this 
perspective, politically-driven inspections have been conducted in Tajikistan to “respond” to increases in fuel 
prices (gas stations inspected), in Mongolia during discussions about foreign investment in mineral extraction 
(mines inspected), etc. None of these, of course, made any difference to the real issue. In theory, of course, 
such “politically-identified” risk approach could be genuinely responsive to the “perceived risk” (as defined by 
Slovic et al.415) of the majority of the voters – but it appears that, in both democratic and authoritarian 
countries, it is more often used as a way to divert attentions from problems the government is failing to solve, 
and give the illusion of action. Generally, the evidence available strongly supports the case to make regulatory 
delivery agencies more independent from direct political supervision – and the definition of “risk” independent 
from political intervention. 
 
Risk defined, and assessed, in relation to probability and degree of harm 
In contrast to the first two approaches, defining risk as the combination of the probability and the possible 
magnitude of adverse outcomes is more of a “technical” (or “technocratic”) view. It is based (as much as 
possible) on science, but in the end assessments, classifications and prioritization are done by “technical 
specialists” rather than scientists – and risk-based approaches have to make assumptions where there is 
scientific uncertainty416. Risk is defined as what can create harm (to life, health, the environment, etc.417) – 
                                                           
412 This “responsiveness” is precisely what is seen by advocates of “risk acceptance” as a problem. What one side calls “responsiveness 
to citizens’ concerns”, the other calls “risk regulation reflex” (see next section on discussions of risk and regulation). 
413 While fraud in gas stations was certainly a concern, few believed that the inspection campaign would decrease it, but rather it was 
seen as a fig-leaf for more rent-seeking for inspectors and their supervisors. 
414 I.e. one that would be confirmed as really significant by examination of data. 
415 See Slovic et al. 1981, 2002. 
416 See next section for a discussion of the issue of uncertainty in relation to risk and regulation. 
417 “Harm” is not limited to physical issues – it can be financial/economic (loss in state revenue, market distortion, etc.). 
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and the risk level is proportional to how likely such harm is to occur, how severe it may be and how many 
people it would affect (or what would be its scope in environmental or financial terms etc.).  
In this perspective, inspections should be targeted at the establishments where the combined likelihood and 
potential harm is greatest, which means not just greater frequency of inspections, but also “deeper” 
inspections, with more time spent on site, more qualified staff involved etc. In the third part of this research, 
we will be examining the available empirical evidence of the effectiveness (or lack thereof) of such approaches. 
Thus, we will for the moment set aside the first challenge to such approaches, whereby opponents of “risk-
based inspections” suggest that it amounts to “regulatory surrender”, and results in excessively weak 
enforcement418.  
If we set aside this question of effectiveness, there remain two major challenges in implementing such a 
system based on “actually measured/assessed risk to public welfare”: a technical one (how to get relevant 
data and how to plan in practice) and a legal one (is it legally acceptable to thus focus and “willingly neglect” 
what is considered as “lower risk”). Both challenges have been raised both by scholars and in practice. 
The legal principles argument against risk-focus and risk-proportionality is related to the challenges made 
against “responsive” approaches, and rests on the idea that risk-based approaches may break equality before 
the law, which is a fundamental principle (see e.g. Yeung 1984 pp. 82-83, 87). While we have discussed this 
argument already in the context of compliance models and discretion, it is worth restating here that, to us, 
this is not really a tenable position when considering actual practices rather than theoretical models, at least 
in the vast majority of cases. Indeed, “non-risk based” inspection approaches do not show less disparity in 
inspection frequencies, criteria used by inspectors, enforcement decisions etc. in most cases (see Blanc 2012 
pp. 21-27 for some examples – interviews with both businesses and officials in France suggest disparity of 
inspectors’ approaches and decisions, and disparities in targeting, are very significant issues)419. Thus, risk-
based approaches should not, in our view, be appraised against an “ideal type” of entirely unbiased 
inspections, but against a reality of inconsistent and sometimes incoherent practices. Rather than introducing 
bias, risk-based approaches can thus be seen as introducing an organizational principle in practices where 
“equal treatment” does not exist anyway420. .  
As for the technical implementation challenge, it has two key elements: 
- What parameters should the risk classification be based upon, how to measure them, and how to then 
“rate” establishments according to these? 
- How to turn these criteria and rating systems into a functioning planning tool, in particular how to get the 
relevant data on establishments and manage it? 
There is a trend to base risk analysis, criteria development, ratings etc. on sophisticated “data mining” 
techniques, using statistical tools to determine “objectively” (though the selection of the parameters being 
analysed is never purely objective) the most relevant parameters and thresholds. This approach is most often 
proposed for tax inspections planning (see e.g. chapter by Vellutini in Khwaja,  Awasthi and Loeprick 2011) – 
and is most applicable in their case, as tax and accounting data are suited to processing through such tools. 
In practice, deploying such approaches is often simply impossible, or extremely difficult. As Baldwin and Black 
(2010) point out, regulators may be “dealing with low frequency events from which reliable probabilistic 
                                                           
418 See e.g. Tombs and Whyte 2010 with precisely this title. 
419 See also Badarch and Kagan 1982 pp. 67-69, contra Yeung, on the many unintended and negative consequences of an excessively 
rigid adherence to “equal treatment”, “impartiality” and “objectivity” if they are not balanced by other principles. 
420 The same remarks could be made about the problems of consistency and transparency noted by Baldwin and Black (2010) in some 
examples of implementation of risk-based approaches (p. 204) – while their points are perfectly valid, we would still argue that risk-
based approaches should be compared to “actually existing alternatives” rather than to “perfect models”. 
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calculations cannot easily be drawn or with conditions of uncertainty in which the risk is inherently 
insusceptible to probabilistic assessment” (pp. 184-185). Even when the issues regulators deal with (say, food 
safety) could in principle lend themselves to data-driven approaches (because contaminations, outbreaks etc. 
are frequent), the quality of data makes it frequently impossible in practice (because detection of 
contaminations depends on reporting by and testing of patients, which rarely happens, and leads to 
considerable under-detection and bias). In addition, even when it comes to the data that inspectorates 
themselves could hold, the relevant data on establishments and inspections results is either unavailable in 
consolidated and computerized form, or incomplete and inconsistent. This is not just the case in the poorest 
countries of our sample (such as Tajikistan, where no data is yet computerized, except for tax data of the 
largest taxpayers and the main cities), but in middle-income countries such as Ukraine or Kazakhstan (where 
some data is available, but incomplete, often inconsistent etc.) – and for many inspectorates in the EU, even 
among its richest members (data might exist but not consolidated, or may be in numerous incompatible 
systems, etc.). Thus, in practice, such statistical analysis as the “pure” foundation of risk-based planning is not 
a feasible option.  
In practice, there exists a workable alternative way to develop such rating systems, far less statistically 
rigorous, and thus introducing more bias and discretion. The essential parameters of risk for a given “sphere” 
of regulation and control (e.g. “food safety” or “building safety”) can be determined by a group of experts 
(scientists and practitioners) based on (a) the existing state of science, (b) practice and experience around the 
world and (c) experience in-country (even if summarized more in a “qualitative” than strictly “quantitative” 
way) as well as (d) available data on the issues being supervised (whatever its limitations). If done properly, in 
our experience, the main parameters will often be agreed upon relatively easily, be rather consistent across 
countries, and effectively correspond to actual risks “on the ground”. For instance, in the food safety sphere, 
key parameters to classify establishments according to risk tend to be: (i) type of products processed, (ii) types 
of processes used, (iii) volumes, (iv) specifics of population served, (v) prior history and track record. This 
corresponds to the combination of “inherent risks arising from the nature of the business’s activities and, in 
environmental regulation, its location” and “management and control risks, including compliance record” 
(Baldwin and Black 2010, p. 184)421.  
In the absence of “data mining”, rating and ranking based on these parameters is subject to improvement and 
refinement through a “trial and error” process. The group of experts developing the rating instrument will 
affect scores to different parameters (corresponding to different types of processes, different sizes of 
establishment etc.), then define overall score thresholds for classification as (e.g.) “high”, “medium” or “low” 
risk422 –based on practical experience and outside examples. The thresholds’ levels have to ensure that 
establishments with only minor risk factors end up as “low”, those with several critical risk factors end up as 
“high” etc. It is then crucial to test and adjust these scores and thresholds: the risk criteria are tested against 
real-life cases of establishments. If obvious aberrations occur, the scores and/or thresholds are modified. Once 
the system is in use, adjustments may occur if too many, or too few, businesses end up in “high risk” and 
“medium risk” categories. These categories are to be used to selectively allocate limited inspection resources, 
so the risk classification should look like a pyramid, with more in “low”, less in “medium” and even less in 
“high”423. 
                                                           
421 A variation of this is to consider “inherent risks” as linked to the type of activity and its size, “vulnerability factors” that can increase 
inherent risk (e.g. location, populations affected), and “track record”. 
422 Three categories of risk being the minimum, and in our experience usually a sub-optimal number. Baldwin and Black (2010) rightly 
remark that the number of risk categories varies greatly. See BRDO (2012) for one example of “more than three but not too many”. 
423 A key “reality check” is to compare the risk categories thus created to relevant statistics on hazards affecting the country, when 
possible), otherwise absurdity can ensue. E.g. in Kyrgyzstan hairdressers were classified uniformly as “high risk” due to old Soviet-time 
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Implementing these criteria for actual planning is often another challenge, because it requires consolidated 
data on establishments and software to use it. Research has shown that not only are consolidated databases 
with adequate information rare in developing countries and transition economies, but also in many agencies 
of OECD countries (cf. Blanc 2012). Some of the challenges involved in setting up such systems are: 
- Collecting the information initially to create a database; 
- Setting up a mechanism to update this data constantly; 
- “Pooling” data across inspectorates to improve efficiency and effectiveness. 
The overall take-away from the experience in designing risk-based rating and planning systems is that this is 
feasible if one moves away from a “statistics-based” approach and adopts a more flexible one, which 
incorporates generally available scientific finding, aggregate data, lessons from the practice etc.. The difficulty 
is then mainly in the implementation, which requires data and information management. While such 
approaches may appear excessively “unscientific”, the point is again to question to what practices they should 
be compared. When put against a complete absence of targeting except by the whim or hunch of individual 
inspectors or managers, or very crude approaches based only on individual experience of seasoned inspectors, 
such imperfect risk-based approaches are considerably more evidence-based and consistent. 
 
An “alternate account”? “controlling harms” through “projects” 
At least one author has somewhat challenged the terminology of “risk” altogether, and proposed an alternate 
account of what “control” work is about, and how to improve it. Sparrow (2008424) deliberately avoids the 
word “risk” and prefers “the word “harm” for its freshness and for its generality, and for the fact that scholars 
have not so far prescribed narrow ways to interpret it. I’d like to find a way that covers the broadest set of bad 
things.425” In practice, the use of “risk” is probably far more flexible than Sparrow suggests, and for all intents 
and purposes his use of “harm” is not very different from what we have named above “adverse effect”. In fact, 
many of the definitions of “risk” in a regulatory inspections context in fact use the word “harm” (risk being 
equivalent to the combined likelihood and potential magnitude of harm). This being clarified, let us consider 
what Sparrow has to say about both harms and risks. 
His primary concern is that broad terms such as “risk” cover a number of different “operational challenges”, 
and that these are insufficiently investigated. First, there are both probabilistic risks, as well as current or past 
problems426 – and, in most cases, regulators have to deal with both types, but they involve different 
“operational challenges”. In addition, there can be many levels at which “risks” or “problems” manifest 
themselves and, in Sparrow’s view”, the “literature seems to have gravitated to the highest levels and to the 
lowest levels of aggregation, with less attention (so far) paid to the messy, complex and textured layers in 
between427”. This is the core of Sparrow’s argument – that the actual operational level has been mostly 
forgotten. He sees risk perceptions research (e.g. Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1979) as helping us to 
understand reactions, decisions and behaviours at the individual level – and “at the opposite extreme – the 
highest levels of aggregation – risk analysis helps us navigate the complexities of macro-level resource 
allocations for risk-control, and helps us evaluate the costs and benefits of various macro-level 
interventions428”. Let us consider his views and recommendations for the intermediate, operational level. 
                                                           
rules (and rent-seeking considerations), even though no health statistics backed this up (note: see chapter 1 on the roots of this 
classification in the Stalin era). 
424 See also Sparrow 2000. 
425 Location 285, Kindle edition. 
426 Ibid.  
427 Location 307, Kindle edition. 
428 Location 331, Kindle edition. 
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In Sparrow’s perspective, “it is practitioners, not theorists, who need to know how to navigate the textured 
substructure of any general risk. It is they who have to know at what level of aggregation (…) to define a new 
project, and how many knots (harm-reduction projects) to take on at any one time. It is they who have to 
construct the data gathering practices and analytic lenses that enable them to spot the knots (risk 
concentration).429” His approach is one that squarely focuses on operational practice.  
Some of the key challenges he identifies on the way to harm-reduction are linked to the nature and 
characteristics of specific harms: some “have a brain behind them” (involving authorities in a “game of 
intelligence and counter-intelligence”), some are “essentially invisible, with low rates of reporting or 
detection”), some correspond to powerful performance incentives, others are rare but potentially 
catastrophic430. These different challenges, to be properly addressed, require a set of methods and approaches 
that Sparrow covers in the second part of the book.  
Another critical question is that of measurement – which, as we have seen above, is highly problematic. He 
points out the inherent tension between regulatory enforcement work that is mostly organized around 
“functions”, “programs” or “processes” – and the need to give a “compelling account of harm controlled”431. 
Moving from reporting on outputs to reporting on outcomes can be mandated from above, but achieving it is 
far more difficult. It involves solving the questions of causality and attribution, as well as whether “it is possible 
to measure prevention”, “accidents that didn’t happen”432. Sparrow’s contention is that it is in most cases 
practically impossible to prove causality, but that changing the way work is organized and performance is 
reported can allow to make a convincing case based on “the contributing micro-level outcomes: the stories of 
the projects433”. While such a method will definitely not be “scientific” and will not “prove” causation, by 
building accumulated convincing micro-success stories, and as long as they “constitute significant progress 
towards important strategic objectives”434, it will make it far easier for the organization to make a strong case 
for its effectiveness. 
Without doubt, Sparrow’s work is important, and it is influential among practitioners, because it focuses on a 
level of “operational challenges” that has generally been under-researched. His central recommendation in 
operational terms is to focus on “unpacking” aggregate harms and identify “knots”, causalities, patterns, and 
structure interventions on this basis, i.e. by “projects” rather than through fixed functional structures. From 
our perspective, his emphasis on practice, and his suggestion that convincing patterns of effects may be more 
realistic than absolutely scientific attribution are clearly relevant. On the whole, however, we would not say 
that Sparrow’s vision really is an “alternate account” of risk-based planning and risk proportionality in 
inspections and enforcement. Rather, it gives inspection officials very useful directions on how to make sense 
of problematic patterns, how to design more “creative” interventions.  
Not only is our research focus at a somewhat more “aggregate” level, but we also believe that Sparrow’s 
insights are best applicable within organizations that have already moved to a risk-based approach. His 
recommendations will then improve effectiveness, review organizational structures, put the question of risk 
(or “harm reduction”) at the centre of operational decisions in practice and not just in theory. Thus, while we 
consider these insights as sufficiently important to cover them in some details here, we will make limited 
references to his work elsewhere in this research, as it mostly relates to the question of operational 
implementation within the context of an already “risk-focused” agency. 
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b. Dealing with risk: precaution, risk aversion, risk proportionality 
 
i. Risk aversion and crisis-driven “panic” reactions 
 
Introduction and definitions 
In many areas of life, consciously or not, citizens rely on rules and regulations protecting them, and on these 
regulations being effectively complied with and enforced. Such expectation of protection underpins the trust 
in the food we eat, the products we buy, and the air we breathe. In practice, however, if designed inadequately 
or with unrealistic expectations, regulations can fail to work. In other cases, market incentives and contractual 
obligations may be sufficient, without the need for regulation to intervene. Often, implementation is the 
problem: insufficient guidance and support, or lack of resources for control and enforcement, or wrong 
methods, can all lead to disappointing levels of compliance. But there clearly remain “market failure” 
situations where regulations are indispensable to ensure safety and protect the public interest and where, if 
well designed and implemented, they can be very effective. Likewise, for some of these regulations, 
inspections and enforcement by state authorities are indispensable to promote compliance and, if done with 
the right methods, can ensure that regulatory goals are reached. 
Over the past two decades, tools and methods of “better regulation” have been developed and put in practice, 
aimed at ensuring that existing and new regulations are of the efficient and effective kind. Somewhat more 
recently (but since at least 10 years), these improvement efforts have also extended to the whole “regulatory 
delivery” sphere, all the actions and tools that aim at turning regulation into practice, in particular regulatory 
inspections and enforcement. In spite of these tools and efforts, however, complaints abound that many new 
laws and regulations continue to be adopted that fail to pass muster in terms of necessity, cost-benefit and 
other key criteria, and political decisions on delivery tools and methods (licenses, permits, inspections, 
enforcement approaches) also frequently appear at odds with evidence and best practice, disproportionate, 
inefficient, or frankly counter-productive.  
In some cases, this seems to happen because regulations, decisions, priorities are pushed through in response 
to sudden accidents, crisis situations, in a kind of panic reaction that has been called the “risk regulation 
reflex”, a term coined by Margo Trappenburg in an essay she prepared for the “Day of Risk” conference, 
organized in May 2010 by the Dutch Risk and Responsibility programme435. The term “risk regulation reflex” is 
meant to refer to a mechanism leading to disproportionate government interventions surrounding a risk or 
following an incident. A corollary of the risk regulation reflex is that preventing, avoiding or compensating for 
risks is often seen as a government responsibility by default – in other words, the “risk regulation reflex” would 
be in some ways the opposite of “risk-based regulation”436. The “risk regulation reflex” concept can apply to 
both “short term” incident responses, and to the broader, “long term” trend towards ever more safety. It can 
designate “a trend towards ever more far-reaching safety measures which carry the chance of imbalance 
between the gain in safety and the costs and side effects of the measure, and the pitfall of public demand for 
a swift response following an incident leading to disproportionate measures” (van Tol 2012). From our 
                                                           
435 Over 2008-2009, originally as part of the Netherlands’ Inspection Reform Programme, increasing focus was put on exploring 
“overreaction to risk” and how to address it, building on the UK RRAC’s work (van Tol 2012). This led in November 2009 to the creation 
of what came to be called the “Risk and Responsibility” programme (van Tol 2012, 2013) – in Dutch “Risico’s en 
Verantwoordelijkheden”.  
436 See Rothstein, Borraz and Huber 2013 on how the “duty of protection” (“Schutzpflicht”) embedded in German legal principles makes 
it difficult to implement risk-based regulation. 
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perspective, both aspects are essentially linked: disproportionate responses to incidents are made possible by 
a context of “risk aversion” and, in turn, successive incident responses end up building a trend. Both can lead 
to changes in inspections and enforcement practices that go opposite what “risk-based inspections” seek to 
achieve.  
 
Is risk aversion on the rise? A disputed issue 
Unfortunately, solid statistics on regulations, and in particular on how many may have been adopted as a 
result of such “reflex” situations, are hard to come by – meaning that it is impossible to prove beyond doubt 
that the phenomenon is real. Anecdotal evidence, as well as important studies437, suggest however that risk 
aversion (e.g. in the form of the “risk regulation reflex”) is a significant cause of inadequate policy responses 
– either directly (new rules developed in the immediate aftermath of the event), or by making their way into 
the election platform of a party, and being introduced after an election victory. In all cases, what happens is 
that political priorities trump analysis and evidence, and that these political priorities are defined based on 
risk avoidance and “absolute” statements (“this risk is unacceptable” and “this should never happen again”). 
In 2005 already, Tony Blair, then Prime Minister of the United Kingdom, issued the following warning: “In my 
view, we are in danger of having a wholly disproportionate attitude to the risks we should expect to see as a 
normal part of life. This is putting pressure on policy making [and] regulatory bodies (…) to act to eliminate 
risk in a way that is out of all proportion to the potential damage. The result is a plethora of rules, guidelines, 
responses to ‘scandals’ of one nature or another that ends up having utterly perverse consequences438.” This 
same speech was quoted in Rethinking Regulation, a report published in January 2006 in Australia and 
summarizing the work of the “Taskforce on Reducing Regulatory Burdens on Business” (Banks 2006). This 
report opened with remarks on the growth of regulation, which covered Australia but could have been about 
many other countries: “Australia has experienced a dramatic rise in the volume and reach of regulation, in 
response to a variety of social, environmental and economic issues”. It then moved on to discuss the possible 
causes of this regulatory inflation: “It is important to recognise the forces behind the growth in regulation if 
sustainable solutions are to be found. Perhaps the most fundamental of these is the changing needs and 
expectations of society itself. Some of this is a natural and desirable consequence of rising affluence and 
increased scientific knowledge. However, in the Taskforce’s view, a more problematic influence has been 
increasing ‘risk aversion’ in many spheres of life. Regulation has come to be seen as a panacea for many of 
society’s ills and as a means of protecting people from inherent risks of daily life. Any adverse event (…) is laid 
at government’s door for a regulatory fix. The pressure on government to ‘do something’ is heightened by 
intense, if short-lived, media attention.” 
Both Tony Blair and the Banks report thus give a “classical” summary of the “risk regulation reflex”: excessive 
reaction to adverse events, excessive demands for absolute safety and protection, resulting in regulations that 
go far beyond the needed and the reasonable. While the Banks report focused on regulations affecting 
businesses (and particularly small businesses, reminding that “regulatory burdens fall disproportionately on 
the economy’s many small (including ‘micro’) businesses, which lack the resources to deal with them”), Tony 
Blair expounded also on the impact of such risk-averse regulations on “daily life”: “something is seriously awry 
when teachers feel unable to take children on school trips, for fear of being sued” – and further in the same 
speech: “for example, one piece of research into a supposed link between autism and the MMR single jab, 
starts a scare that, despite the vast weight of evidence to the contrary, makes people believe a method of 
                                                           
437 See e.g. Productivity Commission 2012 – page 316. All this work owes a lot to the work of the UK’s Risk and Regulation Advisory 
Council – see  RRAC 2009 (series of publications) in bibliography section. 




vaccination used the world over is unsafe. The result is an increase in risk to our children's health under the 
very guise of limiting that risk”. Indeed, the MMR vaccination scare is a perfect example of “scare” leading to 
adverse health effects. Problems with what used to be routine school activities (school trips, or bringing home-
baked cakes) have also been reported (and felt sorely) in many European countries – though they do not 
always originate in new regulations, but sometimes in increased litigation and enforcement of liability 
originating from quite “old” regulations. 
Critics have pointed out (Carroll 2006) that the Banks report was making important claims, but did not always 
have data to back them up. Showing that the volume of laws and regulations has increased may only reflect 
the calls for higher quality of rules and increased quality, and the estimates of administrative burden are (by 
the Banks report own admission) difficult to make and highly variable. Furthermore, again as per the Banks 
report itself: “While a number of studies have sought to estimate the economic costs of regulation in Australia, 
the limitations of such studies mean that the estimates should be treated with caution (…). Further, none of 
the studies measure the extent to which the compliance costs exceed what is necessary to achieve the policy 
goals underlying the regulations, which is the focus of this review. Quantifying this unnecessary element is 
even more difficult, and clearly”. Indeed, it is difficult to convincingly prove (or disprove) that the regulatory 
burden has increased, and/or that regulation is ever more intrusive and covering areas of life that used to be 
freer, and doing so in ways that add little or no discernible safety or other benefit. It could conceivably be 
done by thorough analysis of changes in regulations, benchmarking across countries etc. – but it would require 
a significant research undertaking, and resources.  
In short, there is some discussion as to whether such “risk adverse” responses are overall on the rise or not, 
whether the volume (and consequences) of poorly-designed policy responses they produce is increasing or 
not – and overall it is very difficult to quantify how large the effect of such policies is (see Helsloot, Schmidt 
2012 and UK National Audit Office 2011). Available evidence however suggests that “risk aversion” and the 
“risk regulation reflex” are not insignificant problems – not only in economic terms, but also because excessive 
regulation undermines the legitimacy of public action, both because it hinders legitimate private activity, and 
because it fosters the illusion that the government can achieve “perfect safety”, which is bound to be 
disappointed (“it can hinder society’s self-reliance and resilience, restrict the freedom of citizens and 
businesses, diminish the government’s authority as a result of promising too much” – van Tol 2012). In 
addition, a negative impact on the economy in turn will have significant negative impact on safety and health 
– as pointed out by Helsloot and Schmidt (2012): “life expectancy is strongly related to a person’s income (…). 
Life expectancy actually increases up to seven years for people with a higher income compared to people 
which are poor, and the difference in the number of years the two groups experience a good health is as much 
as 16 to 19 years. A safer society, at least if we define safety in terms of average life expectancy, can 
consequently be reached by boosting prosperity in lower income groups” (see also Mackenbach, Kunst, 
Cavelaars 1997). 
Thus in our view the limitations in evidence are not a major obstacle in terms of establishing the importance 
of risk-based approaches as a way to balance “risk aversion” trends. First, because “anecdotal” evidence of 
“regulatory creep” and “risk aversion” in regard with “daily life” activities is quite substantial, and the growing 
discontent it generates in a number of countries sufficient cause to think about how to alleviate it. Second, 
because there is also considerable evidence, through benchmarking in specific regulatory areas, that some 
countries within the EU, i.e. with many of the same fundamental parameters and many harmonized 
regulations, impose far more burdensome regulations and regulatory procedures (licensing, permitting, 
inspections etc.) than others – without additional safety to show for it in many cases439 - and it is precisely this 
                                                           
439 An important clarification is in order here: in some cases, countries impose higher regulatory requirements than is the case 
elsewhere in the EU and have a clear difference in results to show for it (e.g. several nordic countries in environmental matters). In 
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evidence that we intend to consider more closely in the third chapter. Finally, because in any case, regardless 
of overall trends in risk aversion or regulation, ensuring that the best possible policy decisions are taken in 
terms of effectiveness and efficiency is of public benefit. 
In this perspective, rather than focusing the discussion on whether there is convincing proof of an increase in 
regulatory burden (which is debatable, particularly if we are talking about net burden, i.e. “burden less 
benefits”), or an increase in risk aversion in the society (with some clear examples in some areas, but also 
important counter-examples), the focus should be on what situations, contexts and systems produce bad 
decisions – and which ones can, on the contrary, foster good ones. To quote the authors of The Government 
of Risk: “macroscopic and world-historical perspectives on risk and its management may have their uses. But 
most of them do not explain, or even describe, variety within the putative ‘regulatory state’, ‘risk society’ or 
‘audit society’. Yet casual observation, academic inquiry, and official surveys alike indicate substantial variety 
in the way risks and hazards are handled by the state” (Hood, Rothstein, Baldwin 2001). 
 
Understanding “risk regulation reflex” processes 
One may wonder why reacting to a disaster would necessarily lead to the wrong response. Since the Middle 
Ages at least, if not earlier, regulations (and institutions) have come into existence in response to risks, real or 
perceived, and often in the immediate aftermath of disasters of some kind (be it a sudden event or a prolonged 
situation). This has been particularly true of the growing system of regulations and regulatory implementation 
structures that has developed over the past two centuries – covering occupational safety and health and 
labour rights, environmental protection, food safety etc. We have outlined some of this early history in our 
first chapter. While we attempted to show how much of the adoption of new rules and creation of new 
institutions was linked to risk perceptions (mediated by a number of social, political and economic factors), it 
is nonetheless clear that some important regulatory steps responded to very real risks. Just as clear is the fact 
that, in spite of the difficulties in causality and attribution, and the evidence that some improvements 
predated regulation, at least some of the improvements in safety and public welfare were driven by these 
regulatory changes. 
Taking a couple of examples will help illustrate the point. In the UK, the 1833 Factories Act led to the creation 
of HM Factory Inspectorate in the same year, and the 1842 Mines Act to the creation of the Mines Inspectorate 
in 1843 (with increased powers from 1850). In both cases, this came in reaction to public opinion being 
shocked about working conditions in factories and mines (particularly for children and women). In the United 
States and much of Europe, as in the UK, mining accidents led to safety regulations being adopted, and often 
inspecting institutions set up, in the 19th century. The same goes for instance for the US Food and Drugs 
Administration, created in 1906 following scandals about adulterated or otherwise hazardous foods and 
drugs440. Tragedies caused by drugs touted as “safe” (e.g. Thalidomide) led to increasingly stringent prior 
approval regimes for medicines in the 20th century (and further scandals, such as the Mediator one in France, 
have led to further changes in these systems). Mid-20th century “killer fogs” in London led to pollution controls. 
The Seveso disaster gave its name to an EU directive (and its successive iterations), and other chemical 
disasters such as Bhopal in India, Love Canal in the US etc. all led to strengthened regulations and oversight441.  
                                                           
such case, it becomes a question of cost-benefit analysis and of prioritization in values and objectives whether to opt for such stronger 
regulations or not. In other cases, countries impose considerable burden often through numerous permits, approvals etc., or additional 
regulatory norms (like the lift safety example we used above), with very little or no positive impact at all. This latter case is the one we 
are referring to here. 
440 http://www.fda.gov/AboutFDA/WhatWeDo/History/CentennialofFDA/default.htmUK 
441 See e.g. Balleisen, Bennear, Krawiec and Wiener (in press) as well as IRGC Conference presentations by the same authors 
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Even though critics of government regulations would argue that current occupational safety or food 
regulations impose too much burden on economic initiative, the part of these regulations that dates back to 
a century or more ago is widely accepted as having delivered considerable benefits at what appears to have 
been a very limited cost to economic growth, innovation etc. What, then, has changed so that nowadays 
dramatic events are said to lead far too often to regulatory responses whose costs outweigh the benefits they 
may bring (or even sometimes bring only negatives)? What is it that would explain a “risk regulation reflex” 
with overwhelmingly negative outcomes? The first change is probably the increasing marginal cost of 
adverting accidents and other hazards: the higher the existing safety level, the higher the cost of additional 
improvements in safety. As Helsloot and Schmidt (2012) put it: “every improvement curve flattens out at a 
certain point. Consequently, anyone who wants to achieve anything in the ‘tail’ of the curve needs to be very 
cautious about making substantial investments, as [their costs] can easily be disproportionate [to their 
benefits]”.  
This “flattening of the improvement curve” is a feature that is very difficult or impossible to affect through 
public policy – and thus there is an inherent character, to some extent, in the fact that further improvements 
in safety and health will, more or less inevitably, have greater costs than the ones that came from earlier “low 
hanging fruits”. There are, however, a number of other factors that can lead to an excessively costly and poorly 
thought-through “risk averse” way of regulating, and they are often understood to be:  
- Lower risk-tolerance, meaning that we tend to address issues that in earlier times would have been 
accepted as the normal state of things 
- Difficulty for scientific evidence to overcome ideological preconceptions, pseudo-science, and 
fundamental psychological patterns with regard to risk 
-  “Positioning” of political and other actors (media, interest groups) in a world where information flows 
extremely quickly and where what used to be small, local news items swiftly become national or global. 
This leads to over-reaction, and to decisions being taken too quickly and without proper analysis, 
insufficient attention to regulatory design etc.  
 
We would argue that all three points are important, and indeed there are factors pertaining to risk-tolerance 
and risk-aversion (and their psychological underpinnings), to the trust or lack thereof in scientific advice and 
in policymakers statements, and to policy actors – but the characterisation above leads to many 
misunderstandings of how unavoidable risk-aversion is (or is not).  
 
Psychological aspects of the risk response 
Indeed, psychological aspects are important, and indeed human heuristics are poorly suited to dealing with 
uncertainty and statistical aspects of risk (see Tversky and Kahneman 1974, 1979)442 – but research and 
experience also show that, when engaging properly with the public, it is possible to discuss risk in a rational 
way and to ensure that risk perception does not necessarily degenerate into risk aversion, but rather that risk 
acceptance can be fostered. Indeed, while risk perception is essential in determining each member of the 
public’s initial response to a risk or incident (see e.g. Slovic, Fischhoff, Lichtenstein 1982, Slovic 2000), what 
matters in the end is whether the initial perception is “frozen” or not.  
Repeated research (see Helsloot, Schmidt 2012) has shown that, while simple questions asked without any 
background or any additional information tend to produce responses where people manifest strong risk 
aversion, this can change when additional information and context are provided. Indeed, people do not 
                                                           
442 See p. 187 below for more discussion of human heuristics. For a specific discussion of availability heuristics and their effects on risk 
regulation, see Kuran and Sunstein 1999. 
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respond to risk only from a “more” or “less” risk perspective – but integrate a number of other values (fairness, 
equality, liberty, self-reliance etc.) (see Eeten, Bouder 2012443). Research suggests that “people seem to be 
able to make a difference between their own risk perception and what risks should be accepted reasoning 
from an administrator’s point of view” – when given sufficient information on costs and benefits, they will 
balance the advantages of addressing a specific risk with its downsides and with other alternative uses of 
resources, whereas if only asked whether a given risk is important and worth addressing, they will usually 
answer “yes”444.  
The conclusion here would seem to be that the public may well be far smarter than usually given credit for – 
engaging members of the public takes time and resources, but can yield a far more balanced and rational 
approach to risk than relying on rushed “yes/no” questions with no context and information445. Balancing 
these findings and optimistic views on the possibility of a rational debate on risk comes other evidence that 
public discussions of risk are very difficult because of the problem of risk perception. We have already 
presented the findings by Slovic and others on how perceptions of risk are often very distant from what 
statistical estimates would suggest. In addition, other psychological factors mean that a discussion of a 
statistical risk may see the very salient and understandable risk (‘death’) be perceived far more strongly than 
the statistical probability (‘one in a large number’, which is very difficult to conceive). A more nuanced 
conclusion would thus be that attempting to have public discussions of risk is possible, but requires to set a 
discussion framework that starts in small settings and builds understanding of the issue (and of the data) 
among stakeholders (including the media). When risk discussions suddenly break out in public discourse 
without such an effort at building a joint understanding, the results tend to veer much more towards risk 
aversion and “panic” reactions. 
 
Science, transparency, trust 
Likewise, the public’s relationship with science is also more complex than many experts would suggest, who 
mostly see the public as insufficiently listening to science and not able to properly distinguish “real” from 
“pseudo” science. Most of these conclusions lead their authors to recommend that efforts be made to ensure 
that the public defers more to scientific advice, but in ways that seem more like “communication” and 
“propaganda” than real engagement.  
There is certainly a share of the public who will not accept scientific findings and rather adhere to other views 
– be they based on religion, ideology, conspiracy theories or any other worldview. When a significant share of 
the population holds such views, it is important to acknowledge them in the public discussion, including 
indicating that the policy decision will not be based on them, but on scientific findings and utility 
maximization446. What matters more to us here is that, for those members of the public (typically, the majority) 
that do not hold deeply views that are fundamentally at odds with a scientific perspective, trust in scientific 
advice (and in policies that claim to be based on it) can be built up – and can be destroyed as well.  
Dissimulation or manipulation of evidence, claims of full harmlessness for things that later are proven to have 
been extremely hazardous (or the opposite: claims that something is very dangerous whereas further evidence 
                                                           
443 For an excellent overview of the different values that can underpin radically different approaches to risk and trade-offs in the 
criminal justice field see Buruma 2004. 
444 In one of the experiments presented by Helsloot and Schmidt (2012), 35% of respondents essentially change their mind within the 
course of one single interview, when moving from simple dual questions to a more considered discussion and asked to put themselves 
“in the shoe” of a policy maker. 
445 Supporting this view, see Posner 1998 and Esptein 2008. 
446 Discarding them without even a proper mention, by contrast, decreases legitimacy by making the process “unfair” from a procedural 
justice perspective, as dissenting views are not even given a “voice” (regardless of the final policy outcome). 
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demonstrates it to be less so), can severely damage the public’s trust in science – or at least in official claims 
for policies to be based on “science”. We will discuss these issues in more details further in this research. 
 
Policy actors – the risk aversion cycle, and the problem of “risk 
experts” 
Finally, the question of policy actors is important, and has at least two aspects – one being the way all actors 
in the “risk regulation reflex” are linked through a kind of cycle, the other being the activities and impact of 
“policy entrepreneurs”. 
The circular aspect is the way, in a “risk regulation reflex” process, all actors in a way attribute responsibility 
for decisions and actions to someone else: the media claims that the public is outraged and demands action, 
politicians say they have to act because the issue is all over the media – and civil servants claim they are 
compelled to act by politicians and the media. As for the public, it faces a barrage of media coverage, and 
politicians all promising that “it should never happen again”, and feels reinforced in all feelings of risk aversion. 
This relationship has been called “Februari’s Circle” (van Tol 2014) after Maxim Februari, who exposed it as 
part of the work done for the Risk and Responsibility programme (van Eeten et al. 2011). The crucial element 
of this circle is that no one is taking responsibility – and everyone claims to be doing their job. The media say 
they have a responsibility to voice public concerns (and an interest in “crisis”, which sells well). Politicians say 
they have to respond to their constituents’ demands (and an interest in winning, not losing, elections). Civil 
servants say they have a duty to follow priorities laid out by elected politicians (and an interest in keeping their 
jobs). In all this, interest is more evident than duty – and the attitude of members of the public is typical of the 
“Not In My Backyard” (NIMBY) pattern (Helsloot, Schmidt 2012).  
As we have indicated above, this circle is not a fatality: breaking may be possible, by providing the public with 
more information and context, and initiating a real public conversation about the risk at hand. This requires, 
however, initiative from at least one group of actors. This is not easy – as Carrigan and Coglianese (2012) put 
it: “Intense reactions by the public (…) drive an intense desire by politicians to take action. Under such 
circumstances, taking any action targeted at the regulatory process, regardless of how well or poorly crafted, 
will be better politically than taking no action at all. Political incentives point in the direction of quick legislative 
action that responds to calamities. Voters focus much less on considerations of how a law will be implemented 
than on the enactment of a new law itself (Mayhew 1974; Mazmanian and Sabatier 1983). Legislators can reap 
rewards from passing legislation regardless of whether doing so turns out to be realistic or effectual”. 
However, we have seen that research also shows that engagement with the public can yield real changes – 
thus, if the “circle” can be interrupted, the pressure to act regardless of effectiveness will stop. This report 
aims at presenting ways in which space for such a “rational conversation” can be created. 
In addition to actors in the “circle” seeking to push responsibility on others, there are some specific actors who 
actively seek to strengthen risk aversion, who have an active interest in reinforcing the reflex, in making the 
particular risk appear as particularly serious so as to maximize the response. What many authors call “policy 
entrepreneurs” can be of many kinds, and have been studied from a variety of angles (see e.g. Roberts, King 
1991 – Mintrom, Norman 2009 – Cohen 2011). The importance of “policy entrepreneurs” as one of the 
elements shaping response to risk has been pointed out by Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001)447, and the 
presence and activity of these “entrepreneurs” is for them one of the elements that can lead to different “risk 
regulation regimes”. From the perspective of the RRR, which represents a specific case of “risk regulation 
regime” (one with particularly strong response compared to what could be expected from a rational analysis 
of the “market failure” – see again Hood, Rothstein, Baldwin 2001 for a broader typology), a feature seems to 
                                                           
447 And we have seen that this role is not new, as it also had its importance in the creation of the US FDA in the early 20th century. 
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be that there are “policy entrepreneurs” particularly successful at pushing for such a response. These “policy 
entrepreneurs” were generally already pushing for their favourite policy, and the incident gives them an 
opening: “Crises provide opportunities for policy entrepreneurs to place at center stage those solutions they 
have already been seeking to see adopted (Kingdon 1984:91). Even if those solutions were not developed to 
address the particular problem at hand, politicians often feel compelled to consider them— to “do something” 
(Carrigan, Coglianese 2012).  
They can belong to different categories – private businesses in some cases (e.g. suppliers of equipment or 
services to address the particular risk considered, e.g. lifts retrofitting as in the French example presented 
above), NGOs in others (e.g. those focusing on environmental protection, or some trade unions etc.), but also 
“experts” (independent or affiliated with consulting firms, research institutions, NGOs, businesses etc.) – and 
they are also quite often inside public administration (and in such cases, pushing for more regulation in their 
sphere of competence is a way of entrenching their importance, and their budgets – see Helsloot, Schmidt 
2012).  
Not all such “policy activism” is motivated by self-interest, far from it – “risk experts tend to really believe, and 
policy makers are made to believe, that an incident is proof that regulation should be tightened” (Helsloot, 
Schmidt 2012). The difficulty for civil servants and elected officials alike (and for journalists) is to decide 
whether these “risk experts” are right – to screen their proposals, or to review existing rules adopted in a 
previous “RRR moment”. Indeed, “knowledge is required in order to determine what rules are 
disproportionate and can therefore be repealed. This knowledge is usually only available to the risk 
professionals of policy departments and their external advisors” (ibid.). 
Thus, again, an essential step in order to avoid risk-averse, “reflex-driven” decisions is to provide time and 
space for careful consideration of arguments and evidence, rather than relying immediately on whichever 
“solutions” are advocated by “experts” which, even in the absence of material interests, will have a personal 
investment in their own field of study and expertise. 
 
Modelling the policy decisions in a risk context 
Another, more detailed way to look at these factors of “reflex” reactions and their consequences is the model 
proposed by, Balleisen, Bennear, Krawiec and Wiener (in press). In this model, crisis events can lead to small 
or large changes in risk perceptions, and the latter again to major or minor shifts in policy agenda. The 
magnitude of changes depends to a large extent on how the crisis fits or contrasts with baseline risk 
assumptions, and how the perception of the crisis is mediated by ideologies, heuristic models, narratives 
(“master-stories”) etc. The interplay of interest groups’ agendas, resources available, trust or distrust in 
specific institutions or actors, etc. then again influences whether the changes are substantial or mostly 
“cosmetic”. Weber (in Balleisen et al., in press) adds a psychological dimension to the analysis (based in 
particular on Tversky and Kahneman): for instance, humans tend to under-estimate the actual risk of events 
that are common and that they perceive as “normal”, and to over-estimate the risk of events that have a very 
low probability but that they have previously experienced. There are many psychological mechanisms which 
mean that perception of risks by non-experts (be they politicians, journalists, citizens) can differ widely from 
what data shows the actual risk level to be. This is of course one of the primary reasons why over- (or under-) 
reaction to accidents and crises can occur. 
In terms of sequence of events and reactions, this model sees events as being first mediated through baseline 
risk assumptions, and then modulated by a series of filters (ideologies, “master-stories”, heuristics, media) in 
order to produce a “causal narrative” of the crisis. Depending on the different aspects of the context, this may 
result in blaming culprits or scapegoats, looking at structural issues, “policy regret” or bias confirmation. The 
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causal narrative may be agreed upon, or disputed. Then, the causal narrative or narratives themselves get 
complemented by expert analysis (or analyses) and the whole agenda or “policy menu” gets itself filtered by 
interests at play, resources available, institutional structures and the level of trust (or distrust) in institutions), 
to result in policy decisions. Depending again on the whole set of events and context, these may be “cosmetic” 
or “substantial” changes.  
In a more formalized way, this model emphasizes the same factors as the “risk regulatory regime” approach 
of Hood, Rothstein and Baldwin (2001) or the key elements of the RRR evidenced by van Tol (2012) and 
Helsloot and Schmidt (2012): the importance of a context where values and visions of the public and the 
different actors shape how they perceive and react to risk, the impact of the intervention of experts and other 
actors to shape events into a “causal narrative” and a policy agenda, etc. It adds to this the importance of 
institutional capacity (or lack thereof) in steering the final policy decisions – Helsloot and Schmidt (2012) 
present, however, several examples of how the RRR can lead to policy decisions in favour of new regulations 
even in the absence of capacity to implement them (in several of these cases, the new regulations later end 
up being abolished, because they have not been seriously implemented).  
All these analyses and models concur in highlighting the importance of perceptions and shaping of the issues, 
and also of what interests are at play, and what context the crisis occurs in. The key about the “reflex” 
mechanisms is the tendency to react too fast to the event – without giving sufficient time for inquiry and 
analysis. Against this, Bennear (in Balleisen et al., in press) suggests that the answer should be “deflect” (take 
visible but inconsequential actions showing political attention but not locking-in potentially harmful decisions 
– thus giving time for further consideration) or “reflect”. The key seems to be to create a shared understanding 
of this need to defer meaningful action until the situation has been more fully understood, to create the 
“conditions of possibility” for this time and “breathing space”.  
 
Relevance to the inspections and enforcement issue 
The trends, research and discussions we have attempted to summarize relate to “regulation” in general, and 
not only or specifically to inspections and enforcement. They are, however, fully applicable to the inspections 
and enforcement “stage” of regulation. As mentioned above, the Netherlands’ Risk and Responsibility 
programme, which led to the definition of the “Risk Regulation Reflex” concept, itself originated from the 
Netherlands’ Inspection Reform programme. This inherent link between reaction to risks and regulatory 
control and supervision is an important angle for our study, and one of the areas where addressing risk 
aversion is most important. 
Indeed, when incidents happen, inspectors and inspection services are often among the first to be blamed – 
and stricter, more frequent inspections very often top the list of “risk regulation reflex”-driven requests. When 
new technologies or practices emerge, inspectors may be the first to notice them – and possibility in some 
cases to prohibit them. Inspectors are on the “frontlines” of regulation, the main interface between rules and 
those who have to abide by them (mostly businesses, but also citizens).  
Most of the difficulties related to inspections and enforcement in a perspective of rational risk management 
and risk mitigation come from a number of fundamental misconceptions on inspections themselves (their role 
and methods), and on compliance and safety (and their drivers) – misconceptions that are not only held by 
many members of the public (as well as “experts”, interest groups etc.) but also by a number of inspectors and 
inspectorates managers.  
These misconceptions revolve around the assumption that more inspections and stricter inspections (or more 
and stricter control, police checks etc.) will mechanically drive higher compliance, and that this will in turn 
automatically result in higher safety. This assumption in turn stems from a vision of compliance with rules is 
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primarily or exclusively driven by deterrence, fear and rational calculations. It also implies a belief that 
inspections, checks etc. do not have significant adverse and unintended effects. In turn, this excessive and 
unfounded assumption that deterrence is the major driver of compliance (and safety) and that inspections 
and checks are thus the primary tool to be used (and used as much as possible) fosters excessive expectations 
from inspections – i.e. that they should manage to ensure perfect safety, complete protection from risks in a 
given field. 
Thus, the consequences of risk aversion on inspections and enforcement questions are serious. Understanding 
better the mechanisms of the “risk regulation reflex”, and the ways to achieve a more balanced approach to 
risk, are essential to provide a foundation for “risk proportional” inspections. 
 
ii. Uncertainty, trade-offs and transparency 
 
Conflicting goals – and the pitfalls of excessive certainty 
Individuals, societies, governments, international or “supra-national” organizations, all have sets of goals and 
objectives that coexist but may in some cases (or even frequently) come in conflict. Many would argue that 
the quest for more material well-being (observed both at individual and social level, and backed up by policies 
supporting economic development and the private sector) can conflict with another objective of both 
individuals, societies and public bodies, the protection of health and more broadly the environment. Certainly, 
it is not always the case that these goals conflict, as for instance the whole “green growth” idea (and realities) 
show. But there definitely are instances when objectives (and the values underpinning them) conflict. This 
conflict is clearly visible about risk – with risk-averse, “precautionary” demands on one side, and the push for 
a more risk-proportional, freedom-enhancing approach on the other. 
A very good example of such conflict in goals, and of its possible consequences in terms of regulation, is 
presented by Ragnar Löfstedt in his article on the ‘Swing of the Regulator Pendulum’ (Löfstedt 2004): “the 
issue of both improving and implementing regulations are closely linked to the three main drivers of EU 
regulatory concerns: competitiveness, good governance and sustainable development. For example, if 
regulations are not improved, not only will European competitiveness be adversely affected, but also the 
criteria for good governance will not be met. Similarly, if environmental and health regulations are not 
properly implemented how can the EU state that it is taking sustainable development seriously?” He goes on 
to indicate that “the three drivers (competitiveness, sustainable development and governance) are, according 
to the Commission, closely interrelated and compatible. The Commission has long held the view that there is 
no actual conflict between environmental protection and competitiveness. It stated in the 1993 5th 
Environmental Action programme that: The perceived conflict between environmental protection and 
economic competitiveness stems from a narrow view of the sources of prosperity and static view of 
competition.” While not commenting on this optimistic view held by the Commission, Löfstedt further exposes 
the tensions between the “precautionary” and “impact assessment” philosophies, and suggests that, in 
attempting to build credibility by showing “fairness” through “tough” decisions against business interests, the 
EU regulatory bodies have probably overshot their target and that the pendulum is likely to start swinging 
back towards “risk assessment” rather than “harm prevention”.  
This example suggests implicitly that there are, indeed, trade-offs – at least, in the author’s perspective, 
between legitimacy of public authorities and economic growth. But we would argue that the cases presented 
in the article actually show that there is a tension between environmental and health protection and, if not 
economic growth overall (on which it is more difficult to comment because of the complexity of the effects 
involved), at least the availability of cheap products on the market, and possibly short-term job creation. One 
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of the examples used by Löfstedt is the ban on virginiamycin in animal feed, and the use of the precautionary 
principle by the European Court of First Instance in its 2002 ruling against Pfizer. Since the article states that 
“there was no reputable scientific evidence that there was a transfer of antibiotic resistance to humans as a 
result of the use of the antibiotic in animal feed” and further suggests that the decision was excessive (and an 
example of steps that may in the end trigger a “swing of the pendulum” in the other direction), it is worth 
looking (of course with the benefit of hindsight) at how well this decision has stood the test of time in terms 
of science and risk assessment. In its latest guidance for industry on the subject of use of antibiotics in animal 
feed448, the United States Food and Drugs Administration (FDA) emphasizes the need “to help phase out the 
use of medically important antimicrobials in food animals for production purposes449”. In 2013, the US Center 
for Disease Control (CDC) stated in its Antibiotic Resistance Threats in the United States report: “Antibiotics 
are widely used in food-producing animals (…) This use contributes to the emergence of antibiotic-resistant 
bacteria in food-producing animals [which] are of particular concern because these animals serve as carriers. 
Resistant bacteria can contaminate the foods that come from those animals, and people who consume these 
foods can develop antibiotic-resistant infections. (…) Scientists around the world have provided strong 
evidence that antibiotic use in food-producing animals can harm public health (…) Because of the link between 
antibiotic use in food-producing animals and the occurrence of antibiotic-resistant infections in humans, 
antibiotics should be used in food-producing animals only under veterinary oversight and only to manage and 
treat infectious diseases, not to promote growth.”  
We have quoted on purpose from US rather than EU agencies, because many authors (see e.g. Löfstedt 2004, 
Wiener 2003) would agree that they have been (at least in recent decades) rather less precautionary, and 
because (partly as a consequence of this regulatory stance and partly as a result of different economic 
structures) antibiotic use in animal feed is considerably more widespread in the US than in the EU. The fact 
that the FDA guidance documents are voluntary (a clear result of the need to balance safety issues and 
economic interests, and of the difficulty to overcome industry resistance) cannot obscured the fact that both 
the FDA and CDC are highly concerned and are trying hard to eliminate the routine use of antibiotics in animal 
feed, particularly when there is no disease being controlled and antibiotics just function as growth aid. In April 
2014, the FDA released a list of  “voluntary withdrawal” including 16 Antimicrobials for use in food-producing 
animals450 – it included virginiamycin, the drug at issue in the Pfizer 2002 case. It seems that the Court’s 
“precaution” was not so mistaken and groundless after all.  
This shows the importance of caution when considering risks where significant uncertainty exists and 
knowledge is still under development. While designing adequately proportionate decisions in cases of well-
known and understood risks is in general possible, there is a strong case to be made for a combination of 
“precaution” and “proportionality” when dealing with uncertainty. This may occasionally result in decisions 
that hindsight shows to have been excessive, but also in a number of other cases may result in avoiding very 
significant damage or disasters (see European Environment Agency 2001 for numerous examples). This is true 
not only for strictly-speaking “regulatory” decisions (adoption of new rules) but also for inspections and 
enforcement decisions. Inspectorates are often expected by public opinion to immediately address any risk, 
even when that risk is not certain, through control visits, withdrawal of products, sanctions etc. In cases where 
the “uncertain risk” is covered by the agency’s mandate (i.e. it has authority to act), but also in other cases 
                                                           
448 Guidances #209 issued April 13, 2012 - #213 issued December 2013 – both referencing guidance #152 issued October 23, 2003 – 
see http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM299624.pdf and 
http://www.fda.gov/downloads/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/UCM216936.pdf  
449 “FDA's Strategy on Antimicrobial Resistance - Questions and Answers” 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/GuidanceComplianceEnforcement/GuidanceforIndustry/ucm216939.htm - see also 
http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/SafetyHealth/AntimicrobialResistance/JudiciousUseofAntimicrobials/default.htm  
450 http://www.fda.gov/AnimalVeterinary/NewsEvents/CVMUpdates/ucm392461.htm  
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(because the agency could be at least lobbying to have its mandate extended), it is crucial for them to have a 
transparent approach to how they seek to balance risk management and precaution. 
This applies for instance to authorizations and supervision of the use of medical drugs and devices, chemicals 
(food additives, pesticides etc.), or any other new technology. When considering the long-run, such a careful 
balancing act is important, and adopting a ‘risk-based approach’ should not be understood to automatically 
mean discounting risks that have not been proven significant simply because data is still lacking (as opposed 
to well-known risks where the data clearly points to their being of low importance). Indeed, a track record of 
discounting risks when uncertainty is significant, and of subsequent damages where it had been claimed that 
there was none to be feared, results in undermining the credibility and legitimacy of public authorities and 
their scientific advisors – and thus in undermining support for risk-proportionality. It is not just a question of 
costs and benefits in terms of life and health, and economic and social impact, but of the “snowball” effect 
that credibility loss will have. 
 
Understanding and accepting trade-offs 
A far better path towards understanding the “risk regulation reflex” problem and laying out potential solutions 
seems to us to be sketched out in the contribution of Cary Coglianese and Christopher Carrigan to the 
collective volume Regulatory Breakdown. Quoting them: “Is it possible that the ultimate failure of the U.S. 
regulatory system is that the American public, through its elected representatives, asks regulators to oversee 
activities that are at once desired but also deadly?” (Carrigan, Coglianese 2012). In other words, there are 
trade-offs: to a certain extent, different goals may be compatible, but at some point, they may conflict with 
each other, and choices (conscious or unconscious, open or hidden) will have to take place.  
This is important in terms of managing expectations from inspections and enforcement agencies specifically, 
and not only expectations from government regulation generally – and thus in achieving support for risk-based 
approaches that are explicitly founded on the premise that preventing every risk is impossible, and that there 
are some risks where the costs of attempting prevention would be higher than the potential benefits. Thus, 
the very idea of trade-off is central to risk-based inspections, and the refusal of trade-offs is a key driver of 
risk-averse approaches, and of attempts to inspect every establishment, and to practise “zero-tolerance” 
enforcement. 
As Carrigan and Coglianese point out, denying these trade-offs may well be one of the key reasons behind the 
RRR – as “insufficient” or “failing” regulation becomes an ideal scapegoat when something goes wrong. 
Quoting them (ibid.): “Calamities, we suggest, bring with them strong tendencies for faulty assessments of 
both underlying causes and necessary reforms. These tendencies are due to a host of factors, including both 
psychological biases as well as nuances in the policy process itself. The pressure politicians feel to adopt 
change even without solid policy analysis (…) means that solutions can end up being adopted that are either 
unrelated to the true cause of disasters or that actually work at cross-purposes to improving conditions. In 
addition, sometimes the underlying problem may not have to do with the (…) operations of the regulator or 
the regulated industry but may instead reflect inherent societal choices about trade-offs.” 
Disasters easily lend themselves to faulty assessments, based on heuristics that humans have developed to 
survive in their natural environment hundreds of thousands years ago, but are increasingly inappropriate to 
understanding situations in a technologically advanced environment and highly complex societies (Bennear 
2014 and Carrigan, Coglianese 2012). Again quoting from the latter: “psychological and behavioral economics 
research (…) support the notion that people tend to focus more on worst-case outcomes and to believe that 
vivid events are more common than they really are (Tversky and Kahneman 1973). Moreover, researchers 
studying these phenomena— known as the “availability heuristic,” along with other cognitive biases— also 
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report that they can be exacerbated by the media, which for obvious reasons tend to focus on especially 
dramatic events (Shrum 2002).” In such situations, regulators and regulations provide ideal points of fixation 
for negative emotions. The “culprits” in the narrow sense may be the business operators or individuals who 
were directly involved in the disaster, but regulators often end up receiving nearly as much blame. They form 
ideal “scapegoats” to blame for something that went wrong – regardless of whether this was in fact at all 
possible to predict, whether there were any structural elements or not. 
If indeed the issue is fundamentally linked to the refusal to confront contradictions inherent to multiple goals, 
and to accept trade-offs, then “scapegoating” regulators and calling for stronger rules and enforcement is a 
way to continue this refusal. It is convenient for politicians, who avoid confronting their own failures (see for 
instance the case of the Deepwater Horizon in Carrigan 2013), and in a way for citizens as well, who do not 
have to make hard choices (at least not consciously). Achieving a more risk proportionate, approach to 
regulation and regulatory enforcement would thus start by making tensions and contradictions between 
different goals and aspirations clear and visible. From this, a rational conversation could be had regarding the 
potential trade-offs, the possible ways to reconcile conflicting goals to some extent, and the limits of this. On 
this basis, rational policy decisions can then be taken, with a clear view of what upsides and downsides they 
entail.  
 
The uses and limitations of science in relation to risk and regulation 
Risk-based regulation aims to rely on evidence and data in order to assess risks and decide on the adequate 
response, and this applies to risk-based inspections of course as well. In most areas, assessing risks in a “non-
subjective” way requires the use of scientific findings – but this is not always as easy as many would think it is, 
because science is complex, incorporates uncertainty, and cannot answer all questions (and in particular 
cannot answer values-based questions). 
A cursory review of developed countries in particular (but even many emerging economies) will easily show 
that “scientific advice is found almost everywhere in our technological cultures” and that, for many scientific 
advisory bodies, “the emphasis is on translating the state of scientific knowledge to make it useful for politics 
and for policy making” (Bijker, Bal, Hendriks 2009). Even though some of the institutions involved in scientific 
advice go back a very long way in time (like the Netherlands’ Health Council, the Gezondheidsraad, which was 
founded in 1902), there does appear to have been an increase in the reliance on scientific advice in public 
policy, or at least the push for increased reliance, in the past three of four decades. This can be linked at least 
in part to major incidents – as a way to react to these not in a “reflex” way, but by improving the adequacy of 
policies and regulations in particular, through the incorporation of the “best available” science. In the case of 
the EU, around the mid-90s “amid scandals over industrial safety (Seveso), ‘mad cow disease’, dioxin 
contaminated food and oil vessels safety, the EU reconsidered the role that scientific evidence could and 
should play in its decision-making system” (Alemanno 2014). More broadly, the increasing emphasis on 
scientific advice in policy making can be tied to the increasing complexity of technologies employed both by 
businesses and in the private sphere, and the need to take decisions in front of issues where prior experience 
or a decent education are clearly insufficient guidance.  
The increased reliance on science, part of the broader trend towards more “evidence based” policy making 
(of which RIA is a particularly characteristic example), is not only the result of technological change, however 
– and it is also not fully uncontroversial. On a fundamental level, one can argue that founding policy decisions 
exclusively or primarily on scientific evidence is in itself a major policy choice, reflecting a utilitarian ideology, 
and not (as it is often presented) a “neutral”, “non-ideological” approach. Very often, in fact, “on contested 
topics (…) science, values and politics collide”. The “utilitarian” perspective, which would have science be the 
primary guide for policy choices, and statistically predicted impact on human life the key indicator, has been 
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vehemently criticized from many corners (from, say, the religious right to the radical left) as reductive and as 
ignoring the role of “higher” (or at least “other”) values in policy choices (for an early example of such criticism, 
see e.g. Slama 1993). The reason it is essential to remind of this here is that science can in any case not give 
the answer as to “what should be the right policy” – it can only, at best, indicate which instruments and specific 
norms are likely to be most appropriate for given policy parameters. For instance, if safety and health are the 
policy priorities, smoking bans and all measures against smoking will be welcome. But if individual freedom of 
choice is considered a higher value, then such bans and policies will be opposed (see Slama 1993). The only 
things science can say are (a) what the impact of smoking on health is (medicine and biology) as well as, to 
some extent, (b) what measures and tools are more likely to lead to reduced smoking (behavioural science, 
psychology, socio-legal studies etc.).  
In addition to this fundamental limitation, there are many situations (and indeed, often in the “hottest” topics) 
where science is simply uncertain. Of course, at its heart, science always includes an element of uncertainty, 
in the sense that a better understanding of reality may always emerge – but “stronger” uncertainty is what 
matters here, that which is at stake in issues which are still only imperfectly understood, and where as a result 
diametrically opposing viewpoints can both claim to be based on “science” (as in the Endocrine Disrupting 
Chemicals – EDCs –  “controversy”, even though the vast majority of scientists appear to be on one side, i.e. 
the one that points out the hazards of EDCs451).  
To summarize, there are several fundamental, intrinsic limitations to what “answers” science can give to public 
policy issues: 
- Science cannot address conflicts between values, or respond which values to prioritize 
- When a policy choice is likely to have conflicting impacts on different aspects or indicators, science cannot 
answer on which one should be given priority 
- In fields where important uncertainty remain, it can only give answers which are affected by this 
uncertainty, i.e. based on probabilities 
- Thus in all cases science cannot make choices – scientific advice can, rather, be a “honest broker” or 
“cartographer” that “helps decision makers to choose wisely between the available options” or at least 
understanding the implications of different “policy paths” (Wilsdon 2014). 
 
The specific case of “scientific uncertainty” – dealing with 
uncertainty, dealing with risk, two different but connected problems 
In many situations where regulators are under pressure to act, but also subject to criticism for over-reacting, 
science is in fact not fully clear. Whereas scientific issues are not in debate for instance in the Deepwater 
Horizon disaster or in the Foot-and-Mouth crisis (and the questions are only about the proper tools to address 
technological or epidemiological issues, and trust deficits), they are or were very much openly debated or at 
least “not fully solved” in cases like the BSE (“Mad Cow”) crisis, or EDCs and the right response to give them. 
There is, indeed, a tendency (on many sides) to present scientific opinion or advice as “one” – and to see 
problems only in terms of ensuring that scientific evidence gets accepted and acted upon. Quoting an 
influential report on Enhancing the role of science in the decision-making of the European Union, for instance 
(Ballantine 2005), the only limitations it sees to scientific evidence are “policy-makers and decision-makers 
[being] often unable to make use of scientific advice”, “lack of public confidence in the utility of scientific 
evidence, particularly in managing risks to human health, which limits its effectiveness”, “difficulties in 
                                                           
451 The controversies on GMOs would of course be another example, but their complexity and the passions at stake are even greater, 
and in addition the “scientific arguments” used by both sides tend to show that they (on purpose or not) do not even speak about the 
same issues – many proponents of allowing GMOs cultivation and sale emphasize studies showing innocuity on human health, but 
many GMO opponents do not focus on human health effects but rather on the environmental impact.  
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obtaining ‘independent’ and ‘excellent’ scientific advice” and the fact that “some influential groups452 do not 
accept that scientific evidence is an appropriate input”. We contend here that this is an exceedingly restrictive 
and “technocratic” view, that assumes the answer is clear and beyond doubt, and the only problem are 
“people” and “politicians” not listening or unable to act upon scientific advice. The reality is far more complex. 
 
Scepticism is often grounded in major failures in the past 
If many people (or “groups”) show limited trust in what is presented to them as being the state of science, it 
can be not only because they conflict with their values or “ideologies”, but because past experience has shown 
the limits of claims of safety of technologies based on “science” [regardless of whether or not the claims were 
indeed based on science or just presented as such].  
Chemicals or drugs later found to be highly toxic (and remaining actively toxic for extended periods) remained 
in some cases on the markets for decades – with both instances of their toxicity having long been known, or 
of their being originally seen as safe and knowledge of their toxicity only gradually emerging. Infamous cases 
that have made history in the worst way include thalidomide, which was marketed as perfectly safe for several 
years in a number of countries, and led to around 10,000 birth defects leading to infant deaths and 
phocomelia. Diethylstilbestrol likewise was prescribed for three decades to pregnant women in the mistaken 
belief it would reduce the risk of pregnancy complications and losses – and not only had no positive health 
effects, but led to cause a variety of significant adverse medical complications during the lifetimes of those 
exposed (in particular genital tract diseases, e.g. vaginal tumours and uterine malformations). PCBs and other 
chlorinated hydrocarbons were recognized early as toxic due to a variety of industrial incidents, but serious 
regulation was only introduced nearly forty years after the first studies, in the 1970s. DDT was used for decades 
before serious attention was given to its adverse effects, which had been hitherto noticed only by a few 
scientists. Significant campaigning against the massive use of this chemical only started in the early 1960s, 
after several decades of massive use worldwide. Asbestos and lead, two naturally occurring chemicals, had 
harmful effects on health that were known in part since ancient times (at least for lead), but serious regulation 
of their production and use took often decades to be imposed (with the United States only banning lead-based 
paints in 1971, Europe lagging at least a decade after the US to ban lead in gasoline etc.) – industry associations 
during this whole time made considerable efforts to resist regulations and try and discredit scientific expertise 
that showed the hazards caused by these materials. 
We have chosen these few examples on purpose, as particularly well known. They have in common massive 
adverse effects, and the fact that they were marketed as perfectly safe and warranting little or no precaution 
(thalidomide and diethylstilbestrol were indeed specifically targeted as pregnant women, the most vulnerable 
population of all). In some cases, active dissimulation was involved – adverse effects were well known and 
hidden. In others, adverse effects were not really known, but no efforts were made to investigate whether the 
compound was really safe, and it was intensively marketed as such. They should remind us that, when 
individual citizens, NGOs or indeed scientists are sceptical about claims of innocuity, they are not refusing 
“scientific advice” (as Ballantine and others would put it) but showing legitimate caution in front of statements 
that probably overstate the confidence we should really have in many products’ harmlessness. Being sure of 
the (absolute or relative) harmlessness of chemical compounds that are novel and are being put into massive 
production is extremely difficult, if not impossible, at least in a short timeframe. Deciding between a 
precautionary stance and a more “growth oriented” one is a matter of balancing risks, opportunities, and 
uncertainty – it is a matter on which a rational conversation can be had, and rational people on both sides can 
                                                           
452 Given the make-up of the Steering Group for this report, with many industry representatives, the “groups” are clearly meant mostly 
to refer to NGOs – but could also be understood more broadly. 
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disagree. It is not a topic where a simple “scientific truth” can be told and any disagreement should be seen 
as baseless obscurantism. 
 
Openness and transparency are indispensable to build trust 
Using “science” as a foundation for risk-based regulation, and specifically risk-based inspections and 
enforcement, is thus not a simple matter of following “science” as if it were just one clear set of directives. We 
would argue that the first step is building real trust through transparency, including transparency about 
uncertainties and disagreements. Not paying attention to uncertainties, full transparency and the need to 
clearly show divergences of opinions may have been one of the causes for the controversy surrounding the 
former Chief Scientific Advisor (CSA) to the President of the European Commission, whose office was not 
renewed under the new Commission: “if her mission is to strengthen the role of science within the policy 
process, it is manifest that the CSA cannot and should not do that alone. It is only by rendering public a possible 
divergence between her advice and the political decision that the CSA’s ontological mission to promote science 
in government could be accomplished. Of course, this is not to suggest that scientific input should prime over 
other sources of advice, but that when a tension exists between the two this should be rendered public” 
(Alemanno 2014)453. 
If scientific advice is to be any use in making the public trust the risk-based approaches of inspectorates, and 
their claims to an adequate balance of costs and benefits, the scientific advice itself needs to be trusted. 
However, in some instances, this trust has been harmed considerably by prior experience (see above), and by 
what is seen as attempts to push policy decisions that result from choices and prioritizations as “the only 
choice”. Transparency is needed on what are the uncertainties, the options and the costs associated with each 
one. Scientific advice should not mean advocating only one policy option, at least in many or most cases, but 
rather laying out clearly the upsides and downsides of different options. When significant uncertainty is 
involved, different scenarios should be sketched out, the costs of different options clearly presented, as well 
as their potential benefits.  
If we take an issue like EDCs, simply stating that their risk to human health is “hypothetical at best, possibly 
illusory, and certainly never scientifically established454” appears to be an overstatement that is damaging to 
the cause being advocated, because in front of the evidence already collected (WHO UNEP 2012, which comes 
on top of 10 years of research after the first 2002 report), this appears at best as an overstatement, at worst 
like as fully misleading. It does not ensue that the decision should be an “outright ban” (which Julie Girling is 
advocating against) – but certainly the policy debate cannot simply be dismissed by trying to disparage or 
dismiss the findings of what appears to be the clear majority of scientists specialized in this field. 
In conclusion, while scientific advice is an indispensable element of proper risk-based approaches to 
inspections and enforcement, it can in no way provide the sole source of rules, decisions, guidelines and 
practices. It is essential to understand and acknowledge that political decisions will be needed, based on values 
– as well as “technical” decisions by inspection officials, based also on values, combined with experience and 
a variety of heuristics. Combining a form of “precautionary principle” with a risk-based approach to inspections 
is not necessarily a contradiction. Precaution can be understood as a tool to use in the face of uncertainty, and 
it would not be impossible for a regulator to decide to be precautionary in the face of risks that cannot be 
assessed with certainty, but to otherwise make its approach proportional to risks in terms of requirements 
and enforcement decisions, and targeted on risks in terms of resources. The precautionary principle would 
just be in this way a heuristic tool to assign a rating to hazards that are subject to high uncertainty. A 
                                                           
453 See Blanc, Macrae and Ottimofiore 2015 p. 59 for a summary on this controversy. 




“precautionary” regulator would give a higher rating to these than a non-precautionary one, but could still 
adopt and practice a risk-based approach overall. 
In addition, in order to ensure trust and thus build support for their approach, regulators need to ensure that, 
whenever a decision is based on scientific advice or findings, they also set forth clearly what are the different 
values at stake, and if there is any actual or potential conflict between them. Acknowledging such conflicts is 
far more conducive to constructive engagement from all stakeholders with the advice given, whereas denying 
them by presenting the implicit values that form the advice’s foundation as the only possible approach is 
creating strong negative reactions455 (most scientific advice takes it as a given that safeguarding as many lives 
as possible is the main goal – but there are other values, like freedom or specific religious rules, for instance, 
that many citizens may see as deserving as much, or more, consideration – in other cases, advice incorporates 
an implicit “cost effectiveness” element, without discussing the alternatives, etc.). 
In addition, it is important that “scientific advice” is understood not only as input from natural sciences into 
policy decisions involving technological and natural risks, but also as taking into account social sciences. This 
means first having social sciences give input into the policy advice on those policies aiming to address 
technological and natural risks, to ensure that issues related to behaviours, compliance etc. are adequately 
addressed, and that thus the presentation of policy options and their likely effects is realistic (see Wilsdon 
2014). This is of major importance because, as a result, policies in social matters tend to be in many cases 
based far more on preconceptions and ideologies and far less on evidence. This also has serious implications 
for the legitimacy of all scientific advice and public support to evidence based policy: as long as it appears to 
be “cherry picked” and apply only to some issues, it is far more difficult to build broad-based consensus for 
it456. Considering findings from social sciences in regulatory matters is, precisely, what “smarter inspections” 
are about. 
 
c. Applying risk-based approaches to inspections 
 
Having attempted to summarize some of the main issues pertaining to the interactions of risk and regulation, 
and before we turn to examining in more details practical examples, it is time to consider the application of 
risk-based approaches to inspection from a general, part-theoretical and part-practical perspective. We will 
first consider the rationale for specifically basing inspections on risk (as distinct from “regulation” more 
broadly), then look at what are the main elements that appear to characterize “risk-based inspections” in the 
existing literature, and from there try to conclude on the theoretical basis for risk-based approaches in 
inspections and enforcement. 
 
i. From risk regulation to risk-based inspections 
 
                                                           
455 A policymaking process where the values and voices of stakeholders are not adequately represented will lose legitimacy – in 
contrast, procedural justice (irrespective of what the final decision is) will build legitimacy and thus acceptance of the policy decision 
in the end – see e.g. Maguire and Lind 2003. 
456 At the risk of being somewhat over-simplistic: much (but certainly not all) scientific advice on the risk of different products and 
technologies may end up showing that risks are acceptable and support broadly speaking “pro-business” policies. Broadly speaking 
“left-wing” groups tend to be skeptical of scientific advisory bodies as a result. Were scientific advice to also include social issues and 
social science, a quick look at the prevailing scientific evidence and consensus suggests that it may often result in supporting policies 
that are supported by these same groups that oppose the “pro-business” policies. By demonstrating that scientific advice and evidence 
is not “cherry picked” but used throughout all policy areas, it could contribute to broader support and acceptance, based on procedural 
justice effects (see above). 
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Risk-based inspections are not just a narrower field, a sub-section of a broader “risk and regulation” field – 
they are also one that has specific drivers, concerns and tools. While overall it is not only possible but 
legitimate to put them in the perspective of the broader risk regulation studies, it is also essential to 
understand this specificity.  
BRDO’s 2012 Common Approach to Risk Assessment outlines the different levels at which “risk assessment” 
(and, more broadly, risk-based approaches) can be applied in the regulatory sphere: “strategic risk”, “priorities 
between national and local risk”, “operational risk”, “risk assessment of individual businesses” and 
“sanctioning according to risk” (pp. 3-4). In this outline, “strategic risk” corresponds to the overall strategy of 
the regulatory body, the key risks that it is its mandate to control. The setting of national or local priorities is 
in some ways UK-specific, given the importance of local regulation in the British system (though this 
articulation of different priorities can also be relevant to many other countries). “Operational risk” refers to 
the level where interventions are designed, the choice of regulatory instruments and tools made. The two last 
stages correspond to the classification of establishments according to risk (which is the basis for risk-based 
inspections, but can also be used for e.g. licensing), and to risk-proportionate enforcement. 
We want to suggest here a slightly modified version of these different levels of risk-based regulation457: 
strategic risk assessment, operational risk assessment, risk-based targeting and risk-proportionate 
enforcement. The first deals with the policy-making level: what risks to regulate, and how. The second deal 
with the choice of implementation methods: what regulatory tools to use for which risks and situations. The 
third covers the targeting of inspections (and possibly of other regulatory tools). The last one deals with 
enforcement. While this classification is clearly based on that elaborated by BRDO, we think it introduces 
useful nuances and is more broadly applicable. 
Mertens (2011) suggests a classification that focuses more on the risk assessment and management stages 
that take place within an inspectorate (p. 271). His classification has two broad levels. First a systemic one, 
which corresponds to the strategic inspection framework, defining priorities and programming. The output of 
the systemic stage is a classification of categories of risk level per type of establishment, and an action 
programme. Second, an operational level, which corresponds to the operational organization of inspections, 
involving information gathering and definition of specific focus. The output of this stage is an overview of 
results of prior inspections for each establishment, and an inspections plan.  
There are several fundamental differences between what one could call the “macro” (strategy), “meso” 
(operational) and “micro” (targeting, enforcement) levels. While at the first level policy-makers operate at a 
rather high level of abstraction, and take decisions based on overall highly “aggregated” risk assessments, the 
“meso” level is already concerned with more concrete situations, and decisions that will translate into 
concrete differences for businesses – depending on which regulatory instruments are selected for different 
categories. The “micro” level, in turn, deals with individual cases (businesses, establishments), allocates them 
in one or the other category, and takes decisions based on findings on the ground. Thus, the first crucial 
difference is that one goes from abstract categories to individual cases. 
The second essential difference is that the operational and “individual cases” levels all operate within the 
framework given by the strategic risk assessment. If the policy decision has been taken that a given category 
of risk will be addressed through regulation, then this is a given, which forms the environment within which 
lower level assessments and decisions will be made. The strategic level is where analysis such as Regulatory 
Impact Assessments can take place. At the operational level, the question is not anymore whether to regulate, 
but what instruments to use in order to best implement a regulatory decision already taken, with the available 
                                                           
457 This relies on an internal World Bank Group paper, which was developed jointly with Wafa’ Aranki and Lars Grava, both of the World 
Bank Group. They deserve equal credits for this.  
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resources, and taking into account what is known of the target groups, of compliance drivers, etc. Finally, at 
the individual cases level, the decision concerns first allocation of resources (given finite staff-hours, where 
will they be most useful) and how to respond to a given situation. 
Whereas policy makers can, in practice, decide to regulate even if a realistic assessment would indicate that 
resources are insufficient, the regulation ill-designed, the goals unachievable – inspectorates cannot stretch 
resources beyond what they have. Thus, if they do not prioritize they will generally end up having to visit an 
unrealistically high number of premises (or check an unrealistically high number of products), meaning that 
each inspection will have to be very short. There are only three possibilities in the absence of risk-based 
planning: “blanket” coverage (every establishment/product is controlled), random inspections, or selection on 
a basis other than risk. In the first case, each inspection will have to be so short (except in rare cases of 
inspectorates dealing with a very small field) that it will be essentially useless – and, in fact, within a given 
establishment inspectors will be unable to control everything, hence there will be selectivity anyway (by 
default). In the second, there is formal “equality” (everyone has equal chances of being visited), but no 
uniformity in fact (some are visited, some not), and a clearly less-than-optimal resource allocation. In the third 
case, in the absence of a rational, somewhat objective instrument for selection, inspections end up being 
targeted based on convenience of inspectors, potential for flattering numbers (of fines, for instance), or rent-
seeking. In other words, risk-based inspections are not an alternative to “non-selective” inspections, but to 
“selective by default” (see e.g. Blanc 2012, p. 31). 
 
ii. Understanding what “risk-based inspections” entail 
 
We have used so far a variety of related expressions to refer to our field of research, reflecting the diversity 
that is in use among both scholars and practitioners, and the different aspects that “risk-based approaches”, 
broadly speaking, can take when applied to inspections. It is time for us to both specify more narrowly how 
we understand these different terms, and to consider what practices these refer to in the inspections field, 
based on the existing literature (both academic and originating from international organizations or state 
institutions).  
“Risk-based inspections” are the broadest term: it refers to inspections approaches and practices that, 
generally speaking, are based on the notion of risk, and the idea that the regulatory response should be linked 
to the assessment of risk. “Risk-based planning” or “risk-targeted inspections” refer to the practice of linking 
the planning of inspection visits to the risk assessment of individual establishments (or, at least, of groups of 
establishments) – in one form or another, it is probably the most widespread form of “risk-based inspections”, 
and also the meaning that most authors and practitioners are likely to associate immediately with the 
qualification “risk-based”. “Risk-proportionate” inspections and/or enforcement refer to practices linking 
what is checked during the inspection visit, the importance given to different issues, as well as the way the 
inspection is followed up on (including enforcement decisions, if any) to the level of risk as assessed “on the 
ground”.  
Finally, there is a more comprehensive understanding of “smart”, risk-based inspection practices that has not 
really been named adequately to date, and includes risk-based planning as well as risk-proportionality, but 
also goes beyond to incorporate a risk-differentiated approach in terms of selecting tools for compliance 
promotion (i.e. not only relying on inspection visits), and a far greater emphasis on information and guidance. 
This approach is grounded on a complex vision of compliance drivers, and seeks to make use of all of them at 
the same time. It corresponds to what the British now call “better regulatory delivery” (for which the Better 
Regulatory Delivery Office is responsible – but this is even broader since it includes other regulatory 
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instruments than inspections, e.g. licensing etc.). In specific discussions (when we try and “disaggregate” 
terms), we will refer to this as “smart inspections” – but in other cases, we will understand this to represent 
the “fullest expression” of “risk-based inspections”. In other words, a fully risk-based approach to inspections 
will include targeting based on risk-assessment, focus during visits and enforcement decisions proportional to 
risk, and compliance promotion approaches which are differentiated based on risk (and on compliance drivers 
analysis). We will now take a slightly closer look to these different elements. 
 
Risk-based targeting and planning 
 
Before discussing the specifics of the criteria and tools used for risk-based targeting, a short preliminary 
discussion is required of a closely-related issue: the question of reactive versus proactive planning of 
inspections.  
 
Reactive and proactive inspections 
Inspection agencies can visit establishments either because they respond to a complaint or request (or a tip-
off of some sort), or on the basis of their own planning, without any external trigger. Following a distinction 
introduced by Black (1970) for police work, Tilindyte (2012) refers to these two ways in which inspections can 
be initiated as “reactive” and “proactive”, and this is a terminology used by a number of regulatory agencies 
themselves, at least in the EU. In other parts of the world, different labels may be used – in former Soviet 
countries, “proactive” inspections are known as “planned”, and “reactive” ones as “unplanned”. Whatever the 
words used, the distinction is widespread, and the vast majority of inspection agencies we have studied had a 
combination of both reactive and proactive work – but with very different proportions of each. In some rare 
cases, inspectorates even function nearly exclusively on the basis of complaints (reactive inspections). 
Having reviewed the existing literature, as well as considered the issue from a theoretical perspective, Tilindyte 
(2012) comes to the provisional conclusion that complaints are more cost-effective, but that “only a small 
proportion of OSH violations are likely to come to the labour inspectorates’ attention through private 
complaining”. By contrast, “proactive policies (…) enable a more comprehensive, preventative and systematic 
approach to inspection” (pp. 42-43). Considering the specific experience of England and Wales, she concludes 
that inspectors mostly “do not view complaints as especially helpful” as “many of them are ill-informed” (p. 
120). Inspectors in Germany reported problems linked to a “high number of complaints” coming from 
“disguised competitors” (p. 180). In other words, the quality of complaints-based information is frequently 
problematic in the OSH sphere.  
If we consider other areas, the information basis for reactive inspections appears just as problematic, although 
in different directions. As shown by Bentata and Faure (2015), environmental complaints by private persons 
tend to be strongly biased towards “nuisances” rather than very significant pollution issues, and cannot form 
a sound basis for enforcement activity (and while their work shows NGOs picking up a significant amount of 
the serious cases in France, it cannot be assumed that this will be the case everywhere). In consumer issues, 
van Boom and Loos (2007) show that in the cases of repeated infringements with only limited loss for 
consumers (“trifle loss” problem), there is generally under-litigation (and, frequently, under-reporting). The 
propensity to complaint, in addition, is strongly linked to a number of social and cultural parameters. A recent 
OECD study of regulations in Lithuania (2015) shows that there is a real problem of excessive use of reactive 
inspections by the market surveillance inspectorate, and that the vast majority of complaints are trivial, or 
relate to issues that are not regulated by law (pp. 133-134). 
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“Proactivity” and “reactivity” are linked to the issue of risk-based targeting (or its absence), but in a somewhat 
complex way. In principle, complaints and other “tip-offs” can and should be integrated within a well thought-
through risk-based targeting model. In practice, however, inspectorates that rely very strongly on complaints 
tend to have a very weak risk-orientation, if any. While Black (1970) focused on the bias in registering crime, 
there are a variety of major biases in complaints. These biases result from different cultures and perceptions, 
cost-benefits issues, social position (conditioning ease of access to “formal channels”), relationships with the 
objects of the complaint, etc. It can in no way be assumed that complaints will yield valuable information: 
many of them may be trivial, some are likely to be malevolent and dishonest, and if an agency simply follows 
up on each and every one of them, it will be stretched so thin that it may be unable to properly respond to the 
important ones. 
As we will consider in more details in the third part of this research, inspectorates such as the Lithuanian 
market surveillance for which reactive work makes up more than half of all inspections tend not to be the 
“best practice” around. Systematic follow up of all complaints by an inspection tends to be frequent in post-
Soviet or post-Communist systems, e.g. in Mongolia where more than 60% of the visits conducted by the 
General Agency for Specialized Inspections (GASI)458 are “unplanned”, i.e. complaints-based. 
Rather, external sources of information can and should be incorporated into a risk-based analytical mode. As 
Tilindyte (2012) shows, this is the case for OSH in England and Wales, where the Health and Safety Executive 
handles complaints based on a series of factors, which allow to determine whether an investigation should 
take place (p. 119), and which include the potential or actual harm, past performance of the establishment, 
enforcement priorities, etc. A risk-based consideration of complaints can also take into account the existence 
of other (previous) complaints relating to the same establishment (which can be part of “past performance”), 
as well as the degree to which the complaint is substantiated. Conversely, in order to have up-to-date risk 
information on each establishment, an inspectorate needs to try and incorporate not only complaints, but 
other sources of information – coming from other inspectorates, the media, internet monitoring etc. 
On balance, however, it appears clear that a risk-based approach to inspections means that an overwhelming 
majority of inspections would be proactive, and data-driven, rather than reactive and complaints-driven. It is 
worth noting that this relates to one of the key differences between regulatory inspections and police work 
(and more broadly crime-fighting work): most of the objects of inspections (establishments) are known, and 
the issue is to manage to estimate their risk level – whereas in criminal matters, identifying the culprits is 
precisely the main problem (and, in “victimless crime”, identifying the crime itself). This is not to say that 
detection problems are not important (cf. Baldwin and Black 2008), but (at least for the most relevant 
inspection functions in terms of numbers), the universe of establishments is known, and the planning task is 
to determine where to go in priority. The primary objective is prevention, not response (even though response 
also matters). By contrast, even though police work aims overall at preventing (reducing, containing) crime, 
its operational focus is to a large extent based on response (even though of course there is a large amount of 
preventive action, e.g. patrolling). For these reasons, the significance of the reactive work as identified by Black 
(1970) for police work is far lower for inspections459. Bardach and Kagan (1982) make this very same point that 
“enforcement of protective regulation by inspectors is different” from typically law enforcement as 
                                                           
458 The GASI gathers most inspection functions, except fire safety and revenue (tax, customs). Based on internal (unpublished) GASI 
data for 2013 and 2014. 
459 We posit here a strong difference between “regulatory inspections and enforcement” and “police work/criminal law enforcement”. 
This difference is far from always being obvious, there are many “grey areas” and complex interrelationships, but on balance we think 
that the difference in fundamental focus is meaningful. It would have to be further investigated and discussed in future research. It is 
worth noting that we are far from the first to make this point, and to note that criminal law approaches are not necessarily the most 
effective or efficient for regulatory issues (see for another perspective on this Simpson 2002, investigating what she calls the “punitive 
model of corporate crime control” (p. 10), and concluding to its inadaptation to business regulation issues). 
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“inspectors sometimes respond to complaints, but they usually come on their own initiative to enterprises 
that have not been accused of any wrongdoing. They search for ongoing violations, things that might go wrong 
in the future” (p. 31). The question then is how best to select these places to proactively visit. 
 
Targeting and planning in practice – the data issue 
Selecting enterprises to be (proactively) inspected based on their risk profile is so essential to risk-based 
approaches that the two are often identified, i.e. that many lose sight of the fact that a proper “risk-based 
approach” includes more than targeting. We have already outlined above that the foundation of risk 
classification for inspections is to combine the likelihood of harm with its potential severity and magnitude. 
Doing so in an effective way requires disaggregating the processes that may lead to harm, in order to 
understand what are the causes of the harms that the inspectorate seeks to prevent, and to ensure focus on 
the right issues and establishments (cf. Mertens 2011 pp. 272-273).  
There are different ways to structure the classification that is to form the instrument for planning. One 
approach (BRDO 2012, World Bank Group 2013 a) is to form a matrix with two axes – one corresponding to 
the likelihood of harm (including the likelihood of non-compliance, but not limited to it – World Bank Group 
version) or the likelihood of violation (BRDO version), and the second to the potential severity and magnitude. 
In such an approach, intrinsic risk and management risk are somewhat aggregated in the way they are 
presented (even though, analytically, they are to be handled separately). Another is the approach presented 
by Mertens (2011, pp. 273-274) where the risk classification is done purely on the basis of intrinsic risk, and 
then a level of inspection priority is determined by crossing the resulting risk level with the compliance history 
or expectation (management risk).  
In any case, a fully-fledged risk-based targeting is to take into account a set of risk components that includes 
(a) intrinsic risk of the activity (hazardousness), (b) scope/size of the activity (number of people who could be 
affected, or other relevant indicator), (c) additional relevant vulnerability factors (e.g. types of populations 
affected, location etc.), (d) likelihood of harm. This last element can be itself split between intrinsic likelihood 
(which can be combined into “intrinsic risk”, or not – in which case intrinsic likelihood and intrinsic severity 
are handled separately) and management-related likelihood, or “compliance risk”. The relative weight that is 
given to each of these factors can vary (even though most “matrix” models suggest that severity and likelihood 
should overall be given equal consideration, precise methodologies are diverse). The ways in which these are 
rated, graded, measured etc. also varies considerably, with some agencies having far more sophisticated and 
“data-driven” models, some far more “qualitative” approaches (see Baldwin and Black 2010). The use of 
“qualitative” indicators does not mean the rating systems are necessarily simple – the Food Standards Agency 
in England and Wales has indicators that are mostly not data-driven, but a rating system that incorporates a 
number of dimensions and a sophisticated set of check-lists (cf. Blanc 2012 p. 33). 
Once a classification has been created, as well as a grading/rating tool to assign a risk rating or category to 
each establishment (or product, or more generally “inspection object”), targeting involves assigning a category 
or rating to each concrete object, and to decide on an actual plan of inspections. These are two conceptually 
separate processes (whichever way they are actually conducted in practice). 
If we look first at the question of planning, it involves matching resources to the needs, establishing “typical 
frequencies” for different risk categories, and also adding (or not) an element of “random selection”. Here the 
most practically logical approach would involve deciding first only on an optimal frequency of visits for the 
highest risk category, then adjust it downwards if existing resources do not allow to implement it, and only 
then look at factually possible frequencies for lower categories, given existing staff and average duration of 
inspections. There are, however, many cases of frequencies assigned for all categories based on more-or-less 
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arbitrary estimations of what is “adequate”, which then may or may not be feasible given available resources. 
In any case, the guiding principle of a risk-based approach is that high risk establishments should be visited far 
more regularly and frequently, that low-risk ones may not even warrant regular visits at all, and that the 
classification should be done in a way that results in only a minority of businesses being at the “peak” of the 
“risk pyramid” (World Bank Group 2013 a). In order to keep a “reality check” of whether the classification and 
ratings are adequate, and to avoid creating incentives for non-compliance for low-risk businesses, it is often 
accepted that keeping some level of (rare) randomly selected inspection cases for the low-risk category is a 
valid approach (see Baldwin and Black 2010, Sparrow 2008 et al.). 
While the classification and the “indicative frequencies” for each category provide the tools for the actual 
planning, replacing abstract categories with actual “targets”, establishments to be visited, requires data as a 
foundation – at a minimum, a list (database) of all establishments under supervision, with at least some 
fundamental information on the most important parameters that allow to determine the risk level. In some 
cases, the database can be very sophisticated, and be paired with an automated case selection system (which 
also takes care of matching frequency of visits with available resources, etc.) – in most cases, the systems are 
less sophisticated and require a significant human input. In any case data is, in a number of jurisdictions and 
agencies, the weakest link. There are, however, frequent misconceptions around this, so it is important to 
distinguish what is absolutely necessary from what is “good to have”, and to understand what is the real level 
of operational challenges and resources involved. 
A common assumption is that putting in place effective data systems for risk-based targeting and management 
of inspections would be very costly, and that moving to a risk-based approach is thus a major investment for 
an inspectorate – which, in turn, can be a reason to settle for avowedly inferior approaches to inspections. 
Such an assumption underlies for instance Tilindyte’s statement that “proactive monitoring” has “generally 
high costs”, “especially if it is to be based on a comprehensive risk assessment” (2012, p. 42). Baldwin (2007) 
expresses similar concerns, with more specifics: “a further tension (…) may arise out of the Government’s 
desires (a) to reduce quite significantly the burdens of supplying information (…) and (b) to ensure that 
regulators target their enforcement activities more precisely (…) The problems are, first, that the targeting of 
enforcement demands that inspections and other actions are based on intelligence and, secondly, that if the 
obligations of businesses to supply information to regulators are reduced, it is increasingly difficult for 
regulators to engage in targeting without generating intelligence independently. Such independent generation 
of data may, of course, prove hugely expensive for regulators – indeed far more expensive for them than for 
the businesses that they are controlling” (p. 40). There are many points here, which all deserve to be properly 
addressed. 
First, in theory, it may be true that building an information database on objects under supervision and a risk-
based targeting system from scratch may be expensive. Similarly, regularly gathering information “in a 
vacuum”, i.e. launching extensive investigations, would certainly be costly for an inspectorate. In fact, any 
form of information gathering has costs (even processing data submissions by businesses), and there is no 
doubt that making a planning system more data-driven will increase somewhat data-related costs. Finally, 
assuming the information submitted by businesses is adequate, it is clearly cheaper for the regulators to push 
the information collection burden on them. All these points, however, rely on assumptions that are 
fundamentally at odds with reality, at least as observed in most cases. 
The first inaccurate assumption is that such information database would have to be built from zero – in fact, 
most inspectorates around the world have been operating for years or decades and, at least in OECD countries, 
the vast majority already have databases of objects under supervision, even if these may be managed through 
sometimes outdated software, or be partially incomplete etc. Furthermore, gathering data on establishments 
under supervision is something that naturally occurs anyway as part of each inspection. Given that, in fact, the 
inspection coverage tends to be far higher than suggested by studies focusing on only one agency (sometimes 
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“marginal” in terms of volume of activity), inspectorates gather each year a considerable volume of data simply 
as part of their normal control activities. The problem is that this data is often not managed properly, i.e. not 
entered into systems that would make it useful for further analysis and planning. Another difficulty is that in 
many contexts inspectorates do not share information among themselves, which reduces the number of 
establishments they can cover in a given year (cf. Blanc 2012 pp. 21-25 and 77-80). In other words, the already 
are considerable “sunk costs” whereby inspectorates have collected or are regularly collecting information, 
through their main activity i.e. inspections – the problem is how to best make use of this existing data. 
A second highly problematic assumption is that whatever information is filed by businesses will be accurate (if 
not fully, then at least mostly). This is, based on our experience, unlikely to be always true, and in fact unlikely 
to be the case precisely on some of the businesses where information is most needed. Indeed, if we come back 
to our compliance models, and the proposed typology of different profiles, precisely the establishments which 
are the least likely to comply are also the least likely to submit truthful information, as they will correctly 
understand that this information may be used for risk-based profiling460. As for those who are inclined to 
voluntary compliance, burdensome information collection is likely to create resistance and to overall lead to 
a decrease in compliance. Thus, it is unlikely that relying strongly on information submitted by businesses 
themselves is ever a very good idea. It is, in some cases, relevant and necessary – but it should remain simple, 
and certainly not be the sole (or even the main) source of data461. This is not to say, again, that business-
reported data cannot be useful – but that in any case it never could be sufficient. This is particularly obvious if 
one thinks of the case of “fly by night” businesses, i.e. those who try to stay invisible and operate partly or 
fully illegally, and without control. Both Sparrow (2008) and Baldwin and Black (2008, 2010) discuss in some 
depth these cases. Clearly, detection of such businesses will not be improved by relying on reporting 
obligations462. Rather, inspectorates need to rely on a combination of tools to “spot” businesses operating 
“under the radar”: tip-offs and complaints, “physical” monitoring (verifying whether visibly operating premises 
are listed in the database), online monitoring (looking for signs of activity, e.g. websites, advertisements or 
social media comments, and checking whether the business is listed), and information sharing between 
regulators (if one of them detects an unregistered business, all of them should be notified). This shows how 
much active data collection is, in any case, a condition of effective supervision, with or without risk-based 
approach. 
More effective sharing of information between different state bodies (and in particular between those which 
have a regulatory and/or supervisory function) is indeed an essential element of “smarter regulation”, if by 
this we understand a way of regulating that would be both more efficient and more effective. This is 
particularly true when it comes specifically to risk-based inspections – information sharing is key to improving 
data on establishments/products under supervision, and making sure risk information is comprehensive and 
up-to-date. It is important to remind that, again, this is not only linked to the introduction of risk-based 
inspections. A number of governments have put in place, or are trying to introduce, policies or tools to avoid 
duplicating information requests, and ensuring that information collected once is shared across all of the 
public administration463. Some examples include the abolition of the use of certificates in the relations 
                                                           
460 See a detailed account of such problems in Bardach and Kagan 1982, pp. 90-91 – they write, in summary: “Documentation, by its 
very nature, is a declaration of innocence, and most of it is received by officials who ignore it almost entirely” (p. 90). 
461 Enterprise-submitted information is primarily useful to simply notify existence of an establishment – through business registration 
(for all establishments) or for specific activities (e.g. EU-wide notification of food business operations). These are also relatively “risky” 
for the business to evade, at least if the activity is easy to detect. Another case where information is more likely to be truthful is high 
risk, large scale businesses where inspections are frequent. In fact, for such businesses, relationships with regulators tend to be 
“ongoing”, and this is not really the target group for reducing reporting requirements. 
462 One could argue that punitive sanctions for non-reporting could strengthen deterrence, but for all the reasons exposed in the 
compliance section, this is not very likely to work for most cases. 
463 As much as privacy legislation allows. In some cases, privacy concerns and/or applicable laws have been making information sharing 
more difficult, but this is a concern that is stronger in the case of citizen rather than business information, and in any case goes beyond 
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between private persons and the public administration in Italy464, or the Netherlands’ Stelsel van 
Basisregistraties (“System of Basic Registrations”, in other words a system of unified registries465). More 
recently, France has embarked in a similar direction with the programme “Dîtes le nous une fois”, which aims 
at avoiding duplicate requests and submissions of similar information466. At the EU level, important 
instruments have long been helping with exchange of information on emerging hazards in food and non-food 
product markets (RASFF for food and RAPEX for non-food467).  
Specifically in the inspections field, information sharing can be done in a number of ways. At the local level, 
the fact that most inspection fields are under a single department under local authorities in the UK means that 
there is a good amount of information sharing going on between them, and there is ongoing work to develop 
information systems that will make this sharing more systematic and easier – and also ensure that sharing 
happens between different regions468. In the Netherlands, two systems have been developed to allow for more 
effective sharing of information between inspectorates (Inspectie View469) – and to allow inspectorates to 
access a trove of data on the business, avoiding duplicate submissions, specific queries etc. 
(Ondernemingsdossier – “Enterprise File”470). In Italy, a somewhat similar system has been created, first at the 
regional level (in Emilia Romagna since 2011) – with an extension to the national level now decided upon – 
the Registro unico dei controlli (“Unified Registry of Inspections”) for the agricultural (and agricultural 
processing) sector, which allows inspectors of all relevant agencies to see records of all inspections, even by 
other agencies471. Clearly, much is happening in this direction – however, the existence of many legacy systems 
and institutional barriers mean that integration is done ex post, in a relatively uneasy way, and without 
automation (it all relies on inspectors actually using the system to make queries). The Inspectieloket portal 
even suggests that the decision to have different Inspectie View for different domains was done to avoid 
                                                           
the scope of our research at this stage. The very real trade-off between privacy and burden is often poorly perceived, and this is clearly 
an area where more efforts should go both in terms of research and of policy discussions. 
464 Requesting certificates is in fact prohibited and would be a violation for civil servants – as per Law n. 183 of 12 Nov. 2011. See 
explanation on the website of the Office for Administrative Simplification: http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/lazione-del-
ministro/decertificazione---direttiva-n-142011/la-direttiva-del-ministro-per-la-pubblica-amministrazione-e-la-semplificazione.aspx.  
465 See detailed presentation of the system here: http://www.digitaleoverheid.nl/onderwerpen/stelselinformatiepunt/stelsel-van-
basisregistraties. 
466 A principle that is inspired e.g. by previous experiences in the Netherlands. On the French programme, see the following website: 
http://www.modernisation.gouv.fr/les-services-publics-se-simplifient-et-innovent/par-des-simplifications-pour-les-entreprises/dites-
le-nous-une-fois-un-programme-pour-simplifier-la-vie-des-entreprises.  
467 See on the European Commission website: http://ec.europa.eu/food/safety/rasff/index_en.htm on RASFF, and 
http://ec.europa.eu/consumers/consumers_safety/safety_products/rapex/index_en.htm on RAPEX. See also the first chapter of this 
research on the creation and development of RASFF. 
468 Which, in the past (and even currently), has been a significant problem at least in some areas. See e.g. Ogus, Faure and Philipsen 
(2006) p. 40, which underlines the problem with various risk-assessment models (something the 2012 BRDO Common Framework was 
precisely created to address). 
469 The system has gradually developed over several years and was created to allow any inspector to access data from other 
inspectorates on a given establishment/object – in particular prior inspection records. There is a general level (Inspecte View Bedrijven 
– “Inspection View for Companies”) which can be used for planning and aggregates inspections and results from Social Affairs, 
Environment and Transport, Food and Non-Food Products Inspectorates. There are then several “specialized Inspectie View” with a 
deeper level of information sharing (greater wealth of information, e.g. on permits etc.) – for inland transport and environment (for 
now). For more information, see Inspectieloket portal: http://www.inspectieloket.nl/organisatie/index/ - and detailed files at the 
project webpage: http://www.informatieuitwisselingmilieu.nl/publicaties.php?id=11.  
470 The “Company File” allows to access all the information the company decides to make available – it is being rolled out gradually, by 
sub-sector of the economy, as it is run by businesses, not by the public administration. More information is available at: 
http://www.ondernemingsdossier.nl/. The “Company File” can be seen as an attempt to not only avoid duplication of reporting 
requirements, but also to access more information from businesses and thus make overall planning and targeting more effective (see 
Baldwin and Black 2008 p. 31 on the importance of mobilizing the private sector in gathering information).  
471 For the Emilia Romagna experience, see on the Region’s portal: http://agrea.regione.emilia-romagna.it/servizi/accesso-agli-




“unnecessary and excessive complexity and size of data”. This appears, if one considers the “state of the art”, 
to be more of a fig leaf than a genuine problem. 
In fact, several jurisdictions have gone much further and created fully integrated databases for most inspection 
types (generally excluding fiscal ones), linked to a management system that directly uses the data and risk 
management guidelines to produce an inspection plan (and in some cases even assign cases directly to 
inspectors) – not to mention other features for inspections results recording, data analysis etc. These cases 
and best practices, which are mostly to be found in reports prepared by international organizations such as 
the World Bank Group (2014 b) and the OECD (cf. Blanc 2012 pp. 77-80), mostly (though not exclusively) come 
from emerging markets (broadly defined). With a lower presence of legacy systems, relatively lower 
institutional resistance, and the rapid technological progress (which lowers costs from year to year), it has 
been possible to set up systems that are far more advanced and effective. In fact, what appeared particularly 
difficult and costly a few years ago is now far more feasible (e.g. having a fully integrated database across most 
inspectorates) – but it requires significant decisions (political and technical), and good management.  
In short, the important conclusion is that even really advanced and integrated systems are increasingly 
“feasible”, and with certainty simpler systems of data collection and management are fully possible to 
implement even with relatively constrained budgets. Of course, any data collection and management system 
will have costs, and implementing analysis-driven planning will have costs relative to “rule of thumb” targeting 
– but these costs are far from being as considerable as suggested by several authors (which maybe relied too 
much on the testimony of regulators themselves, who may have their own motives for being reluctant), many 
data collection activities are anyway necessary (and it is just about using this data more efficiently), and there 
are considerable costs (in effectiveness) in the status quo. As we have noted above, such efforts to achieve 
more consolidation and sharing of data can be challenged based on privacy concerns (and privacy and data 
protection legislation, in some cases). There are very different perspectives on what is the appropriate level 
of privacy and data protection in different countries, and it is obvious that implementing such new systems 
would be more difficult e.g. in Germany than in the UK, from this perspective. Because the information at issue 
is corporate rather than personal, and because of the overwhelming case to be made from an efficiency and 
effectiveness perspective, we do not think such concerns should stand in the way of data sharing in the field 
of regulatory inspections of economic activities (as distinct from other areas where data sharing may be 
considered, and which are not the object of our research). Indeed, in countries where efforts at data 
consolidation and integration have been made (the UK, the Netherlands with Inspectie View and the 
“Company File”, Italy with the Registro Unico Controlli, etc.), the parties directly affected (the businesses) have 
been in favour of the change, and have not generally voiced concerns. It remains that it may be different in 
other contexts (e.g. regarding the publicity of inspection findings such as is the case for food hygiene ratings), 
and that the issue is not uncontroversial. Technically feasible does not mean legally feasible, and does not 
mean desirable either (though, from an instrumental perspective, it clearly is). 
 
Risk-based inspections “on the ground” – risk-proportionate enforcement 
As we indicated above, targeting and planning are but the first element of risk-based inspections, and the way 
inspections are actually conducted “on the ground”, as well as the way inspectors and their management 
follow up on them, are just as essential if one is to have an approach that is really founded on risk. While there 
have been very important scholarly works focusing on how inspectors take decisions and interact with 
regulated entities, there has been rather less on what they check (and what skills, experience and culture 
influence it). There has been considerably less work on inspections and enforcement practices specifically 
focusing on risk-based approaches, how inspectors understand them, and how they are translated into 
practice. Hawkins’s very important work on enforcement practices in Britain’s Health and Safety Executive 
(2002) considers in great detail and depth the practices of inspectors, the framework which influences their 
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decisions, the ways in which the agency’s management attempts to shape them. It does this, however, without 
a specific focus on the question of risk, but rather at the notion of discretion and with a very open investigation 
of all the drivers that may be at play – and with a specific focus on the enforcement rather than on the 
inspection phase472. Overall, a relatively “diffuse” notion of risk permeates both Hawkins’s work and the 
culture and framework in which he sees inspectors as operating – but not (and this was not his research’s 
purpose) a “picture” of what “risk-based inspections practices” may look like. Baldwin and Black (2010) seek 
to define “really responsive risk-based regulation”, but focus more on the intermediate, operations 
management level, than on the inspecting stage. Similarly, Sparrow (2008) considers more problems 
identification and “harm control/reduction projects” than the work of control at the “end phase”. May and 
Winter (2012) consider the relative effectiveness of “enforcement styles”, but not whether risk considerations 
may play a role in it, and without really looking at the inspection phase. The same could be said in general of 
much of the work on enforcement, including Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) and others: the main interest is the 
effectiveness of different interaction and enforcement strategies, not what inspectors actually check when 
they conduct an inspection visit. 
Among major earlier works in our field, the closest to our question may be Bardach and Kagan (1982), since 
their consideration of “regulatory unreasonableness” to some extent looks at what inspectors check (at least 
through the prism of “what they then decide to enforce”), and does it with a prism that is closely related to 
“risk-based approaches”. Their definition of “unreasonableness” can be read as, in a way, the opposite of “risk 
proportionality”: “a regulatory requirement is unreasonable if compliance would not yield the intended 
benefits (…) Further, a regulatory requirement is unreasonable if compliance would entail costs that clearly 
exceed the resulting social benefits (…) Finally, unreasonableness means cost-ineffectiveness” (p. 6). One of 
the book’s first examples illustrates how “unreasonableness” could also be less effective in absolute terms, i.e. 
distract attention and resources from more important problems, when a business operator (aluminium 
smelter) says of the “worst case scenario” which OSHA uses to justify its requirement: “Of course it could 
happen. Almost anything could happen. Never mind that it’s more likely that an earthquake could happen. (…) 
This is a total misapplication of resources. I could use that money for real risk reduction in plenty of other 
places” (pp. 4-5). The same interviewee in fact refers clearly to the question of risk assessment: “Never mind 
that in the 15 years the plant has been operating nothing like that happened, or even any incidents that 
suggest it might happen” (p. 4 – emphasis ours).  
While Bardach and Kagan use the word “risk” only rarely, and do not use the “risk-based” concept (which was 
yet to emerge at the time), the portrait they make of the “good inspector” encompasses many of the 
fundamental aspects of risk-based inspections “on the ground”. First, they present precisely the problem that 
is one of the key justifications for a risk-based approach to select what to inspect: “the inspector who walks 
through a factory and faithfully enforces each regulation may not detect or do anything about more serious 
sources of risk that happen to lie outside the rulebook; at the same time, he alienates the regulated enterprise 
and encourages noncooperative attitudes” (p. 123). Indeed, at the core of risk-based inspection work on 
inspected premises is the idea of effective investigation, looking for the key risks, which requires to know how 
to prioritize, what to look for, and how to stimulate cooperation in order to get insider information (or, barring 
this, to detect dissimulation, and act accordingly). Bardach and Kagan introduce their vision of the “good 
inspector” by analogy with the “good cop”, whose goal is to “reduce serious crime, particularly crimes of threat 
and violence” (p. 125). Translated into the regulatory field, this corresponds to a strong focus on risk, on “harm 
reduction”. In order to achieve this, the police and regulators both need cooperation – “good community 
                                                           
472 We will return to the findings of Hawkins’s work in the third part of this research, looking at current HSE practice and considering 
whether there has been any evolution compared to the period his work considers. 
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relations is an essential element of effective law enforcement” because “citizens must be willing to inform the 
police of serious law violations” (ibid.). 
From these premises emerge the vision that a good inspector “must have sufficient knowledge and 
understanding” but also at the same time “certain personality traits and communications skills”. S/he must 
have “the capacity to empathize with those subject to the law and to understand their concerns, problems 
and motivations” (p. 127). These “communications skills” and understanding of the establishments s/he 
regulates should enable to (as much as possible) gain “compliance without stimulating legal contestation” (p. 
128). This requires a “critical ingredient”: “the capacity to be reasonable, to distinguish serious from 
nonserious violations, and to invest effort in the former” – which, in turn, requires “technical competence” 
(including understanding “the technical and economic problems of compliance”, so as to be able to “evaluate 
the businessman’s excuses or complaints” – ibid.). The inspector must have “tough-mindedness to probe”, “be 
willing and able to exercise authority”, and be “patient and persistent in the face of resistance” (pp. 129-130). 
S/he must be ready to offer “forbearance to elicit compliance” (p. 136), being lenient on minor issues to 
achieve progress on more important ones. Gaining cooperation may also involve supplying information: 
“drawing on its cumulative experience with a variety of firms”, the inspectorate “can provide information 
about risks and abatement techniques”, and inspector can advise “about significant hazards that have escaped 
the attention of company officials” (p. 143). The advice will be particularly well received if it “enables to make 
reforms more cheaply, and with less disruption of routine” (p. 144). The key, in other words, is to have 
inspectors that are able to spot and help solve problems rather than focusing on violations (p. 79-80). 
The problem is then how to enable such inspectors to arise, and to work? First, of course, this way of working 
should not be forbidden: “good inspection can flourish only in an organizational and political environment that 
cultivates it, or at least permits it” (p. 151). Further than this, there should be tools to help inspectors do their 
work, which involves making “intuitive judgments about the motivations and capabilities they deal with” (p. 
71), and developing a “specialized vision, more sensitive to possible risks and deceptions than the average 
person’s” (p. 82). Risk-based approaches have been developed precisely with the intent to enable inspectors 
to be more along the lines of the “good inspector” defined by Bardach and Kagan, to help them have more 
effective tools for detection, but also better skills and approaches both for investigation and to stimulate 
cooperation and compliance. We will give here just a few examples of what can be done to make such “good 
inspectors” better equipped, and more numerous – considering the examples of the Health and Safety 
Executive (HSE) in Britain (Enforcement Policy Statement and Enforcement Management Model), the UK Better 
Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO) Common Approach to Competency for Regulators, and Lithuania’s 
experience with risk-based check-lists. 
Through its Enforcement Policy Statement, the HSE sets out the goals of inspections and enforcement 
activities, and their key principles – with risk as an essential foundation. First, the goals: “The ultimate purpose 
of the enforcing authorities is to ensure that dutyholders manage and control risks effectively, thus preventing 
harm” and “The purpose of enforcement is to: - ensure that dutyholders take action to deal immediately with 
serious risks; - promote and achieve sustained compliance with the law; - ensure that dutyholders who breach 
health and safety requirements, and directors or managers who fail in their responsibilities, may be held to 
account” (p. 2). Addressing risks is thus the most important, ultimate purpose. Then, the Statement lists the 
tools to these aims: “The enforcing authorities have a range of tools at their disposal in seeking to  secure 
compliance with the law and to ensure a proportionate response to criminal offences. Inspectors may offer 
dutyholders information, and advice, both face to face and in writing. This may include warning a dutyholder 
that in the opinion of the inspector, they are failing to comply with the law. Where appropriate, inspectors 
may also serve improvement and prohibition notices, withdraw approvals, (…), and they may prosecute” 
(ibid.). Proportionality is immediately put forward. The Statement goes on to define the principles on which 
inspectors (and the whole organization) should base their actions (and their choice of tools): “HSE believes in 
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firm but fair enforcement of health and safety law. This should be informed by the principles of proportionality 
in applying the law and securing compliance; consistency of approach; targeting of enforcement action; 
transparency about how the regulator operates and what those regulated may expect; and accountability for 
the regulator’s actions” (p. 3). The principles are then defined in further detail: “Proportionality means relating 
enforcement action to the risks” and “In practice, applying the principle of proportionality means that 
enforcing authorities should take particular account of how far the dutyholder has fallen short of what the law 
requires and the extent of the risks to people arising from the breach” (p. 4)473. Targeting, while it relates 
primarily to planning (see previous section), also has implications for how inspections and enforcement are 
conducted in practice: “Targeting means (…) that action is focused on the dutyholders who are responsible for 
the risk and who are best placed to control it – whether employers, manufacturers, suppliers, or others”. In 
order to address the problem of excessive discretion and lack of equal treatment, HSE has a principle of 
consistency: “Consistency of approach does not mean uniformity. It means taking a similar  approach in similar 
circumstances to achieve similar ends” (p. 5). Finally, “Transparency means helping dutyholders to understand 
what is expected of them and what they should expect from the enforcing authorities” (ibid.). 
Such statements may be quite difficult to put into practice and, in fact, Hawkins (2002) suggested that, while 
official enforcement policy was one of the elements forming the framework for enforcement decision-making, 
they were but one of many, and in practice they left much to interpretation by inspectors (and their managers). 
In the meantime, the HSE developed a highly detailed, specific and practice-oriented tool to implement its 
enforcement policy: the Enforcement Management Model (EMM). The EMM’s purpose is to “promote 
enforcement consistency by confirming the parameters, and the relationships between the many variables, in 
the enforcement decision-making process”, to “promote proportionality and targeting by confirming the risk-
based criteria against which decisions are made” and to “be a framework for making enforcement decisions 
transparent, and for ensuring that those who make decisions are accountable for them” (p. 5). While it does 
not replace or limit inspectors’ discretion, it aims to guide it (in particular for less experienced inspectors). The 
EMM includes a number of “decision trees”, rating tables and matrices helping inspectors to make decisions 
based on risk. We will quote here only some of the most important elements. As a first step during inspections, 
“inspectors collect information about hazards and control measures. From this, they make judgements about 
the health and safety risks associated with the activity under consideration. Inspectors should prioritise 
specific hazards and consider common root/underlying causes to ensure they deal immediately with serious 
risks. They should consider how best to achieve sustained compliance with the law” (p. 8). Then, inspectors 
should assess risk: they “should always deal first with matters that give rise to risk of serious personal injury. 
They have the power to either prohibit the work activity, or seize and make safe the article or substances that 
are creating the risk. Sometimes they will do both. When considering the immediacy of risk, inspectors should 
                                                           
473 Proportionality is also a guiding principle in more targeted documents, eg. the Health and Safety Executive’s Enforcement policy in 
respect to iron gas mains (2005). The context of the adoption of this enforcement policy was public risk concern: “In September 2001 
HSE published its enforcement policy for the replacement of iron gas mains for the period 2002 - 2007. This followed a high level of 
societal concern about the potential consequences of gas mains failure. At that time records showed there were about 91 000 km of 
iron mains within 30m of property ('at risk') which may be a risk to people. (…) Given the uncertainty about this issue, HSE undertook 
to review the policy before the end of the first five years so that an agreed programme could be confirmed for the following period. 
The HSE’s conclusion was that it was unrealistic to replace all iron gas mains in a short timeframe, but that at the same time “there is 
currently no feasible alternative to maintaining the network other than to decommission it and replace it with a more suitable material, 
usually polyethylene. This is the basis of HSE's enforcement policy, which requires iron gas mains within 30m of property to be 
decommissioned and replaced at the latest by March 2032 ”. Basically, the enforcement policy offers gas network operators the option 
of developing a replacement programme and, if HSE approves it (for which it must be ambitious enough), they will have serious benefits 
in terms of enforcement: “if pipeline operators have an approved programme, they have a defence from prosecution if they are 
complying with it and a failure occurred on a pipe which was not yet due for replacement under the programme. However, the defence 
would not apply if the operator had knowledge which would indicate that the particular pipe was likely to fail”. The solution adopted 
does not remove the legal obligation to overall replace all these pipes, but accepts that there must be a timeframe to do so, and offers 




use the principles of ‘risk gap analysis’” (p. 9). This “gap analysis” is then explained: once inspectors have 
determined the “actual risk (where the dutyholder is)”, they should “compare this to the risk accepted by the 
law or guidance and decide the benchmark risk(the level of risk remaining once the actions required of the 
dutyholder by the relevant standards, enforceable by law, are met). The difference between where the 
dutyholder is and where they should be is the risk gap” (p. 12). The risk gap is then combined with the 
“authority of the standard” (level of clarity, specificity, strength of the rule) in order to give an “initial 
enforcement expectation” (p. 24). Then, the inspector should consider “dutyholder factors” and “strategic 
factors” (p. 31), “the factors specific to a particular case which may vary the initial enforcement expectation”. 
“Dutyholder factors” include the compliance history, prior enforcement (or lack thereof), whether the 
violations were caused deliberately to seek gain, what are the general conditions in the establishment, 
behaviour of the operator (“responsive” perspective) etc. (pp. 31-34). “Strategic factors” are considerably 
more vague, essentially meaning that inspectors should check whether “the proposed action will produce a 
net benefit to the wider community in terms of reducing risks, targeting public resources on the most serious 
risks and the costs of pursuing a particular course of action” (p. 40). For instance, public expectations of a 
“tough response” may lead to a more severe action, but socio-economic impacts may also suggest in some 
cases a less severe one. 
The EMM is a significant step (and, to our knowledge at least, unique – at least in its specificity) in making 
inspections and enforcement simultaneously more risk-based, more responsive, and more consistent. To put 
such tools to good use, however, competent inspectors are needed. In fact, the more flexibility is introduced, 
the more discretion is needed, the finer the assessment of risk required – the more competent inspectors are 
indispensable474. This notion of “competency”, however, includes more than only technical skills (relating to 
food safety, occupational safety and health, environmental protection etc.), but should also encompass skills 
relating to risk assessment, investigation, relations with business operators and their staff, compliance 
promotion etc. In the UK, a model has been developed in recent years, building on work done within HSE. This 
effort involves a number of regulators and professional associations of regulatory staff is led by BRDO and has 
produced a Competency Approach. This is based on a set of “core skills” that are complemented by “technical 
skills” (rather than seeing core skills as “soft skills” they are put first). Among the core skills are: “assessing 
risks”, “planning”, “promoting compliance”, “advising and influencing”, “interventions”, “enforcing 
legislation”, “work with business”, “work with partners”, “using knowledge”, “personal development” and “IT 
Literacy and Numeracy”. The importance of skills relating to risk-based approaches broadly understood, 
including the choice of interventions, cooperation and persuasion, risk assessment etc. is particularly clear. 
The approach is fundamentally turned towards practice, and is thus not articulated in any lengthy document 
(only short summaries exist), but rather is supported by two web portals. The first is used for self-assessment 
(Regulators Development Needs Assessment – RDNA475) and the second for information and training 
(Guidance for Regulators – Information Point – GRIP476).  
We have presented examples of clearly sophisticated approach, from a country where arguably risk-based 
approaches to regulation and inspections are the most established. It is important to consider whether such 
approaches are also applicable and realistic for countries where leaving discretion to inspectors can be 
associated with greater fears of abuse, where competency and professionalism are somewhat lower, and 
where the legal and regulatory culture generally is different. While we will present more examples and discuss 
this issue in greater depth in the third part of this research, looking at one short example will help complete 
this section. In Lithuania, since 2010, an ambitious programme of inspections reform has been underway, 
                                                           
474 Badarch and Kagan (1982) showed that, conversely, insufficiently competent inspectors tended to “go by the book” (pp. 128-129) 
and be both more “unreasonable” and less effective at managing risks. 
475 http://rdna-tool.lbro.org.uk/  
476 http://www.regulatorsdevelopment.info/grip/  
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openly modelled on the UK experience (and drawing more broadly on international experience and lessons – 
see OECD 2015 b). As part of this reform, the Government has promoted the development and use of check-
lists by inspectorates, in particular for inspections of SMEs. This was first requested by a Government decree, 
and is now also part of the amended Law on Public Administration. In addition, the Ministries of Economy and 
Justice adopted guidelines for inspectorates on how to develop such check-lists, emphasizing the need to 
design them based on risks, and not by compiling all applicable legislation. The aim is to have problem-oriented 
check-lists, that guide inspectors to look at the most essential issues, where the most risk can arise, and take 
them away from “paperwork-focused” inspections477. Interestingly, check-lists for inspectors are not seen 
positively in more “advanced” inspectorates (e.g. in the UK, or in some agencies in the Netherlands) precisely 
because they are seen as excessively limiting discretion, leading to a “tick box” approach, insufficiently 
promoting professionalism. In Bardach and Kagan’s (1982) account, check-lists were in fact a tool that had 
been introduced as part of the more rigid, more “protective” regulatory approach that emerged in the 1970s 
(pp. 74-75), and check-lists were generally examples of “zero discretion” practices, leading to “regulatory 
unreasonableness”. Here, two factors are essential to consider: context, and contents of the check-lists. 
Context, first: a system where risk-based approaches run against deeply engrained practices of inspectors, and 
where resources are not necessarily available for in-depth retraining or to attract new and more qualified staff. 
In such a case, well designed check-lists, while not “optimal”, can represent a major improvement by pushing 
inspectors to a somewhat simplified but still adequate risk-based practice. Contents, second: poorly designed 
check-lists will indeed end up with hundreds of items, a laundry list consisting of many paperwork 
requirements and lending itself to “by the book” enforcement – but a well-designed one will be the opposite, 
focusing on key risks, corresponding to the logical flow of an inspection visit, and clarifying requirements for 
duty holders. 
 
“Smart Inspections” – using all compliance drivers and differentiated tools 
As we have seen with the example of the HSE’s Enforcement Policy Statement, a balanced inspections and 
enforcement approach involves the targeted use of a range of instruments – “information, and advice, both 
face to face and in writing”, warnings, and an escalating range of sanctions. A really “smart” approach to 
inspections includes of course this differentiation in dealing with problems found during inspections, and it 
also consider inspection visits themselves as but one of a range of possible interventions. Not only are 
inspections primarily targeted at high risk (and, to a lesser extent, medium risk) objects, but there is also an 
effort to understand which tools and approaches will be effective to achieve improvements in compliance 
(and, more broadly, in safety) in particular groups of establishments. In its own “risk-intervention” pyramid, 
the UK BRDO sees the default type of intervention in low-risk establishments as information and guidance478. 
Even in cases where risk is not trivial, but inspections would be ineffective, looking for alternative interventions 
is essential. Faced with a problem of unsafe practices in mobile food traders (selling on the highway’s side) in 
South West England in the late 2000s, the Local Better Regulation Office (LBRO – BRDO’s predecessor) 
supported local authorities in developing a “Trader Information Pack”. The recognition was that inspections 
would be ineffective anyway, since mobile traders were, by definition, mobile, and there could be no 
meaningful follow up, long-term interaction etc. Rather, the key issue was seen to be lack of knowledge, and 
this was actively tackled. This was linked to a voluntary light-touch “certification” scheme, which allowed to 
                                                           
477 As Badarch and Kagan (1982) already showed, the emphasis on paperwork is not only ineffective in terms of reducing harms, but 
also tends to provoke resistance in the regulated entities – and it is most frequently practiced by inspectors with limited competence, 
and agencies with “no discretion” policies. 
478 Internal documentation, unpublished presentations, interviews with management. 
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identify “better practices” mobile traders (and notify consumers about them). This was voluntary, but traders 
who did not join got more checks, hence there was a clear incentive to take part479. 
Another example of a “smart” approach is the development and roll out of the “Safer Food, Better Business” 
(SFBB) toolkit480, which we will discuss in greater detail in the third chapter. The development of the toolkit 
was a response to the entry into force of the new EU “Hygiene Package”, and the approach taken stemmed 
from the finding that many catering businesses had fundamental problems with compliance because of 
ignorance or misunderstanding of safety requirements, and that this required an approach based on guidance 
and compliance promotion. In addition, UK food safety authorities had identified the importance of outreach 
to the many non-English-speaking professionals working in the country’s food industry. One of the 
experiments leading to this acknowledgement was made in Chinatown by the Westminster City authorities481. 
After finding that non-compliances in restaurants were not only frequent, but not improving after repeated 
inspections, the Westminster regulatory team attempted to understand why. They found out that chefs mostly 
did not really understand English well, were not aware of local safety regulations, changed repeatedly, and 
that an inspection with negative findings resulted in a loss of face that made compliance, if anything, even less 
likely. The response was to emphasize prior training, and to use the chefs’ language as much as possible. Along 
these lines, the SFBB toolkit exists in 16 languages, those most widespread among chefs working in the UK. 
In other words, inspections are not a one-size-fits-all. In some cases, they can be a waste of resources, even if 
risks are not negligible. They need to be the appropriate tool to the problem at hand. If the problem primarily 
stems from lack of knowledge, then punishment will not help, but even an inspection that is not sanctions-
oriented but rather primarily consists of advice and guidance may not be the most efficient or effective. Not 
the most efficient, because it makes more sense to give the knowledge first, through a lower-cost alternative, 
rather than sending out an inspector immediately. Not the most effective, because in many cases people will 
listen better to whom they hold to be their “peers” – and they may not accept inspectors as such (depending 
on whether there is a history of interaction, what are the prevailing regulatory culture and perceptions etc.). 
Channelling information and guidance through business associations may be in fact more effective. It is partly 
in recognition of this fact that the UK BRDO has now expanded the “Primary Authority” scheme to small 
businesses, through their associations. Under Primary Authority, a business that operates in multiple localities 
in Britain could request to be assigned a “primary” one, which would audit its operations, make 
recommendations, and issue guidelines on how to inspect and enforce in a given regulatory area, which would 
be binding for other local authorities also supervising other premises of this business (costs for this in-depth 
work are to be borne by the business). The scheme has now been extended so that even small businesses 
operating in one locality only can benefit from it, through their business association. It is the association that 
will request a primary local authority, and the authority will then issue guidance on how to operate, and how 
to inspect and enforce, for this given class of small businesses. The expectation is not only that it will make 
inspections more transparent and consistent (and more risk-based, as BRDO ensures that only the most 
competent local authorities can be selected as primary) – but also that this will help spread best practices 
among small businesses, through the guidance given by their associations482. With a similar aim, but different 
means, Lithuania put in place a system of phone and online consultations, whereby businesses can ask their 
questions about regulations and how to apply them, and get authoritative answers, which they know they can 
act upon with no fear of inspectors coming up later with a different interpretation (OECD 2015 b). In short, a 
                                                           
479 Unpublished presentation by Graham Russell, LBRO CEO (and now BRDO Director). 
480 See the Food Standards Agency portal: http://www.food.gov.uk/business-industry/caterers/sfbb  
481 Short case study by the Chartered Institute of Environmental Health: 
http://www.cieh.org/library/Knowledge/Food_safety_and_hygiene/Case_studies/Westminster%20CHIP.pdf  




“smart inspection” approach is one that recognizes both the importance of inspections (and the need to 
conduct them in the most professional, efficient and effective way) but also their limitations – and accordingly 
uses other tools as well to promote compliance and public welfare. 
 
Having sketched out a picture of “risk-based” and “smart” inspections, which includes targeting resources and 
interventions based on data and risk analysis, increasing inspectors’ professionalism and focus during 
inspection visits, making enforcement responses proportionate, and using a variety of tools apart from 
inspections to address the diversity of situations and problems, we will now turn to consider some examples 
from the practice, and try to understand to what extent applying such approaches is relevant to different 
countries’ situations, whether it is realistic, and what results it appears to produce. 
 
The third part will consider data in greater depth. First, its theoretical and actual limitations in terms of 
allowing us to capture the effects of inspections and of changes in methods. Then, specifically considering the 
evidence for the contention that risk-based inspections are more effective and more efficient, i.e. produce 
better (or constant) public welfare outcomes at constant (or reduced) costs. Finally, we will briefly look at 




4. Inspections and enforcement – a view from the practice 
 
“What we need is to be told what is needed within the 
law and sound advice on how to complete certain things.” 
“No business gets everything right all the time. Where we 
fail despite our best efforts we would hope that we are 
not treated as if our non-compliance was deliberate.” 
LBRO, From the Business End of the Telescope (2010) 
 
…reduction in scheduled inspections and other visible 
shifts away from enforcement activity (…) is sending a 
clear, calculated message to corporate criminals that (…), 
they will be even freer to kill and injure with impunity. 
Steve TOMBS and David WHYTE, A Crisis of Enforcement 
(2008) 
 
Street-level bureaucrats dominate political controversies 
over public services for (…)street-level bureaucrats have 
considerable impact on peoples’ lives. 
Michael LIPSKY, Street-Level Bureaucracy (1980) 
 
 
While considering the many theoretical and scholarly accounts of inspections, enforcement, compliance and 
risk regulation, we have on occasion inserted references to current practices, and hinted at what could be 
learned from it. Before that, we also took the historical overview of inspections development up to the latest 
developments, and sketched out some of the main traits of different systems. We have not, however, 
investigated current practices as such, looking at the strengths and weaknesses of different regimes, and at 
whether we can assess their relative effectiveness (or to what extent we can do so).  
In this chapter, we will attempt to give a “view from the practice”. Not a comprehensive account, which would 
be an impossible task given our comparative focus, and already a very challenging task even if we only took 
one jurisdiction. Some have already proposed very rich accounts of inspections practices in one country (e.g. 
Mertens 2011). Others have offered detailed comparisons of one function, in at most a few jurisdictions (e.g. 
Tilindyte 2012). What we undertake here is both much less, and significantly more. Less, because we will have 
to limit ourselves to “snapshots”, glimpses of different regimes and practices – no comprehensive account of 
any particular country or function. More, as we will try and have a broader reach, looking at a larger number 
of countries, and several functions. 
First, we will sketch out several cases of inspections practices – both risk based (to varying extents and 
degrees), and clearly not risk based. We will try to show briefly both what these practices involve, and what 
their effects are. To the extent made possible by available data, we will try and compare some of the results 
and outcomes between different jurisdictions, to attempt to draw some lessons (however tentative) on the 
relative effects of contrasted approaches. Then, we will review and discuss some of the data issues, trying to 
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shed light on the limitations and constraints, as well as on possible ways forward – both regarding the use 
existing data, and the potential production of new data. Finally, we will conclude this chapter by trying to make 
sense of the different findings, considering what they can teach us about the problems inspections regimes 
face (or even contribute to create), the reform experiments that have been undertaken, and the results of 
both inspections practices and their transformations. 
 
4.1. Case studies – views from the practice, comparative assessments 
 
In this section, we will successively present three sets of case studies. The first will center on the British practice 
in inspections and enforcement, which can with some justice be presented as an exemplar of risk based 
approaches in general (Blanc 2012, Rothstein, Borraz and Huber 2013 etc.), and thus a good place to start to 
consider what these approaches look like in practice, and how they appear to perform. The second will 
consider the experience and problems of post-Soviet countries, as well as the contrasted reform trajectories 
and their apparent outcomes. Finally, the third will take somewhat shorter looks at the experience of several 
EU countries, including reforms and their limits.  
We have attempted to keep the presentation of these case studies relatively short, because the overall scope 
of this research, and its length, were already significant. Significant work has gone into gathering and analysing 
the quantitative data that is presented in these case studies, and in particular in trying to make data 
comparable across different jurisdictions in spite of differences in sources, definitions etc. Considering that we 
have already exposed much of the historical and institutional background that is relevant to these case studies 
in chapter 2, however, we have sought to focus them on the essential aspects: description of methods (in 
particular in relation to risk, and to compliance management), presentation of available data, and discussion 
of findings. 
A last word on the selection of these case studies. The intent of the research is to try and find an answer (even 
tentative) to the question of whether risk-based and “smart” inspection methods can yield “win-win” results, 
i.e. better outcomes in terms of public welfare and reduced burden from inspections for businesses. We have 
attempted to select cases that are meaningful to shed light on this question. First, the European cases 
(focusing primarily, but not exclusively, on OSH) build upon the historical research in chapter 2, with some 
variations in scope that correspond to the difference in focus (the intent is to look specifically at diverging 
practices to see whether they yield contrasting results), and to limitations in data availability. Second, the post-
Soviet and post-Communist cases are useful because they cover a far larger set of countries and institutions 
(i.e. they add “scale” to the research), and they are a very strong illustration of non-risk-based approaches and 
their outcomes. In addition, significant attempts at reform (at least in some countries) mean that they offer 
an unrivalled opportunity to compare “before and after” (the move towards more risk-based inspections) in 
terms of both public welfare and administrative burden. Overall, we have a picture that combines focused 
research (OSH cases in Britain and Germany, with a less-detailed look at France and Italy as well), which shows 
very sharply contrasting results in both effectiveness and burden, with broader country-level pictures that 
provide a possibility of confirmation of the validity of findings in a broader context (larger set of jurisdictions 
and regulatory areas). Taken together, and because results appear strongly consistent, they offer a first 
element of response to the research question. Not a definitive one, of course, for which selected case studies 
could never be sufficient (and a definitive answer may well be out of reach in any case) – but at least a tentative 
one, suggesting that certain approaches yield consistently worse results than others, and that this should at 





a. Risk-based inspections in Great Britain – methods, practices, outcomes in OSH (and beyond) 
 
Considering all the different aspects of inspections practices even in a single jurisdiction like Britain483 would 
require a book unto itself. Rather, we will first focus on a function that is simultaneously one of the best studied 
already (e.g. Hawkins 2002, Tilindyte 2012), one where risk-based approaches have been developed for the 
longest time, and where data is relatively easy to access: occupational safety and health (OSH). To try and 
assess the effectiveness of OSH approaches in Britain, we will attempt a comparison of outcomes data with 
Germany484, and see what lessons we can draw from it. In the conclusion to this comparison, we will also 
include highlights of some key aspects of risk-based approaches in food safety inspections, trying to show in 
what ways it most strongly differs from (to use a simple moniker) more “traditional” approaches in other EU 
countries. In so doing, we will also indicate when such approaches are used beyond food safety and OSH. 
 
i. Context and evolutions in the past two decades – the consolidation of “risk based approaches” 
We have sketched out, in the first chapter, the birth and evolution of the OSH regulatory system in Britain, 
and how it resulted in a dual structure – the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) responsible for (broadly 
speaking) “high risk” categories (at least as they were traditionally defined) and “major hazards” (in particular 
those covered by EU directives), and local authorities (LAs) dealing with “lower and medium risk” categories 
(again, based on what was understood as such several decades ago). In recent years, spurred by successive 
reports (e.g. Löfstedt 2011), the HSE has also taken a stronger role of guidance and coordination of methods, 
even though it does not have direct authority over LAs officers. Even prior to this recent trend of growing HSE 
involvement in guidance for LAs, a level of consistency was already ensured – both by the HSE’s role in issuing 
clarifications and guidance on how to comply with regulatory objectives (which were used by businesses, and 
inspectors, regardless of which supervisory authority they reported to), and by the common background 
shared by many inspectors. Indeed, most LAs inspectors and a significant share of the HSE’s485 are 
“Environmental Health Officers” (EHOs), certified by the Chartered Institute for Environmental Health 
(CIEH)486.  
The existence of a specific profession of EHOs, with a broad perspective on environmental health risks rather 
than a narrow technical focus, as well as the large share of this profession employed in the regulatory sphere, 
are in themselves a specificity and have no correspondence in most other countries. Elsewhere, by contrast, 
such inspectors would stem from distinct technical fields, and have a background that is not linked to 
                                                           
483 Because of the complex structure of the United Kingdom, regulatory structures are distinct in its different constituent parts – 
England, Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland. In practice, England and Wales share national-level agencies, and also have similar 
structures at the local level. Scotland shares some of these with England and Wales, and the similarities are sufficient to speak of 
“British” practices (see details further in the text to justify this). While Northern Ireland’s regulatory bodies tend to use similar 
approaches, their structure is sufficiently different to make it difficult to cover “UK practices” as a whole, hence our choice of “Britain” 
as the jurisdiction being considered. 
484 We will also make a partial comparison with France, but data on this country is incompletely available and does not allow for a full 
comparison. The choice of Germany is primarily due to Tilindyte’s 2012 work comparing OSH in Britain and Germany, to which we are 
much indebted, as well as to the full availability of data, and the relative “proximity” of the two countries – but also to some other 
(real or imaginary) characteristics of Germany, as we will discuss further. 
485 Consistant with its missions, which focus far more on manufacturing industry, in particular heavy industry, and major hazards, the 
HSE also has a significant number of enginees and other technical specialists on staff, whereas LAs rely primarily on Environmental 
Health Officers.  
486 For an overview of its history and role, see CIEH’s website at: http://www.cieh.org/about_us/history.html - for Scotland, CIEH’s role 
is assumed by the Royal Environmental Health Institute of Scotland (REHIS) – see: http://www.rehis.com/about/about-rehis  
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regulatory issues. This specificity clearly has major significance in ensuring greater consistency, and in giving 
inspectors a sense of the existence of an “inspection and enforcement” field as such that cannot be reduced 
to the technical issues covered. Because food safety inspectors (at least those dealing with the processing and 
retail stages487) and environmental inspectors in the UK also generally are EHOs, this unique training and 
qualification model also ensures some consistency of approach and sharing of views beyond the OSH field. 
Ensuring further coherence, and culminating in the recent evolution giving a stronger guidance role to the 
HSE, there has been a succession of policy steps to achieve greater consistency in enforcement. In 1997, an 
“Enforcement Concordat” was launched by the Local Government Association (LGA) and the Government 
(Secretary of state for the Environment, Transport and the Regions). This concordat was proposed for adoption 
by LAs, and established a number of “principles of good enforcement policy” (Davey 2011, pp. 263-264): clear 
standards for the level of service and performance, openness including information/advice and consultations, 
helpfulness based on a “prevention is better than cure” approach, effective and timely complaints procedures, 
proportionality of both requirements and enforcement actions and consistency (including with other 
enforcement bodies) to balance necessary inspector discretion. We have already reviewed above the HSE’s 
Enforcement Policy Statement (see 3.3.c), and it is clear that there is a strong alignment between the two 
documents. In spite of institutional fragmentation (only one national-level body for OSH, but 433 local councils 
in the UK, including 407 in Britain, as of 2009488), there is thus a significant level of shared principles across all 
of Britain (and the UK).  
This was further reinforced by successive developments from 2005 onwards. In 2005 was released the report 
of the review led by Philip Hampton: Reducing administrative burdens: effective inspection and enforcement 
(“Hampton Review”). OSH was of course among the major regulatory functions reviewed, both at the national 
and local level (see list of main regulatory functions pp. 14 and 17). This report was very influential and led to 
a series of Government initiatives. As a conclusion of the review of the existing situation and challenges, it 
proposed a series of principles, including: the need to use comprehensive risk assessment to target resources, 
accountability for efficiency and effectiveness combined with independence in operational decisions, 
regulations should be clear and based on consultation, inspections should be justified, information should only 
be requested once and when strictly needed, sanctions should proportionate but also meaningful and prompt 
for repeat offenders. Regulators should “provide authoritative, accessible advice easily and cheaply”. In 
addition, the Review recommends consideration of enforcement issues from the policy drafting stage, 
avoiding the creation of new regulators when not needed, reviewing their “size and scope” compared to their 
missions, and recognition by regulators that “a key element of their activity will be to allow, or even encourage, 
economic progress and only to intervene when there is a clear case for protection” (p. 7). The Hampton Review 
has often been seen as being the starting point of a drive for more risk-based inspections in the UK. As we 
have seen, while it certainly put an increased emphasis on risk-based targeting and proportionality (and on 
the burden-reduction and economic growth angle) it built on a much longer tradition, and reiterated many of 
the principles already present in the 1998 concordat, for instance. 
The Hampton Review resulted in a series of policy initiatives, which included the adoption of the 2008 
Regulators’ Compliance Code (see Davey 2011 p. 264). It was followed up by another review on sanctions and 
enforcement (Macrory Review 2008), which in turn led to the Regulatory Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, 
itself resulting in the creation of the Local Better Regulation Office (LBRO), in particular with a view to 
administer the new Primary Authority scheme. LBRO’s mandate was to introduce more consistency in 
                                                           
487 See our first chapter on the historical factors that led to the unusually weak role of veterinarians in food safety in the UK. Even 
though veterinarians are in charge of the Meat Hygiene Service (under the Food Standards Agency), the bulk of inspections remains 
handled by LAs, and primarily by EHOs. 
488 See LBRO 2009 (p. 25)  
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inspections and enforcement, in a spirit of risk-based regulation, reduction of administrative burden and 
compliance promotion. Further developments then included the transformation of LBRO into the Better 
Regulation Delivery Office (BRDO) in 2012, with a mandate now including national regulators in addition to 
local ones, and the adoption of the 2014 Regulators Code, superseding the 2008 one. These successive 
developments further consolidated the emphasis on the “Hampton Principles”: risk-based targeting, 
proportionality, guidance and advice, attention to economic growth etc. 
Several specific reviews were conducted of the Health and Safety regulatory system – the first in 2008 (done 
by the Better Regulation Executive) and a second one (after the change of majority) in 2011 (by R. Löfstedt). 
The 2008 review showed, among other issues, that the split of responsibilities between HSE and LAs, based on 
a rigid legislative formula489, resulted in a misallocation of resources from a risk perspective that has been 
nicknamed the “twin peaks” problem. Both HSE and LAs targeted their resources based on a “risk pyramid”, 
but the top of the LAs risk pyramid tended to be “lower” from a risk perspective than the base of the HSE one 
(see pp. 59-66). Thus, some premises with actually higher risk tended not to be inspected at all (or 
insufficiently) because they were in the HSE’s remit, and some premises with in fact lower (though not 
inconsequential) risk were being inspected far more intensively. This showed the limits of the rigid allocation 
of responsibilities (which has upside from a clarity perspective and avoids overlaps, but cannot accommodate 
a full risk-based approach). As for the 2011 review, it emphasized the inconsistencies created by the division 
of responsibilities and the large number of LAs involved (pp. 78-83) – and as a result recommended giving HSE 
a much stronger coordinating role. It also, again, highlighted the “twin peaks” problem and called for a much 
narrower focus on high-risk premises (pp. 5 and 82-83). 
The Löfstedt Review recommendations were translated into the 2013 National Local Authority Enforcement 
Code490 issued by the HSE and applicable to all LAs enforcement activities relating to health and safety. Its 
purpose was summarized by the Government as such: “local authorities are being banned from unnecessary 
health and safety inspections” and “will instead target proactive council inspections on higher risk activities in 
specified sectors or when there is intelligence of workplaces putting employees or the public at risk”491. The 
Code sets out to impose on all LAs a series of principles and rules, all emphasizing the need to focus resources 
on higher risks, and to use methods proportional to the risk level492. In particular, “proactive inspection” should 
be used “only for premises with higher risks or where intelligence suggests that risks are not being effectively 
managed” (p. 2). The Code emphasizes the importance of “choosing the most appropriate way of influencing 
risk creators and by targeting their interventions, including inspection, investigation and enforcement activity, 
on those businesses and sectors that represent a higher level of risk to the health and safety of workers and 
the public” (p. 4). It also lists a number of roles for the HSE in relation to LAs, in particular making its advice 
and guidance “authoritative”, and giving it a far stronger role of strategy definition, priorities setting, support 
and guidance for LAs (p. 5). The Code specifically requires LAs to have “risk-based intervention plans” and use 
“proactive inspections” only in “sectors specified by HSE” or where “intelligence” suggests problems with risk 
management (pp. 6-7). It also emphasizes the importance of proportionality, and instructs LAs to follow the 
HSE’s Enforcement Management Model, as well as HSE’s criteria for dealing with complaints on a risk basis 
(pp. 7-8). It also underlines the importance of the Primary Authority scheme as a way to provide more guidance 
and consistency, and more risk focus – as well as the need to develop LAs inspectors competences in line with 
                                                           
489 The precise split is set out in the 1998 Enforcing Authority (Health & Safety) Regulations but “remains largely as it was in the early 
1960s” (BRE 2008 p. 57). 
490 See the HSE website for an introduction and the full text: http://www.hse.gov.uk/lau/la-enforcement-code.htm.  
491 Taken from the Government website’s summary page on the Code – see: https://www.gov.uk/government/news/new-code-curbs-
unnecessary-council-safety-checks  
492 The way in which this is done raises a number of problems, which we will discuss further. For now, we will just note that the Code 
explicitly strengthens the importance of risk-based approaches. 
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the “competency approach” (pp. 9 and 11). In conclusion, following the adoption of the Code, a relatively 
unified model of risk-based inspections applies, at least in theory, to all health and safety inspections in Britain. 
 
Decreases in staffing and number of inspections 
For a variety of reasons, which it would go far beyond our scope to explore, “health and safety” (as it is 
generally referred to in the UK, since the regulatory remit is broader than only occupational risks) has been 
particularly targeted by efforts to reduce regulatory costs (for the state) and burdens (for businesses and 
citizens). This has led to a significant decrease in staffing levels, and in the number of inspections, at least for 
the HSE (it is far more difficult to assess such trends for LAs). One possible explanation for this decline is 
political (pressure from employers to reduce workers’ protection and the associated costs), but (apart from 
ideological motives, which are of course possible) this would not explain why the HSE in particular has been 
under constant pressure to reduce inspections, more (or so it appears) than other regulatory areas.  
First, there are only few major national regulators conducting a significant number of inspections in Britain – 
mostly, the HSE, the Environment Agency, and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs493. Thus, HSE inspections 
“stand out” far more than, say, food safety ones, which are conducted essentially by LAs (except the meat 
slaughter ones, which are EU-mandated and thus “immune” to “burden reduction”). Second, there may be 
(but this would have to be investigated further) a difference in perceptions by the public. While food safety 
requirements and inspections impose clear costs on businesses, they are rarely visible by the public, and do 
not seem to result in a reduction in food availability (even though, in fact, they do). By contrast, there is a 
significant proportion of OSH requirements that appear to have a high “annoyance” factor, and are seen as 
limiting or preventing activities that used to be possible (more) freely. This public perception issue appears 
serious enough that HSE has a dedicated set of activities to address it: “busting the health and safety myths494”. 
There are additional issues at play. Perceptions of health and safety burden by businesses and the general 
public (and the resulting “health and safety myths”) are very probably driven as much (or possibly far more) 
by the activities and recommendations of private consultants, insurers and other actors than by HSE 
inspectors, who are far more likely to come up with “realistic and reasonable” solutions, at least according to 
many practitioners. In the end, however, the public does not differentiate where messages come from, and 
end up complaining about “health and safety” generally – which the Government then tends to react to as if 
it were an indictment of regulatory bodies in charge, HSE in particular495. In addition, the position of the HSE 
as a non-departmental body under the Department for Work and Pensions likely plays a role as well. Indeed, 
the HSE’s functions bear very little relation to the Department’s primary focus (delivering benefits). Thus, in a 
context of budget restrictions, cutting staff and resources to the HSE is likely to be frequently the path of least 
resistance, as it will not be seen as threatening the Department’s overall performance.  
Whatever the causes, and regardless of how these trends may be interpreted, there has been a significant 
decline in HSE staffing and budget, and in the number of HSE inspections. We saw in the first chapter that, 
between 2002 and 2014, overall HSE staff went down by at least a quarter496. The decline in the number of 
                                                           
493 Tax inspections may also be on a downward trend but, given their link to revenue, they tend to be an area that Governments are 
less keen to make savings upon. Environmental inspections in England and Wales are also generally down, but primarily linked to 
changes in the permitting system, so in a different context from the HSE’s. 
494 See on the HSE website: http://www.hse.gov.uk/myth/. 
495 See Dunlop 2014. Summary here: http://www.exeter.ac.uk/news/featurednews/title_427731_en.html  
496 Taking into account the spin-off of the Office for Nuclear Regulation (ONR) and thus not counting the nuclear safety staff in 2002 – 
the exact percentage is difficult to calculate given that the 2002 annual report provides nuclear safety staff separately, but only for 
operations, whereas the spin-off also included management staff for the ONR. Comparing “all of HSE” in 2002 with “HSE and ONR” in 
2014, the decline is 24%. Taking only HSE without nuclear directorate in 2002, and HSE without ONR in 2015, the decline is 29%. 




inspectors is even sharper, particularly in recent years. They were 1,625 in 2002, and only 1,038 as of 31 March 
2015497 - a decrease of 36%498.  
While data on the number of staff is readily available, numbers of inspections have stopped being publicized 
by HSE nearly a decade ago, and have to be found in secondary sources (which obtained them e.g. through 
Freedom of Information requests) or “reconstructed” from different HSE publications. In the 2001-2002 
financial year, there were 75,237 inspections (out of which 65,000 by the Field Operations Directorate). In 
2002-2003, it went up to 84,234 (out of which 74,112). From there, it was a constant decline. In 2004-2005, 
Field Operations Directorate (FOD) inspections were down to 55,195499. In 2006-2007, the same number was 
only 41,496500 - 44% less than in 2002-2003. The decline continued in later years. In 2011-2012, FOD undertook 
21,603 proactive inspections. To these should be added around 4,000 reactive inspections (HSE Annual Report 
2011-2012, p. 23) – 3,957 to be precise, even though not all of these were necessarily handled by FOD (but 
certainly the bulk of them were). HSE also “followed up circa 10,400 conventional health and safety 
complaints” (ibid.) – but not all of these “follow ups” were inspections. 
The critics of this evolution, such as Tombs and Whyte or Hazards Magazine certainly have a point that the 
total inspections data is being dissimulated on purpose, making it difficult to track evolutions precisely. The 
question is, of course, whether HSE management (and the Government) are right that the number of 
inspections is simply misleading and irrelevant. Before moving to considering outcomes, however, let us try 
and look at the latest data to establish the current picture. HSE reported completing 5,004 investigations 
including a total of more than “over 3,260 incidents” meeting HSE criteria. The report also noted the 
“completion within agreed timescales” of 70% of complaints meeting HSE criteria and due to be followed up 
(HSE Annual Report 2014-2015, pp. 27-28) – meaning approximately 9,870 complaints followed up in a timely 
way. Though the report does not indicate it, only a minority of these follow ups involve inspections, and these 
are most probably counted within the 5,004 investigations noted above. A total of 20,200 proactive 
inspections were conducted (p. 16)501, and “over 1,000 major hazard operators” were inspected (p. 31). Thus, 
while a grand total is not available anywhere, it can safety be assumed that the total number of all inspections 
conducted in 2014-2015 by the HSE did not exceed 30,000. Because each source of data and each year ends 
up giving us slightly different perimeters, we cannot do an exact estimate of the decrease for each year, but 
between 2002 and 2015 it was nearly two thirds (64%). This may somewhat over-estimate the decline, because 
2002 itself came after several years of increase in resources and inspections at the beginning of the New 
Labour period. Still, it is quite a major decrease, and would still amount to a halving of inspections compared 
to 20 years earlier. 
HSE inspections  are, however, only a part of the total OSH inspections in Britain. While the HSE is responsible 
for a bit under half of total business premises, LAs are responsible for slightly more than half502. In terms of 
                                                           
497 Note that the annual report 2014-2015 differentiates between “frontline staff (total)”, “frontline inspectors” and “inspectors in 
functions othe than frontline”. The overall picture is similar whether one counts “frontline staff (total)” (1047) or “all inspectors” 
(1038). 
498 The majority of these inspectors are in the FOD, but a large number are in the different specialized departments within HSE. The 
number of Full Time Equivalent (FTE) inspectors may in fact be lower, though the difference is sharper for LAs (see BRE 2008 p. 58). 
499 Hazards Magazine, number 94, April/June 2006 – article available at http://www.hazards.org/commissionimpossible/hse.htm 
(quoting HSE data obtained through Freedom of Information appeal).  
500 Quoted in Tilindyte 2012 p. 117 – see also Tombs and Whyte 2010.  
501 Thus implementing a target of the Coalition Government to see HSE “reduce its proactive inspections by one third (around 11,000 
inspections per year)” (Good Health and Safety, Good for Everyone - The next steps in the Government’s plans for reform of the health 
and safety system in Britain - 21 March 2011 – paper by the Department for Work and Pensions, available at: 
https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66745/good-health-and-safety.pdf – p. 9) 
502 See Good Health and Safety, Good for Everyone p. 10, suggesting a 50/50 split, and BRE 2008 p. 59 indicating a 55/45 split LAs/HSE. 
HSE’s own data gives a slightly different picture: “HSE has responsibility for securing compliance in over 740 000 establishments and 
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employees, the LAs-supervised businesses represent close to 50% (reflecting the fact that, on average, LA-
supervised establishments are slightly smaller)503. As of 2008, LAs also had more inspectors than the HSE’s 
FOD – a total of 1,100 FTE working on health and safety issues (BRE 2008 – 3,320 inspectors in total, but 
covering a range of issues). Parallel to the decrease in HSE staffing, this number has decreased to 2,390 in total 
and 800 FTE in 2013-2014 – still more than the HSE’s FOD504. The rise in importance of LAs in health and safety 
inspections largely reflects deep transformations in the economy, whereby “since the late 1970s, levels of 
employment and numbers of businesses have grown in the sectors of the economy that are inspected by local 
authorities” (BRE 2008, p. 58). LAs overall conduct far more inspections of health and safety issues than the 
HSE – even though a number of these are not “pure” health and safety but cover other issues as well, taking 
opportunity of the fact that EHOs have a competence that also cover for instance food safety issues505. Still, 
even with this noted, LA inspections are far more numerous than HSE ones (though they may often be shorter). 
In 2006-2007, HSE conducted “around 36,000” preventive inspections and LAs “around 121,000” (BRE 2008 p. 
58 – noting also that HSE inspectors spent “significantly more time” per visit). The decline, however, has also 
been significant in the past few years for LAs inspections – in line with the Coalition government’s objective to 
reduce inspections by LAs by “at least a third” (out of 196,000 in total, proactive and reactive, as of 2009-
2010)506. In 2013-2014, after several years of reduction, the total number of LAs inspections for health and 
safety was down to 86,900507.  
Interestingly, the implementation of these new guidelines and priorities seems to have been done with a 
certain degree of confusion in objectives and methods – or at least in statistics. The Enforcement Code for LAs 
called for a reduction in proactive inspections, and ensuring they were focused only on high risk premises (or 
on premises where ‘intelligence’ suggested a high probability of non-compliance). The Government plans 
called for a reduction of ⅓ of inspeceons in total. In pracece, LAs reported508 cuts so radical in proactive 
inspections that these all but disappeared: while they made up 60% of all inspections in 2009-2010, they barely 
reached 8% of the total in 2013-2014. Reactive inspections (including follow-up inspections where problems 
were identified) increased, from slightly over 30% to around 45%. The gap was bridged by the “other” 
category, which rose from 9% to around 47%. Considering such figures, it is clear that the new policy has 
generated a high level of confusion, led to an increase in reactivity vs. proactivity (which is generally not a 
good thing in an approach aimed at preventing risks, since reactive inspections come, by definition, nearly 
always “too late”) – and also led to a collapse in the meaningfulness of reporting categories, since the “other” 
group (supposed to be used for rare cases that did not quite fit one of the main categories) now makes up 
nearly half of the total. This move may, judging by the experience of many other countries, reflect a defensive 
move by inspectors and LAs disagreeing with the new policy, and deciding to keep to the approach they 
consider correct but game the system by avoiding to report their visits as “proactive” and selecting “other” 
                                                           
local authorities enforce the HSW Act in around 1 194 000 establishments” (HSE Annual Report 2001-2002), but successive reports 
have concluded that HSE’s data was not fully accurate on this point. 
503 BRE 2008 p. 59. 
504 See Data Collection – analysis of LAE1 2013/14 data from Local Authorities, Paper Number: H17/01, Paper prepared for the HSE / 
Local Authorities Enforcement Liaison Committee – available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/hela/ 
505 See BRE 2008 p. 64 indicating that the number of inspections to catering premises reported included 60% of joint food inspections. 
Since 2011, such joint inspections have become the norm, see HSE, FSA and Local Government Regulation joint note: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/lau/pdfs/combining-health-safety-and-food-safety-inspections.pdf  
506 See Good Health and Safety, Good for Everyone p. 10 
507 See Data Collection – analysis of LAE1 2013/14 data from Local Authorities, Paper Number: H17/01, Paper prepared for the HSE / 
Local Authorities Enforcement Liaison Committee – available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/aboutus/meetings/committees/hela/ - also 
see latest detailed statistics on LA inspections at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/lau/enforcement-lae1-returns.htm - the detailed data only 
covered approx. 87% of local authorities. 86,900 is an extrapolation done by the paper’s author (methodology unknown). Our own 
estimated extrapolation is around 85,000 (based on the number of enterprises or the population of the non-reporting LAs). The slight 
difference may come from the author using the employed population or another variable for extrapolation. 
508 See ibid. 
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instead. A more positive development appears to be the increasing focus on high risk objects – “inspection of 
higher risk premises has remained fairly constant but inspections of lower risk premises has more than halved 
since the introduction of the Code”509. This picture of increased focus is, however, unequal: “fewer than 10% 
of LAs account for over 77% of the lower risk inspections (B2/C) reported”510. Finally, it appears that many of 
the “other visits” are of advisory nature (a category of visits that the Code allows to continue without 
restrictions) – but in fact this again suggests that many of the former “proactive visits” (which were, to a large 
extent, aimed at advice and guidance to prevent risks) were mostly “renamed”511. While most of the evolutions 
more-or-less matched the guidelines issued by the Government, concern was expressed that, in nearly 20% of 
LAs, no inspections at all were undertaken512. 
 
Consequences of changes – disputed assessments 
As Hawkins (2002) has shown in details, the use of prosecution has already long been a “last resort” for HSE 
inspectors – and we have indicated in the first chapter that this went back to the 19th century. Prosecutions, 
as a result, have always been rare, even though in principle health and safety violations are to a large extent 
“criminalized”, i.e. can be subject to prosecution and (in case of conviction) criminal penalties. As a far more 
frequent alternative to prosecution, and in cases judged serious enough for simple advice to be insufficient, 
inspectors (HSE and LAs) can issue improvement notices (mandating the resolution of a given violation in a set 
time period) and prohibition notices (adding to this obligation the prohibition to use a given equipment, part 
of facility, entire establishment etc.). The latter, in particular, are quite powerful tools, as the economic 
damage imposed can be considerable. Tilindyte (2012) has concluded that the strength and flexibility of 
notices was such that HSE inspectors and management showed little interest to use the new Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act 2008, and the possibility it offered to introduce new administrative penalties 
in addition to existing options of criminal prosecution and notices (see pp. 249-250 and 257-266). Many critics 
of the changes in health and safety enforcement in the past 15 years have spoken of a complete collapse in 
enforcement – Hazards magazine speaking of a “neutered watchdog”513. 
The data on enforcement, as distinct from that on inspections, is however far less clear than critics of successive 
reforms make it out to be. Tombs and Whyte (2008) show a significant decrease in HSE prosecutions from 
2000-2001 to 2006-2007, but the picture is less clear on enforcement notices. These remained roughly 
constant for LAs, and the decline observed in HSE notices from 2002 to 2006 came after a significant increase 
from 1996 to 2002, and thus could be interpreted as a return to longer-term trends (p. 9). As Tilindyte (2012) 
shows, 2005-2006 was in fact (for whatever reasons) a low point in the number of notices, and these increased 
significantly afterwards, returning in 2009-2010 to a level that, while lower than the early years of Labour 
Government, was higher than in the years of Conservative Government in the first half of the 1990s (p. 140). 
                                                           
509 See ibid. p. 2. 
510 See ibid. The note did not include a discussion of the factors that could lead to this difference in practices, and attempting to 
investigate it would have required considerable time. Experience from other countries would suggest that differences in “inspectors 
culture” and management vision could help explain it, as well of course as differences in the businesses themselves. 
511 See ibid. pp. 2-3. Advisory visits cannot result in sanctions in case of violations – but, as is well known from studies such as Hawkins 
2002, BRE 2008 etc., health and safety inspections in Britain very rarely result in sanctions anyway. Hence, the “transformation” of 
many “proactive inspections” into “advisory visits” is mostly a case of change of label, rather than of substance, suggesting again the 
well known fact that excessively rigid quantitative targets, imposed without consideration to practice, often result in “gaming the 
system”. 
512 See ibid. Once more, difficult to say how much it could have to do with local business circumstances (low-risk premises only) or with 
local priorities. In particular, even though LAs regulatory services are organized on a professional basis, they report to the local councils, 
which may have very different political views. One could imagine that Labour councils would support more health and safety 
inspections compared to Conservative ones (while having only limited ability to diverge from national trends due to legislative and 
budget constraints).  
513 Hazards issue 111, July-September 2010 – available at: http://www.hazards.org/votetodie/neutered.htm  
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Notices have continued to increase and decrease irrespective of the Government in place (as the chart below 
illustrates), and of reform trends – suggesting strongly that HSE inspectors are, in fact, quite independent in 
their assessments. 
 
(Sources: HSE Annual Reports 2011-12 and 2014-15 – data for 2014-15 is provisional) 
 
As for prosecutions, as noted by Tilindyte (2012), there was first a noted increase in 1996-2000, followed by a 
decrease until 2006 (p. 142). Since then, the annual number of prosecutions has been relatively stable, 
between 500 and 600 a year, with fluctuations again seemingly not connected in any way with political 
changes (see chart below)514.  
 
(Sources: HSE Annual Reports 2011-12, 2013-14 and 2014-15 – data for 2014-15 is provisional) 
While HSE has always sought to focus its prosecutions on cases where it assessed that the chances of 
successful conviction were maximal (see Hawkins 2002, Tilindyte 2012), this has become an official 
                                                           
514 Note: different sources and works use “informations” (one for each alleged offence) and “prosecutions” (one for each 
establishment) and thus give very different totals. The trends remain: notable decrease until 2006, stable since then – at a level lower 
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performance target and the conviction rate is now regularly reported in annual reports. It has been around 
95% for the past few years. While this speaks to an efficient use of resources from a narrow perspective, 
putting this as a performance target may twist incentives in a way that discourages inspectors to attempt 
prosecutions that may fit many criteria of relevance, but would be somewhat more difficult to conclude 
successfully. As Tilindyte indicates, there are “several set of explanations put forward” by HSE management 
for the decrease in prosecutions, in particular the “rebalancing of resources towards more advice and 
guidance” but also the fact that “the criminal justice system is seen as increasingly time consuming” (p. 143). 
This latter explanation may be the strongest one, since there is no long-term decline in notices, which could 
have occurred had the institution really “moved away” from enforcement altogether. In fact, HSE staff seems 
to have become increasingly focused and efficient at maximizing their enforcement effect. This is suggested 
by the percentage of conviction and average penalty per conviction, which are clearly on an upwards trend 
(Tilindyte 2012, p. 149) – and also by the increase of the ratio of notices per inspections (see Tilindyte 2012 p. 
238 – the trend has strengthened since then, with inspections decreasing rapidly and notices remaining at a 
rather high level). The data provides significant support for the claim of stronger targeting. 
Thus, the assertion that there has been a collapse in enforcement, and a trend of “under-enforcement” 
(Tombs and Whyte 2008, p. 8) does not fully hold up to scrutiny – even less, we would argue, the same authors’ 
even more radical claim of “regulatory surrender” (2010). Still, their point that there has been a tendency to 
resort less to criminal prosecutions is held up by data – and is not disputed by HSE or any other scholar. In 
other words, it is “a feature and not a but”. The question is whether such an approach – less inspection visits 
overall, more risk-focused targeting, emphasis on guidance and advice, risk-based enforcement with limited 
use of prosecution but substantial use of notices – delivers positive results or not for the country at large. 
As said, critics of the evolutions in HSE (and LAs) practices tend to use dramatic language – “neutered 
watchdog”, “regulatory surrender”, “safety crimes”. In a way, this can be understood as no more than the 
counterparty to “better regulation” slogans decrying “red tape”, “stifling burden” and the like. Let us look, 
then, at the substance of what these critics say. First, they make a number of unproven assertions (or claims 
resting on very shaky ground at best). Hearings of the Parliament’s Committee on Work and Pensions (2008) 
thus list claims that there is a “correlation between the decline in the inspection rate and increases in fatal 
injuries”, basing it on data from only one year. In the same hearings, some “argued that it was essential that 
the rate of inspection was increased and that doing so would ultimately decrease enforcement and 
prosecution costs”, but with as little evidence to support it (p. 27). Likewise, in the introduction to a paper by 
Tombs and Whyte (2008), the editorialists assert that “most safety crimes are either undetected or filtered 
out from official channels of resolution” – which, in fact, remains unproven through their paper (which does 
demonstrate other things, but not this claim). The authors then declare that “deaths and injuries suffered at 
work usually result from infractions of the criminal law” (p. 2), but give no data to back up this statement. They 
then proceed to claim that their estimates of “deaths and injuries caused by working” are “more accurate”, 
but this claim of “accuracy” is highly debatable (they simply look at another “perimeter”). They also claim that 
“this process of decriminalisation is reaching crisis point” (ibid.) – but show no evidence of it.  
In fact, their paper is remarkable for the absence of demonstration of any trend in work-related deaths and 
injuries, or any attempt at comparing their level in Britain with that found in other countries. Their 2010 work 
(Regulatory Surrender), though far longer, similarly avoids the question of trends, beyond claiming that official 
statistics are “not credible”. It makes no effort to look at other sources of statistical information (for, we would 
contend, they would not support their claims). Finally, and this point we will discuss in more details, they 
pretend to “discover” some data that would have been “hidden” – in fact only reflecting different possible 
definitions of “work-related” – and similarly claim to “reveal” the unreliability of data (RIDDOR reported 
number of work-related accidents) that everyone (including HSE management) knows very well to be 
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incomplete515. Tombs and Whyte also suggest to include work-related traffic accidents in the total number of 
work-related deaths, which indeed increases the total but (absent consideration of chronological trends, of 
cross-country comparisons) tells us nothing about the performance of the health and safety system (even less 
so, considering that HSE or LA inspectors, or their counterparts in other countries, are not primarily responsible 
for road safety, which is under the supervision of other institutions). Finally, they criticize official data for 
excluding “deaths to members of the public sustained through working environments which are recorded by 
the HSE” (p. 2). While true, this is again a question of definition. In order to compare across countries OSH 
data, definitions need to remain comparable. The real question, i.e. whether the situation in Britain has gotten 
worse, or is worse than in other (more “strictly enforcing”) countries, is never addressed. 
In fact, the problem of the different definitions of “occupational injuries and deaths” is well known, and has 
been considered in a number of studies (Feyer et al. 2001, Australia’s National Occupational Health and Safety 
Commission 2004, HSE 2014, US Bureau of Labor Statistics 2014 etc.). These differences can sometimes be 
reconciled so that comparisons are possible, but not always – in any case, they reflect different methodologies 
rather than some “plot” to hide the scale of a given phenomenon. Some countries (e.g. Germany) include 
work-related traffic-accidents, but this is more the exception than the rule. Since Britain (and Germany) both 
are EU members, the European Statistics Office (Eurostat) compiles statistics on key OSH indicators which are 
harmonized, i.e. where data has been recalculated to conform to a uniform definition. Such data allows easy 
comparisons between countries. It is noteworthy that none of the strident critics of changes in health and 
safety regulation in Britain has apparently seemed worthwhile to consider it. These show that the UK has one 
of the lowest rates of traffic-related deaths516, strongly questioning the strength of Tombes and Whyte’s claim 
that the number of work-related traffic accidents would be shockingly high. Overall, the UK has a life 
expectancy that is slightly below the EU average517 - but not because of violent deaths, where it has 
consistently among the best EU indicators. Thus, while Tombs and Whyte’s are probably right that broadly-
defined “work-related deaths” are indeed higher than deaths caused by violent crime, this says nothing about 
the evolution of work-related deaths (however broadly defined), nor about the relative importance of this 
problem compared to other causes of premature deaths in the UK. To be fair, they make a valid point that 
“the ongoing moral panic that characterises social responses to most ‘mainstream’ violent crime” (p. 11) 
makes a strange contrast to the relative indifference to work-related deaths that are, depending on the 
definition taken, nearly as frequent, or maybe even more frequent (if we take the most expansive definition). 
They do not, however, prove the importance of work-related deaths in Britain. It may just be that the problem 
is opposite, i.e. that “mainstream” violent crime is emphasized far too much, and would deserve far less 
attention, and non-violent causes of death far more. 
 
ii. Comparing health and safety outcomes: Germany and Great Britain 
If we want to look beyond outputs, and also not base our assessment on assumptions but, as much as possible, 
on facts, considering Britain’s health and safety outcomes in a comparative perspective seems unavoidable. It 
                                                           
515 Reporting of Injuries, Diseases and Dangerous Occurences Regulations (RIDDOR) is the official, mandatory system through which 
employers have to report to regulators any significant incident. Because RIDDOR reports frequently (for injuries) or even systematically 
(for fatalities) trigger inspections, employers have an incentive to under-report. While this is generally impossible for deaths (which 
end up criminally investigated in most cases), it is quite feasible for injuries, and results in very significant under-reporting. This is a 
very well known problem (and has similarities in many countries), and is e.g. covered by Tilindyte (2012), pp. 122-123. In its summary 
yearly statistics the HSE, well aware of this issue, reports both RIDDOR and the more reliable data from the Labour Force Survey (see 
e.g. http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/overall/hssh1314.pdf  for the 2013-2014 statistical summary, reporting both figures). 
516 See summary document by Eurostat on causes of death in Europe: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/statistics-
explained/index.php/Causes_of_death_statistics  




is, however, not so easily done. As Hawkins (2002) pointed out, determining and measuring the effects of 
health and safety inspections and enforcement is very difficult – for “it is very difficult for regulatory agencies 
to exhibit their effectiveness in terms of the numbers of injuries or deaths that did not occur” (p. 8). Even if 
one manages to overcome this problem by looking not at absolute numbers but at trends, remains the near-
intractable issue of attribution: not only is it difficult to “see whether situations are improving or not”, but 
even then “how much credit do you give to proper regulation, proper firmness, proper inspections?” (pp. 8-
9). Overall, “reductions in occupational death, disease, and injury are hard to attribute to changes in law or its 
enforcement without having a clear sense of the extent to which other influences, such as technological or 
economic shifts (…) have contributed to any observed effects” (p. 9). These “problems are exacerbated where 
events are rare, or where latency problems make comparative analysis especially hard” (p. 10), as is the case 
with many cases of occupational-related illness, which can have decades of latency compared to the work 
situation which caused them.  
We believe that these problems can, to some extent, be alleviated. First, by focusing our comparative research 
on indicators that have the least latency, and are most easily comparable – in particular fatal occupational 
accidents. While looking only at one single indicator does not allow to fully reflect on the performance of an 
institution or a system, we will try and see whether the findings hold constant when considering other (less 
reliable) indicators. If they do so, we will conclude that there is at least some level of likelihood that the findings 
do reflect the actual performance of the systems. Second, we will try and filter out the effects of other factors 
by comparing the outcomes of two countries that are sufficiently similar in terms of economic and social 
structures, and work methods, and see if there appears to be significant difference in inspection practices, and 
in outcomes.  
 
The complex issue of “comparability” 
The extent to which two jurisdictions can be said to be “comparable” or “similar” is difficult to define precisely, 
because of the number of variables involved, and the difficulty to assess the relative weight of these variables. 
Differences between Britain and Germany are quite real – but the average differences are in many cases 
smaller than the intra-country differences (e.g. on GDP per capita, where the gap between South-East and 
North England or between Bavaria and Sachsen-Anhalt is larger than the aggregate Britain-Germany 
difference). If we had the ambition to build a rigorous mathematical model, we would logically also have to 
try and quantify the most important differences, and attempt to correct for them. Since we have settled, for 
reasons we exposed above, for a more modest (and, to our mind, meaningful) approach, we will not do so. 
Germany and Britain are two advanced economies, two of the earliest to have industrialized, two of the 
earliest to have had a meaningful regulatory system for health and safety (even though Britain was far earlier 
on the two accounts). The population size and enterprise population is also sufficiently similar (Germany larger 
on both accounts, but clearly within the same “group” among EU countries). Looking for factors that could 
plausibly affect health and safety, climate and physical geography are also sufficiently similar (levels of flooding 
do differ, for instance, but again more between different regions of the country than overall, with the two 
countries in the same broad climatic zone). If there are meaningful differences that could bias the results, they 
could mostly be in two areas: employment structure (sectors, size of businesses etc.), and the more difficult 
to pinpoint field of “culture” and “social norms”. While the first question can be relatively easily addressed by 
looking up the Eurostat website, the second is of course far more complex and disputed. 
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Let us start by employment structure. According to Eurostat data518, in 2014 the two countries had active 
populations around 41.7 million (Germany) and 32.6 million (UK519) and employed populations of respectively 
39.9 and 30.6 million. The structure of employment by size of business is not strikingly dissimilar, but does 
show the UK having significantly more employees in large businesses, and Germany more in middle-size ones 
(the famous “Mittelstand”). 
 
Unfortunately, neither the British HSE statistical publications nor the German Sicherheit und Gesundheit bei 
der Arbeit (SuGA) reports520 present occupational accidents differentiated by enterprise size. While this data 
may be available, it is relatively peripheral to our topic, so we did not investigate further. Given that neither 
country appears to consider it a meaningful type of disaggregation, and considering that the difference in 
distribution by size is limited, we can consider its potential effects to be rather negligible. At most, the UK 
structure might give it a slight advantage, if we assume that large businesses have stronger safety procedures 
(which is not always true, even though it is often “received wisdom”).  
The distribution by enterprise sector is somewhat more different, but again is relatively negligible in its effects. 
As is well known, Germany has one of the highest rates of workers in manufacturing in Europe, while Britain 
has evolved far more towards a “service economy”. Manufacturing, however, is not anymore the sector where 
work accidents (and in particular fatal ones) are the most frequent521. In Britain, fatal injury rates in 
manufacturing are only slightly above the average for the entire economy, nearly 20 times lower than in 
agriculture, more than 8 times lower than in waste and recycling, more than 3 times lower than in construction 
(HSE 2015, p. 3). Germany has a different methodology for calculating fatal accident rates (it includes 
transportation accidents related to work), and Eurostat does not have the same level of disaggregation, thus 
it is difficult to fully compare the figures, but the SuGA report for 2013 (BAuA 2014) similarly shows 
                                                           
518 See Eurostat Labour Force Survey data at:  http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/lfs/data/database and Structural Business Statistics 
tables available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/structural-business-statistics/data/main-tables  
519 Eurostat statistics are for the UK and not for Britain only. The inclusion of Northern Ireland, given its small population and economic 
weight, is unlikely to change much to the overall picture. 
520 See BAuA 2014 (available at: http://www.baua.de/de/Publikationen/Fachbeitraege/Suga-
2013.html;jsessionid=F408E48F5081F0A5F2FE529FC070E1E2.1_cid343) and HSE 2015 (available at: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/pdf/fatalinjuries.pdf) 
521 Assuming it ever really was. As we have discussed in the first Chapter, the high accident rate e.g. in agriculture was for many decades 
left unaddressed, probably because of different risk perceptions (“traditional” activity against “disruptive” one). Still, manufacturing 
had very high accident rates a century ago, and even more two centuries ago, as seen in that same Chapter. This is not anymore the 
case. 
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manufacturing as slightly above average only, 40% less than in waste and recycling, twice lower than 
construction, nearly 2.5 times lower than in agriculture522. In conclusion, the differences in employed 
population distribution appear unlikely to result in a large effect on work-related accidents, and particularly 
fatal one. It may have a small effect, though – so the comparison can be valid, but not if it comes to drawing 
conclusions from small variations. Unfortunately, while Eurostat does collect and compute accident rates for 
each economic sector separately, the full disaggregation is not available online (only broad categories are 
available, lumping together all agricultural and industrial sectors). The differences between countries in terms 
of economic structure are, in any case, accounted and corrected for in the standardized injury/fatality 
incidence rates compiled by Eurostat, which are therefore fully comparable and can be taken to reflect the 
frequency of such injuries irrespective of differences in distribution of employed populations between 
sectors523. 
What, then, to think of the “cultural difference” between the two? Many sweeping generalities and unfounded 
assumptions circulate on the different cultures and their characteristics (and effects), but few (if any) are seen 
to hold when confronted with careful examination of facts and data. As Chang (2007) reminds us, the 
stereotypes that cast Germans are more hard working, more respectful of rules, were reversed in the 19th 
century, when British writers found them to be “lazy” and “lying” (pp. 179-183). The recent and still unfolding 
Volkswagen emissions scandal is, from this perspective, a welcome reminder that stereotypes have little to do 
with reality. From our perspective of making “modest” comparisons, not attempting to model or draw strict 
quantitative inferences, the similarities between Britain and Germany appear large enough. To many 
considering them from afar, certainly, they are significant: two societies in North-Western Europe, wealth, 
with a long history of state building, public administration, legal compliance, social services etc. Anecdotal 
evidence underlines the proximity, e.g. data on fatal traffic accidents. Out of many indicators, we selected this 
one because it reflects to a significant extent on attitudes towards compliance with rule and safety issues. 
Because the two countries have (once again) sufficiently similar size, population density, quality of roads, 
wealth etc., other factors that could lead to large discrepancies in traffic fatalities can be discounted for a first 
approximation. Both Britain and Germany end up belonging to the same group of low-fatality countries, with 
Britain performing slightly better, whichever indicator is used (fatalities per population, per motor vehicles, or 
per passenger-kilometres)524. Thus, again, we can for now hold that the similarities between the two countries 
are sufficient to allow for meaningful comparison, though certainly not for drawing excessive conclusions from 
small variations. 
 
Health and Safety outcomes in Britain and Germany 
Lets us first look at outcomes in both countries, and to this aim let us focus on the indicator that is the least 
susceptible to under-reporting (and thus to bias in reporting that could differ from one country to the other 
depending on specifics of regulations and practices): fatal accidents at work. Non-fatal accidents tend to be 
under-reported in Britain (as in many other countries), because they may lead to additional inspections, 
potential liability issues etc., and employers try and incite or coerce their employees in not reporting them 
                                                           
522 It is likely that the fact that the rankings are similar, but the magnitude of the gaps far smaller in Germany, is linked to the inclusion 
of work-related traffic accidents. These can be expected to be somewhat more rare e.g. in construction, and more frequent in 
manufacturing or services, thus reducing the difference between lowest and highest rates. To fully explain the much lower gap 
between agriculture and the average, one would have to dig deeper in the data, but caution is needed because the total numbers are 
low anyway (and the agricultural working population quite small in both countries), thus meaning that variations of a very small number 
of actual cases can yield considerable changes in percentage points.  
523 See full methodological note on European statistics on accidents at work on Eurostat website here: 
http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/hsw_acc_work_esms.htm. 




either. By contrast, in Germany, the no-fault insurance system and the multiple control points (e.g. reporting 
obligations of medical doctors) mean that the reported level is expected to be far closer to the real one525. 
Accidental deaths also avoid the time-lag problem that makes it difficult to link occupational-related illnesses 
with current regulatory practices (as the effects today may often be related to practices one or several decades 
ago). Thus, even though the Labour Force Survey (LFS) provides more reliable accident figures for Britain (and 
they are indeed the ones used by both the HSE and Eurostat), fatal accidents appear the most convincingly 
comparable (also because, for non-fatal accidents, the question of the severity of the accidents would have to 
be taken into account). 
As briefly noted above, fatal accident rates being very low, a change of a few units from year to year can lead 
to important changes in percentage points – thus it is important to compare not only rates for one given year, 
but averages over a longer period. A further difficulty arises when considering which definition of the fatal 
work related incidents rate to take. Eurostat’s definition526 of an accident is “a discrete occurrence in the 
course of work which leads to physical or mental harm” – and a fatal accident is one “which leads to the death 
of a victim within one year of the accident527”. Crucially, the definition since 2008 includes “all accidents in the 
course of work, whether they happen inside or outside the premises of the employer (…) in public places or 
during transport (including road traffic accidents or accidents in any other mean of transportation) and at 
home (such as during teleworking)” (though it excludes “accidents on the way to or from work”). The HSE’s 
definition, by contrast, excludes accidents taking place during transport, which results in a markedly different 
picture (it corresponds to Eurostat practice up to and including 2007).  
As pointed out by Tombs and Whyte (2008), the exclusion of traffic accidents involving “at work” vehicles is 
important – it does not only change the overall magnitude of the problem (which could be without 
consequence for comparisons, if the change was constant across countries), but in fact also changes the 
difference between British and German fatal injury rates, as well as part of their evolution. Because Eurostat 
still publishes data excluding traffic accidents, we are able to consider both alongside each other, as well as 
long-term averages. The tables below presents the evolution and averages of these standardized rates, as 
obtained from the Eurostat website (both excluding and including “at work” traffic accidents) – the former 
corresponding also to the data in the HSE publication European Comparisons –Summary of UK Performance 
(2015)528 and Statistics on fatal injuries in the workplace in Great Britain 2015529. As we can see, while Britain 
performs overall better than Germany, the difference is far sharper when excluding traffic accidents, and even 
ends up slightly reversed in some recent years when including them. Because of changes in Eurostat 
procedures, there are pre- and post-2008 figures with different references and definitions530.  
 Eurostat data 
Standardized incidence rates, fatal 
occupational injuries – excluding 
traffic- and transport-related 







Great Britain 0.59 0.59 0.69 0.73 0.58 0.51 1.4 0.62 1.11 
Germany  1.11 0.66 0.81 0.94 0.9 0.81 2.1 0.87 1.66 
                                                           
525 See Tilindyte 2012 pp. 122-123 (Britain) and 181-182 (Germany). On fatal accidents see pp. 121-122 for Britain specifically. 
526 See: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/cache/metadata/en/hsw_acc_work_esms.htm.  
527 Considerable harmonization work is needed because of this, as different Member States have very different durations being 
considered for their own definition of “fatal accident”. 
528 Available on the HSE website, statistics section, at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/european/european-comparisons.pdf  
529 Available on the HSE website, statistics section, at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/pdf/fatalinjuries.pdf  
530 All standardised incidence rates for fatal accidents are per 100,000 workers. For the methodology, see: European Statistics on 
Accidents at Work (ESAW) – Summary Methodology, 2013, Eurostat – available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/en/web/products-
manuals-and-guidelines/-/KS-RA-12-102. Pre-2008 data excludes traffic and transport accidents (even if work-related or during work 
time), while data since 2008 includes them (but Eurostat also offers tables for incidence rate without these). 
531 Due to change in methodology in 2008, this average is only for informational purposes. Last line is for EU 27. 
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EU 15  1.83 1.64 1.58 1.43 1.3 1.19 2.4 1.5 2.04 
EU 28 (EU 27 until 2008 
included) 
2.31 1.94 1.87 1.59 1.46 1.3 2.6 1.63 2.26 
 
 Eurostat data 
Standardized incidence rates, fatal 
occupational injuries – including 
traffic- and transport-related 





Great Britain 1.02 1.55 1.61 1.8 1.52 2.05  1.59  
Germany  2.67 1.4 1.58 1.59 1.54 1.29  1.68  
EU 15  2.68 2.31 2.35 2.42 2.33 2.17  2.38  
EU 28 (EU 27 for 2008) 3.1 2.52 2.61 2.65 2.44 2.22  2.59  
 
In any event, Great Britain’s performance in occupational safety and health, using fatal injuries as a proxy, is 
way better than the EU average, even using the EU-15 group only, i.e. the “oldest” (and wealthiest) members. 
It is vastly better, for instance, than France (2008-2012 average of 3.83 including traffic accidents or 2.62 
excluding them) or Italy (3.64 and 1.52 respectively over the same period), a point worth coming back to later, 
considering the sharp differences in OSH inspections between Britain and these two countries (France in 
particular). The comparison with Germany is, however, slightly more complex. If we consider the definition 
excluding traffic accidents (which is the one used in Britain by the HSE and corresponds to its mandate, and is 
also the one for which longer-term data is available), then the gap is constantly in favour of Britain, and it has 
remained remarkably constant (33% lower over 1998-2013, 30% lower for 2008-2013, 37% in 2013).  
In recent years, however, if we still consider this same definition, Britain’s performance appears to have 
plateaued (and even worsens in 2013, with a Eurostat footnote indicating a “change in data series”, meaning 
the trend should be checked again in 2014), whereas Germany’s improved markedly between the beginning 
and the end of the period considered. While their performance is essentially similar on average over 2008-
2013 (Britain’s rate being 5% lower overall, a slight edge only), there are important swings from one year to 
the next, and Britain’s rate goes from 60% lower to 60% higher than Germany’s. Overall, swings in data 
including traffic accidents seems to be substantially stronger, possibly linked to the far higher number of 
factors that could influence the overall rate, and the potential for “catastrophic” road accidents having an 
influence on the data.  
For a variety of reasons, we have concluded that the more meaningful figure to compare the effectiveness of 
the inspection and enforcement system in achieving good OSH outcomes is the incidence rate of fatal 
accidents excluding traffic-related accidents. First, this indicator is available on a longer timeframe, which is 
important because of the high year-on-year variability of the rate (given that fatal accidents are anyway rare). 
Second, and crucially, it corresponds to the sphere of responsibilities of the HSE and LA inspections in Britain 
(see below). Third, even if we consider the least-favourable indicator (including road traffic accidents), Britain’s 
performance remains at least as good as Germany’s, while relying on a far smaller number of inspections. If 
we consider data excluding traffic accidents, not only has Britain long had among the best OSH performance 
in Europe, but its edge over Germany has held in spite of strong improvements in Germany’s performance. – 
but also suggest that this edge has been eroding, not because Britain’s performance worsened, but because 
Germany’s improved. Over the period 2008-2013, Britain retains on average the lowest fatal injury rate in the 
EU, with the Netherlands, Slovakia and Germany coming close (in that order). Finland, Denmark and Sweden 
also rank among very good performers, but with somewhat worse data. In the period 1998-2008, the best 
performance was Sweden’s, followed by Britain, the Netherlands and Finland. Thus, Britain has confirmed its 
excellent performance over the long term, being one of the very best in Europe, but Germany has improved 
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its relative ranking – in a period where, in fact, inspections decreased in numbers, as we will see in the next 
section.  
If we use the incidence rate including traffic-related accidents, the best performer is Greece (which is likely to 
reflect the collapse in economic activity since 2008, particularly in high-risk sectors for OSH such as 
construction), followed by the Netherlands, the United Kingdom (data for the whole of the UK rather than 
only Britain), Finland and Germany. Thus, changing the indicator would not meaningfully affect our 
conclusions.532. 
The significantly stronger difference between British and German performance when excluding traffic 
accidents, compared to when they are included, may reflect structural differences, with a stronger share of 
activities involving more intensive use of transportation during work. It also most likely reflects far less 
emphasis on reducing this kind of occupational accidents, which both justifies and questions HSE’s reporting 
data excluding them. On the one hand, as HSE is not responsible for investigating such fatalities as per current 
legislation, it can be understood that they are outside of its remit, and that prevention of such fatalities is the 
province of other state authorities (those responsible for traffic safety more broadly). On the other hand, 
anecdotal experience suggests that there can be a lot of employer pressure on employees driving to “cut 
corners” in order to meet schedules and targets, and these should be recognized as “occupational”, and 
addressed as such (by HSE and LA EHOs, as relevant). Overall, while this gap does not really affect Britain’s 
excellent performance in OSH, and only marginally affects Britain’s ranking, the continued exclusion of traffic- 
and transportation-related occupational injuries and deaths may be misleading, and make it more difficult to 
work effectively on reducing them. At the same time, this very difference actually goes a great way to 
demonstrate the HSE’s (and LA inspectors’) effectiveness: whereas Britain has established a major gap in its 
favour when it comes to occupational safety “on premises” (where their activities are focused), this edge is 
far less pronounced when traffic-related accidents are included, which suggests that, on traffic-related 
occupational accidents alone, Britain’s performance is clearly worse than Germany’s. While this suggests that 
it would be important to enlarge the scope of OSH supervision to further reduce accidents in Britain, it also 
demonstrates very clearly that the way HSE and LAs work is highly effective, and that the far lower number of 
inspections they conduct does not negatively affect this performance. 
 
Health and Safety inspection practices in Britain and Germany 
We can thus conclude from the above that, at least on the metric considered most reliable and most easily 
comparable (fatal occupational accidents), Britain has been performing generally significantly better than 
Germany, though the latter has improved its results in recent years. British performance is worse in areas 
where OSH inspectors are not involved (traffic-related accidents), but this only strengthens the evidence that 
these inspectors (and their institutions) are highly efficient and effective in their domain. Because of 
considerable problems with their reliability, we will not try and complement these data points with a 
comparison of non-fatal injuries (a quick look at Eurostat data shows massive under-reporting in a number of 
countries, making the whole data set unfit for use533). A glimpse at occupational health statistics would be 
useful, to balance the “short term” perspective (injuries) with the “long term” one (diseases), but again Labour 
                                                           
532 Over 1998-2007, Greece’s performance is far worse, suggesting that its excellent rating post-2008 may be (in a paradox frequently 
observed in OSH) linked to the brutal economic crisis, leading to a massive slump in some high-risk areas (e.g. construction).  
533 A look at the Eurostat tables for injuries resulting in more than 3 work days lost shows that the average rate (2008-2012) was lowest 
in Romania, Bulgaria, Latvia and Lithuania, with Romania’s rate less than 1/30th of the EU average, and Germany’s around 15% above 
EU average (Germany’s system, as noted above, makes it likelier that work-related injuries will be correctly recorded). By contrast, on 
fatal injuries, Romania has the EU’s worst performance (more than twice the average incidence), followed by Lithuania. Clearly, under-
reporting is massive, even when Labour Force Surveys are used (work-related injuries are just not “perceived”, and/or are actively 
hidden, and/or workers are simply unable to take days off for fear of losing their job, etc.).  
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Force Survey (LFS) data presents glaring inconsistencies, with some good performance pointing clearly to 
under-reporting, but certainly not all good performance. Let us just suggest here that, considering Britain’s 
excellent record on fatal injuries, there is at least some plausibility that its good record on work-related health 
problems as reported by the LFS may reflect reality rather than under-reporting534.  
The second part of our comparison will now focus on OSH inspection practices in both countries – their 
numbers, targeting methods, and “style”. As Tilindyte (2012) has shown, the structures and practices in Britain 
and Germany differ significantly, and it is precisely these differences, as well as the considerable distance in 
terms of inspections frequency, that matter to us. The structural differences mean, however, that comparisons 
are not as straightforward as one may wish. OSH inspections in Germany are conducted by two sets of bodies: 
state officials working for the federated states (Länder) in the Enterprise Supervision services 
(Gewerbeaufsicht), and employees of the mandatory insurance providers (gesetzliche Unfallversicherungen). 
While the latter focus exclusively on occupational safety and health issues (checking compliance with technical 
norms that are meant to reduce accidents and illness, and thus insurance payments), the former have a 
mandate that is less precisely defined. In some Länder, the Gewerbeaufsicht are assigned a number of non-
OSH related missions, in some their organization has been devolved to the local (municipal) level (Tilindyte 
2012, pp. 166-167). In some cases, the remit of these inspections includes consumer or environmental 
protection (ibid., p. 175). These inspectors also control provisions of legislation relating to child labour, work 
time etc. – but not “provisions of collective agreements, and they do not enforce legislation in relation to social 
security and employment contracts, such as the payment of wages or dismissal”535. Thus, with the exception 
of cases where inspectors are responsible for consumer or environmental law, or market surveillance536, their 
remit is roughly comparable to the HSE’s (somewhat broader in terms of labour legislation, somewhat 
narrower in terms of health and safety, where the HSE is mandated to look in a holistic way and not only at 
the occupational perspective). In some Länder, the supervision of state laws on occupational safety and health 
has also been entrusted to the mandatory insurers, at least in some sectors537 – but this has no incidence on 
the total number of inspections, only on who conducts them.  
Thus, for Germany, in order to assess the total number of inspections we have to consider all the visits 
conducted by the mandatory insurers, as well as most (but possibly not all) of the visits conducted by the 
Gewerbeaufsicht. In fact, it is unlikely that some visits are exclusively focused on non-OSH issues, and most 
likely that all visits incorporate at least some elements of OSH, thus there is sufficient ground to assume that 
all of these visits can be counted as OSH-related. In any case, as we will see, even if we applied some discount, 
the gap between Britain and Germany would remain considerable. 
The data from Britain is somewhat simpler to interpret, but also carries some degree of uncertainty at the 
local level, this time not because what is counted as OSH inspections may incorporate non-OSH visits (though 
this may also be the case), but because it is possible that environmental health officers (EHOs) conducting 
non-OSH visits (e.g. focusing on hygiene) also look “on the side” at OSH issues, thus conducting a form of 
monitoring that may improve the overall coverage and ability to identify risks. This is, in fact, “a feature, not a 
but” of the system – EHOs have a broad set of skills and competences, and a broad mandate, allowing them 
to cover inter-related risks in several areas during one visit, and joint inspection visits are encouraged, as we 
have seen above. In other words, the official count of OSH visits by LAs may be to some extent an 
                                                           
534 See HSE 2014, European Comparisons – p. 4.  
535 ILO’s summary page on Labour Inspection Structure and Organization in Germany – available at: 
http://www.ilo.org/labadmin/info/WCMS_209470/lang--en/index.htm  
536 See ILO, ibid. 
537 See ILO, ibid. 
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underestimation – and it is difficult to put a figure on how significant it may be. Again, we will see that applying 
some correction to these numbers would not change the overall conclusion. 
 
Germany  









   
2011 123252 297917 
2012 110207 267008 




   
2011 353360 639641 
2012 337345 603483 
2013 297941 599605 
 
Total 
   
  
2011 476612 937558 
2012 447552 870491 




Local authorities HSE Total 
   
2006-07 200000 50000 250000 
    
2009-10 196000 45000 241000 
2010-11 194200   
2011-12 151000 37000 188000 
2012-13 106200 33000 139200 
2013-14 86900 30000 116900 
Sources: HELA Paper H15/01, LAE1 return forms, HSE annual reports, 
Löfstedt 2011, “Focus on Enforcement” data for 2012-13. Since HSE does not 
publish aggregate inspections data, the HSE column represents the author's 
own extrapolations based on incomplete data, experts opinions (direct 
interviews with OSH enforcement officials in Britain) and breakdown of 
inspections in earlier years for which full data is available. Numbers in italics 
denote author's extrapolations based on trends (no data source available 
for that year).  
 
The above tables show that there are currently more than 7 times more OSH inspections in Germany than in 
Britain, and that even in earlier years (when OSH inspections were more frequent in Britain), the ratio was 
around 3.5 to 4 times more in Germany. This is quite a striking difference. Of course, the number of active 
businesses (and of establishments to be visited), and the active population, are also different, and significantly 
larger in Germany – hence it is important to look at inspection rates rather than absolute numbers. Ideally, 
like Eurostat data, the inspection rates should be normalized correcting for different economic structures, but 
the British data is not sufficiently differentiated to allow for this (SuGA reports give data by economic sector 
and would in principle allow for such corrections). We will have to accept this limitation, considering (as 




Adjusting for population requires to take a decision as to which population to use (workers or establishments), 
and (if the latter) which definition of establishment, enterprise (or business) population to adopt. This is all 
the more important as Britain has seen an important shift from salaried employment to self-employment, i.e. 
an important rise in the number of individual businesses, most of which are not being controlled by the HSE 
or by LAs538. There is no perfect choice in this matter, so we will present below the different possibilities, as 
well as the results obtained with each of them. The best variable for adjustment would be the number of 
“establishments (premises) under supervision”, but this is not available in either country (though some reports 
in the UK present estimates, which we also refer to below). 
 




                   62.70                      82.70         1.32  
Active population 
(millions) 
                   33.01                      44.70         1.35  
Employed population 
(millions 
                   31.09                      42.70         1.37  
Persons employed in 
private businesses 
           25,354,000              31,914,340         1.26  
Total number of 
businesses 
             5,272,530                3,629,666         0.69  
Number of businesses 
with 10 employees and 
more 
                236,830                   339,087         1.43  
Persons employed in 
non-zero employees 
businesses 
           20,996,000              29,914,278         1.42  
Persons employed in 
businesses with 10 
employees or more 
           17,093,000              24,176,805         1.41  
average ratio (excluding 
total number of 
businesses) 
         1.37  
 
(Sources:  
Great Britain: Office for National Statistics (ONS): Labour Market Statistics – September 2015 release; ONS: Population Estimates for 
the UK, England and Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland, mid-2014 release; Department for Business, Innovation and Skills (BIS): 
Business Population Estimates for the UK and regions, 2015 
                                                           
538 Löfstedt (2011) has recommended not inspecting businesses with no employees except when their type of activity could pose a 
significant risk to outsiders. This policy, while not having the force of law, is widely implemented (and in fact was most probably widely 
implemented already before the report). 
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Germany: Statistiches Bundesamt website: Konjonkturindikatoren, Volkswirtschaftliche Gesamtrechnungen and Arbeitsmarkt; 
Statistiches Bundesamt online database “Genesis”: tables 52111-0001 and 52111-0014539) 
If we exclude the total number of businesses, which is much higher in Britain due to the far larger number of 
self-employed (as mentioned above), the ratio between Germany and Britain is relatively stable, mostly 
between 1.3 and 1.4. Since most of these self-employed fall outside of the HSE’s and LA’s OSH inspections 
remit, we decided not to count this number and consider only the other ratios. The rationale for considering 
specifically the number of workers in businesses with at least one employee and with more than 10 employees 
is that they tend to be those (particularly those with at least one employee, as opposed to purely individual 
entrepreneurs) on which OSH inspections focus. Overall, excluding the total number of businesses, the 
smallest gap is on the total number of persons employed in private businesses, the largest is in the number of 
businesses with 10 employees or more. As indicated above, there is another number which would be most 
relevant to consider, the number of premises under supervision (i.e. at least potentially covered by 
inspections). Unfortunately, this number only exists (as estimate) for Britain. As indicated in the BRE report 
Improving Outcomes from Health and Safety (2008), there were over 2.5 million such premises in 2008 (BRE 
estimate), with over 26 million workers (HSE estimate) (BRE 2008, p. 59). In Germany, the SuGA 2013 (p. 291) 
report (BAuA 2014) indicates over 3.2 million businesses and 31.5 million workers as reported by the 
mandatory insurers, which may correspond to the same definition (approximately at least, though the number 
of premises is likely to be higher than that of businesses) – but the Gewerbeaufsicht may have another 
“universe” of premises under supervision. Using these numbers, the respective ratios would be 1.28 and 1.21. 
This would suggest a smaller gap between the scope of supervision in Britain and Germany, and actually 
strengthen the case that OSH inspections in Britain are considerably less frequent. We thus decided to keep a 
ratio of 1.37 for further calculations, which corresponds to that of the employed population.  
 
 number of OSH inspections  
Germany Great Britain ratio ratio adjusted for population 
2006 1100000 250000 4.4 3.2 
2009 980000 241000 4.1 3.0 
2011 937558 188000 5.0 3.6 
2013 842108 116900 7.2 5.3 
 
(N.B.: data in italics are estimates – for Great Britain, author’s own extrapolations based on available data – for Germany, based on 
Tilindyte 2012 p. 177) 
 
Once adjusted for the difference in population, we see that for a number of years the frequency of OSH 
inspections adjusted for population was 3 or more times higher in Germany. In the most recent years, the gap 
has considerably increased, and the inspections rate is now above 5 times higher in Germany. While 
inspections have overall become less frequent in both countries, the gap has remained, and recently (in line 
                                                           
539 Reconciliation of data for Germany was very difficult, with various sections and tables of the Federal Statistics Office giving different 
totals with apparently similar definitions. These two tables were taken as being the most reliable, and also match best the data 
available p. 291 in the SuGA report (BAuA 2014), which is based on mandatory insurers reports. It should be noted that, for Britain, 
ONS and BIS have different statistics, apparently based on different definitions and sources. We have used the BIS reports as being the 
most up to date and corresponding best to our definitions. Pro memoria, in Germany there are also statistics on the number of Betriebe 
distinct from those on Unternehemen, i.e. a broader “establishments” definition including public sector ones, with a total of 3,835,716 
– we did not use it because it differs from the UK definitions, and would change little to the ratio. There also are discrepancies between 
“employed” and “subject to social security contributions” numbers in some cases. The numbers quoted in the table are “subject to 
social security contributions” as per the Federal Statistics Office tables referenced.  
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with post-2010 reforms in Britain) increased. Even if we discount this recent increase (since, as we will discuss 
below, the reforms may in some respects have gone further than what risk-based principles would 
recommend), the long-term ratio of more than 3 times is very high. As we indicated several times above, 
considering the many ways in which the two countries differ, a small variation in inspections frequency (or in 
outcomes) could be discounted. Three times more frequent inspections (and more), for outcomes that have 
been in the long term generally far worse and (at best, if taking the most favourable indicator) are now 
equivalent appears like a strong indication that inspections and enforcement practices in Germany are clearly 
less efficient than in Britain540. This example clearly shows that the naïve assumption that “more inspections” 
will automatically mean “better outcomes” is mistaken, it also leads to ask what makes British regulatory 
delivery so much more effective. 
 
iii. Explaining effectiveness and efficiency – risk-based approaches vindicated? 
Conceivably, at least some part of this difference in efficiency could be explained by British inspectors having 
access to more effective deterrence tools than German ones – or having a more adequate “enforcement 
pyramid”, making escalation more credible and therefore more effective at increasing compliance. Tilindyte 
(2012) suggests that this may be the case, after an in-depth review of the enforcement options available to 
inspectors in both countries, considering not only the letter of the law but the actual practice, and the extent 
to which theoretically available sanctions are used in practice (pp. 230-274). On administrative sanctions, her 
conclusion, on balance, is that administrative sanctions are relatively more frequently used in Britain than in 
Germany, and that although the HSE only has notices (and, to some extent, license terms modification) at its 
disposal, the publicity of the notices (public registers) adds a powerful “naming and shaming” effect. By 
contrast, German inspectors have in theory more varied and powerful administrative sanctioning tools, but in 
practice (for reasons both of complexity of procedures, of ignorance of the option to impose corporate rather 
than individual sanctions, and of “culture”) use them very rarely (pp. 270-271). Concerning criminal sanctions, 
she likewise concludes that both probability and potential severity are somewhat higher in Britain – and that 
the lack of corporate liability could be a significant limitation in Germany (pp. 269-270). These relative 
weaknesses may indeed to some extent contribute to making German inspections less effective in terms of 
dissuasion – in particular, existing research indeed suggests that negative publicity may be a stronger driver 
than sanctions themselves, and the legal strength of the British “notices” is quite significant. The lack of 
corporate liability in Germany is clearly a significant problem. Nonetheless, these are unlikely to be sufficient 
to explain how an inspection rate more than three times lower results in equivalent or better outcomes in 
Britain, particularly considering that deterrence is (as we have seen in the second Chapter) a relatively weak 
compliance driver. 
The answers can be found by looking more closely at data and practices, in particular concerning targeting, 
the way advice and guidance are structured, and the overall organization of the system. On the first point, 
Tilindyte presents (ibid., pp. 238-239) historical data on inspections, “deficiencies” identified (for Germany), 
and enforcement measures. Though the data is partial (only HSE FOD for Britain, and only Gewerbeaufsicht 
for Germany), it is enlightening. While, for the periods considered, HSE FOD conducts only 12-13% as many 
inspections as the Gewerbeaufsicht, it issues 55-66% as many notices, and initiates from 2 to 7 times as many 
prosecutions (but the German authorities also have the ability to impose direct administrative penalties). In 
other words, German inspectorates visit far more premises, but seem to find problems that are sufficient to 
warrant enforcement action only very rarely. This should be considered also in light of the number of “OSH 
                                                           
540 One could even use this as a possible indication that OSH outcomes have no relation at all to inspections and enforcement practices. 
For the many reasons exposed in earlier chapters and sections, we believe this would be an excessive claim – but surely this example 
shows once again that there is no direct correlation between more inspections and better outcomes. 
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deficiencies” identified in Germany, on average 1.5-1.6 per inspection. Thus, inspectors find a vast number of 
“deficiencies”, but consider most of these to be too mundane for enforcement, or enforcement not to be the 
adequate response. There are several ways to interpret such findings, including that this may represent 
“reluctance” to adopt a formal approach (Tilindyte 2012, p. 239) – but there is also a distinct possibility that 
this reflects a “net cast far too wide”. German inspectors may be over-inspecting, i.e. visiting a large number 
of premises where the risk level is low, then identify “deficiencies541” that reflect a large set of very prescriptive 
and detailed rules (which make non-compliance likely by their very nature), but decline to enforce because 
they clearly see that it would be disproportionate (and would likely trigger backlash from their own 
management or from the public, even if their own professional judgement did not discourage them from 
enforcing). 
Interestingly, professional attitudes between German and British inspectors seem to have some similarities, 
at least in terms of emphasis on advice and “informal” rather than formal enforcement (ibid., pp. 193-194 and 
239-240). It does not appear to be a “lack of advice” overall that could explain the relative under-performance 
of German inspections, or constitute the key difference between the two systems. In fact, the fact that both 
Britain and Germany rank among the very best performers in terms of OSH in the EU (and, more broadly, in 
the world) suggests that “informal enforcement”, rare use of sanctions and emphasis on advice and guidance 
may be working very well at promoting compliance and safety. Tilindyte quotes the EU’s Senior Labour 
Inspectors Committee (SLIC) as reporting in 2005 as observing a “widespread, seemingly institutionalised, 
assumption that advice is more effective and preferable to [formal] enforcement” (ibid., p. 239) – and suggests 
that this, at least, in “tension” with the SLIC principles which, while they foresee the use of “informal 
enforcement”, also put some emphasis on adequate powers and formal enforcement (ibid., pp. 98-99). 
However, the performance of systems that put heavy emphasis on formal enforcement, such as France’s, 
appears considerably worse. As we have seen, France has a rate of fatal occupational accidents that is very 
high (2008-2012 average of 3.85, 50% above the EU 15’s and 2.5 times more than Britain’s or Germany’s), with 
far more inspections than Britain542 (though not necessarily than Germany’s), and an enforcement approach 
that is well known for being very formal, enforcement-prone and “adversarial”543. Clearly, there is a “chicken-
and-egg” question as to whether informal, cooperative enforcement fosters effective cooperation, or whether 
a cooperative climate is what makes informal enforcement possible – but these examples clearly show that 
equating “intensive, formal enforcement” with “higher effectiveness and compliance” is simply impossible544. 
                                                           
541 Which do not necessarily amount to an offense – cf. Tilindyte 2012 p. 191. 
542 In 2010, France’s Labour Inspection conducted 368,236 “interventions” (inspections, investigations etc.). In addition, each regional 
Medical Insurance Caisse has a corps of controllers (not unlike the dual system in Germany). While no consolidated statistics exist on 
their numbers or activities, anecdotal evidence suggests their visits are (at least in some sectors) not less frequent than Labour 
Inspectors’. While in 2011 there were over 2,200 inspectors (broadly defined, as there are two different statutory grades with 
inspection functions) in the Labour Inspection, an estimate based on data from a few regions suggests there should be close to 1,000 
Medical Insurance inspectors at least. Assuming a similar inspection schedule, this would yield between 500 and 600,000 inspections 
per year, vastly more than in Britain, even though the two countries have a similar working population and number of enterprises. 
(Source: L’Inspection du Travail en France en 2011, officla report to the ILO, available at: http://travail-
emploi.gouv.fr/IMG/pdf/Rapport_IT_2011_sans_table.pdf - cf. pp. 63 and 124). Note of course that France’s labour inspectors check 
not only OSH issues but also the full employment legislation, and that this is a major part of their tasks (which may distract their 
attention from OSH). Still, health and safety are part of every inspection they conduct (in principle at least), and the Medical Insurance 
inspectors check only health and safety. 
543 There are reams of anecdotal evidence but evidence is provided by the same report to the ILO – remarkably little on outcomes, but 
strong emphasis on inspections and enforcement (pp. 70-102), far more than on advice and guidance (pp. 108-113). Also the same 
report (pp. 135-137) emphasizes the importance of “protection” (judicial) granted to inspectors in cases of conflicts (including violent 
ones). Such items are of course missing from e.g. HSE reports, and such situations generally unknown in Britain (or in Germany). The 
degree of conflict linked to labour inspections in France is particularly high, with inspectors widely known to be strongly politicized and 
both sides (inspectors and businesses) seeing the other more as “enemies” than “partners”. 
544 As indicated, France has more inspections and far worse outcomes than Britain. As sketched out in the first Chapter, the roots of 
France’s labour inspection challenges and practices go back to the 19th century, and combine political, legal, administrative and social 
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A key difference between the HSE’s practices and advice provided by German inspectors appears to be the 
degree to which, in the UK, advice is provided pre-emptively and with a broad outreach effort, in a way that is 
designed to be easy to understand and implement. In other words, whereas German inspectors seem to 
primarily provide ad hoc  advice based on their findings and their own experience and understanding, the HSE 
(and, increasingly, LAs) provide guidance. This guidance is not provided only when an inspection reveals 
problems, but proactively, to everyone who requests or looks for it (and HSE and LAs make efforts to ensure 
that as many people and businesses as possible are aware of this guidance).  
As Tilindyte (2012) points out, advising businesses on how to comply with OSH regulations is a duty of the 
German state authorities (p. 190). As she underlines, inspectors “see themselves primarily as consultants, 
service providers” assisting to achieve compliance, and this is “particularly true for inspectors of the accident 
insurers” (ibid.). In fact, as we have seen, the SLIC’s assessment considered that, if anything, the Germany 
system was too far on the side of “advice” and not enough on the “enforcement” side. Tilindyte further notes 
“numerous programmes of the individual authorities” that “reflect their aspiration to improve and strengthen 
education and advice” (p. 191). The “quantity” of advice thus does not seem (at least in recent years) to be an 
area where there is a meaningful difference between Britain and Germany. To the extent that Tilindyte 
underlines that evolutions started around 10 years ago led to a strengthening of the “service-oriented”, advice 
component of German OSH structures’ activities, it is conceivable that this change may have contributed to 
the significant improvement in outcomes that we have observed above (with Germany catching up gradually 
with Britain). Still, it appears that the primary vehicle of advice in German OSH practice remains the inspection 
visit itself. A (non-exhaustive) look at different government websites covering OSH suggests that significant 
efforts have been done to improve availability, accessibility and ease-of-use of information, but that much 
remains to improve – in terms of contents, as in terms of ease-of-use. 
The German system’s fragmentation may be part of the causes of the problem, meaning that there is a mix of 
federal and state-level websites to consider, each with a different structure and focus. For this research, we 
reviewed the information available on two state-level websites (Niedersachsen545 and Nordrhein-
Westfalen546, the first as an example of a mid-size state with significant manufacturing industry and a 
                                                           
elements. Still, it is remarkable that the lack of effectiveness of existing methods has been so little challenged. Even if existing practices 
of French labour inspectors may have come “in reaction” to “resistance” by businesses, they clearly seem to have the result to 
strengthen them rather than lead to transformations, thus the “chicken-and-egg” question is not useful when it comes to determining 
a course of action. 
545 See the portal of the Gewerbeaufischt for Niedersachsen (Lower Saxony), with the start page available at: 
http://www.gewerbeaufsicht.niedersachsen.de/. Detailed perusal of the portal shows that there are a number of specific pages e.g. 
on OSH organization in the workplace, protection against specific hazards etc. The portal also links to a certain number of practical 
tools – these include in particular a safety inspection check-list focusing on hazardous installations (available at: 
http://www.gewerbeaufsicht.niedersachsen.de/download/30099/Ausfuellbares_Pruefschema_fuer_Sicherheitsberichte.pdf), and 
(for the same type of safety visits) safety inspection guidelines (available at: 
http://www.gewerbeaufsicht.niedersachsen.de/download/81617/Niedersaechsischer_Inspektionsleitfaden_2012_zur_Durchfuehru
ng_der_jaehrlichen_Vor-Ort-Inspektion_entsprechend_16_Stoerfall-Verordnung.pdf). Practical, easy-to-use guidance is, however, 
rare. One example is a (rather short and not very user-friendly) flyer on asbestos 
(http://www.gewerbeaufsicht.niedersachsen.de/download/57589/Flyer_Entsorgung_von_Asbest_Stand_08_2013.pdf), but there is 
very little guidance overall for construction works, one of the highest risk sectors. 
546 See the portal for occupational safety in Nordrhein Westfalen (North-Rhine-Westfalia), at: http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/. The 
portal is well structured and it is easy to find pages helping employers with their risk assessment and explaining their responsibilities 
(e.g. http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/themenfelder/arbeitsschutzsystem_gefaehrdungsbeurteilung/index.php and 
http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/themenfelder/arbeitsschutzsystem_gefaehrdungsbeurteilung/verantwortung_des_arbeitgebers/i
ndex.php). It has practical tips e.g. on lifting heavy weights (see at: 
http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/themenfelder/arbeitsplaetze_arbeitsstaetten/heben_und_tragen/index.php) including a brochure 
(http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/pdf/themenfelder/sieben_schritte_zum_erfolg.pdf). The latter is, however, rather “conceptual” 
and targeting managers more than directly “visual” and practical. It has tips for builders 
(http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/themenfelder/baustellen/pflichten_des_bauherren/index.php) and a brochure on “safe building” 
(http://www.arbeitsschutz.nrw.de/pdf/themenfelder/baustellen/Fb_Mit_Sicherheit_Bauen_04_final.pdf), but again the latter is light 
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centralized OSH service, making research easier, and the second being the most populous and industrial state 
in Germany), the website of the Federal Ministry for Labour and Social Affairs547, and that of the Federal 
Agency for Labour Protection and Occupational Medicine548. In comparison, for Britain, we have only had to 
peruse the HSE website, which acts as a unique portal for health and safety issues. The conclusions are that 
the German websites are often inadequate for the needs of business operators, managers and workers, having 
fragmented information, complex documents, lack of practical examples etc. It is also difficult to know which 
portal to use. Finally, when real efforts are made to make the information easier to find and to use (as in 
Nordrhein-Westfalen), this is done at the Land level, and thus likely to be ignored in other parts of the country. 
Each Land duplicates the others’ efforts, and best results are not shared.  
In Britain, by contrast, the HSE website is the single portal for all things “health and safety”. One of the site’s 
main tabs is “Guidance549” – which then leads into several clear sections e.g. “Industries” and “Topics”, which 
makes information search easy. There is a specific section on “Risk Management”550 including a set of 
interactive tools and check-lists for different types of premises. There are clear, detailed and practical 
brochures for a number of key types of risks, e.g. working with weights551, “slips and trips” (one of the most 
frequent causes of accidents on the workplace)552, or types of establishments such as construction553. In the 
latter page users can, crucially, find a guide to “absolutely essential” health and safety advice in construction, 
with very practical, clear, visual explanations. This short review leaves no doubt that finding information on 
OSH issues and good practices is considerably easier in Britain, and that the information is also far more usable. 
Sources of information in Germany are both dispersed and complex, and the best guidance documents are 
not available on national (federal) websites and thus are probably ignored in other regions. Of note is also 
that, while the HSE’s efforts in developing and communicating advice and guidance are long standing, they are 
also part of an increasingly coherent government effort in the UK. In 2009, the Better Regulation Executive 
published the Anderson Review of regulatory guidance554, which emphasized the importance of making 
guidance more accessible and clearer – areas in which clearly the available information in Britain is far superior 
                                                           
on practical recommendations. The brochure on risk assessment is detailed and practical (though very text-heavy), and is one of the 
best examples of guidance we have seen on German websites, but the link included in the portal is indirect, and it takes efforts to 
eventually find and download it (https://broschueren.nordrheinwestfalendirekt.de/herunterladen/der/datei/bro-
gefaehrdungsbeurteilung-april2014-pdf/von/gefaehrdungsbeurteilung-am-arbeitsplatz/vom/staatskanzlei/1650).  
547 Bundesministerium für Arbeit und Soziales – website accessed at: http://www.bmas.de/DE/Startseite/start.html - pages on labour 
safety issues e.g. http://www.bmas.de/DE/Themen/Arbeitsschutz/inhalt.html, and for legislation in this area see e.g.  
http://www.bmas.de/DE/Service/Gesetze/arbstaettv.html. On OSH, the website has primarily (a) general descriptions of issues and 
policy activities in different areas and (b) federal legislation. Practical guidance, if any, is very limited. There is also no easy collection 
of links to other institutions, federal and state-level. Hence this website is not really usable as an OSH portal.  
548 Bundesanstalt für Arbeitsschutz und Arbeitsmedizin (BAuA) (portal at: http://www.baua.de/). The portal is heavy on research papers 
and legislation, but also has guidance documents on topics that can be very useful, e.g. on handling heavy weights – but these 
documents tend to be very complex and break down the assessment and recommendations in many components. E.g. there are two 
brochures to cover the “heavy weitghts” – lifting and handling: http://www.baua.de/de/Themen-von-A-Z/Physische-
Belastung/pdf/LMM-Heben-Halten-Tragen.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3, pushing and pulling: http://www.baua.de/de/Themen-
von-A-Z/Physische-Belastung/pdf/LMM-Ziehen-Schieben.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=3. There is a very detailed brochure also on 
handwork positions: http://www.baua.de/de/Themen-von-A-Z/Physische-Belastung/pdf/LMM-Manuelle-
Arbeit.pdf?__blob=publicationFile&v=9. Overall, information is fragmented, and far from easy to use. It targets rather specialists than 
operators.  
549 Available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/guidance/index.htm - see for “topics” http://www.hse.gov.uk/guidance/topics.htm and for 
“industries” http://www.hse.gov.uk/guidance/industries.htm  
550 See: http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/index.htm - and tools at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg163.htm (guidance) and 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/risk/risk-assessment-and-policy-template.doc (template) 
551 See: http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg143.pdf (brochure with clear, visual guidance), http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg383.pdf 
(detailed version with assessment charts), http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg398.pdf (guidance on use of handling aids).  
552 See: http://www.hse.gov.uk/slips/index.htm including a number of assessment tools, practical tips and brochures etc. 
553 See: http://www.hse.gov.uk/construction/index.htm and “absolutely essential” health and safety brochure at: 
http://www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/indg344.pdf  
554 Available at: http://webarchive.nationalarchives.gov.uk/20090609003228/http://www.berr.gov.uk/files/file49881.pdf  
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to that in Germany. The Review also recommended to improve certainty and we will briefly discuss this aspect 
in this section’s conclusion. 
The gap in effectiveness between Germany and Britain could also have parts of its origin in the earlier 
development and adoption of a risk-based approach in OSH in Britain. Following the 1974 Health and Safety 
Act, risk assessment became the norm. In Britain, OSH risk was thus focused on identifying and preventing or 
mitigating risks, driving efforts to identify trends and evolutions, concentrate resources, provide guidance on 
the problems most commonly identified (including on problems affecting many different sectors). Rather than 
prescribing standards, the 1974 Act emphasized outcomes and left flexibility on how best to achieve them. By 
contrast, in Germany, OSH remained essentially based on sector-specific, detailed standards-based 
regulations. The 1989 EC Directive on health and safety at work (89/391/EEC), which introduced “general 
principles of prevention” based on risk (and on risk-assessment and risk-management) (cf. Tilindyte 2012, pp. 
92-96) led to significant changes in the German legal order (whereas it ended up requiring remarkably little 
changes in Britain, as the Directive to a significant extent drew on the same principles as the 1974 Act)555. The 
Directive was translated in German law with the adoption of the 1996 Occupational Health and Safety Act (see 
Tilindyte 2012 pp. 165-166). While the current system (in particular the mandatory insurers’ requirements and 
practices) is still largely based on pre-1996 principles, including detailed sector-specific rules, and while the 
uptake of risk assessment by businesses has been slow and difficult (ibid. p. 183), there is little doubt that this 
legal change had important consequences. Still, it is plausible that the more than 20 years gap in implementing 
risk-based approaches in OSH regulations may be one of the reasons for the gap in efficiency and effectiveness. 
The fragmentation of the German system goes together with what appears to be a somewhat weaker 
management of information, and a less formalized risk-based planning system. German authorities, in fact, 
used to have regular, “individualized” supervision of businesses largely independently of risk (Tilindyte 2012 
p. 182), before the reduction in resources and change in approach led to more targeting (p. 183). As Tilindyte 
notes, however, much of the targeting is done “in the absence of formal models or comprehensive risk 
assessment models” (ibid.), with some targeting based on sectors, other on issues, and many cases simply on 
the inspectors’ “personal experience and expertise”. The inspectors’ previously very broad autonomy is 
gradually reducing, but formalized risk assessment models exist so far only in some Länder (ibid., p. 184). By 
contrast, risk-assessment and risk-based targeting are far more clearly formulated and more strongly and 
consistently implemented in OSH inspections in Britain (though not without room for improvement) – and this 
is evidently a decisive factor in the fact that Britain manages to achieve excellent OSH outcomes (comparing 
to EU average for instance) with far less inspections than Germany. 
OSH inspections in Britain are explicitly planned on a risk-assessment basis556, and meaningful risk-assessment 
requires both data and an information management system. On this count, the dual structure of OSH 
enforcement (HSE and LAs) leads to a sub-optimal structure. HSE records inspection activity and findings (and 
enforcement follow-up) using a database called COIN (Corporate Operational Information System)557. Every 
intervention is recorded in the system and the findings result in an “inspection rating” – taking into account 
“past performance as well as demonstrated attitudes towards health and safety” (Tilindyte 2012, p. 125). 
These inspection ratings are then combined with the sector-based prioritization to determine which premises 
                                                           
555 This is of course a very much shortened account of the process, which was considerably more contentious. The Directive, though 
using the language of risk, imposes mandatory prescriptions and does not use any language comparable to the British “So Far As 
Reasonably Practicable” (SFARP). In fact, the “SFARP” clauses were challenged before the CJEU in 2005 by the European Commission, 
but the CJEU found in favour of the UK (Tilindyte 2012 p. 108). As a result, the British legal framework for OSH was little affected by 
this Directive (though further, specific directives e.g. on protective equipment have of course been taken up, but they belong more to 
the “conformity assessment” field than to the OSH field in terms of their implementation and enforcement mechanisms).  
556 See further for a discussion of the changes in terms of targeting introduced by Government policy in recent years, in particular the 
notion that there could be “high risk” activities but where inspections have been demonstrated to be ineffective. 
557 See on the HSE website: http://www.hse.gov.uk/statistics/data-quality-statement.htm and also Tilindyte (2012) p. 125 
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will actually be targeted. Significant efforts are made to ensure the integrity and quality of the COIN database, 
however recent reports suggest that it may not be fully adequate to ensure optimal targeting. In particular, in 
the 2014 research report conducted by the Health and Safety Laboratory as part of the review of the new “Fee 
For Intervention” scheme (see also below on this), inspectors reported significant issues with COIN data: 
“challenges for both [proactive and reactive visits] related to the quality of information available on COIN. For 
proactive visits, a major challenge discussed was that the intelligence provided was not targeting a sufficient 
number of organisations with poor health and safety standards” (p. 2). The report further details that 
“challenges associated with the preparation for proactive visits related to the quality of site information that 
was available and, more broadly, the intelligence provided to inspectors. In particular, inspectors expressed 
frustration with the availability of company information on COIN. It was described that very often company 
information (such as previous inspections or investigations) is not available on COIN because details get 
deleted for companies that have not been inspected for seven years” (p. 28). It appears that the HSE’s targeting 
system is hampered here by a double challenge. First, inspections are becoming more rare because of 
decreases in staffing and of a political drive to reduce their number, which means that inspectors are more 
rarely visiting premises, and thus that updated information on establishments under supervision becomes 
rare. Second, the quality of targeting suffers from a well-known problem affecting organizations that moved 
early to computerized data: problems linked to legacy systems. In this case, the information system (COIN) is 
set up so that data older than seven years is deleted, which means that prior track record will be lost (for 
companies that have been visited more recently), and that other establishments see all their data disappear 
altogether from the database (if they have not been visited for the last seven years).  
As for LAs, each one uses its own IT system, and they only provide consolidated summary data to the HSE each 
year (over 90% of LAs effectively do it). While the lack of data sharing between LAs and HSE is in principle not 
a problem (since supervision and enforcement are clearly divided between them, and there is no 
establishment where both could be involved in OSH supervision), the fragmentation of data among different 
LAs is an issue for companies that operate in a number of localities. Efforts to address this problem exist, e.g. 
as part of the Primary Authority scheme (see further below), but this remains a real limitation. 
Overall, in spite of these limitations, there is significant evidence that greater emphasis on use of data (in 
particular records of previous inspections) and clear criteria for risk-based targeting are instrumental in making 
Britain’s OSH inspections more efficient than German ones, i.e. better able to cover key risks for a given 
number of visits. 
Finally, and though there is at this stage no evidence of this link (other than correlation), it is plausible that the 
way enforcement is structured, and discretion is framed, has some influence on the results. Indeed, we have 
seen that in Britain OSH inspectors’ discretion is exercised within a particular set of institutions, practices and 
cultures (Hawkins 2002) but also, increasingly, within an “enforcement management framework” that gives 
more transparency and predictability, and explicitly links the exercise of discretion to an assessment of risk. 
Post-enforcement discretion of course exists in Germany (Tilindyte 2012 pp. 187-188), within the limits of 
Administrative Procedures Law (Verwaltungsverfahrengesetz), and depending on the wording of the law being 
enforced (much like in Britain and elsewhere) – but there are no specific guidelines to help inspectors take 
decisions, and make these more transparent. There are a number of general principles, notably “equal 
treatment”, “proportionality”, “necessity” etc. (ibid., p. 188). All of these, however, require interpretation, and 
leave considerably more leeway and uncertainty than the very specific guidance included in the HSE’s 
Enforcement Management Model (EMM). There are two ways in which the clarity, predictability and 
transparency introduced by the EMM could have positive effects in terms of safety. First, it could plausibly 
have a positive procedural justice effect, by making it clearer for duty holders how they will be assessed, and 
how decisions will be taken – resulting in an increased likelihood of voluntary compliance. Second, because 
the EMM emphasizes the importance of risk assessment and of the “risk gap”, it may push businesses to focus 
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on critical issues and concentrate their compliance efforts on the points that are likely to have the greatest 
safety impact. In other words, if the EMM is understood (at least in general) by businesses, and if they can 
reliably expect that enforcement decisions will be risk-based, they will have a strong incentive to focus on 
improving the points that may cause the most harm and thus (assuming limited resources and inevitably 
imperfect compliance) maximize the safety outcomes for a given “percentage” of compliance. By contrast, 
German businesses, left with far more uncertainty and far less clarity of what inspectors expect, are more 
likely to try and increase compliance in all directions, or focus on points that appear clear but may have less 
impact. At this point, we do not have any specific data that could prove these relationships, but this would be 
an interesting area to explore in future research. 
 
iv. Areas of potential concern 
 
We have seen above that there is very strong data suggesting that Britain’s OSH inspections system and 
approach are significantly more efficient than Germany’s (comparable safety outcomes with several times less 
inspections), and that this appears to be linked to a more consistent use of risk in planning and decision-
making, and more emphasis on guidance and advice, as well as a system that is generally more structured. 
This does not mean, however, that all is perfect in the British system and that there are no areas of concern. 
First, we have seen that Britain’s OSH performance used to be significantly better than Germany’s, but that 
the latter has partly caught up (because Britain’s has not continued to improve) – although the trend is less 
clear when traffic-related accidents (which are not supervised by the HSE) are excluded. Second, we have 
noted some concerns related to the quality of data used for risk-based targeting. We have also discussed above 
the many critics of the latest years’ evolutions. We have also indicated that there seemed to be serious under-
performance in the area of work-related transport accidents. We will first discuss the “data quality” issue (and 
also respond to observations made in Germany’s case), then consider the question of transport-related 
accidents, and conclude by considering the most recent reforms and their likely effects on OSH effectiveness 
in Britain. 
 
Data quality, IT systems and low frequency of visits 
A relatively frequently made claim is that introducing a comprehensive database of establishments, including 
their risk profiles, is far too resource-intensive and costly, and this is often used to resist pushes to introduce 
risk-based planning. Tilindyte (2012) thus writes (in respect to Germany) that “clearly, the effort necessary to 
establish, maintain and implement such models is substantial” (p. 185), and goes on to emphasize the number 
of workplaces supervised in each Land. Like Baldwin (2007), she goes on to suggest that the costs “to collect, 
to process and evaluate information on all of them” are a “mammoth task”, imposing “high costs” – and that 
the necessary regular updates will again imply further high costs (p. 185). As we have already noted in the 
theoretical discussion on risk-based targeting, there is reason to believe that such concerns are overblown 
(and, possibly, not expressed in an entirely candid way). In reality, as we have seen, German inspectors (if we 
consider both mandatory insurers and Land inspectors) visit nearly 400,000 enterprises each year. Granted, 
this is only a bit more than 10% of the total number of businesses, but this is more than all the enterprises 
having 10 employees or more. In other words, German inspectors, assuming that they pool their efforts and 
all (mandatory insurers and Gewerbeaufsicht) enter data in a unified system, could cover all the most 
“meaningful” enterprises in one year, and all the enterprises with at least one employee in at most a couple 
of years, simply by conducting their existing number of visits. We have observed the experimental verification 
of such an undertaking’s feasibility in Mongolia. In 2010, the World Bank Group took a group of officials from 
the General Agency for Specialized Inspections (GASI) to Bosnia and Herzegovina, and they observed the 
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effectiveness of the unified database and information management system in place in the State Inspectorate 
of the Republika Srpska entity. Over the next couple of years, GASI’s management instructed all inspectors to 
henceforth conduct a risk assessment during every inspection visit, and to enter the data from this risk 
assessment in a computerized database558. After only a couple of years, GASI built up a comprehensive data 
of all establishments, with their risk profile, and it is being regularly updated. It appears difficult to believe that 
German inspectors could not do the same – but it would require the setup of a unified system for OSH 
inspections, and also a clear decision to focus on premises with significant risk (i.e. premises with at least 10 
employees at first, moving on afterwards to premises with more than 5, and eventually to those with at least 
1 employee – and essentially leaving out those with no employees). 
The situation is different in Britain – better for now, but with the perspective for getting worse. Indeed, in 
contrast to Germany, OSH inspections are now really rare (equivalent to less than half of the enterprises with 
10 employees or more, and a small fraction of those with at least one employee). Because computerized 
databases already exist for HSE and most LAs, the problem is one of updating – and of maintenance for the 
HSE system, given that premises with no inspection in the last 7 years get “reset” to zero. As we have indicated 
above, there is a dual information technology problem (a “legacy” system in HSE, fragmented systems in LAs) 
– combined with an operational challenge created by the decrease in the number of inspection visits overall. 
It is not the purpose of this research to develop detailed responses to the challenges identified, but this one 
deserves consideration for, if it was impossible to address it, this could seriously undermine the viability of a 
risk-based approach. In fact, even assuming that inspections remain at a sustained low rate as is currently the 
case, there would be practical means to get more regular updates on the risk profile of establishments. This 
would involve the replacement of current legacy systems (at national and local levels) by a new integrated 
system with a common database for several types of inspections (involving several national agencies and all 
the different regulatory areas covered by LAs) or, at a minimum, a system enabling regular data sharing 
between the different existing systems and databases. We have discussed above the existing models and 
systems that exemplify such approaches (cf. also World Bank Group 2014b and Blanc 2012, as well as OECD 
2015 b), and there is no doubt that such data sharing is feasible with existing technology. The challenges 
involved in Britain would be institutional and political, particularly when it comes to building a system 
connecting national and local institutions. So far, significant efforts at data sharing between different 
inspection areas have been done in some local authorities, but broader integration would involve significant 
steps politically and administratively. In addition, while the idea that other agencies can act as “eyes and ears”, 
that compliance problems in one area can often be predictors of issues in another areas, that the fundamental 
characteristics of an establishment can be assessed by one inspector for the benefit of several agencies are all 
correct, it may still be important to reconsider the current trend towards ever-decreasing HSE inspections. 
 
Transport-related accidents 
We have seen above that the fatal accident rate reported by HSE, i.e. excluding transportation-related 
accidents, has Britain as the EU’s best performer, and with a far lower rate than Germany. When considering 
the rate of fatal accidents including transportation-related “at work” accidents, Britain still features among 
the “best in EU”, but not anymore quite at the top, and not better than Germany, at least in recent years. The 
fact that HSE reports generally the rate excluding transportation accidents has been criticized (e.g. by Tombs 
and Whyte 2010) as leading to under-estimation of the seriousness of OSH problems, and indeed it tends to 
distort reality and present a picture more flattering than should be the case. The source of the issue, in fact, 
appears to be regulatory provisions rather than a specific attempt to understate the issue (and, in fact, this 
                                                           
558 Sources: interviews with GASI management and GASI central risk assessment unit, review of internal GASI reports for 2012-2014, 
direct consultation of the database in September 2014. 
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regulatory requirement much predates the reforms of the past few years). Under the Reporting of Injuries, 
Diseases and Dangerous Occurrences Regulations (RIDDOR) which govern occupational accidents reporting, 
work-related accidents on public roads are not reportable to HSE, for responsibility for investigating them lies 
with the police. HSE would only get involved if the police identify any serious management failings that they 
feel led to the accident and as a result refer it to the HSE – and such referrals are, in practice, quite rare559. 
However, even when work-related transport is taking place on public roads, health and safety law still applies 
and employers are under a duty to manage occupational road risk in the same way as any other risk – and HSE 
and LAs inspectors could perfectly include this risk in their preventive and inspection work. 
In practice, it seems the absence of a reporting requirement to HSE has been an incentive for health and safety 
inspectors to avoid focusing on occupational road risk. This issue has been known for a long time: the Royal 
Society for the Prevention of Accidents (RoSPA) has been lobbying for a greater focus on road accidents “at 
work” for many years, and laid out findings and recommendations in a 2002 report. This report estimated that 
between ¼ and ⅓ of road fatalities in Britain may be work related, and that “at work” road accidents may make 
up more fatalities than all other occupational injuries (Eurostat data indeed suggests the two to be roughly 
equivalent, or road accidents possibly a bit more numerous than all other types). It suggested that “car and 
van drivers who cover 25,000 miles a year as part of their job” were working in the equivalent of 
“acknowledged high hazard sectors such as construction and quarrying” (p. 1). It found, however, that “health 
and safety law is not applied on the road” in spite of existing legal duties (ibid.). Among the changes considered 
in the report was making road accidents reportable under RIDDOR (p. 2) and ensuring that employers manage 
risk on the road as part of health and safety (p. 3). To this aim, the report suggested that HSE provide guidance 
to employers, to conduct a major awareness campaign, and to link more effectively police and HSE 
enforcement (p. 3). More than a decade afterwards, however, none of these recommendations has been 
implemented, and the additional resources the report called for have given way to a sharp reduction in 
resources. 
What is particularly important here is that this is an illustration of the well-known adage “what gets measured 
gets done”. In spite of limited (and shrinking) resources, there is solid evidence that the HSE and LAs in Britain 
have had very good results in keeping fatal occupational injuries at what is, seen from an international 
perspective, a very low rate. It seems, however, that they have devoted at best minimal attention (or in many 
cases probably none at all), and that this has had very real effects in terms of sustained rates of “at work” road 
accidents that are on par with countries that overall have far worse OSH performance than Britain. In spite of 
limited resources, which would mean that any investment in preventing road accidents may reduce resources 
available elsewhere, there is some reason to suspect that at least a moderate investment in awareness and 
prevention, and the inclusion of road safety issues when reviewing risk management plans, could have a net 
beneficial impact. Rather than concluding, with Tombs and Whyte, that the non-inclusion of these accidents 
is deliberate and deceitful, we would rather find that it is the result of poor initial regulatory design (RIDDOR), 
institutional inertia and the unavoidable effect of incentives – if HSE’s performance assessment does not 
include road accidents, then it would not be logical for HSE to invest resources in preventing them (to the 
possible detriment of other areas where its performance is being assessed). The importance of adequately 
defining performance indicators and the scope of the risks that an agency is supposed to work on preventing 
is thus demonstrated. 
 
“Fee For Intervention” and the reduction of proactive inspections 
                                                           
559 Author’s interview with experienced H&S inspectors in Britain. 
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We have seen above that the significant decrease in inspections that took place in the past 10 years did not 
seem to harm Britain’s OSH performance in aggregate, but this does not means that some of the evolutions 
do not present some ground for concern. This is the case in particular with the recent drive to reduce all 
inspections further and particularly proactive one, and to introduce a scheme known as “Fee For Intervention” 
(FFI). This scheme was introduced in 2012 with the aim to “shift some of the cost of health and safety 
regulation from the public purse to businesses and organisations that break health and safety laws”560. The 
scheme’s principle is that if inspectors, when visiting a business “see material breaches of the law”, the duty 
holder “will have to pay a fee561”. The introduction of FFI was based on the Government’s policy paper Good 
Health and Safety, Good for Everyone562. This policy paper had three main components: clamping down on 
“rogue health and safety advisers”, reviewing and simplifying regulations (and providing clear and simple 
guidance, in particular for SMEs) – and “shift the focus of health and safety activity away from businesses that 
do the right thing, and concentrate on higher risk areas and on dealing with serious breaches of health and 
safety regulation”. FFI pertained to this last objective563, and resulted from its further articulation in the 
following way: “this will mean a very substantial drop in the number of health and safety inspections carried 
out in the UK. We will also shift the cost burden of health and safety away from the taxpayer, and instead 
make those organisations that gain competitive advantage by flouting the rules pay for the costs of putting 
things right”. While the objective itself may be uncontroversial (reduce burden on compliant businesses, focus 
on high risks and “repeat offenders”), the ways proposed to achieve it (“substantial drop” in inspections, and 
shifting of the cost burden) are neither obviously logically connected to the goal, nor necessary to achieve it – 
and quite possibly may in fact work contrary, at least in part, to this stated objective. To understand this better, 
we need to consider separately the questions of “cost burden” (FFI), and of the number of inspections. 
“Making offenders pay” is one of these mottos that has the appeal of its simplicity. It reminds one of “make 
polluters pay”, and superficially could be thought to rely on a similar economic logic – just as charges for 
pollution aim at ensuring negative externalities are priced in, charges for OSH offenses could do the same, and 
make compliance more frequent by tilting the economic incentives in its favour. However, as we have 
discussed at length in the second chapter, there is at best weak evidence that various forms of deterrence (i.e. 
tilting economic incentives) are really effective at promoting compliance, and the (unequal, relatively weak) 
effects of deterrence frequently conflict with opposite effects caused by deterrence strategies harming 
voluntary (ethics-based) compliance. It is thus far from clear that the introduction of FFI should be expected 
to have a positive effect on compliance (and, ultimately, safety levels). The level of the fees (GBP 124 per hour 
charged564) is in any case most likely too low to create any significant incentive for large businesses, while it 
may on the contrary end up being perceived as a major (and unjust) burden if applied to SMEs. 
The purpose of FFI’s introduction clearly appears to be reducing budget expenditures rather than “fairness” 
or “effectiveness”. Even the report by the “Independent FFI Review Panel” (2014)565, which was written clearly 
from a “positive” perspective566, had as its first conclusion that in spite of “challenges associated with FFI” they 
could “see no viable alternative to it within the current environment for public expenditure” (p. 2). In other 
words, considering the Government’s budget policy, and the seemingly low priority put on HSE budget by the 
                                                           
560 HSE, Guidance on the application of Fee for Intervention (FFI), 2012 (latest revision 2014) – available at: 
www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse47.htm - p. 1 
561 Ibid., p. 6 
562 2011 – available at: https://www.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/66745/good-health-and-
safety.pdf  
563 Listed in second position in the policy paper, p. 3 
564 See the FFI page on the HSE website: http://www.hse.gov.uk/fee-for-intervention/index.htm  
565 Available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/fee-for-intervention/independent-ffi-review-panel-final-report-2014.pdf  
566 A comparison of the report text with the appendices shows that the drafters took the conclusions as far into positive territory as 
possible considering the (limited) evidence collected 
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Department for Work and Pensions (for which HSE’s mandate is far from its core ‘business’ of managing and 
delivering benefits), FFI was the only remaining option to fill a major funding gap. If we look at the total fees 
collected so far under the FFI scheme567 they amount (for October 2012 to May 2015) to a modest GBP 2 
Million, to be compared with a total HSE expenditure in financial year 2014-2015 of over GBP 152 Million (HSE 
Annual Report 2014-2015). Thus, it seems that the cost/benefit value of the scheme may be very unfavourable, 
considering the significant time costs of administering it for staff568, and the very real risk of unintended, 
negative consequences. 
To sum up these, we will briefly quote the independent review report – its very euphemisms pointing out the 
many problems FFI is still expected to pose, and the authors being keen to note that they have not materialized 
yet (which, after only a year and half, is not surprising): “the consistency of approach adopted by HSE 
inspectors has minimised the detrimental effects”, there is “a cost to pay in terms of the relationship between 
dutyholders and inspectors, particularly with respect to the advice that inspectors feel able to offer businesses, 
and that they are motivated to seek from inspectors. But the evidence we have considered suggests that this 
cost has not been as high as was predicted before the introduction of FFI” and finally that the review “could 
find no compelling evidence to suggest that HSE is using FFI as a ‘cash cow’, solely to generate revenue”. In 
other words, the very solid and structured professionalism of HSE, and the strength of the existing 
relationships with duty holders, minimized the harm done by the scheme to HSE’s ability to be effective at 
promoting compliance through guidance and advice, and the ability of its inspectors to keep their professional 
judgement unaffected by funding considerations. This does not mean that FFI, if extended long enough, would 
not seriously undermine HSE’s professionalism – it only means that it has not done so yet. The limited amount 
of fees collected, making FFI income a marginal source overall, certainly contributed to this. 
FFI is different from previously existing cost-recovery areas of HSE’s work (e.g. the “major hazards” work under 
Control of major accident hazards regulations – COMAH), or from similar risk- or complexity-based fees levied 
e.g. by the Environment Agency of England and Wales or the Swedish Fire Inspection, because FFI is linked to 
the discovery of problems, and is thus a quasi-automatic “fine” in case of violations, and one that is 
proportional not to the seriousness of the issue, but to the time HSE will spend on the case. While there is a 
safeguard, namely that FFI should only be imposed when there is a “material breach569” of health and safety 
regulations, i.e. a “contravention of health and safety law” that is serious enough to require the inspector to 
issue a written notice. In a way, this is an automatic fine added to the improvement (or prohibition) notice, 
but one that is proportional only to time spent, and not to risk or harm (or to undue profit), thus being at odds 
with the overall HSE enforcement approach. Because it is specifically linked to time spent, it endangers the 
focus of HSE on advice, and the readiness of duty holders to ask for and receive such advice. 
The risks posed by FFI may seem minor, considering the review’s results and the HSE’s well established 
practices and professional standards. Still, it is important to keep in mind that the effects of such perverse 
incentives as built in by the FFI scheme work over time, and can lead to quite dramatic results. We have already 
discussed above the terrible effects caused by a number of municipal police forces in the United States relying 
primarily on fines and penalties for funding, resulting in police actions that aimed not at securing citizens and 
maximizing compliance, but at maximizing recorded and penalized violations. We have observed closely a 
number of agencies that were allowed to keep a part of the fines they issued (or other mandatory payments 
they imposed, e.g. testing), and in every case it led to a clear worsening of practices, creating strong incentives 
                                                           
567 Available on the FFI page of the HSE website – direct link: http://www.hse.gov.uk/fee-for-intervention/ffi-invoice-oct12-may15.pdf  
568 See Appendix 1 to the Review Panel Report, available at: http://www.hse.gov.uk/fee-for-intervention/ffi-review-appendix-1.pdf  
569 See HSE, Guidance on the application of Fee for Intervention (FFI), 2012 (latest revision 2014) – available at: 
www.hse.gov.uk/pubns/hse47.htm - p. 8 
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to maximize the number of violations found570. The fact that the Government imposed at the same time a 
target to reduce the overall number of inspections means that FFI cannot (in such a context) result in the HSE 
trying to maximize the number of inspections, but it distorts the relation with duty holders, and the incentives 
for inspectors, with very few benefits (even financial ones being marginal). 
The other element of the new strategy that was meant to “reduce burden” on compliant businesses was the 
reduction in proactive inspections. This is one more decision which has a very weak link with the stated goal, 
and only can appear logical if considered very superficially. It is, in fact, very problematic. First, as we have 
discussed extensively above, proactive inspections are in fact widely considered to be the more effective, more 
efficient kind, as opposed to reactive ones which (as Tilindyte 2012 noted) have for them to be the “low-cost” 
option (since they require no targeting and no intelligence gathering and rely on accidents, complaints or 
findings of previous visits). A proper risk-based approach can, by definition, not be primarily based on reactive 
inspections, as we have noted. In fact, HSE constantly conducted far more proactive inspections than reactive 
ones over all the years we were able to consider, and this was a fundamental part of its risk-based approach. 
While the ratio remains clearly in favour of proactive inspections in HSE (which are 3 to 4 times as numerous 
as reactive ones in the latest available annual report for 2014-2015), this Government priority on reducing 
proactive inspections has led to their collapse in LAs inspections (but as we noted above, the “other” category 
ballooned, suggesting that many visits were just “re-labelled”). Reactive inspections may be “justified” in a 
“punitive” vision of inspections, but they are simply not the most effective from a risk-based prevention 
perspective571. 
A valid question would be whether reducing OSH inspections in Britain, at this stage, makes any sense – from 
a burden perspective, and from an effectiveness and efficiency one. We have seen above that OSH inspections 
in Britain are several times more rare than in Germany, and also far below the levels found in France. We have 
also noted that this may be reaching (or be close to reaching) the point where too rare visits make it difficult 
to maintain a robust risk-based targeting system (though there may be solutions in sharing data with other 
regulators). How, then, do health and safety inspections compare to other types of inspections within Britain, 
when they are thus singled out for reduction? In order to do so, we looked at the data compiled as part of the 
“Focus on Enforcement” initiative of the Department for Business Innovation and Skills572 - with the latest 
available year being 2012-2013. Four agencies573 stand out as making up the bulk of “business inspections”: 
the Environment Agency (EA), the HSE, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) and the Animal Health and Veterinary 
Laboratory Agency (AHVLA). Unfortunately, whereas the FSA reported the inspections made by local 
authorities on its behalf, the EA did not (HSE also did not, but we have this data from their website, and we 
have already presented it. Thus, we can only say that the EA inspections are slightly less frequent than the 
HSE’s (around 25,000 per year), but the EA uses another regulatory instrument far more often (permits, with 
around 500,000 permit holders). It can be expected that LAs environment inspections add a significant tally to 
                                                           
570 This was true of course in countries and agencies with major corruption problems (e.g. Ukraine’s Tax Service and State Committee 
for Consumer Protection and Standardization in 2006-2009, Tajikistan’s Tax Inspectorate in 2004-2007 etc.) but also in agencies with 
a real commitment to reform and making significant efforts to reduce corruption and increase effectiveness (e.g. Mongolia’s GASI in 
2014-2015). In all cases, funding incentives meant that inspectors tended to inspect more frequently than needed from a risk 
perspective, and to find as many violations as possible (and impose fines in every case). 
571 Again for comparison, the General Agency for Specialized Inspections (GASI) in Mongolia has been making progress in introducing 
risk-based targeting, but its inspectors keep being distracted from it by the practice of following up on every single complaint through 
an inspection, resulting in over 60% of inspections being reactive. There is no doubt that it results in major inefficiencies. The HSE of 
course has solid criteria to filter out complaints, and only conducts reactive inspections in cases worthy of investigation, but the general 
idea that proactive inspections should be reduced by executive fiat is clearly not in line with risk-based principles. 
572 See Focus on Enforcement website at: http://discuss.bis.gov.uk/focusonenforcement/ and the link to the data for 2012-2013 at: 
http://discuss.bis.gov.uk/focusonenforcement/regulator-data-201213/  




this number. But OSH inspections are dwarfed by the number of food safety visits: more than 540,000 for the 
FSA, and over 100,000 for AHVLA. Most of these visits were in fact conducted by third-parties and reported by 
the national regulator (for the FSA, these third-parties are LAs). Thus, in 2012-2013, OSH inspections made up 
less than 140,000, and broadly “food-safety related” ones over 640,000. In this perspective, it is not clear that 
targeting a reduction of OSH inspections made sense even from a pure burden-reduction angle. 
It may be that food safety issues warrant a higher level of control from a risk perspective (this would require 
detailed research on the prevalence of OSH and food risks in Britain, which is beyond our scope), but it may 
also be that food safety inspection numbers are “shielded” from reduction by a combination of popular 
perceptions of risk (food safety being usually high among public concerns), EU regulations, and the fact that 
nearly all inspections are done by LAs. By contrast, it appears that “health and safety” gets targeted for 
reductions because of a combination of mistaken beliefs (“health and safety myths”), lack of strong interest in 
the topic from the HSE’s parent department (Work and Pensions), and possibly the vagueness of the term 
(“health and safety” is so broad that many people may attribute to HSE regulations and controls that are 
completely unrelated to its activities). Whichever the causes, in any case, it seems reducing what is already 
clearly a very “lean” inspection number is unlikely to have positive results. As we have discussed in the second 
chapter, there is some evidence suggesting that there may be a lower “threshold” under which the perceived 
probability of detection is so low that violations do increase (breakdown in deterrence). While there is no 
evidence that this has been reached yet, this pitfall should be taken in consideration for the future. 
 
v. Conclusion – Risk-based and “smart” inspections in Britain 
 
From the above, we can conclude with some confidence that OSH inspections in Britain are indeed a valid 
example of risk-based, risk-proportionate inspections (both in terms of planning and of enforcement 
decisions). Indeed, the ways in which the HSE in particular emphasizes guidance and compliance support 
appears to make this a real example of “smart inspections” in the full sense of the word: risk-focused in 
inspections, risk-proportionate, transparent, aiming at promoting compliance rather than maximizing 
“outputs” such as inspection visits, violations identified etc. The comparison of both outputs (inspection visits) 
and outcomes (rate of fatal occupational injuries) with Germany strongly suggests that Britain’s OSH systems 
is considerably more efficient (at least similar outcomes, with far less inspections) – and even that it was, at 
least until a couple of years ago, apparently more effective (significantly better outcomes). 
While attributing these outcomes fully to the inspections and enforcement system is impossible, and we 
cannot thus exclude that Britain’s better performance is largely or partly due to other factors (still to be 
specified), there is reason to think that at least some significant part of this higher efficiency is due to “smarter 
inspections” – and, before that, to a much earlier regulatory focus on risk. As we have seen, the emphasis on 
risk assessment and risk management in OSH dates back, for Britain, at least to the 1974 Act, and translated 
into very different practices not only for inspectors, but for businesses. A similar evolution, as yet unfinished, 
did not start in Germany before the 1996 Law translating the 1989 EC directive into German legislation. 
At the same time, we have seen that this does not mean that Britain’s OSH inspections regime is “optimal” 
from a risk and “smartness” perspective. First, because of some limitations in the quality and interconnection 
of data used for targeting. Second, because some of the evolutions in recent years (e.g. FFI) are causes for 
concern, and may be running against a sound risk-based approach rather than being (as they purport to be) 
its continuation. Third, of course, because perfection in such matters is never possible, and there will inevitably 
be areas where practices could be improved – the non-inclusion of road accidents “at work” being one of the 
most obvious areas for improvement. 
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To put these findings in the perspective of the broader inspections and enforcement system in Britain, it is 
worth looking briefly at some interesting practices and observations in another regulatory sphere, food safety, 
which we have selected along with OSH as one of our areas of focus – and also at recent changes that affect 
inspections and enforcement in all regulatory areas. 
 
“Safer Food, Better Business” and Food Hygiene Ratings 
We have noted briefly above that food-related inspections in Britain are far more numerous than OSH 
inspections. It is difficult, without considerable further research, to draw any conclusion from this in terms of 
whether this means that risks are significantly higher in food, and/or that “high-risk” premises are more 
numerous – or whether it reflects a lower level of focus and an approach that is more “inspections heavy”. 
There may be elements of both, considering the large number of food handling premises where risks are not 
negligible (hospitality and catering), and at the same time the existence of EU legislation that mandates a 
significant level of inspections (e.g. in slaughterhouses). Rather, we will consider two important examples of 
“smart approaches” – the “Safer Food, Better Business” toolkit, and the use of Food Hygiene Ratings. 
 
“Safer Food, Better Business” 
The 2009 Anderson review stated that Government guidance to businesses should be clear, accessible and 
consistent. While the review looked at health and safety and employment law guidance, and we have seen 
that the HSE has made significant efforts in this direction, one of the most interesting examples of guidance is 
in the food safety field. The origins of the “Safer Food, Better Business” (SFBB) toolkit574 are to be found in 
practical experience, and feedback from inspectors on what they found. These resulted in the development of 
a toolkit that essentially “translates” all essential requirements for catering businesses (including all the EU 
Hygiene Package provisions, and thus including – crucially – the “HACCP” approach) in a way that is readily 
understandable by cooks and other employees. The SFBB guide (which exists as a printed pack, PDF or online 
tool) makes all guidance visual, explains the logic of requirements, and structures them in categories that 
correspond to the fundamental dimensions of food safety in the kitchen (cross-contamination, cleaning, 
chilling, cooking, management). It includes a diary (refillable) to keep all mandatory records.  
The approach taken in SFBB can be traced back to the finding that many catering businesses had fundamental 
problems with compliance because of ignorance or misunderstanding of safety requirements, and that this 
required an approach based on guidance and compliance promotion, including outreach to the many 
professionals working in the UK but speaking a foreign language. One of the experiments leading to the 
development of SFBB was made in Chinatown by the Westminster City authorities575. After finding that non-
compliances in restaurants were not only frequent, but not improving after repeated inspections, the 
Westminster regulatory team attempted to understand why. They found out that chefs mostly did not really 
understand English well, were not aware of local safety regulations, changed repeatedly, and that an 
inspection with negative findings resulted in a loss of face that made compliance, if anything, even less likely. 
The response was to emphasize prior training, and to use the chefs’ language as much as possible. In 
consequence, the SFBB toolkit exists in 16 languages, those most widespread among chefs working in the UK. 
The development and launch of SFBB came in response to the entry into force of the EU “Hygiene Package” 
and of Government concerns that compliance could prove very difficult for SMEs and in particular small 
catering businesses – and that this difficulty could come more from difficulties in understanding the 
                                                           
574 See the portal: http://www.food.gov.uk/business-industry/caterers/sfbb  
575 Short case study: http://www.cieh.org/library/Knowledge/Food_safety_and_hygiene/Case_studies/Westminster%20CHIP.pdf  
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requirements, than from material challenges576. Both national and local evaluations showed strongly positive 
results after the first year of the scheme already. First, “perceptions of external assistance were very positive. 
The FSA information packs were very well received with the vast majority wanting to see these continue in 
future. There were equally positive about local authority interventions, particularly one to one coaching and 
training courses” (Jigsaw Research 2007, p. 4). The implementation of Food Safety Management appears to 
have strongly benefited from SFBB. From an evaluation’s survey of food business operators, “based on their 
own perception, 93% of businesses claimed to have FSM in place, and of those, around three-quarters claimed 
it was fully implemented” (ibid., p.3). Direct evidence from local authorities’ inspections provided somewhat 
lower numbers (unsurprisingly), but still clear confirmation of positive effects: “Compliance with the food 
safety management requirement for all food businesses has improved from 30% in 2002 to 45% in March 2006 
to 48% in March 2007. These figures are based on local authority inspections. Many businesses that have been 
helped using SFBB have yet to be re-inspected (as the average inspection frequency of the target businesses 
is once every 18 months). The 48% figure for compliance in March 2007 therefore under-reports the effect of 
the programme moving businesses towards full compliance. In addition, many businesses are close to 
compliance and actively working toward it. Evidence from the local authority grant projects shows that where 
support has been provided, 66% of businesses are broadly compliant shortly after the intervention in the 
business” (FSA 2007, p. 3).  
Assessing and evaluating more precisely the degree to which SFBB has improved (or not) food safety levels in 
Britain compared to other EU countries, and the extent to which it has helped food businesses (and particularly 
small ones) make the transition to the new EU legislation, would both require considerable efforts, in 
particular given the vast number of other factors affecting both indicators. What is important is the strong 
emphasis put by the British authorities577 on this approach, and the scarcity of similar examples elsewhere. 
The only similar guidelines we could find in the EU were developed in the region of Lombardy (Italy) and 
published in 2014578. This Italian document (Manuale di buone pratiche di igiene per le microimprese alimentari 
– “Good Practice Handbook for Hygiene in Food Micro-Businesses”) is very interesting in that it covers also 
food processing, and is adapted to the specifics of Italian food, but it is somewhat less “granular” than the 
SFBB toolkit and does not as conveniently break down the control steps and points. Still, it remains a very 
interesting document, that is unfortunately sub-optimally publicized (it is available on a variety of regional and 
                                                           
576 See Hogg (2007): “In response to the new Food Hygiene regulations (EC Regulation 852/2004 on the hygiene of foodstuffs) for the 
UK, which came into effect on 01 January 2006, the Food Standards Agency (FSA) introduced a new food safety management system 
based on the principles of HACCP (hazard analysis critical control point) called Safer Food Better Business (SFBB). This system is much 
simpler than the traditional HACCP methodology in that it cuts out all of the jargon and can be tailored to meet each individual food 
business needs throughout the country. It is also a very simple system for food businesses to put in place.” (p. 4) – available at: 
http://www.torridge.gov.uk/CHttpHandler.ashx?id=265&p=0  - and from the first official FSA evaluation of the scheme: “The aim of 
the programme is to help micro1 and small catering and retail businesses comply with the 2006 food hygiene regulations that require 
businesses to put in place effective food safety management procedures. There are over 400,000 micro food premises in England. 
Research has shown these businesses previously found food safety management difficult to implement and that improving their 
standards would have a positive impact on public health by reducing food poisoning. Given the numbers of premises, the scale of 
activity represents a significant challenge for the Agency and its partners.” (FSA 2007, p. 2 – available at: 
http://tna.europarchive.org/20120419000433/http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/pdfs/board/fsa071204.pdf ) 
577 Note: the Food Standards Agency that used to work in all of Britain has now been replaced by a Food Standards Agency for England 
and Wales, and Food Standards Scotland– because Scotland disagreed with the narrowing down of the FSA mandate by the Coalition 
Government. Food Standards Scotland has the same emphasis on guidance and risk-based approaches and to all intent and purposes 
this institutional change does not affect the points we discuss here. Among existing nuances in approach, Scotland has had since 2006 
a guidance for implementation of HACCP approaches that is somewhat different from SFBB, though similar in concept, called 
“CookSafe” – see http://www.foodstandards.gov.scot/cooksafe  
578 The publication date is estimated from the date of publication of the different webpages referencing the guidelines, as well as the 
dates of local authorities’ decisions given for context – see e.g. The page on the site of the Azienda Sanitaria Locale (Monza and Brianza): 
shttp://www.aslmonzabrianza.it/ita/Default.aspx?SEZ=1&PAG=135&NOT=979. The toolkit can be downloaded here: 
http://www.aslmonzabrianza.it/user/download.aspx?FILE=OBJ02262.PDF&TIPO=FLE&NOME=manuale_buone_pratiche_microimpre
se_alimentari_RL or here: http://www.asl.lecco.it/intranet/docs_file/6_6582%20allegato.pdf   
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local websites in Lombardy, but not on national websites, and it is not featured prominently, contrary to SFBB, 
meaning that many businesses are probably unaware of it). We were not able to ascertain if this Italian 
handbook was inspired by SFBB, although this seems highly likely. The SFBB toolkit has proven to be inspiring 
for national authorities in a number of countries where it was presenting, even though adaptation has been 
rare so far – beyond the Italian example, one more case is Mongolia, where the World Bank Group has 
supported the translation and adaptation of SFBB into Mongolian, and its distribution to inspectors and local 
businesses579. 
 
Food Hygiene Ratings 
Assigning ratings to food businesses based on inspection findings in terms of hygiene is not a new idea, and it 
does not appear to have originated in Britain. The first example we are aware of, and which is documented in 
scholarship, is from Los Angeles County in the United States, and was introduced in 1998. An evaluation 
showed substantial beneficial effects on compliance of this scheme, which also involved a risk-based targeting 
approach (Fielding et al. 2001). Overall, the study found that “the development of risk categories has resulted 
in better targeting of high-risk establishments through more frequent inspections” and that “Retail food 
establishments behave as if achieving a high letter grade is sufficiently important to comply more strictly with 
food safety practices. Of particular note is the almost 75% decrease in establishments scoring below 70%, 
suggesting the impact not only of greater public access to inspection scores, but also of the revised program’s 
more stringent penalty for establishments scoring below 70 twice in a 12-month period. The decrease in 
closure rates (…) also suggests improved adherence to public health standards for food handling” (ibid., p. 
242). Of particular importance for us here is, beyond the vindication of risk-based targeting and the note on 
the importance of deterrence for repeat offenders, the effectiveness of publicly available ratings at increasing 
compliance. Similar schemes were later introduced in other locations, e.g. in Denmark (from 2001), which has 
long been one of the best known such schemes580. Similar schemes have been introduced or discussed in 
countries as diverse as Nepal and China, Germany and France, Kyrgyzstan581 etc. Thus, Britain’s use of Food 
Hygiene Ratings is neither an isolated nor a “pioneering” case – but it deserves consideration in how it fits with 
Britain’s approach to food safety inspections and enforcement more broadly. 
Food hygiene ratings were introduced much later in Britain than in Denmark: “the FHRS582 was launched in 
late 2010 and local authority uptake following that progressed rapidly such that the scheme is now well 
bedded in. All but one authority (Rutland County Council) in the three countries583 is now operating the scheme 
and information is available on the FSA website on over 440,000 food businesses. The FHIS584 is now operating 
across Scotland. The FHRS was put on a statutory footing in Wales in November 2013 to provide for mandatory 
display of FHRS ratings at food premises. The transition from the voluntary scheme to the statutory scheme is 
due to be complete in May this year. Northern Ireland is set to follow suit with draft legislation introducing 
mandatory display currently being considered by the Northern Ireland Assembly, and the FSA strategy for 2015 
to 2020 highlights that pressing the case to extend this to England is a priority”585. As this report indicates, the 
display of food hygiene ratings is still not mandatory in England, though all businesses do get a rating after 
                                                           
579 Author’s direct interviews with World Bank and Mongolian government officials involved. 
580 See overview of the system here: http://www.findsmiley.dk/en-US/Forside.htm and here http://en.fvm.dk/focus-on/smiley-food-
inspection/.  
581 Author’s direct observations (press reports, pilot schemes) in France, World Bank colleagues internal reports on Germany and China, 
author’s direct involvement in pilot schemes in Nepal and Kyrgyzstan. 
582 Food Hygiene Ratings Scheme 
583 England, Northern Ireland and Wales. 
584 Food Hygiene Information Scheme 
585 Source: Food Standards Agency Board Meeting – 25 March 2015 (FSA 15/03/06), Food Hygiene Rating Scheme – Update And Next 
Steps, Report by Jason Feeney, Chief Operating Officer – available at: http://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/fsa150306.pdf  
258 
 
each inspection, and consumers can freely access these on line. Furthermore, non-display of the rating is likely 
to indicate that the rating is low, and the FSA website logically advises caution to consumers in such cases. 
There is an important difference between the FHRS (England, Wales, Northern Ireland) and the FHIS (Scotland), 
which is the number of possible different ratings. The FHRS has zero to five stars586, whereas the FHIS only has 
“pass” or “improvement required”587 (by comparison, the Danish scheme has four types of smileys, plus the 
“elite smiley” for those repeatedly obtaining a clean sheet). The FSA scheme thus provides more nuanced and 
detailed information (at the risk of some potential for confusion on the exact meaning of such nuances for 
consumers), whereas the FSS goes for a very simple system. In any case, what is noteworthy is that ratings are 
distinct from enforcement decisions, and introduce an additional tool for compliance promotion, with more 
flexibility than enforcement measures. 
Indeed, as the FSA’s “Frequently Asked Questions” on FHRS make clear, even a business with a low rating is 
not necessarily always shut down (or at least not immediately) – low ratings are not equivalent ipso facto to 
formal enforcement measures, but rather are a “stronger form” of informal enforcement, using the powerful 
incentive (market effect) created by the ratings’ publicity. Quoting the FSA website: “Businesses given ratings 
of ‘0’ or ‘1’ must make urgent or major improvements to hygiene standards. The local authority food safety 
officer will use a number of enforcement tools as well as giving advice and guidance to make sure these 
improvements are made. (…) The Food Hygiene Rating Scheme means that people can choose instead to eat 
out or buy food at places with higher ratings and businesses with low ratings are in danger of losing customers 
and so will be encouraged to improve standards more quickly and to maintain these in the future. If the officer 
finds that a business’s hygiene standards are very poor and there is an imminent risk to health – this means 
food is not safe to eat – the officer must take action to make sure that consumers are protected. This could 
mean prohibiting part of an operation or closing the business down588.” This additional, intermediate form of 
“semi-formal enforcement” can be appropriate in a number of situations where the inspector thinks shutting 
down operations is inadequate (negative social impact, loss of revenue that will make improvements even 
more difficult to achieve etc.). The ratings are a tool whereby the administrative action (inspections and 
enforcement) uses market forces to ensure increases in compliance. They are interesting in that they offer 
high flexibility (because formal enforcement is not automatic, there is reversibility in the decision if things 
improve), and businesses can ask for a re-visit if they have made the required improvement. By offering 
transparency to consumers, less drastic measures than formal enforcement (and a chance for improvement) 
to businesses, food hygiene ratings thus are an instrument that seems to be able to combine a real 
“deterrence” effect (through reputational risk) and a high level of procedural justice.  
The March 2015 report to the FSA’s board includes the summary of an evaluation (conducted over 2011-2014) 
which shows that (i) “consumer awareness and reported use of the FHRS have steadily increased to 36% and 
20% respectively, and 76% of people recognise the distinctive green and black branding”, (ii) “there was a 
significant increase in ‘broad compliance’ (ratings of 3 to 5) in the first year, and a significant increase in ‘full 
compliance’ (rating of 5) in the second year in local authority areas after FHRS was introduced, compared with 
areas where the scheme was not yet operating” and “there was also a significant decrease in the proportion 
of very poorly performing businesses in the first two years after launch”589. Thus validating the findings of the 
2001 survey of the Los Angeles County case, this FSA evaluation shows (including by comparing “treatment” 
                                                           
586 See FSA website at: http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/hygiene-rating-schemes/ratings-find-out-more-en/fhrs  
587 See FSS website at: http://www.foodstandards.gov.scot/food-safety-standards/food-safety-hygiene/food-hygiene-information-
scheme  
588 “Why are businesses with poor ratings not closed?” in FAQ at: http://www.food.gov.uk/multimedia/hygiene-rating-
schemes/ratings-find-out-more-en/fhrs  
589 Source: Food Standards Agency Board Meeting – 25 March 2015 (FSA 15/03/06), Food Hygiene Rating Scheme – Update And Next 
Steps, Report by Jason Feeney, Chief Operating Officer – available at: http://www.food.gov.uk/sites/default/files/fsa150306.pdf - p. 3 
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and “control” groups given phased introduction of the scheme) that public food hygiene ratings are (gradually 
at least) used by consumers, and have a positive impact on compliance. 
Of course, it is important to remember that such food hygiene rating schemes are only useful if the 
professionalism and ethics of the inspectors assigning the ratings is such that (a) consumers will have trust in 
the ratings and pay attention to them (something that, of course, also requires adequate efforts to “advertise” 
the rating scheme) and (b) they will not abuse the power given by these ratings (since bad ratings can be highly 
damaging to businesses) for corrupt purposes. Such potential pitfalls are not limited to low- and middle-
income countries. The 2001 evaluation of the Los Angeles County case pointed out that “Strong economic 
incentives to achieve higher grades increases the risk of bribery.(…) One confirmed episode of an inspector 
soliciting a bribe, captured in an investigative report on a local news station in November 1998, prompted DHS 
to review and revise measures in place to prevent illegal and unauthorized activities by inspectors” (Fielding 
et al. 2001, p. 244). Credibility and visibility can also be real issues. Some initial pilot schemes in France had 
little success, and it remains to be seen whether the new initiative to publicize the inspection results (as ratings 
in four letters) from July 2015 (to be extended country-wide in 2016) will be more successful590. Thus, food 
hygiene rating schemes are not a solution that can be implemented independently from a broader risk-based 
approach, and require to be successful a strong basis of professionalism among inspectors. 
 
The Primary Authority scheme 
The United Kingdom (and Britain, within it, in particular) present the specific situation of regulations that are 
primarily national (or, in some cases, European) with inspections and enforcement that are primarily 
conducted by officers hired by local self-governing bodies. In a 2009 report, the then-Local Better Regulation 
Office (LBRO – now BRDO) counted 433 councils administering regulatory enforcement across the UK (out of 
which 407 in Britain) – to which should be added 58 Fire and Rescue Authorities (57 in Britain) and 151 Port 
Health Authorities (141 in Britain)591. Reviews for a number of years, such as those conducted by Hampton or 
Löfstedt, have been pointing out the issue of consistency as a key area for improvement. The Regulatory 
Enforcement and Sanctions Act (2008), apart from establishing the possibility of introducing new types of 
administrative sanctions (as recommended by the Macrory review) also created the “Primary Authority” 
statutory scheme, to be administered by LBRO (and, from 2012, by BRDO as its successor body). Though we 
will only discuss it in a very cursory way, Primary Authority is interesting because it seeks to address several 
issues: consistency of enforcement between different localities, transparency and clarity of regulations, 
certainty of advice. 
Primary Authority can apply to “a single business that is regulated by multiple local authorities, or to a business 
that is part of a group of businesses that are collectively regulated by multiple local authorities, where these 
businesses share an approach to compliance” that “might be demonstrated, for example, through 
membership of a trade association that provides regulatory guidance, or through a franchisee relationship 
with a business that specifies compliance controls”592. The business(es) enter(s) a partnership with a single 
local authority (‘primary authority’) which has to be approved by BRDO, which will validate it only if it has 
assessed this particular authority as adequately competent in the regulatory area(s) under consideration. The 
role of the primary authority is then to be a “key point of contact” in relation to the business’ interactions with 
                                                           
590 See newspaper reports: http://next.liberation.fr/food/2015/07/01/quel-niveau-d-hygiene-dans-les-restaurants-pres-de-chez-
vous_1340907 and http://next.liberation.fr/food/2015/07/01/y-a-t-il-vraiment-un-probleme-d-hygiene-dans-les-restaurants-
asiatiques_1313183 - official news release and data here: http://agriculture.gouv.fr/experimentation-de-la-mise-en-transparence-des-
controles-officiels-en-restauration-commerciale-paris  
591 LBRO 2009, pp. 25-27 
592 BRDO, Primary Authority Statutory Guidance, September 2013 – p. 3 
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local authorities that regulate it and to coordinate the regulatory enforcement efforts in relation to this 
business593. It does this e.g. by providing “advice and guidance on compliance to the business (known as 
‘Primary Authority Advice’) in areas of regulation covered by the partnership, on which the business can rely” 
and also by providing advice and guidance to other local authorities in regard to this business. It may “publish 
an inspection plan” to guide and co-ordinate their enforcement activities. Crucially, the advice given by the 
primary authority to the business can be opposed to another local authority: “where the business faces 
potential enforcement action by an enforcing authority, the primary authority will assess whether the 
proposed action is inconsistent with any Primary Authority Advice given. If the action is inconsistent, the 
primary authority is able to direct the enforcing authority not to take the action”. If the primary authority has 
published an inspection plan, other authorities have to follow it. They also must “notify the primary authority 
of enforcement action in relation to the business” and “in most circumstances this notification is required 
before the action can be taken” (except for emergencies)594. In other words, the primary authority for a 
business can give it in-depth advice that, if it then follows, it can be assured will be found to be valid by other 
authorities – and it establishes a significant degree of consistency and coordination in inspection plans and 
enforcement responses. Because of the significant amount of work involved for the primary authority, its work 
within such a partnership is done on a cost-recovery basis. 
The benefits for businesses are clear: they get assurance that, if they behave in a certain way, this will be found 
to be in compliance with the law – and that the way they are treated will be as uniform as possible across the 
country. There are significant benefits expected for citizens as well (be they consumers, neighbours, workers 
etc.): if key regulatory requirements are “internalized” in the internal directives and procedures of businesses, 
they are far more likely to be complied with. Ensuring that advice and guidance are given by the most 
competent local authorities in a given field is also expected to improve the overall regulatory outcomes. And, 
of course, higher certainty of regulatory interpretation should lead to some uptick in investment and growth 
– and lower regulatory burden to (marginally) lower prices. 
Primary Authority has been the subject of several evaluations and studies – a first evaluation in 2009-2011 
(conducted by RAND Europe), a second in 2013 by acl Consulting, and an evaluation of the impact of training 
sessions on primary authority for inspectors, by Dunlop, Kamkhaji and Radaelli in 2013-2015. As the scheme 
is not universally applied (contrary to, say, the food hygiene ratings) and uptake is voluntary, and since it is in 
many ways a very significant change, it is not surprising that evaluation results were not one-sided. The 2011 
review found that positive effects on consistency were not reported by more than 22% of businesses, but 
many noted that it was “too early”, and for most participants it had not been a major concern or primary 
reason to enter the scheme anyway. The evaluation noted differences between a more “thorough” primary 
authority relationship (with an inspection plan) and “lighter” ones: when an inspection plan was present, 
consistency was more strongly increased, and satisfaction levels were higher (in any case ¾ of businesses were 
satisfied). The study was not designed to really capture compliance levels, but noted that a significant share 
of local authorities had changed the way they dealt with businesses in case of problems, far more often going 
to the head office rather than branches (pp. 43-47). The 2013 evaluation found again ¾ of businesses satisfied, 
but only 45% of local authorities considering the overall impact positive (versus 30% negative and 25% 
neutral). Businesses generally noted a reduction in time spent on regulatory issues, better relationships with 
regulators, more consistency in advice and guidance. On the compliance side, it was found to reduce 
“instances where action is necessary in respect of non-compliance by promoting informal discussions between 
primary authorities and enforcing authorities” – but the authors noted that most participants in the scheme 
were already businesses with a “positive approach” and “positive interest” in compliance, making it difficult 
                                                           
593 Ibid. 
594 Ibid., pp. 3-4 
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to see a clear impact on that front (pp. 5-7). As for the study by Dunlop et al. (2015), it did not look at the 
scheme itself, but at the trainings provided by BRDO to inspectors, and found that they had a significant impact 
on the extent to which inspectors understood the logic and the relationships with the scheme, and thus their 
ability to make the most of it (p. 3). Because both evaluations (2011 and 2013) noted that there remained 
many implementation and understanding issues, this finding on the effectiveness of training is important. 
Overall, Primary Authority is a very important innovation conceptually, and there is a large amount of 
anecdotal evidence of its benefits595, but there is not yet a set of very strong evaluation findings on its effects. 
In any case, from our perspective, it demonstrates the importance of considering inspections and enforcement 
issues comprehensively, not only in terms of targeting or numbers, but of methods, consistency, relations with 
duty holders, guidance etc. Primary Authority is not yet old enough (and, maybe, not yet widespread enough 
in use) to make strong conclusions, but does appear to be an approach that has the potential to bring 




As we can see from the above OSH case study, and from the snippets presented from inspections and 
enforcement practices in other areas, Britain (and, more broadly, the UK) can be taken as a valid example of 
risk-based approaches and, at least in some areas, of “smarter approaches”. This does not mean, of course, 
that inspection practices in OSH or other areas in Britain are “perfectly risk-based” (if such a thing were 
possible). There are areas where significant improvement from this perspective would clearly be possible, for 
instance data quality in OSH, or the “twin peaks” created by the distribution of premises between HSE and 
LAs. In food safety, SFBB and food hygiene ratings seem to be very promising initiatives, but their impact 
remains to be more fully evaluated, as should be the frequency of inspections. Primary Authority is innovative 
and seems to have the potential to solve major contradictions and issues in inspections and enforcement, but 
is still in its growth phase. In addition, institutions, methods and practices are all vulnerable to changes driven 
by short-term budgetary considerations more than by sound evidence, and the introduction of FFI and sharp 
reduction of proactive inspections in the OSH area are causes for serious concern, and seem likely to lead to a 
worsening rather than an improvement of the efficiency and effectiveness of the system. 
Still, when considering the overall performance of Britain’s OSH system compared to Germany’s, the 
magnitude of the efficiency gap is such that it strongly suggests that Britain’s risk-based approach seems to 
have real benefits. With several times less frequent inspections, Britain has consistently performed at least as 
well as (and, until a few years ago, significantly better than) Germany. This is certainly not a result that is due 
entirely to different inspection practices (and, for instance, the far earlier emphasis on risk-management 
within enterprises in Britain probably also played a role), it also seems unlikely that Britain’s far more risk-
focused approach is not one of the reasons for this difference in performance. Investigating whether such 
greater efficiency and positive results can be seen in other areas (e.g. food safety) would thus be a very valid 
area of future research. 
 
 
b. Post-Soviet and Post-Communist Experiences 
                                                           
595 See BRDO (2014), Primary Authority: A Guide for Officials, available at: 




The “post-Soviet” or “former Soviet” world (or, to use a convenient moniker, the Former Soviet Union or 
FSU596) continues, in spite of the more than 20 years elapsed since the USSR’s collapse, and of the obvious 
deep differences between its constituents, to share a number of common characteristics, particularly in the 
structures and workings of the public administration. This is true also, albeit to a lesser and more unequal 
extent, for countries that were never part of the Soviet Union, but were under its direct influence (Comecon 
members)597. Decades of shared institutions, legal systems, practices and experience (longer for some, shorter 
for others) resulted in regulatory systems that were, at least at the onset, very close. Of course, various 
backgrounds in terms of earlier history and social structure, economy, culture and geography meant there 
were major differences between all these countries – but also considerable similarities, among which was 
precisely the way economic activity was organized (and, at it gradually became private, regulated). 
These countries’ shared history and structures did not end all of a sudden in 1989-1991, but rather in many 
cases have effects that can still be easily observed. Nor were privatization (with the many challenges it 
represented, and the many ways in which it went socially, economically and politically “wrong”) or “shock 
therapy” (where it was attempted) enough to comprehensively transform the relations between state 
administration and economic operators598. In fact, at the end of the 1990s, business regulation, and as part of 
it inspections and enforcement, were a significant issue in practically all FSU countries, and most if not all other 
former Communist countries (including some outside of the group we are considering, e.g. former Yugoslav 
republics). As a result, reforming business regulations and specifically, in a number of cases, business 
inspections and enforcement, started to become an important priority – both for national governments, 
international organizations and, in the case of candidate countries, for the EU. 
Problems with regulatory systems stemmed from a number of aspects of the Communist-era inheritance. A 
hostile attitude to private ownership and private businesses fostered confrontational approaches geared at 
punishing violations that were expected to be numerous, with businesses seen as criminal by essence. The 
way the law was for decades systematically made to mean whatever was in favour of the authorities left a 
very weak rule of law and highly problematic ethics in the state administration (and outside of it too), and 
courts that tended to rule in favour of the most powerful (and, in particular, in favour of the state). Institutions 
left over from the previous period were strongly specialized, heavily staffed, with a strong technical bend, and 
a risk-averse approach, resulting in a tendency to try and achieve total control over each and every risk, and 
also in each risk dimension being controlled repeatedly from several different angles. Of course, this common 
background was nuanced by country specifics. The Baltic States, for instance, drew on a more liberal tradition, 
and on the legislative traditions from the inter-war period. Russia, by contrast, had a dreaded figure of 
‘inspector’ long before Soviet times, as exemplified in Gogol’s Inspector General (in Russian “Revizor”). In most 
of these countries, however, and definitely in all former Soviet ones, the term “inspection” (in Russian 
                                                           
596 This includes the following fifteen internationally recognized independent countries: Armenia, Azerbaijan, Belarus, Estonia, Georgia, 
Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Latvia, Lithuania, Moldova, Russia, Tajikistan, Turkmenistan, Ukraine, Uzbekistan 
597 This includes the following: Bulgaria, Czech Republic, Hungary, Mongolia, Poland, Romania, Slovakia. Former Yugoslav Republics 
had a completely different legal and administrative system, and so had Albania (though the latter was far more “statist” than the 
former). Vietnam could also be considered, as well as Cuba, but they were considerably more “remote” from the Soviet Union, and 
present major specificities. We will thus limit ourselves to the seven listed above. East Germany was incorporated into the Federal 
Republic of Germany and took over “wholesale” its regulatory structures. Some differences may linger in practices of various 
Bundesländer but studying them is beyond the scope of this research. 
598 See e.g. EBRD Transition Report for 1999 and 2000. These reports, however, focused on a very limited set of “liberalisation” 
indicators (e.g. price and quantitative import/export controls) and, while they occasionally mentioned broader “market access” issues, 
did not really investigate them. In the first decade of “transition”, the importance of technical, safety etc. regulations (and their 
enforcement) was not always perceived, with more “fundamental” aspects of a market economy being still in the forefront. 
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“proverka”) and its derivatives were well known by all, and elicited prompt responses from any interviewed 
citizens, business operator or not599.  
While European integration ensured that, to a large extent, underlying regulations were transformed in 
candidate countries, it left regulatory procedures largely untouched. Indeed, as we will outline in the next 
section, the level of harmonization of “regulatory delivery” is overall relatively weak in the EU, even in areas 
where regulations themselves are partly or strongly harmonized, with the partial exception of food safety and, 
of market surveillance of non-food products. This means that, in many areas, inspection structures and 
methods were left largely untouched by the EU accession process (while corruption in “street level 
bureaucracy” did overall decrease as a result of across-the-board institutional reforms, but was clearly not 
eliminated). While the stronger level of harmonization in food safety meant that inspection structures and 
practices did change in this area, this did not necessarily lead to changes in other instruments, e.g. licenses 
and permits, which were able to remain “on top” of EU requirements. Harmonization in conformity 
assessment for the “New Approach” directives in regard to non-food products was likewise strong, but did not 
prevent the persistence of pre-reform inspection practices, additional licensing requirements etc. In short, 
while EU accession did result in significant changes (particularly if comparing new EU Member States with 
other former Soviet countries in Eastern Europe, e.g. Ukraine), it did not (by far) transform all pre-existing 
practices600. 
The salience of the problem was evidenced through action taken by governments in Eastern Europe and 
Central Asia, with or without the support of international organizations – Latvia was one of the very first, with 
an inspectorate improvement programme supported by the World Bank Group in 1999-2003601, Armenia 
passed a law on inspections in 2000, and Russia a law on the protection of business operators during 
inspections in 2001. Romania attempted to consolidated a number of inspection functions in 2003, and Poland 
set procedural guarantees for businesses during inspections in 2004602. Lithuania embarked significantly later, 
but in a more ambitious way, in a thorough reform of inspections (2010 onwards)603. Evidence of the 
prevalence of the problem is also evidenced in the responses to the business surveys that the World Bank 
Group started running in a number of countries, in support of business environment reform programmes 
(which increasingly included inspections as well as permits and licensing reforms), from the end of the 1990s. 
Countries covered by these surveys (at various dates) include Azerbaijan, Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, 
Mongolia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan604. All of them showed, at least before reform (and often after 
several years of it, in spite of some improvements), the prevalence of inspections-related problems.  
The wealth of data collected by these surveys (as well as by some country-specific ones, e.g. those run by the 
Lithuanian government since 2010)605 will be a very important source for the outline of inspection practices, 
                                                           
599 See for instance Coolidge, Grava and Putnina 2003 on the situation in Latvia in the late 1990s. 
600 For an example of how such regulatory practices can survive in a new EU Member State, see e.g. OECD 2015 b on Lithuania. The 
whole report is sub-titled “focus on the delivery side”, emphasizing the importance of regulatory procedures and processes rather 
than only the text of regulations. See in particular chapters 7 (inspections and enforcement) and 9 (construction permits). Lithuania 
also has a large number of other licenses and permits, including approval requirements for food business operators that are stricter 
than mandated by EU regulations (source: direct interviews with and presentations by senior officials). Several other OECD reviews of 
regulatory reforms covered post-Communist countries (Czech Republic, Russia, Kazakhstan) – see: http://www.oecd-
ilibrary.org/governance/oecd-reviews-of-regulatory-reform_19900481. 
601 See Coolidge, Grava and Putnina 2003 as well as Putnina 2005 and Coolidge, Grava and Liepina 2008. 
602 See Putnina 2005 and World Bank Group 2010. 
603 See OECD 2015 b, chapter 7. 
604 The surveys covered the following years: Azerbaijan: 2008 (a later survey remained unpublished) –  Belarus: 2003, 2004, 2005 and 
2008 – Georgia: 2003 and 2005 -  Kyrgyzstan: 2008 and 2010 – Mongolia: 2009 and 2015 (forthcoming) - Tajikistan: 2003, 2005 and 
2007 (a later survey remained unpublished) – Ukraine: yearly from 2000 to 2004, then 2006, 2008 and 2010 – Uzbekistan: yearly from 
2001 to 2007. All these surveys see bibliography IFC (various years).  
605 See OECD chapter 7 for a summary of these surveys. Other surveys covering businesses’ experiences in the region are those run 
jointly by the EBRD and World Bank Group and known collectively as BEEPS (Business Environment and Enterprise Performance 
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effects and changes in former Communist countries that we will briefly draw below. The other key source will 
be our own experience – being involved as an advisor to governments in a number of these countries since 
2004606, which resulted in countless discussions and interviews with both government officials, businesses and 
external experts.  
 
i. Inspections pre-reform: burden and attempt at “total control” 
Geographically, this section focuses on several countries of the Former Soviet Union (Armenia, Azerbaijan, 
Belarus, Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Ukraine and Uzbekistan), to which Mongolia (which was very close 
administratively to the Soviet system) is added. We also consider one EU Member State that is also at the 
same time a former Soviet republic (Lithuania). There are several reasons to consider this particular set of 
cases. First, the Former Soviet Union, and more broadly former command-economies of the Soviet block, have 
been (for many still are) characterized by rigid and heavy regulatory systems which aim at preventing “all risks, 
all the time, everywhere” – in effect, a direct opposite of the risk-based approaches we are considering in this 
research. Second, most of these countries have undertaken significant regulatory reforms (often focusing 
specifically on inspections, and with a risk angle) in the past ten or even fifteen years, and many have reached 
important results, but also faced significant limitations – thus presenting interesting lessons on how such 
reforms can succeed (or not), and with what effects. In all these countries, business inspections used to be, 
and often still are, a major problem, and thus have been a key area of reform – which allows to investigate 
specifically this aspect, and the impact of changes. Because of the salience of these issues, and of the need to 
have reliable data to design, steer and evaluate reforms, the International Finance Corporation of the World 
Bank Group, and the World Bank Group Investment Climate Advisory Services, have conducted business 
surveys in most of these countries (and the Lithuanian government has done likewise, and with similar 
questions and methods), focusing on regulatory procedures and instruments, in particular inspections, which 
provide a wealth of data. 
Before reform, the regulatory approach in these countries was (and still is in part in many cases) extremely 
prescriptive, with detailed “specification-type” rules setting out exactly what material should be on the walls, 
how a shop or factory should be laid out, what recipe to use to preserve cucumbers, how many coat-hangers 
should be in a hotel room etc. Not only were these rules highly prescriptive and detailed, but they were hugely 
numerous, and came from a large number of different regulatory bodies, without coordination (and quite 
often with contradictions). In order to ensure adherence to these norms, and to control business activity more 
broadly, most activities were (and often still are) subject to ex ante controls: businesses and citizens require 
hundreds of permits, approvals, licenses etc., which must frequently be renewed. In addition, once operating, 
businesses are subject to numerous inspections regardless of the actual risk level of activities, and likewise 
customs, traffic police etc. attempt to control each and every person, truck, shipment. 
Evidently, most of these countries (or, probably, all of them, but to varying extents) present clear links 
between “petty corruption” (that of “street level bureaucrats” rather than major top-level corruption involving 
large contracts) and frequent inspections (and permits, licenses etc.). This link is not only seen in the circle of 
                                                           
Subject). We discuss later in this research issues with the reliability of these surveys, but in any case they essentially do not cover 
inspections (except in a very marginal way) and thus are of limited relevance to our work. 
606 Working in this period in Armenia, Azerbaijan, Georgia, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Lithuania, Mongolia, Tajikistan, Ukraine and 
Uzbekistan. It should be added that, before that, we also experienced first hand government inspections in Tajikistan as a non-profit 
entity, while working as Central Asia coordinator for the French NGO ACTED. In 2003, a shipment of WHO-recommended insecticide 
to be used for malaria preventionwas delayed over a month at the border for spurious technical reasons (and very real corrupt 
demands), until it got escalated by the funding party (the EC) and cleared at the highest political level. This resulted in serious harm 




more inspections resulting in more bribes resulting in continued frequent inspections. It is also observed in 
that it appears that burdensome and intrusive controls, unfair treatment and constant inspections breed 
disrespect for the law on the side of the controlled persons and entities. Thus, it appears that even in cases 
where individuals are not corrupted, these practices tend to “corrupt” the system, i.e. make it inefficient and 
ineffective. The relevance of these (tentative) findings may be challenged by arguing that the regimes of 
Central Asia, Russia or Ukraine, are “inherently” authoritarian, plagued by ’cultural issues’. Many (over more 
than a century) have argued that authoritarian rule is endemic to the ’Russian character’. Others may suggest 
those governments’ are unable to manage modern administrative systems because of lack of resources. This 
is too easy a way to dismiss the significance of post-Soviet (post-Communist) cases.  
Clearly, lack of resources is not the reason. Russia’s, Kazakhstan’s, Azerbaijan’s or Mongolia’s GDP per capita, 
thanks to natural resources wealth, increased rapidly during most of the 2000s (even though Mongolia has 
slowed down, and Russia and Kazakhstan suffered from drops in oil prices and exchange rates)607, and are on 
par with at least some European countries. Belarus (even though this is partly due to its industry still benefiting 
from a de facto energy subsidy from Russia) also has higher PPP GDP per capita than the poorest EU Member 
States. Even though other countries in our study group are mostly poorer (with the exception of Lithuania), it 
is sufficient to show that lack of resources cannot be the explanatory variable – particularly given that 
corruption problems in regulatory issues are definitely not lower in the resource-rich group (except for 
Mongolia, which has a significantly more open and more democratic system). Nor can the old fallacy of 
“cultural specificities” explain away the “control and corruption nexus”. This fallacy is in fact used most 
frequently by corrupt senior officials themselves to justify the lack of reforms. In the 19th century, Germans 
were derided by Britons as lazy and corrupt – and laziness was also one of the main Japanese characteristics 
according to Western observers in the early 20th century608. Nowadays it is held that the German and Japanese 
cultures embody hard work and that corruption is low in Germany because it is abhorrent to the national 
culture.  
Cultural differences exist, and the way the Soviet Union applied its laws (as tools to root out dissidents, 
meaning the law would always be against you no matter what it appeared to say) is definitely a key factor in 
the corruption problem. But one should look closer: most Russians, Ukrainians, Tajiks etc. complain about 
corruption and see it as a problem609. Most officials, for their part, go to great lengths to appear to comply 
with the laws. In many cases at least, based on numerous conversations with businesses in all these countries, 
officials generally make references to applicable norms and highlight violations that are at least partly credible, 
rather than outright asking for a bribe (though at the lowest level, with micro-businesses e.g. in Tajikistan, 
directly asking rather than bothering with pointing out norms is frequently observed). Most people, both 
citizens, businesses and officials, clearly see corruption as an evil – even if it is widely practised, even if they 
                                                           
607 In 2014, Russia and Kazakhstan both had higher nominal GDP per capita than Romania and Bulgaria (the poorest EU Member States), 
and only 10% lower than Hungary. Mongolia’s was much lower but catching up already with Tunisia and Albania, for instance. At PPP, 
Russia was even above Poland and around 10% below Slovakia, Kazakhstan was above Slovakia and Mongolia less than 10% below 
Serbia  





608 See Chang (2007), Chapter 9 
609 Even though surveys as BEEPS sometimes report the percentage of respondents rating corruption as a “major” or “serious” 
problems to be decreasing, this is neither because of a decrease in the phenomenon, nor (based on considerable evidence, including 
successful revolutionary movements in Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine, and unsuccessful movements elsewhere) because of growing 
acceptance of it, but simply because of the way such questions tend to elicit unreliable responses because of the way respondents 
may perceive “problems” as meaning “unusual or somewhat solvable issues”, as opposed to endemic and permanent ones. See for 
this our section discussing data reliability issues in surveys such as BEEPS. 
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benefit from it themselves. They may be profiting from corruption (on any side) but they are not advocating 
the practice as being “good” or even “normal”. Crucially, and by contrast, there is a wide consensus about the 
way the system should work: there should be effective total control. Citizens long for it, businesses assume 
this is how things should work and inspectors are partly pretending, partly genuinely trying to enforce rules 
(taking bribes is not necessarily in contradiction with thinking one is trying to enforce laws, and sometimes 
actually enforcing them). Our argument is that this objective of total control is precisely a core element of the 
problem, and one that is therefore worthy of reform – and of study. 
All the countries that we are considering here have attempted, with varying levels of commitment, different 
approaches and unequal success, to reform their inspection systems. These reforms were driven by the 
recognition that there were blatant problems with existing practices, and they also were part of an 
international context, where reforms in some countries of the region inspired others, and where the World 
Bank Group (and, to a somewhat smaller extent, other international assistance actors such as USAID, for 
instance) promoted such reforms and worked on trying to spread risk-based approaches. Crucially for our 
purpose, in most of the countries where it implemented programmes to support inspections reform, the 
World Bank Group ran representative business surveys to capture the frequency, duration and a number of 
other aspects of inspections (and of a number of other administrative procedures). While there were some 
variations in sampling structure and in precise wording of questions, these surveys offer a sufficient level of 
homogeneity to make meaningful comparisons on inspections incidence and frequency, and their evolution, 
both between the different countries surveyed, and over time. Given the large sample sizes used for most of 
these surveys (1 to 2 thousand respondents in general), and the relatively high engagement of World Bank 
Group teams in these countries in quality control, the reliability of data is rather high, at least when one 
considers simple “objective” questions such as the number of inspection visits. Unfortunately, no equivalent 
data exists to track the regulatory outcomes such as food safety or occupational safety (for reasons that we 
will briefly discuss), hence a full comparison of “before” and “after” reform will be impossible, but this will still 
enable us to get a first impression of the impact of changes. 
 
ii. Data perspective: reform results and international comparisons 
How much a regulatory agency inspects is a fundamental metric – be it relative to its staff’s other tasks, or 
from the inspected establishments’ perspective (what percentage of them are inspected every year, and how 
often on average). Data on the share of resources and staff-time spent on inspecting is mostly lacking. Even in 
OECD and EU countries, many agencies are loath to release such figures, or simply do not track them. It is even 
more so in the focus countries for our paper, even though discussions with officials suggest that most 
resources and time are spent on inspecting610. 
All the countries in our “surveyed group” shared initially a high level of inspections “volume”, i.e. most 
businesses611 (75% to 100%612) were inspected613, usually several times a year. Post-reform data, in a majority 
                                                           
610 Close to 100% of resources spent on inspecting in FSU. Confidential data from regulatory agencies in some OECD countries suggests 
that, there, at least 20% is spent on analysis and back-office work (and regulatory work includes not just inspecting, but informing). 
611 Looking at percentage of establishments would be more accurate, as a single business may operate several. In surveyed countries, 
however, the majority of businesses (and the near-totality of SMEs) correspond to only one establishment. Since, for sampling reasons, 
surveys were based on business population [because business registries are based on entities, not premises), the two are assumed to 
be essentially equivalent here. 
612 The populations surveyed are not entirely identical, due to differences in the registriation of sole proprietors (and the possibility, 
or not, to combine their sample with legal entities’), the inclusion or not of agricultural producers, etc. Nonetheless, the general picture 
is comparable. See survey reports for detailed methodologies. 
613 To assess targeting, it would be better to have data on the percentage inspected out of the supervised population, i.e. the 
establishments that the regulator effectively has competence upon, but in most cases, for the countries considered, this population 
can be equated with the general business population, as regulators have very broad mandates, and make full use of them. 
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of countries where it is available (i.e. where reform has progressed for long enough, and where new surveys 
have been conducted), shows a significant decrease. The extent of this decrease, however, varies considerably 
depending on the character of the reform (more or less radical and/or well implemented, with Georgia the 
most, and Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan and Ukraine the least), and on its duration. It appears also that strong, 
authoritarian governments can (when they are set on doing so) achieve significant decreases in inspections 
incidence, frequency and duration more easily, in some instances, than relatively weaker or more democratic 
regimes. These strong decreases, however, often do not reflect profound improvements in the environment 
for business creation and growth, or real changes in practices, but rather formal compliance with orders from 
the top. Thus, changes in the percentage of businesses inspected (incidence), the number of annual visits 
(frequency) or the duration are interesting indicators – but far from the whole story. 
The graph below gives a general picture – with “baseline” and “post-reform” corresponding to different years 
for each country614 [note that reform continued in Georgia, and inspections volumes went down much further, 
but no subsequent survey was conducted, hence the figure below is the latest available]. It shows both the 
very high incidence of inspections all across our group of countries pre-reform, and the significant decreases 
in most cases. 
 
Percentage of businesses inspected in a given year, by country 
Incidence is, of course, not the only relevant indicator. Other data, such as the number of inspection visits and 
their aggregate duration, generally give the same picture, with the same countries displaying strong (or weak) 
performance, and generally high baselines (though with significant differences) in all cases. 
                                                           
614 Azerbaijan: 2007 [a subsequent survey was planned but did not take place], Belarus: 2003 and 2012, Georgia: 2003 and 2005, 
Kyrgyzstan: 2008 and 2011, Mongolia: 2008-9 (Q4 to Q3) [a follow up survey is planned in 2016], Tajikistan: 2003 and 2010 [the 2010 
data was presented publicly but not published, it suffers from lower quality than previous years – last published report is 2007], 
Ukraine: 2006 and 2010, Uzbekistan: 2001 to 2007. Reforms started in: Azerbaijan 2011 only, Belarus 2006, Georgia 2001 with 
acceleration in 2003, Kyrgyzstan 2005 but stalled several times because of political events, Mongolia 2003 but stalled and resumed in 
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These figures aggregate all inspectorates but the bulk of inspections are conducted by one to five (at most 
ten) agencies, while the remainder615 are far less active, because of limited staff and resources. Overall, in all 
countries, tax inspections, fire safety inspections, hygiene and food inspections formed the bulk of the visits. 
Survey results show the prevalence of these inspections, as well as mixed reform results, corresponding to 
different degrees of implementation by different agencies. 
                                                           
615 Just a couple in Mongolia, where most agencies were consolidated in a “single inspectorate” – around 20-30 in Tajikistan, 
Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan – around 80 in Ukraine. This compares with around 70 in Lithuania, similarly with only a few being really active 
and most of them being very small, or less than 15 in Latvia or Slovenia. It is often difficult to ascertain the number of inspection 
agencies because many can be small, or local/regional. Thus, while in the Netherlands there is now only a dozen of national 
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It would be optimal to compare this data to that of EU countries, but it is difficult to do so for, unfortunately, 
most agencies do not publish data on the percentage of businesses inspected, and very few countries have 
conducted surveys on this issue616.  
It is in some cases possible to estimate inspections incidence based on (a) the published number of inspections 
and (b) the total number of businesses in the country617, but again it is only possible for those who publish 
their inspection numbers (a small minority). We have to explain here why we think it possible to use data 
published by inspecting agencies themselves in this case, whereas for FSU countries we have preferred to rely 
                                                           
616 The data from these surveys is of a different nature, and scope, from the data used in the function-focused case studies. While in 
the OSH studies (Britain, Germany, and further down France) we have inspectorates’ own data, covering only one regulatory function, 
here we look at survey data with responses from businesses, covering a number of different functions. In countries where there are 
reasons to doubt the quality of inspectorates’ data (which is frequently the case, even in the OECD, as we illustrate below in the case 
of France OSH – but is far more the case in a post-Soviet context, for instance), business surveys are a superior alternative. Considering 
percentages inspected, rather than raw number of inspection visits, allows to make easier comparisons country-to-country, regardless 
of their size. Finally, the ability to look at the overall prevalence of inspections across all functions allows to give a picture that goes 
beyond a specific function, and reflects the general situation in the country in terms of inspection practices. 
617 This over-estimates the percentage of businesses inspected, since some may have visited twice, and this this data is not usually 
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on representative surveys. The reliability of data on inspections numbers provided by inspectorates relies on 
at least three preconditions: adequate information systems to record the data, high compliance with internal 
rules by frontline officers, and alignment of incentives for the agency, the inspectors and the management 
(i.e. absence of incentives to manipulate the data one way or another). These conditions are broadly met in 
the case of the EU-based examples we use below618, but not in the FSU countries. There, by contrast, not only 
are information systems frequently absent (except in tax services, records tend to be only paper-based), and 
compliance with internal processes is far from assured619. Most crucially, while there are strong incentives to 
conduct as many inspections as possible in practice (inspectors and their managers frequently draw illicit 
income from this, and some inspectorates are also allowed to keep a percentage of the official fines), there is 
an incentive to report less, since political authorities generally want to at least have appearances of business 
friendliness, so would react negatively at the very high numbers of inspections that would be reported. 
Considering official reports by the French tax service620, and official data from the Latvia tax service621, they 
both appear to inspect less than 5% of all businesses, a sharp contrast with the very high percentages observed 
in the FSU. As for British Occupational Safety and Health inspections, we saw in the previous section that there 
are less than 200,000 of them per year, for more than 5 million businesses, resulting in a percentage inspected 
of less than 5% as well. 
Doing comparisons for an entire country (all types of inspections together) requires, however, business survey 
data, for no EU country currently has consolidated data on all inspections conducted in a given year by all 
agencies. While some have good quality data, this is far from the case for all of them, many do not publish 
inspection numbers, and there is in any case no way to avoid double counts and deduct from these numbers 
an aggregate incidence and frequency. Only very few EU countries have conducted representative surveys 
that we can use for our purpose. While the UK’s National Audit Office and Better Regulatory Delivery Office 
conduct regular surveys of businesses about regulatory matters (in recent years jointly), these do not directly 
ask whether a business was inspected in a given year, they do not include tax services, and overall do not 
provide data that would be comparable622. The governments of Italy and Lithuania, by contrast, have both 
conducted surveys that yield (with some minor caveats) directly comparable data.  
                                                           
618 When an inspectorate thinks the inspection numbers may be “too high” or “too low” for some important stakeholders, it usually 
simply refrains from releasing them in the EU. This is e.g. the case of the British HSE in recent years, which prefers to avoid releasing 
aggregate figures to avoid criticisms one way or another. 
619 Both because of archaic management practices (heavy on authoritarian approaches, weak on real control) and because of incentives 
(low salary and high prevalence of corruption), actual compliance is low at all levels. 
620 See: Direction Générale des Finances Publiques (DGFIP), Rapport d’activité 2014 – cahier statistique, available at: 
http://www.economie.gouv.fr/files/files/directions_services/dgfip/Rapport/2014/RA_2014_cahierstats_0107_web.pdf. See page 13: 
in 2014 there were less than 48,000 on site ‘accounting verifications’ (tax inspections) as well as less than 70,000 checks of compliance 
with the public television service contribution. Even assuming (though it is highly unlikely) that all these targeted different businesses 
(whereas in fact a large overlap is likely), the total number receiving any form of “on site” controls was only around 100,000. In the 
same year, France had more than 3 million non-agricultural enterprises, and over 500,000 agricultural enterprises, hence somewhere 
between 2 and 3% of enterprises (at most) received an on-site tax inspection [enterprise population see INSEE website – accessed at: 
http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=if4 and http://www.insee.fr/fr/themes/document.asp?ref_id=T13F172]. By 
contrast, the number of checks conducted remotely (documentation checks) was far higher – but still covered no more than around 
10% of all businesses (even assuming that each individual control measure affected a different enterprise, which is again highly 
unlikely). 
621 Unpublished case study prepared for the International Finance Corporation of the World Bank Group in 2009, showing that less 
than 5% of enterprises in Latvia received a tax inspection in the most recent year. 
622 Several EU countries have initiated programmes that could yield a consolidated view of inspections, but so far they cover only some 
sectors, regions or inspectorates, and never all inspectorates in a country (though a few examples of this exist worldwide, e.g. in 
countries where most inspectorates have been consolidated in one single agency, like in Bosnia and Herzegovina). In Italy, the Registri 
Unici dei Controlli cover only the agricultural production and processing sector, and so far only at the regional level (though a 
nationwide extension has been decided). In the Netherlands, the InspectieView programme covers only national inspectorates (and 
not all of them fully at this stage). For more on this topic, see World Bank Group 2014 d. 
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In Italy there was (so far) a single survey covering 2011 and whereby over 1,500 respondents were interviewed, 
covering businesses with 5 to 250 employees. Because very small businesses were excluded, there may be a 
non-insignificant bias in the results (they may be inspected less frequently and, because of their high number 
in Italy, this would reduce the mean incidence and frequency). The exclusion of large businesses is likely to 
have less of an impact given their small number (though the mean incidence and frequency of inspections in 
these businesses is likely to be high). Though detailed results of the survey were presented in a number of 
events in 2012 by the Dipartamento della Funzione Pubblica in charge of administrative simplification, only 
some excerpts are available on line623. This survey showed that the percentage that had received at least one 
inspection in 2011 was slightly above 36% - hence, far lower than in FSU countries (even though, by many 
metrics, the Italian authorities considered the inspection burden to be far too high, in particular because of 
many duplications in controls, and of the high concentration of inspection visits on a few sectors, which 
received a far higher burden than the average may suggest624).  
In Lithuania, the percentage inspected pre-reform was high, though somewhat lower than FSU countries that 
have not joined the EU, at around 60% in 2011 (see OECD 2015 b, p. 122). Initial gains (decrease to less than 
45% in 2013) have been partly reversed due to a lower focus on reform under a new administration. If one 
considers not only incidence but also the combined frequency of visits and duration, the overall inspections 
burden fell around 30% in the first years of reform and, even after the partial reversal in recent years, this 
burden remains around 20% lower that at the baseline (ibid., p. 124).  
 
iii. Assessing outcomes of inspection systems – and of reforms 
Ideally, in order to properly assess the effectiveness of inspection systems in FSU countries, and of reforms, 
we would take an approach similar to the one we used to compare British and German OSH inspections, using 
publicly available data on key outcomes such as food-borne diseases, occupational health etc. Unfortunately, 
such data is generally highly unreliable in most FSU countries, partly for the same reasons that official data on 
inspection numbers is not reliable. First, information systems are often lacking entirely, or are limited in scope 
and usage. Second, political priorities may make under- or over-reporting a much better strategy for managers 
than giving accurate data. In addition, challenges such as detection (e.g. for food-borne diseases) that apply 
in all countries are even stronger in countries where the public health system has been in upheaval for a couple 
of decades and is frequently plagued by corruption. Thus, it is impossible to look for precise correlations at 
the level of one inspection field, except possibly in taxation, where data on tax income (and on tax income as 
percent of GDP, and on collections vs. plans) are significantly more reliable (though not perfect).  
Being able to compare data on food safety would be very valuable, for it is an area where, in spite of major 
differences in conditions (natural, economic), changes in practices can make a very strong difference, and one 
could expect better inspections and enforcement practices to deliver positive results (at least over some years, 
by supporting changes in how business operators and consumers behave). Unfortunately, except in cases of 
major outbreaks, food-borne diseases tend to be under-reported: not all patients will see a doctor, and few 
doctors will prescribe tests to identify the pathogen, except if the case is particularly serious. To this must be 
added very different practices in terms of health care (in some countries, most patients will go to a general 
practitioner, if they consult at all – in others, many will go to hospital), different reporting rules and standards. 
In addition, the consolidation of data from local sources is, in some countries, very problematic – with cases 
of “sloppiness”, but also cases of outright manipulation of data in order to either show better performance 
                                                           
623 See: Dossier – I Controlli, Dipartamento della Funzione Pubblica – Ufficio per la Semplificazione Amministrativa – available at: 
http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/media/1023751/dossier_controlli.pdf (see pp. 21-23). 
624 Our estimates based on the published data suggest that, for businesses with more than 10 employees, the mean number of 
inspection visits for those having been inspected at least once was around 10 per year in 2011, a very high number indeed. 
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than is the case or, in other circumstances, make the situation look worse to obtain more funds625. While food-
borne diseases are in aggregate a serious issue, and they rank among the foremost public concerns in 
developed countries, they are rarely among the most salient risks, or gravest epidemics, and are thus not even 
reported separately in global health statistics compiled in WHO reports626. These WHO reports do however 
include incidence of under-5 mortality due to diarrhoea (not all of which is linked to food-borne diseases, but 
which can be a somewhat acceptable proxy), and WHO statistical tables (unfortunately with data over 10 years 
old, from 2004)627 include estimates of Disability Adjusted Life Years (DALY) loss for diarrhoeal diseases (which 
is again an acceptable proxy, and this time for the whole population). The WHO also provides statistical tables 
with somewhat more recent data (2008) for standardized death rates from diarrhoeal diseases628 - these are 
somewhat less helpful (effectiveness of health care system will impact the death rate more than the DALY, 
and some diarrhoeal diseases will rarely be deadly, so DALY is a better reflection of the actual food safety 
situation), but combining the two sources allows to cross-check if the situation has evolved significantly 
between 2004 and 2008. 
Reviewing the available data on diarrhoeal morbidity and mortality from WHO tables shows that its reliability 
is far from perfect629. This is unsurprising given what we have noted above. More precise data (on specific 
causes of disease) is, when available at the national level, even less reliable. Detection of even the most 
prominent causes of disease, such as salmonella, is problematic in most countries. To compensate for 
detection and reporting biases, advanced regulatory systems such as the EU’s are underpinned by systematic 
monitoring programmes in order to assess (based on sampling and testing) the actual prevalence of key 
contaminations630. Since such monitoring is not conducted in a comparable way (neither in terms of sampling, 
nor of reliability of tests or consolidation) in countries of the Former Soviet Union (excluding, of course, those 
that have joined the EU), it is impossible to precisely assess their food safety levels631. Still, combining WHO 
statistics and other sources (anecdotal evidence, expert reports, audit reports on the food safety system) it is 
possible to draw some tentative conclusions. 
First, several of the countries with very high food safety and hygiene inspection rates (and which have had 
such high rates for many years) have clearly dismal records in terms of food safety. This is the case e.g. for 
Tajikistan, Kyrgyzstan or (demonstrating that this cannot be explained only by low income levels) Azerbaijan. 
                                                           
625 We have witnessed first hand all of these problems in the years 2001-2004 in Tajikistan, not for food-borne diseases but for malaria, 
a disease that is normally higher profile and thus more systematically diagnosed and reported (and where data quality problems are 
thus likely to be less salient than for food-borne diseases). First, an epidemilogical survey showed that there was very considerable 
under-detection at the local level. Second, review of the hospital-level data and comparison with aggregated national data showed 
that there was strong under-reporting once consolidated. Third, sharp variations in consolidated levels year-on-year suggested active 
manipulation of data for fundraising purpose (while keeping the overall under-reporting to protect the Ministry’s image). 
626 See WHO database available at: http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.home and consolidated reports on World Health Statistics 
(WHO, yearly) available at: http://www.who.int/gho/publications/world_health_statistics/en/  
627 Available at: http://www.who.int/healthinfo/global_burden_disease/estimates_country/en/  
628 Ibid. 
629 For instance, Ukraine has DALY loss for diarrhoeal diseases that is only 30% higher than in the UK and othe EU countries (2004) and 
even reports age-standardized death rates for diarrhoeal diseases (2008) that are significantly lower than e.g. the UK, France or 
Germany. While this is not impossible, other available evidence does not suggest this to be true, but more likely the result of under-
detection and/or under-reporting, as the food safety situation in Ukraine is widely agreed to be worse than in these countries (of 
course, some of this could translate in longer-term health problems rather than diarrhoea, or less easily categorized symptoms, e.g. in 
case of chemical contamination). Among the “high incidence” countries, there are also very sharp variations between otherwise 
relatively comparable countries, that all point to the need for caution in using these statistics. They are, however, quite helpful for a 
first approximation.  
630 See in particular EFSA’s monitoring programmes at: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/fr/topics/topic/monitoringandanalysisoffood-
bornediseases and summary reports at: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/fr/node/952441  
631 National-level data, when it exists, should be treated with great caution. While working in Ukraine, in 2008, we heard a very senior 
official of the country’s Sanitary and Epidemiological Service deny any problems with food safety regulations in the country by stating 
that their salmonella prevalence was lower than Switzerland’s or Norway’s. It may very well be that the officially reported prevalence 
was lower, but it was obvious to all that this did not reflect in any way the real situation in the country.  
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All three have high (>900 per 100,000 for Kyrgyzstan till >1,900 for Tajikistan) DALY loss from diarrhoeal 
disease (2004) as well as high age-standardized death rates from these same diseases (>9 per 100,000 for 
Azerbaijan till >26 for Tajikistan – 2008). The US Food Safety and Inspection System has not conducted any 
audit of any of these countries632, Tajikistan has never been audited by the EU either, Kyrgyzstan was only 
audited in 1998 for horses (and the findings were negative, i.e. exports to the EU were not authorized)633. 
Azerbaijan received a few audits, focused on fishery products (2002, 2007) and equidae (2009)634. The audits’ 
conclusions on the food safety system as a whole were negative, even though some establishments were 
found satisfactory. Of course, the EU FVO reports (or their absence) reflect not only on the food safety 
regulatory system, but on private sector capacity. Very poor countries, landlocked, like Tajikistan and 
Kyrgyzstan, also simply little that could be of interest to the EU, and no establishments that could meet its 
requirements – but the negative findings on Azerbaijan show the lack of connection between frequency of 
inspections and effectiveness. This is confirmed by the many difficulties Kyrgyzstan and Tajikistan have faced 
in recent years for their exports to Russia and Kazakhstan because of food safety concerns635.  
Further evidence of the disconnection between heavy inspections regimes and effectiveness of the food safety 
regime is provided by the examples of Georgia and Ukraine. As indicated above, Georgia dismantled most of 
its regulatory agencies and drastically curtailed regulatory inspections following the “Rose Revolution”. With 
EU assistance, and as a requirement for the conclusion of the Deep and Comprehensive Free Trade Agreement 
with the EU636, Georgia has gradually built up a new National Food Agency (NFA). However, in keeping with 
the market-friendly orientations of government policy, as of 2014637 the NFA was still conducting only very 
few inspections (at most a couple of percent of all businesses were being checked yearly). In spite of this “light 
touch” approach, successive EU FVO reports showed strong improvements (in the fisheries sector, which was 
the one for which approval for exports was requested) between 2010 and 2014638. As for Ukraine, it has 
received many successive EU FVO audit visits over the year, being a major agricultural producer and food 
processor, neighbouring the EU, and with a major export potential. While until 2007-2008 most reports 
highlighted very serious deficiencies, there have been marked improvements in the past 8 to 10 years, with 
increasing market access in particular for certain Ukrainian eggs and dairy producers (though it is worth noting 
that this applies only to a few of the best firms in the country, and most of the sector is still excluded, reflecting 
unequal private sector capacity). In spite of inspections that remain overall very frequent639, important 
reforms took place in the years 2008-2014 (and are being continued), in particular the consolidation of all food 
processing inspections under one agency (State Veterinary and Phytosanitary Service of Ukraine, formed and 
                                                           
632 See on the USDA website: http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/international-affairs/importing-products/2000-2003-
foreign-audit-reports and http://www.fsis.usda.gov/wps/portal/fsis/topics/international-affairs/importing-products/eligible-
countries-products-foreign-establishments/foreign-audit-reports. The US FDA audit reports are not systematically published and only 
available on the basis of Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)requests, so this evidence could not be used for this research – see answer 
on availability of reports on the FDA website: http://www.fda.gov/Food/ComplianceEnforcement/Inspections/ucm211823.htm#q33  
633 See report on the FVO website: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=471  
634 There are also 2 reports on aflatoxin contamination in hazelnuts, which are less useful as proxies for the whole food safety 
system. See reports on the FVO website: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=894 - 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=1894 and - 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=2378.  
635 Russia is well known for using food-safety based import bans for geopolitical purposes, but the two countries are rather firmly in 
its sphere of influence and in these cases the bans or threats seemed to at least partly reflect very real concerns. Kazakhstan’s measures 
on meat and dairy from Kyrgyzstan seem to primarily reflect real concerns. Russia’s and Kazakhstan’s food safety systems are 
themselves far from perfect, but the overall situation is markedly better than in Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, giving some credibility to 
the assessment. See e.g. several instances of bans on Kyrgyz dairy by Kazakhstan: http://www.akipress.com/news:564986/ and 
http://en.tengrinews.kz/politics_sub/Kazakhstan-to-lift-ban-on-dairy-products-imports-from-7842/.  
636 This Agreement (DCFTA) was achieved as part of the signature of the Association Agreement in 2014 – see: 
http://www.eeas.europa.eu/factsheets/news/eu-georgia_factsheet_en.htm  
637 Interview of senior management of the NFA of Georgia by the author, June 2014. 
638  
639 See World Bank Group (2011), Investment Climate in Ukraine as Seen by Private Businesses – pp. 39-42 
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reorganized in 2010-2012640), the abolition of mandatory certification of food products by the State 
Committee for Standardization, etc. Overall, these changes resulted in a significant decrease in inspections 
and enforcement (and in other mandatory procedures), even though the post-reform level remains high 
(average number of inspection visits per year down around 30% between 2006 and 2010 as per World Bank 
Group survey data). Thus, while it is obvious that Ukraine’s inspections system remains closer to the “old post-
Soviet” norm than to EU practices, significant improvements in regulatory performance as recorded in 
successive EU FVO reports641 took place alongside a significant decrease in inspections coverage and 
frequency. 
A further confirmation of the disconnect between inspections “intensity” and public health and safety 
outcomes is provided by looking at aggregate data for Georgia compared to its neighbours Armenia and 
Azerbaijan – three countries which, in spite of their differences (in particular very rapid growth in the past 15 
years in Azerbaijan due to its massive hydrocarbon resources), share many similarities in terms of starting 
conditions and level of development. Considering that inspections affect many areas of public safety and 
health, and that precise indicators are hard to come by and/or present reliability issues, we can take the 
opposite approach and consider high-level aggregates. Following Helsloot (2012) and Helsloot and Schmidt 
(2012 a), we can use life-expectancy as a proxy for overall physical safety in the broadest sense, and look at 
trends in life-expectancy in these three countries. Considering the period before any regulatory reform started 
(i.e. the late 1990s), life-expectancy at birth was (WHO data642) 72 years in Georgia in 2000, 71 years in Armenia 
and 66 years in Azerbaijan. The same source indicates 74, 71 and 72 years respectively in 2013. World Bank 
data gives very similar figures643. Georgia had a slightly longer life-expectancy at birth before the reforms 
started, and it still does, with a slight improvement over 2000. Armenia has remained stable. Azerbaijan has 
experienced a rather strong improvement, which is likely to be primarily linked to the massive increase in 
wealth over the past 15 years644 (and possibly the phasing out of some very highly polluting chemical industries 
inherited from the Soviet period). While Azerbaijan has not done significant reforms in regulations, inspections 
and enforcement, this is beside the point because their effects would in any case be dwarfed by the increase 
in incomes (and income is the primary driver of physical safety, cf. Helsloot 2012). What matters to our 
research is that Georgia, which did very radical reforms resulting in a very sharp drop in inspections and 
enforcement “intensity” did not see any worsening of life expectancy (and even a small improvement), in spite 
of the period also being characterized by internal and external warfare, as well as a partial economic embargo 
imposed by Russia, which heavily weighed on economic recovery. In spite of disaster warnings by some that 
cutting such inspections would have dramatic safety consequences645. Both President Saakashvili and Minister 
of Economy (and then of Reform Coordination) Bendukidze stated during the reform process that risks were 
minimal from disbanding these institutions and stopping their activities, because they had hitherto been 
corrupt and using ineffective approaches. Facts appear to have mostly vindicated them. 
                                                           
640 See EU FVO report on dairy products (2014) available at: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=3377  
641 See e.g. meat 2009: http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=2344 – animal health 2010: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=2651 – salmonella in eggs 2013: 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=3159 – dairy 2014 : 
http://ec.europa.eu/food/fvo/audit_reports/details.cfm?rep_id=3377 
642 See WHO Global Health Observatory data repository: http://apps.who.int/gho/data/node.main.688  
643 See in World Bank data repository: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/SP.DYN.LE00.IN  
644 See World Bank data repository, GNI per capita (PPP in current US$): Azerbaijan 2000 = 3,340 –  2014 = 16,910. By comparison, 
Georgia 2000 = 2,690 – 2014 = 7,510 and Armenia 2000 = 2,380 –  2014 = 8,450. The impact of war (internal secessions, external war 
with Russia) and of Russian embargo (on key export products) is highly visible in Georgia and has severely curtailed growth. Data 
available at: http://data.worldbank.org/indicator/NY.GNP.PCAP.PP.CD 
645 In 2007-2008 for instance the OIE warned about potential dramatic impact from disbanding the previous system of veterinary 
inspections. The dire warnings did not as yet materialize (which does not mean nothing could happen, of course).  
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A last example can be taken from the tax inspection field. As part of its 2007 Business Environment in Ukraine 
report, the IFC of the World Bank Group conducted several calculations to look at comparative “tax yields” in 
jurisdictions with varied tax inspection levels, both inside and outside of Ukraine. The international 
comparison (p. 56) showed Latvia as having a far better “yield” (compared to tax potential) by employee with 
far less inspections than Ukraine. The internal comparison (focusing on SMEs) showed that, between different 
regions of Ukraine, there was no link whatsoever between the tax revenue per SME and the percentage of 
SMEs inspected. Additional research showed that most tax inspections in Ukraine brought negligible revenue, 
while a very small percentage (10% at most) brought roughly 90% of the additional tax assessments and 
penalties.  
As we have acknowledged from the start, none of these data points is enough to fully prove the case, data 
reliability, attribution and other issues being limitations that cannot be overcome, at least at this point. Taken 
all together, however, they build a strong picture of how the volume of checks, their coverage and frequency, 
are essentially uncorrelated to public welfare outcomes – be they safety, health or tax revenue. Equating 
“more inspections” or “more stringent enforcement” with “higher effectiveness”, as is still too often done, is 
simply not supported by evidence. While one could argue whether the findings from Former Soviet countries 
can be transposed to an EU or OECD context (considering in particular the different situation in terms of petty 
corruption – though it is far from unknown in EU or OECD too), these findings should be a warning to those 
who think that “stronger enforcement” is a priority in developing countries and emerging market, in front of 
problems such as environmental pollution, or health and safety issues. Indeed, sometimes at least, more 
effective enforcement may be direly needed. This does not mean, however, that “more” or “stronger” 
enforcement will prove to be effective. 
 
c. Short overview of a few EU countries: Lithuania, France, Italy 
 
As indicated in the introduction, the scope of this research did not allow us to rely exclusively on case studies, 
nor to undertake a comprehensive review of each and every case that would be possibly relevant. Our aim 
was not to demonstrate with full certainty a causal relationship (one way or another) but to challenge 
established assumptions and to check whether, based on available data and findings, some evidence in 
support of risk-based inspection practices and “smart inspections” could be found. The above examples 
appear to rather strongly support our hypotheses: there clearly is no positive correlation between “more 
inspections” and “increased safety”, and Britain (using risk-based targeting, risk-proportional enforcement, 
and putting much emphasis on guidance and support) achieves significantly better results (and/or similar 
results with far less costs) than countries relying on more “traditional” approaches to inspections and 
enforcement, such as Germany or France. 
Similar analytical work would need to conducted in other regulatory areas to confirm these preliminary 
findings, but it is rarely easy to find reliable effectiveness data (as we have discussed above at some length), 
and consolidated statistics on inspections are also hard to come by. Taking a short look at some of available 
data points from other countries can, however,  be done in order to this review of evidence from the practice. 
 
i. Lithuania – OSH, reforms and challenges 
In Lithuania, as we have seen, post-2010 reforms led to a significant decrease in the overall frequency and 
duration of inspections. They also led to important changes in enforcement practices. Because Eurostat 
standardised data on fatal occupational accident rates is, as explained above, one of the most reliable 
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indicators to compare effectiveness, it is worth considering briefly labour inspections in Lithuania and their 
evolutions.  
First, the country’s performance in terms of occupational safety appears overall poor. The standardised 
incidence rate for fatal accidents646 was 6.62 in 2008 (4.56 excluding traffic-related accidents) and only slowly 
and unsteadily crept down (5.06/3.79 in 2013). By comparison, the EU-28 average is 2.22 in 2013 (1.3 excluding 
traffic-related accidents), France (which we saw has practices in sharp contrast to Britain, and worse-than-
average performance) achieved 3.71 (2.94) in 2013, and Germany 1.29 (0.81). As we have seen, year-on-year 
variations should be treated with caution (because of the small number of observations, which can result in 
sharp variations in the incidence rate), but the 6-year trend is clear: poor performance, with slow 
improvements647. 
Second, inspections pre-reform appeared to be at a relatively high level in terms of frequency, and to be rather 
“heavy handed” in terms of enforcement, at least compared to the British and German cases studied above. 
The Lithuanian State Labour Inspectorate’s (SLI) annual reports648 give data on the number of inspections that 
is not easy to compare, because they include in the “total number of businesses” under supervision all farms, 
that amount to more than 50% of the total (but with the breakdown only available for most recent years). 
Unfortunately, the SLI does not indicate how many inspections were conducted in farms versus non-farms. 
2012 data, for instance, would suggest a rate of approximately 5% of businesses inspected (if taking the entire 
population, farm included) but as high as 11% if assuming that nearly only non-farms were inspected – and 
even more if assuming that mostly private businesses (rather than “all economic entities”)649 were visited. 
Comparing with data from business surveys conducted by the Ministry of Economy (see OECD 2015 b, p. 123) 
show that in 2012, close to 15% of surveyed businesses reported receiving at least one labour inspection. 
While comparisons are complex due to different economic structures and uncertain quality of the data, such 
a coverage would be more comparable to Germany’s than to Britain’s, particularly considering that the 2012 
rate already reflected a strong decrease (from 16,000 inspections in 2008).  
In terms of enforcement, in 2008 the Lithuanian SLI issued 10,980 improvement notices, far more than the 
British HSE, in spite of covering a considerably smaller economy, and nearly as much as in Germany (12,693 
for 2008, cf. Tilindyte 2012 p. 192). In that same year, it suspended operations over 2,400 times (against 
approximately 3,000 in Britain, again for a vastly larger economy), and issued or proposed 2,500 administrative 
penalties (twice more than in Germany). These numbers suggest that, in addition to a rather heavy coverage 
by inspections (possibly reflecting a lack of risk-focus), the enforcement approach was heavy on sanctions and 
rather “confrontational”. Data from 2014 suggests there has been a significant change, with only 1,723 notices 
(down from still 5,192 in 2012, meaning the decrease has accelerated in recent years), only 43 suspensions of 
work activity, and 511 administrative fines. The collapse in the number of suspensions was particularly marked 
in 2012 (only 9, down from 230 in 2011) – and it is likely that the uptick in fatalities in that same year led to a 
partial reassessment (with approximately 40 suspensions per year since then).  
This data, combined with the review of practices done by the OECD (2015, pp. 127-130), suggests that the SLI 
has strongly changed its practices since 2011, in reaction to reform efforts by the Government, to its own 
assessment of methods and results, and to the economic crisis (which to a large extent explains the collapse 
in suspensions of operations650). The decrease in inspections coverage is less clear (OECD 2015 b, p. 123: 
                                                           
646 Eurostat data available at: http://ec.europa.eu/eurostat/web/health/health-safety-work/data/database  
647 Lithuania has the EU’s second-worst performance on fatal accident rates (including or excluding traffic accidents), just after 
Romania. Neighbouring Latvia has rates that are nearly as high, suggesting long-term trends linked to the post-Soviet context. 
648 Available for 2008-2014 at: http://www.vdi.lt/English/VDI_English.aspx  
649 See detailed enterprise statistics on the Statistics Lithuania website, at: http://osp.stat.gov.lt/en/temines-lenteles51  
650 Both because of the slowdown in the high-risk construction sector, and because of a deliberate policy by the SLI to minimize 
suspensions – direct interviews with senior SLI officials, december 2014. 
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decrease in 2013, but uptick in 2014), but seems nonetheless real over the last 6 to 7 years. At the same time 
as the SLI thus reduced its inspections coverage (at least somewhat) and turned away from heavy sanctioning 
to embrace a far more “compliance supporting” enforcement approach, key effectiveness indicators showed 
overall a slight improvement. Even the 2012 “surge” in fatalities just brought their level back to 2008. Thus, it 
seems that at the very least it is possible to conclude that the move towards a far more risk-proportionate and 
more compliance-supporting approach, while it clearly meant far less burden on private businesses, did not 
have any negative results on effectiveness – and probably had some limited positive impact. It is still too early 
to say whether time will strengthen this positive trend, but it is at least clear that the heavy-handed approach 
used for many years did not have any positive impact in terms of safety, and that a change was clearly in order. 
 
ii. Labour inspections in France: conflicts, data issues, and disappointing results 
Many “old Member States” of the EU (i.e. those who joined before successive “eastern enlargements”, up to 
1995) have disappointing OSH results, i.e. data that is significantly worse than the EU-28 average. This is the 
case for instance of Luxembourg, Belgium or Spain if excluding traffic-related accidents –  and of Ireland, Italy 
or Austria if including them651. We elected to look briefly at only one of these, namely France, because labour 
inspections are a highly contentious issue there, with important political forces considering that any decrease 
in frequency of inspections or any laxity in enforcement would have dramatic consequences for workers (and 
other forces seeing labour inspections as a major impediment for business development). While the fatal 
accidents data is clear, however, it is not the case of inspections data. The Ministry of Labour publishes yearly 
reports to the International Labour Organization that include relatively detailed statistics on labour inspections 
and enforcement652, these statistics are based on reporting in a unified information system by labour 
inspectors, and the annual reports repeatedly point out the variations in reporting rates and accuracy of 
reporting653, meaning that the data should be considered as more indicative than authoritative. In addition, as 
we have pointed out above, other institutions inspecting OSH issues are not accounted for in these reports, 
which mean they seriously under-estimate the overall inspection and enforcement activities in France on this 
issue. 
Considering the uncertainties surrounding the data, it is difficult to make definitive assertions, but there seems 
to be no real trend in terms of frequency of inspections, or of enforcement measures, over the period 2000-
2013. According to the annual reports for the years 2000, 2003, 2008 and 2013, the key indicators were as 
follows: 
 2000 2003 2007 2011 2012 2013 
                                                           
651 Austria has a particularly high fatal accidents incidence when including traffic-related accidents, averaging more than 5 over 2008-
2013 – since its performance excluding traffic accidents is just barely worse than average, this suggests a specific and very acute 
transport-related problem. 
652 See links to reports since 2000 on the Ministry’s website, available at: http://travail-emploi.gouv.fr/ministere/documentation-et-
publications-officielles/rapports/article/l-inspection-du-travail-en-france-en-2013  
653 See in particular the 2000 report: l'inspection du Travail en France en 2000 - les chiffres clés. Rapport au Bureau International du 
Travail, Ministère de l'emploi et de la solidarité, Paris, 2000. This report indicates that all statistics on inspections and other 
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While there seems to be some decrease in the most stringent form of improvement notices (Mises en 
Demeure), there appears to be no noticeable trend in any of the other indicators (some of the data is very 
differently reported in different years, explaining the repeated “not available” mentions). The quality of 
reporting data seems to be a real issue, with software problems compounded by inspectors’ refusal to use the 
new procedures. The 2003 report (pp. 220-221) outlines a long-term decrease in the total number of 
interventions, but this appears based on incomplete data, and partly reversed in recent years. The high 
number of warnings and prosecutions (compared e.g. to Britain or Germany) reflects the overall climate 
surrounding labour inspections in France, characterized by distrust on both sides (inspectors and employers). 
During the same period, no improvement trend is visible in our key safety indicator, i.e. fatal accidents 
incidence, as the table below demonstrates658. France has the 9th worst average over 2008-2013 if including 
traffic-related accidents, the 7th worst if excluding them. It seems to be sliding in relation with the performance 
of other “old Member States”, since over 1998-2007 had the 11th best performance – which meant 4 of the 
EU-15 had worse performance. Since 2008, only Portugal (and Austria, if including traffic-related accidents) 
has worse performance among the EU-15 group. 
                                                           
654 In France, there are many types, among which “control visits” (inspections stricto sensu) are only the most frequent, around 60% 
according to the most recent annual reports. For greater simplicity, and because the proportions appear more-or-less stable, we use 
here the total number of visits, whichever their legal nature and cause. 
655 Extrapolated from the report’s figure of 216,029, based on the note that this represents approximately 73% of the real number of 
interventions, cf. p. 162 of the 2000 Report to the ILO. Extrapolation for improvement notices is based on indication (p. 163) that only 
55.7% of agents reported on this indicator. 
656 Extrapolated from the report’s figure of 253,386, based on the note that this represents approximately 85.7% of the real number 
of interventions, cf. p. 219 of the 2003 Report to the ILO. Same extrapolation done for all data in the 2003 column. 
657 Extrapolated from the report’s figure of 215,588, based on the note that this represents approximately 90% of the real number of 
interventions, cf. p. 155 of the 2008 Report to the ILO. Same extrapolation done for all data in the 2007 column. 
658 As for data presented above on Britain and Germany, there is a break in time series after 2007, meaning that data up to and after 
2007 is not directly comparable. 
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What these findings suggest is that OSH inspections in France seem to suffer from sustained problems: poor 
data (making it difficult to track evolutions), lack of questioning of prevailing practices and their effects even 
confronted with repeated poor performance, high reliance on formal enforcement measures but without 
evidence of positive impact on compliance. Data suggests that there is neither a trend in reducing the 
inspections incidence or the amount of enforcement measures, nor a positive evolution in safety. This suggests 
that the reliance on a “traditional”, confrontational and non-risk-proportional approach does not seem to yield 
positive results. 
 
iii. The inspection system in Italy – structures, crises, attempts at reforms 
The survey conducted in Italy in 2012 on businesses’ experiences with inspections offers a level of insights on 
inspections coverage and patterns that is unfortunately available in very few countries659. There are, however, 
some limitations in the uses that can be made of it, at least without considerable further research. Since no 
subsequent survey was conducted (or at least published), it is not possible to check for any changes in the 
most recent years. As most other EU countries have no comparable data, it is not possible to directly compare 
levels of inspections or patterns. And, because of all the limitations in effectiveness data discussed above, it is 
very challenging to easily assess the effectiveness of these inspections. That said, there are a number of 
interesting points in the data, which at least allow to confirm the relevance of some of the questions raised in 
this research. 
In terms of coverage, in spite of inspections being conducted by a large number of agencies, in a variety of 
fields, the bulk of the control visits (and also documentary controls) are done by a small sub-set of them, 
focusing on a narrow set of domains: food safety and public health (Aziende Sanitarie Locale – ASL, Local Public 
Health Establishments, controlled the highest number of businesses), fiscal issues (the Guardia di Finanza, i.e. 
tax and customs police, was second, and the tax agencies fourth – cumulated, they controlled more businesses 
than even the ASLs), OSH and labour law (Labour Inspectorate and INPS, Istituto Nazionale Previdenza Sociale 
– National Institute for Social Prevention plus INAIL, Istituto Nazionale per l’Assicurazione contro gli Infortuni 
sul Lavoro – National Institute for Insurance against Labour Accidents – again, the combination of Labour 
Inspectorate, INPS and INAIL totalled more controls than the ASLs). A fourth group was made up by controls 
of the various police forces (excluding the Guardia di Finanza, GdF), which can cover a variety of issues (food 
and hygiene, environment, “nuisances” and public order etc.). In total, there were (in 2011, for businesses 
with 5 to 250 employees) more than 115,000 businesses controlled tax and duties, around 100,000 for labour 
and OSH inspections, over 80,000 by ASLs, close to 50,000 by police forces (excluding GdF) – but only around 
10,000 by the Regional Environment Agencies (Agenzie Regionale per la Protezione Ambientale, ARPA), around 
17,000 by the Fire Service, and less than 10,000 by the Forest Corps.  
Many of these inspections in fact covered repeatedly the same businesses, as we have already pointed out 
earlier. Data shows a considerable amount of overlap between ASLs, Labour Inspectorate, GdF, tax service and 
INPS. Thus, a given business, if it was inspected, was likely to receive repeated visits on very closely related 
issues, or even on the same subject, from different (unrelated and uncoordinated) agencies. While some 
                                                           
659 The survey results were presented in several public events in April and May 2012, as well as later in the year, but are not available 
in a published form. The below is based on data distributed during these presentations, which the author attended. The survey was 
conducted by the Italian State Statistics Agency ISTAT on behalf of the Office for Administrative Simplification in the Department for 
Public Administration under the Presidency of the Council of Ministers  
(see their website at: http://www.funzionepubblica.gov.it/uffici/ufficio-la-semplificazione-e-la-sburocratizzazione ) 
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reforms were initiated to try and address this situation (e.g. by taking away the inspection function of the 
INPS), it is unlikely that this situation has altogether changed since 2012. 
As a result, it appears that inspection resources are in many instances fragmented and not used in the most 
efficient way (with repeated controls on the same topics by agencies that do not share planning or results), a 
concentration on some issues (e.g. labour/OSH) that produces mixed outcomes (as we have seen above, Italian 
performance in OSH is below EU-28 average at least when including traffic-related accidents – when excluding 
them, it is below EU-28 average, but still above EU-15 average660), and possibly a lack of resources for some 
important risk areas. This is particularly the case of environment, which we discuss briefly below. To conclude 
on the data, however, it is also important to note that the survey also included questions on the number of 
hours required to deal with inspections by each authority. These showed without surprise that tax and duties 
controls took the most time (1 to 2 days each), but the average time for labour-related and health-related 
inspections (around 5 hours each) was also not insignificant, particularly considering that the survey focused 
on SMEs.  
Several major scandals affecting environmental protection, public health and occupational safety and health 
have broken out in recent years in Italy – and both are still ongoing issues. The first is the waste-management 
crisis in Southern Italy (leading to very serious public health concerns), and the associated food safety issue 
when it was found that illegal waste disposal had led to dioxin-contamination in mozzarella di bufala.661 The 
second is the pollution scandal linked to the Ilva Taranto steelworks (long the largest in Europe), which 
exceeded applicable norms for decades, with major effects on public health in the area (both workers’ and 
general population’s) and the environment more broadly.662 At first glance, these scandals could point towards 
some serious gaps in environmental protection inspections and enforcement – however it is not clear how 
much they are linked to what one could call “regular” inspections and enforcement, or whether they rather 
reflect very specific political and criminal contexts, on which regulatory agencies have very little influence (if 
any). In Campania and other Southern Italian regions, indeed in principle regular inspections could have helped 
to spot problems early on (particularly illegal waste dumps), but it is unclear how much inspectors could have 
done in a context where such illegal waste operations were managed by organized crime. As to the lack of 
adequate investment in proper, legal waste management, this went back to political decisions (and, again, 
criminal influence) – not issues on which any “business inspections” could have helped. The Ilva Taranto case 
is different663: environmental inspectors did their work, found out about the (major) violations, notified the 
need for improvement, attempted to withdraw the environmental permit allowing the factory to continue 
operating – but the political connections and wealth of the Riva family (which owned the plant) and the huge 
social importance of the plant (the main employer, by far, for Taranto and its region) meant that there was 
constant political backing (from otherwise opposite political camps) to adopt special legislation allowing it to 
continue operating. Only once the case was taken over by criminal prosecutors did it become possible, as part 
of the criminal case, to suspend operations. Thus, the problem was not the environmental inspectors failing 
at the task (they did not), but politicians overriding them (for a variety of reasons). Both of these cases show 
                                                           
660 Though Eurostat data on fatal accident rate suggests a trend for improvement – the 1998-2007 series (excluding traffic 
accidents)saw Italy’s rate decline from 5 to 2.5, and the 2008-2013 series a decline from 4.5 to 3.06 (including traffic accidents) and 
from 1.89 to 1.24 (excluding them). It may thus be that some results are seen from sustained efforts, but the overall performance 
remains worse than EU-15 average (though better than results in France). The Ilva Taranto disaster (see below) also shows that long-
term occupational health risks may be a serious issue at least in some parts of Italy. 
661 See Pasotti (2010) on the waste management crisis, and Borrello, Brambilla, Candela et al. (2008) on the mozzarella contamination 
scandal. 
662 See Pascucci (2013) 
663 There exist many summaries of the case, which has developed over a couple decades – see e.g. the Wikipedia article in Italian, 
which is regularly updated and has a number of links (https://it.wikipedia.org/wiki/Ilva#Taranto) or articles in La Repubblica such as 
http://www.repubblica.it/ambiente/2015/03/03/news/good_morning_diossina_il_libro_di_angelo_bonelli_sul_caso_taranto-
108646777/ or http://temi.repubblica.it/micromega-online/ilva-uno-scandalo-di-incompetenza-e-malapolitica/?refresh_ce  
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how important it is not only to distinguish between “regulatory enforcement” and “criminal enforcement”, 
but also the importance of having effective links between them – as there are cases which cannot adequately 
be addressed from a regulatory compliance perspective.664 
Considering available data on key performance indicators e.g. in food safety665 or environmental protection666 
does not suggest that Italy has very serious structural problems of regulatory compliance “across the board”. 
Still, performance in food safety (at least from EFSA/ECDPC reports) is not outstanding, and neither is 
environmental performance. Occupational safety performance is, as we have seen, below par. Considering 
that this happens against a background of inspections that are overall rather frequent, and particularly 
“concentrated” on a limited number of businesses (many repeat inspections), with significant institutional 
overlaps, there seems to be a real case for improving risk analysis, targeting, compliance promotion methods, 
and overall coordination of inspection activities. All these areas belong to the reform work that the 
Government has undertaken since 2012, but it is still too early to see whether the situation has changed 
significantly. 
 
4.2. Data challenges – inherent limitations in considering factual evidence 
 
As we have briefly discussed earlier in this research, the question of whether regulations pose a significant 
burden on economic growth and competitiveness cannot be fully responded to based on available research. 
Investigating whether regulations deliver their expected benefits in terms of public welfare is likewise 
complex, and existing research gives conflicting answers (which often reflect different regulatory approaches 
and goals, but may also correspond to limitations in research design). The focus of our research is markedly 
more modest and limited: attempting to find out whether different approaches to inspections and 
enforcement appear to have different effects in terms of public welfare, while also considering the level of 
administrative burden they create (which is an admittedly very imperfect proxy for the impact on business 
growth, but is an indicator that can be more-or-less easily available), and the degree to which they include 
compliance-supporting activities or not. All through the different cases exposed above, we have relied on 
                                                           
664 Note that such effective interaction can be through integration of prosecution in the regulatory agency itself (British HSE) or by 
coordination between distinct institutions. 
665 See for instance the European Union summary report on trends and sources of zoonoses, zoonotic agents and food-borne outbreaks 
in 2014, European Food Safety Authority and European Centre for Disease Prevention and Control, available at: 
http://www.efsa.europa.eu/sites/default/files/scientific_output/files/main_documents/4329.pdf (and see generally EFSA monitoring 
and other reports at: http://www.efsa.europa.eu/en/topics/topic/monitoringandanalysisoffood-bornediseases). While EFSA and 
ECDPC warn against limitations in comparability, and there are many indicators for which reporting bias is an issue, data from 
monitoring campaigns done according to specific EU regulations (where comparability is maximal) do not suggest any systemic 
weakness in Italy – e.g. in terms of Salmonella control, it overperforms in some areas (e.g. contamination in breeding flocks, p. 44, is 
below average), underperforms in other (e.g. contamination in laying eggs flocks, p. 47, is somewhat over average). The situation is 
somewhat worse in broiler flocks before slaugher (pp. 48-49). Overall, Italy is rarely among ‘best performers’ (though it is in some 
indicators), but the situation does not appear to be cause for concern either. 
666 Italian compliance levels in key areas such as EU regulations on water and air do not seem out of line with other Western European 
Member States. For instance, the most recent report on water quality is Synthesis Report on the Quality of Drinking Water in the EU 
examining the Member States' reports for the period 2008-2010 under Directive 98/83/EC (COM(2014) 363), available at: 
http://ec.europa.eu/environment/water/water-drink/pdf/report2014/1_EN_ACT_part1_v3.pdf shows Italy having no problems in 
microbiology, and some (isolated) issues in chemical contamination, but not more than Germany or Spain (pp. 4 and 10). There is no 
equivalent report for air quality, but the closest comparison we found is the In depth analysis of the NEC national programmes - Final 
Report, prepared by ENTEC (2005), available at: http://ec.europa.eu/environment/archives/air/pollutants/pdf/final_report.pdf. The 
Executive Summary (page iii) states that “only four Member States are currently projected to comply with all of their NEC targets by 
2010 without the need for further actions” – suggesting a far lower level of compliance with the targets. Specifically for Italy (pp. 87-
88), the report highlights some limitations on public action, but again not different from what is found in many Member States, and 
reflecting broad public policy issues rather than specific shortcomings in inspections and enforcement. 
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aggregate, country-level, average data, and not attempted to do any statistical analysis of possible correlations 
– be it across countries (using country-level data) or within a country (using e.g. firm-level data).  
There are several reasons for this. First, the purpose of this research is rather to look at the issue in as broad 
a way as possible, considering a large number of countries and regulatory areas, and combining a review of 
existing research and explanatory models with evidence from the practice. The time and efforts required to 
attempt a statistical analysis of the data would be substantial, and would have required to curtail other parts 
of the research. Second, and more fundamentally, there are reasons to doubt that such work would produce 
conclusive results. These doubts are grounded both in the fact that existing statistical research on the 
effectiveness of inspections has yielded rather conflicting research, and on the many limitations and 
shortcomings of the datasets that could potentially be exploited. Before concluding on this chapter 
considering examples from the practice, we will briefly present some of the examples that led us to avoid 
engaging in statistical analysis of data (in spite of the benefits it could potentially provide if conclusive results 
were within reach). 
 
a. Limitations and contradictions in studies attempting to investigate effectiveness 
As a preliminary remark, it is essential to note that existing data-based research purporting to investigate the 
effectiveness of inspections was formulated as looking into the effectiveness of “regulation”, with inspections 
seen the primary means of translating this regulation into practice, but not considered in their specificities. 
Thus, this research did not specifically look at the methods used to target these inspections (and whether 
some may be more effective than others), or the approach used during inspections (and whether they may 
have different impact), but only at whether there was a statistically significant effect of having had an 
inspection, versus not having had any. Given that the topic of our investigation was to see whether there was 
a differential impact between different methods and approaches for targeting and conducting inspections, the 
findings of these studies are anyway interesting but not directly conclusive. Still, they are interesting as an 
illustration of the pitfalls existing when attempting to base such research on strict statistical analysis. 
The studies we will now consider focus on occupational safety and health, a regulatory area that has been 
subject to a number of studies, primarily in a US context, largely because of its high level of “political salience”, 
with political parties sharply divided about its costs to the economy, positive impact on welfare, and overall 
policy choices in this regard. Because many other countries have less of a political conflict on this topic667, 
there have been less such studies elsewhere. This means that in many other countries researchers have rather 
assumed that having occupational safety and health regulations was in and of itself likely to have positive 
effects on workers’ health and safety, and research has thus focused on the approach and “style” of regulation 
and enforcement, but not on whether having regulations (as opposed to having none) had an impact, and 
which ones668. 
Interestingly, two significant studies on this issue have very similar approaches – but end up with findings that 
appear contradictory at first (we will see that “deconstructing” the findings allows to understand, if not solve, 
this contradiction) – even though the second survey references the first. We will start by summarizing briefly 
                                                           
667 see e.g. Clark 1999 on the difference between US and Australia in matters of occupational safety and health regulations – but note 
that OSH and labour regulations are very “political” and “confrontational” in France and Italy, for instance (as illustrated in Italy by 
labour inspections being excluded from the scope of the inspections reform that started in 2012 – in France, yearly reports to the ILO 
regularly discuss physical conflicts involving labour inspections, and the need to request police protection, which is a good illustration 
of the level of conflict). 
668 This is possibly also because the Occupational Safety and Health Act of 1970 provided a convenient cut-off date for comparative 
research – before that date, researchers could consider that regulation was relatively minimal, federal inspections nearly absent, and 
overall the level of regulatory intervention was very low. 
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the two studies and their findings, before discussing their assumptions and conclusions, and seeing if we can 
draw some lessons from the apparent contradiction(s). 
 
i. Inspections: effective, but not for their stated purpose? 
In a first paper (Bartel and Thomas, 1985), the authors used official data from the Occupational Safety and 
Health Agency (OSHA) database, on inspections, (non-)compliance findings (and enforcement), and combined 
it with data obtained from the Bureau of Labor Statistics and Census Bureau, covering workers’ injuries rate, 
firm size etc.. The data used covered the 22 states where only OSHA was enforcing the 1970 Occupational 
Health and Safety Act (and not the 28 others where state-level enforcement was also involved). The study 
intended to test two conflicting hypotheses on why previous studies had “failed to find any statistically 
significant impact on national injury rates due to the Occupational Safety and Health Administration” (p. 1) – 
the first is the “noncompliance hypothesis” (“because of limited statutory and budgetary authority from 
Congress, OSHA is unable to compel industrial compliance with its own standards”) and the second the 
“inefficacy hypothesis” (“Since OSHA standards address only part of the problem, these standards can have at 
best minimal effect669”) (pp. 1-2). The authors aim to explain what they consider a paradox – that in spite of 
apparent ineffectiveness (since there is no impact on national injury rates), and in spite of “enormous financial 
burdens on industry” , “OSHA safety regulations and their enforcement were continuously supported and 
funded by Congress throughout the decade 1970-80 despite significant Congressional controversy” (p. 2). 
Among the study’s major findings are that “the negative and significant coefficient on the inspection 
probability (…) indicating the responsiveness of firms' compliance decisions to OSHA's enforcement efforts” 
and that “noncompliance is also strongly affected by increases in the penalty structure (…). Indeed, increases 
in the penalty structure are a more efficacious means of achieving greater compliance than increases in 
inspection rates. Hence we have quite strong evidence that the noncompliance hypothesis is false” (pp. 20-
22). However, “the result of a doubling of the inspection rate is only a 2.5 percent reduction in the lost workday 
rate because of the weak relationship between compliance and safety” (p. 22). The authors further note that 
“large firms (…) clearly choose lower violation rates because of lower marginal costs of compliance. These 
findings demonstrate the presence of significant economies of scale in compliance for large firms and, 
therefore, the opportunity for redistributions of wealth from small to large firms through OSHA enforcement” 
(p. 22). Finally, they note that “industries with higher injury rates (holding constant compliance levels) and 
industries with higher profit rates are inspected more frequently” and that “unionization has a negative and 
significant coefficient; this implies that unionized firms use OSHA as a tool for imposing costs on nonunionized 
firms. In addition, industries with larger average firm sizes have lower inspection rates, although this 
enforcement asymmetry disappears by 1978670”.  
The authors conclude that “our study has found only weak linkages between noncompliance and workplace 
accidents, indicating that the inefficacy hypothesis is largely correct, although the statement that OSHA 
standards achieve no reductions at all in injuries is probably invalid. In contrast, there are significant effects of 
OSHA enforcement on industry violation rates, indicating that the noncompliance hypothesis is false” (p. 25). 
In other words, they find that inspections and sanctions are effective at increasing compliance, but that the 
rules are inadequate and thus compliance ends up having little positive impact on safety. Their second 
conclusion is that “indirect effects of OSHA regulations exist, are significant in magnitude, and may well 
                                                           
669 “It is important to recognize that OSHA standards are not performance requirements that specify some maximum accident rate for 
each firm, but rather are design requirements for the workplace itself. Most OSHA standards are in fact capital equipment standards 
dictating, often in great detail, physical characteristics of plant and equipment.” (p. 4) 
 
670 Possibly because of greater political attention given to complaints by small businesses, referred to in the study. 
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dominate any direct effects (certainly direct benefits). The apparent beneficiaries of these indirect transfers 
of wealth are unionized and large firms, who would reasonably provide political support for the agency, so 
long as OSHA has some cost impact-and so long as this impact is asymmetrically distributed against nonunion 
and small firms” (p. 25). The overall conclusion of the study is thus to validate a “regulatory capture” vision of 
OSHA standards and enforcement strategy, as well as a “deterrence” vision of inspections (but with a lack of 
effectiveness to improve safety, the stated objective of the rules and of the institution). 
 
ii. Inspections: effective, and with “lagged” effects? 
In a second paper (Scholz and Gray 1990), the authors built upon past research (including Bartel and Thomas, 
which we just summarized), but were able to use a different dataset “merging OSHA enforcement records and 
Bureau of Labor Statistics (BLS) injury data for 6842 manufacturing plants”, which “provides richer information 
than has been available to other studies” (p. 284). The data covers 1979-1985, i.e. a different period than the 
previous study. It combines data on inspections and enforcement actions, characteristics of the plants 
inspected (including size, but also some qualitative data on the workforce), injuries (not aggregated rates, but 
at the plant level). The study was predicated generally on the same deterrence-based compliance model (as 
originally formulated in Becker 1968), but incorporating major elements from the “behavioral theory of the 
firm” (p. 283), as well as findings from research on “decision making under risk and uncertainty” (coming from 
Kahneman, Slovic and Tversky 1982 in particular) (p. 285). Thus, the model being used is somewhat more 
sophisticated (in that it incorporates more findings on behaviours and decision making), but still founded on 
deterrence theory. The authors investigate four hypotheses: that firms respond to accidents (by attempting 
to correct the safety risks they have revealed), that firms respond to perceived increases in “enforcement risk” 
(OSHA enforcement activity) but “over several years”, that OSHA imposing penalties against firms has an 
additional, “specific deterrence” effect – and that firms react independently to the two “dimensions of 
expected penalty (probability and amount)” and “respond more to changes in probability”.  
A key difference with other studies (and one that the authors think explain a substantial part of the difference 
in findings) is that the sample is not representative of the general enterprise population but, rather, 
corresponds to types of plants which are an area of focus for OSHA. This is due to the BLS over-sampling large 
plants. As a result, the sample had firms with on average nearly 10 times more workers than the general 
enterprise population, and far more regularly inspected (“27% of them inspected in 1979, compared with 8% 
for all manufacturing plants”, p. 288). While not representative, this lent the sample “more analytic power” 
(ibid.) to try and investigate responses to enforcement activities.  
In their conclusions, the authors note that “the number of lost workdays and (…) injuries decrease significantly 
after increases in general enforcement and after specific contacts with enforcement agencies” (p. 302), i.e. 
there is both a general effect of OSHA enforcement existing (and increasing), and a specific effect of OSHA 
visits (the authors consider this a deterrence effect but one could argue that it may be a broader effect, and 
not only deterrence). They also note “relatively long lags between enforcement changes and changes in injury 
risks” (p. 302), and that “our estimates suggest that the effect [of changes in enforcement] continues into later 
years” (p. 295). In addition, “the results confirm that changes in probability and penalty are not symmetrical 
(…) increase in inspections reduced injuries and lost workdays more than a comparable increase in penalty” 
(p. 297). However, “enforcement effects are relatively modest, as other studies have found; a 10% increase in 
enforcement would reduce injuries by around 1% for the large, frequently inspected firms represented in our 
sample” (p. 302). In short, while inspection effects are small, they are clearly present, and produce effects over 
a couple of years (which can be both because the behaviour effects last a couple of years before reverting to 




iii. Making sense of the findings: “how” rather than “whether”? 
At first glance, the difference in findings may partly be explained by the sample composition and more detailed 
data: Scholz and Gray had more detailed data (with injuries etc. per plant), and in any case the effects are 
small, thus looking at a sub-sample of larger, more frequently inspected businesses, magnifies results that may 
otherwise be too small to be significant. Revisiting these two studies from the perspective of practical 
experience in inspections across many countries allows us, however, to challenge a number of the underlying 
assumptions for the two studies, and to suggest possible alternative interpretations of their findings.  
First, both studies rely fundamentally on the same model of compliance – though a slightly modified (or 
“enhanced”) version in the case of Scholz and Gray. The fundamental driver is seen as deterrence, with 
compliance entirely (or mostly) determined by rational calculations of costs and benefits. For Barthel and 
Thomas, “firms will elect to violate OSHA standards whenever such noncompliance is profit maximizing. Even 
apart from OSHA enforcement efforts, the level of noncompliance by a firm will have several distinct effects 
on profits” (p. 5) – probability and cost of enforcement actions intervene by modifying the cost-benefit 
calculation. In their study, Scholz and Gray use the same model but with additional considerations for “risk-
induced” behavioural responses (reaction to accidents etc.), “based on observations of business decision 
making processes, in particular observing that firms’ behavior deviates systematically from optimal 
performance (which would simultaneously maximize expected profit over all possible behaviors) because of 
limitations on the firm’s decision-making ability” (p. 286). There is no consideration that firms’ behaviours (and 
the behaviours of individuals who work within the firm) may be driven by a variety of other factors (social, 
cultural, psychological etc.), values, and thus may not be strictly determined by a combination This is all the 
more striking considering that, as the authors themselves write, “most empirical studies have investigated the 
deterrence hypothesis” but “the results of these studies have not consistently demonstrated the linkage 
[between deterrence and compliance] (…), although the insignificance of effects is sometimes interpreted as 
a sign of ineffective or inadequate enforcement rather than of a weak theory” (pp. 283-284). The inconsistency 
of findings, as well as the modest magnitude of deterrence effects observed even in Scholz and Gray’s study 
(in spite of its sample “bias” towards more-heavily inspected firms) would, rather, appear to us to strongly 
support the view that deterrence is not the only or even the main compliance driver (at least in most cases), 
and that the modesty of the observed effects simply reflects this. Putting too much emphasis on deterrence, 
regardless of the sophisticated economic models developed for these studies, flies in the face of daily 
evidence. Every day, most individuals will comply with rules and norms for which the probability of detection, 
were they to violate them, is vanishingly small – and thus the deterrence effect very low671. A more 
sophisticated model of compliance is clearly necessary.  
Second, while the authors have attempted to control for a number of factors, the way they have done it is not 
entirely convincing, which has to do with their overly schematic compliance model, with insufficient 
consideration of the specifics of the phenomena studied, and with data limitations. Because of the deterrence 
model, they did not look at the potential influence of factors such as information about regulations, type and 
quality of interactions with inspectors. Because of data limitations (or at least so we have to assume), they did 
not look at the question of costs of compliance, and whether there appears to be significant differences in 
compliance between firms which would have substantially different costs (in fact, both studies repeatedly 
refer to the question of costs, but always with assumptions and never with data). Even on factors for which 
they do attempt to control, one can but notice that they do so with some lack of attention for the specifics of 
                                                           
671 Quoting Tyler (2003): “In most actual situations, the objective risk of being caught and punished is quite low. For example, according 
to an analysis of crime and arrest rates, the objective risk of being caught, convicted, and imprisoned for rape is about 12 percent; for 
robbery 4 percent; and for assault, burglary, larceny, and motor vehicle theft 1 percent”. Even if a number of people over-estimate the 
probabilities, the fact that the vast majority of us do not steal cars is sufficient evidence that a large part of compliance cannot be 
explained by deterrence effects only. 
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the issue. A perfect example is the question of reporting of accidents and injuries. This is a fundamental 
variable for both studies, but barely gets any discussion. Bartel and Thomas write that “an analysis of worker 
injuries must take account of the role played by the workers' compensation system. The benefit structure 
varies across states and over time, and previous research by Butler and Worrall has shown that reported injury 
rates are higher in those locations and those years when benefit formulas are the most liberal” (p. 13) and 
they therefore opted to correct for this by using the “expected benefit measure for a representative wage 
earner” in each industry, and a “weighted average of the waiting period for receipt of benefits”. Scholz and 
Gray make no mention of this issue at all. However, we know from many other settings and studies (e.g. 
Tilindyte 2012 pp. 122-124) that there are many situations of under-reporting of incidents, for a variety of 
reasons (mostly employers’ pressure and/or attempts to reach an informal settlement and avoid any possible 
liability, sanctions etc.). There may be reasons why these do not apply to the US, but none of the authors even 
discuss them.  
Third, the two studies make a number of somewhat “heroic” assumptions and/or downright non sequiturs. A 
strong example of this is to be found in Bartel and Thomas (p. 14): “Violations of OSHA standards are much 
like victimless crimes in that they are not automatically reported, but rather must be uncovered and verified 
by inspections. Not violations per firm (VF) but only registered violations (R) generated by inspections (I) are 
observable. The variables are related as follows: R = VF I. Hence registered violations per inspection (observed 
noncompliance) is a proxy for violations per firm (actual noncompliance).” In fact, this makes a number of 
(hidden) assumptions and there is no logical link from the premises to the conclusion. It assumes that each 
inspection finds all violations in the establishment, and that violations (and/or inspections) are distributed 
randomly so that indeed one variable can be used as proxy for the other. There is no reason to assume that 
this is correct.  
Fourth, the fact that the effects of inspections (on compliance, and safety) are found to be small, but appear 
to increase (or be more significant) when one “focuses” more (e.g. through Scholz and Gray’s sample of larger 
firms), actually suggests that the line of inquiry should be different. The question is not so much “do 
inspections achieve anything” but “under what circumstances, with which methods, do inspections work 
better?” If we take a different (or complementary) interpretation of the persistence of OSHA funding in spite 
of disappointing aggregate results in the 1970s, i.e. that Congress knew that the public wanted more 
protection, how do we make this protection more effective? Thus, we would argue that the question asked 
was maybe not the most relevant one – and that rather than asking “is there an impact from inspections”, the 
question should rather have been “are there more efficient and effective ways to reach the desired impact”.  
In any case, these two studies show the limits of statistics-based investigations in our field. Rather than yielding 
conclusive and solid findings, two successive studies considering the very same issue result in largely opposite 
findings, partly reflecting differences in the data, but also to a large extent differences in the methodology and 
underlying assumptions (different weights, coefficients etc. given to different variables and phenomena). 
Considering the very considerable resources required for this type of work, the cost/benefit ratio does not 
appear very favourable. 
 
iv. Broadening the view: US OSHA in international perspective 
Let us attempt to draw a couple of lessons from these two studies, their strengths and shortcomings. Overall, 
they are “on the verge” of making a significant contribution to understanding inspections’ impact on safety 
but, in our view, do not quite reach that point because they adopt a narrow model and neglect a number of 
aspects of the problem – and because they remain too far from the practice to actually consider how the 
institution selects targets, how the inspectors conduct their work.  
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To some extent, this problem is exacerbated by the specific characteristics of occupational safety and health 
(OSH) regulation in the US. For a number of reasons (in particular the fact that the OSH reform movement was 
more linked with broad social movements, environmental and consumer activists etc., than with organized 
labour), in the 1970 OSH Act “cooperation, discretion and flexibility were designed out, while adversariness 
and strict adherence to rules and procedures were designed in” (Clark 1999, p. 99). In line with this, “OSHA’s 
deterrence philosophy involves a much greater emphasis on citations and penalties. US compliance inspectors 
are accorded little discretion” (ibid., p. 96). In addition, “the courts are highly involved in the development and 
interpretation of US health and safety regulation” (ibid.) – which means OSHA will be keen to adopt rules that 
prescribe as much as possible “objectively verifiable”, material standards, rather than practice-focused / safety 
outcomes requirements, to protect itself against judicial review. At the same time, “the operations of OSHA 
have continued to attract an intense amount of scrutiny, controversy, challenge and criticism in Congress, the 
courts, the executive branch (…) and the media” (ibid., p. 98). It would be understandable, in this context, that 
researchers gave less attention to “enforcement style”, since it is so obviously constrained – though in fact 
Scholz himself has written elsewhere on the importance of enforcement methods (Scholz 1994)672.  
Looking at the practice, here, would have meant trying to understand how OSHA was selecting inspection 
targets, and if some selection methods gave better results, for instance. It could also have meant comparing 
OSHA’s results with that of other agencies where inspectors are given more flexibility and discretion, to 
investigate whether the benefits of discretion can outweigh the risk of capture. Even with the very rigid 
regulatory framework that surrounds OSHA, there is clearly scope for improvements in data analysis, 
targeting, outreach and information, and development of inspectors’ skills – all these can have a major 
influence on results, and looking only at aggregate results in one agency tells us relatively little. In fact, to the 
extent that Scholz and Gray’s results indicate a stronger effect than Bartel and Thomas’s, and that this seems 
at least to a large extent due to their more focused sample, these studies in a way show “by contrast” that a 
more focused selection approach (e.g. a risk-based one) would produce more effects on safety – but this point 
is not really seen, as the focus is on validating a set of theoretical hypotheses rather than on understanding 
how practice works.  
A last point of interest considering the US OSHA case would be whether its practices appears to deliver better, 
or worse results than other, more “responsive” ones. There is no easily available conclusive evidence on this 
topic, but we can look for some indications. Ayres and Braithwaite (1992) wrote of OSHA’s regulatory strategy 
that it was “poorly conceived”, with inspectors that “constantly nip at firms with flea-bite fines”, where “petty 
punitiveness is in the foreground and no big guns are in the background” (p. 49). By contrast, Clark (1999) 
wrote that “there is evidence to suggest that, in terms of workplace outcomes, Australia’s current occupational 
safety and health performance is, at the very least, no better than that of the USA” (p. 102) – but unfortunately 
she did not indicate any of this evidence.  
The only relatively “easy” indicator that is available to compare the performance of OSH systems across 
countries is the fatality rate, which suffers from less distortions (and under-reporting) than the rate of (non-
fatal) injuries – even though one of the studies used here reports that “limited or incomplete information on 
the death certificate and variation in certifier interpretation of the “injury at work?” item contribute to an 
estimated under count of occupational injury deaths of between 10% and 30%” (Feyer, Williamson, Stout, et 
al. 2001, p. 23). With this caveat then that one should not exaggerate the precision of rates of fatal 
occupational accidents, there are at least four published papers or reports comparing these rates across a 
                                                           




number of advanced economies (and online data allows to complement older studies by seeing how rates 
have evolved).  
Feyer et al. in 2001 compared New Zealand, Australia and the US, and showed the US as having somewhat 
better results than Australia (and New Zealand performing worst), but “because the United States data 
collection method likely underestimates the occurrence of work related fatal injuries, the true difference 
between the United States and the other two countries is probably less” and “much of the difference between 
countries was accounted for by differences in industry distribution” (the differences within a given industry 
being far smaller, and sometimes going in the opposite direction) (p. 26). It should be noted that Australia’s 
performance appears to have improved strongly over the decade and more since this paper was published, as 
the most recent data shows that “The 191 fatalities in 2013 equates to a fatality rate of 1.64 fatalities per 100 
000 workers. This is the lowest fatality rate since the series began 11 years ago. The highest fatality rate was 
recorded in 2004 (2.94)” (Safework Australia 2013, p. vii). 
The next study was done by Australia’s National Occupational Health and Safety Commission (2004). It decided 
to exclude the United States “as their data, particularly at industry level, would require significant 
manipulation before it could be included” (p. 23). The report added that “as the USA’s incidence rate (4 deaths 
per 100,000 employees per year) is considerably higher than the countries selected, it is unlikely its inclusion 
would alter the findings of this report. This is in contrast to the report by Feyer et al. (2001) which concluded 
using 1989–92 data that the USA performed better than Australia. Since this time Australia’s performance has 
improved substantially whereas the USA’s rate appears to have remained fairly constant based on data 
supplied to the ILO” (though methodological caution applies). In this 2004 report, “Sweden and the UK [had] 
the lowest fatality rates” (p. 24). 
The last two studies (one prepared by the UK HSE, the other by the US BLS) are both from 2014 and can be 
used to complement each other. The BLS’s Wiatrowski and Janocha (2014) compare aggregated European (EU) 
OSH data with US one, while the HSE looks at the UK in comparison with other major EU economies. The US 
rate appears to be somewhat higher than the EU’s in aggregate, and sometimes far higher at the sector level 
(Wiatrowski and Janocha 2014, p. 3). Within the EU, the HSE study (p. 2) shows that “the UK consistently has 
one of the lowest rates of fatal injury across the EU. In 2011 the standardised rate was 0.74 per 100 000 
workers, which compares favourably with other large economies such as France (2.74 per 100 000 workers), 
Germany (0.94 per 100 000 workers), Italy (1.5 per 100 000 workers) and Spain (2.16 per 100 000 workers)”.673 
Indeed, the UK’s rate was roughly half the EU-15 average for most of the past decade and more. 
Considering this data, it appears that both Australia (which has a fatality rate that in most recent years appears 
to be 40 to 50% lower than the US) and the UK (which has less than a third of the US’s fatality rate) perform 
significantly better on at least this most easily comparable (and telling) measure of OSH. Differences in 
economic structure are substantial, but even when corrected for, the difference still exists, in the same 
direction. Australia and the UK both have two of the “enforcement styles” that most emphasize 
responsiveness, flexibility, promotion of compliance and overall focus on achieving safety outcomes rather 
than registering and sanctioning each and every violation. As we have seen, by statute and by design, OSHA’s 
practice is in sharp contrast to this.  
It would be difficult to conclude, however, on the relative level of effectiveness of OSHA’s practices without 
considering the number of staff it can mobilize, and the number of inspections they conduct. As it states on 
its own website, and considering the size of the US economy and labour force, “federal OSHA is a small 
                                                           
673 As discussed in earlier sections, these are the rates excluding fatal occupational accidents which took place in transit or transport. 
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agency”674 – with “approximately 2,200 inspectors responsible for the health and safety of 130 million 
workers675”. Part of the 50 US States have inspections and enforcement delegated by OSHA to State-level 
authorities, under an agreed plan – other have direct OSHA inspections and enforcement, hence the 2,200 
inspectors include “state partners”. By comparison, as we have seen earlier, the total number of (full-time 
equivalent) staff in the UK HSE and in Local Authorities working on OSH issues made up around 1,900. Britain, 
however, only has (latest Eurostat data) around 29.5 million workers overall (including self-employed), out of 
which slightly over 25 million employees (the main focus of OSH inspections in Britain). Thus, the ratio of 
inspectors to employees would be approximately 4.5 times higher in Britain, were there no other agencies 
involved in the US. In fact, there are agencies and structures at the local level that may be involved in OSH and 
are not summarized in OSHA’s numbers, and there are some other federal administrations (most notably the 
US Mine Safety and Health Administration, MSHA) involved. These agencies are, in some cases, responsible 
for a distinct set of workers, but taking them into account may significantly change the ratio. For instance, the 
MSHA’s 1,000 staff676 are responsible for at most the slightly over 700,000 workers in the “Mining, Quarrying, 
and Oil and Gas Extraction” sector677.  
Likewise, while OSHA and its state-level partners conducted in 2015 slightly less than 80,000 inspections 
(federal inspections: 35,820 – StatePlan inspections: 43,471 – OSHA “Commonly Used Statistics” data), there 
were inspections conducted by other agencies (such as MSHA). These amount to approximately 43,000 visits 
per year on average over 2011-2014678, including all kinds of visits (spot inspections on one single topic, 
reactive inspections, planned/regular inspections, information-focused visits etc.). Even accounting for such 
additional inspectors and inspections, however, it remains that their numbers appear low compared to 
prevailing levels in major EU countries, and even to Britain (where they have steadily decreased, and are far 
lower, as we have seen, than in Germany), at least considering the far larger working population. Indeed, a 
rough estimate would suggest that OSH inspections are at least 4 times less frequent in the US than in Britain, 
pro-rated to the working population. Things can look different, however, if we consider another unit of 
analysis, i.e. the number of active businesses (or of business establishments), and particularly those that are 
“above micro-size”, since OSH inspections mostly focus on those where a significant number of workers is 
employed. Indeed, the US have, for a number of reasons, a very different enterprise structure from Europe, 
and a far smaller share of SMEs among the total number of businesses.679 Britain has as of 2015 more than 5.2 
million businesses, compared to 5.77 million in the US680. On this basis, the difference in the number of 
inspections per business would be negligible. If one considers only the businesses with at least 10 employees, 
the difference is however far larger (1.2 million in the US, around 235,000 in Britain). Thus, the ratio between 
the two countries will be very different depending on what is measured: inspections per workers, inspections 
per businesses, or inspections per businesses above a certain size. Overall, the total number of inspections in 
the US and Britain is relatively similar (around 120,000 if considering both OSHA and MSHA, and both HSE and 
                                                           
674 Quote and data (including in next paragraph) from the “Commonly Used Statistics” of the OSHA website – available at: 
https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html  
675 Out of a total labour force of close to 160 million (see US Bureau of Labor Statistics data available at: 
http://www.bls.gov/news.release/empsit.t01.htm)  
676 Staffing numbers could not be found on the MSHA’s website (http://www.msha.gov/) and were therefore obtained from the 
Wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Mine_Safety_and_Health_Administration  
677 And in fact the MSHA is not responsible for all workers in this sector – data from the US Bureau of Labor Statistics available at: 
http://www.bls.gov/iag/tgs/iag21.htm  
678 MSHA does not publish anywhere a consolidated report on its number of visits. We had to extract this by analyzing the bulk data 
on all MSHA visits since the agency’s creation, available at: http://ogesdw.dol.gov/views/data_catalogs.php (select “MSHA data” and 
then on next page “MSHA inspections”). Between 2011 and 2014, the total number of visits (all kinds) ranged from 41,174 to 46,366. 
679 See successive editions of the OECD’s SME Outlook for details on this (the latest SME Outlook dates from 2015 but findings on this 
structural difference are still valid). 
680 US Census data for 2013 – see: http://www.census.gov/econ/susb/  
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LAs respectively, in most recent years) – but the ratio of working population (US/GB) is around 4.4, and the 
ratio of businesses with 5 employees or more is similar (4.44).  
Thus, because on most measures OSH inspections in the US are roughly 4.4 times less frequent than even in 
Britain (itself a “low coverage” country by European standards), it is difficult to make any conclusions on the 
relative effectiveness of different inspection approaches between the US and countries with more risk-
proportional, compliance-promoting countries. This has not prevented the fatal accidents rate to decrease in 
the US681, but it has remained (as we have seen) significantly higher than in comparator countries. The fatal 
injuries’ rate decrease was also slower than e.g. in Britain, where the HSE’s figures put it at 84% between 1974 
and 2015682 (but of course the HSE had more staff, not only different methods).  
What conclusion, if any, can we draw of this? Unfortunately, the existing studies and data tell us little about 
the relative effectiveness of US OSHA’s approach compared to the British HSE – and tell us nothing about 
possible differences within the US (between federal OSHA and state partners, for instance). This also tells us 
very little about the question of focus and targeting. From Scholz and Gray (1990), we know that OSHA 
primarily targets larger firms. From OSHA's own website, we know that inspections heavily rely on “reactive” 
scheduling, while also incorporating an element of risk-based targeting.683 The existence of a distinct 
administration (MSHA) also means that a very substantial share of the total OSH inspecting workforce is 
looking at a very small sub-set of the working population (admittedly, one that works in a high risk sector – 
but the institutional separation means that there can be no reallocation based on evolving risks). There are 
also risk factors that are US-specific, and which the action of OSHA inspectors is unable to affect. As US Bureau 
of Labor Statistics data shows684, nearly 10% of fatal occupational injuries were homicides – whereas the 
number in Britain is nearly negligible. 
There is, however, one area where it is possible that OSHA’s approach, as mandated by its statute, may have 
had specific (negative) effects – it is in reinforcing political polarization around the agency’s activities. While it 
is likely that (given the specific political climate in the US) some political polarization would have been present, 
the contrast with the US FDA (which elicits significantly less opposition) suggests that there may be some 
element of reaction to what Bardach and Kagan (1982) called “regulatory unreasonableness685”. Since the low 
level of OSHA’s staffing (and the resulting low level of inspections) are partly a factor of political opposition by 
the Republican party to any increase in OSHA’s funding, and since hostility to OSHA among businesses was 
likely reinforced by the agency’s “enforcement style”, there may be a negative feedback loop between its 
approach and its effectiveness, not directly but mediated through its effect on the political and social 
acceptance of the agency’s actions. 
Overall, this short glance cast at the US situation and US-focused studies has raised more questions than it has 
yielded answers. Possibly, the decrease in fatal injuries would have happened regardless of regulatory 
interventions, given technological, economic, managerial and social change. The sharper decrease in the UK 
may reflect more resources, better methods, a different context – or all of the above. To our mind, this all 
strengthens the case to start by making more systematic comparisons – of resources, activities, methods and 
outcomes – before “drilling down” into statistics-based analytical work. This way, we may be better able to 
ask the right questions. 
                                                           
681 By over 2/3 since 1970 and OSHA’s creation – see: https://www.osha.gov/oshstats/commonstats.html  
682 See “historical picture” in the HSE statistics section: http://www.hse.gov.uk/Statistics/history/index.htm  
683 See “Inspections Fact Sheet” available at: https://www.osha.gov/OshDoc/data_General_Facts/factsheet-inspections.pdf  
684 See set of charts on fatal occupational injuries at: http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0012.pdf and a summary article on this 
topic (which has been the object of increasing public discussions) at: http://www.vox.com/2014/9/14/6139883/how-americans-die-
on-the-job-in-5-charts  




b. Real correlations or “noise” – assessing the quality of available data 
 
We indicated above that there were two key reasons (apart from, obviously, limited time and resources) that 
we did not engage into systematic statistical analysis of data (looking for correlations in particular): 
inconclusive evidence from studies based on these methods (with conflicting findings) was the first, that we 
discussed in the previous section. The second was significant issues with data quality and reliability in many 
datasets – issues that become rapidly overwhelming once one attempts to correlated several insufficiently 
reliable data points, or to combine several insufficiently reliable sources. 
Even in the OSHA study by Scholz and Gray (1990) that we have just discussed, not all data points are fully 
reliable. The records of inspections are most probably correct, but there is no absolute certainty that additional 
visits have not happened that were not recorded – while this may be insignificant in the case of OSHA, this is 
far from being negligible in other countries or institutions. Assessments of safety and health effects rely on 
reporting of injuries, diseases etc. that are inherently far less reliable, as we have discussed. As soon as a study 
seeks to take into account not only such relatively “objective” indicators but also more “qualitative” ones such 
as enforcement style, or some “hidden” ones such as corruption (broadly defined), or even “objective but hard 
to measure” such as burden – then the data becomes considerably less reliable. As a result, we would argue 
that studies that attempt to perform statistical analysis and establish correlations (let alone causalities) from 
such datasets tend to err, not because of their methodology, but because they apply what may be sound 
methods to profoundly unsound (or at least insufficiently reliable) data. 
 
i. The difficulty of measuring corruption 
Let us consider one simple example. At the onset of this research, we were hoping to include considerations 
of links between certain inspection and enforcement systems and practices on the one hand, and corruption 
prevalence in inspections on the other. Indeed, inspection and enforcement power can be abused by those 
who hold or oversee it, regardless of where orders come from, of what the law actually prescribes, of the 
existing safeguards etc. Such a possibility will always exist, and it would have been highly interesting to see 
whether certain systems seemed less corruption-prone than others. As we have discussed in earlier sections, 
there are reasons to believe for instance that performance management for inspection agencies based on 
public welfare outcomes decreases incentives for a particular form of “institutional corruption” whereby the 
agency tends to have an interest to find as many violations as possible to bolster its performance rating or its 
income (if they are linked to the number of inspection visits and of violations sanctioned). Systematically 
investigating this as well as other hypotheses on corruption would have required, however, some data that 
we could trust. Unfortunately, corruption is a very difficult phenomenon to measure (though it is easy to know 
it exists from anecdotal evidence). Indeed, the actual prevalence of corrupt behaviour is inherently difficult to 
measure and track. Corruption is by nature hidden, and most victims will be reluctant to report it for fear of 
reprisals - and in some cases the “victims” may in fact be rather willing to engage in corrupt behaviour, because 
it may be easier and less costly than compliance. Thus, it is very difficult to find adequate and reliable measures 
of corruption, and what data exists inevitably suffers from a number of limitations, regardless of the apparent 
precision given by scores and indices 
Going further, establishing any causality between certain inspection regimes’ features and corruption is even 
more problematic, at least if we look at demonstrating causality in a statistically- and quantitatively-grounded 
way. That would require not only assuming that responses to corruption-related questions were sincere (or at 
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least that under-reporting bias was constant in different jurisdictions and cases, which is highly unlikely), but 
also having databases which have been adequately checked for consistency and quality. 
Considering the existing surveys which underpin the various indices on corruption (or exist as stand-alone), 
there are at least three different kinds of questions aiming at assessing corruption: 
- Direct questions on whether the respondent has had to pay a bribe (or engage in corruption in any 
other way, e.g. gifts etc.), either in general to “facilitate” relations with authorities, or in direct relation 
with a given procedure (e.g. in our case an inspection); 
- Indirect questions on whether the respondent considers that corruption is “prevalent” or “common” 
in a given situation (or in general in relations between enterprises and the state, or citizens and the 
state); 
- Qualitative, rating questions, where respondents are asked to indicate how “severe” corruption is, or 
how much of a burden it is for their business (or businesses in general), or how “important” they 
consider corruption to be as a problem, etc. 
Unfortunately, all three of these types of questions have shortcomings. The third category is the most 
obviously problematic: ratings are highly subjective, and depend on expectations, prevailing behaviours, 
existence or absence of comparison points, etc. They rarely correspond to what a data-driven analysis (e.g. 
growth or productivity factors) would indicate. They also rarely reflect the actual differences in prevalence of 
corruption, as examples in the following table will show. Possibly the only advantage of such questions is that 
answering them may be considered less “dangerous” by respondents, and so they may be relatively more 
open. But there are clearly major downsides in terms of reliability, particularly when trying to establish fine 
differences (i.e. between relatively similar countries, and not between “worst case” and “best case”). 
The first and second types of questions are somewhat similar, and only differ in that in the second case the 
question is asked more generally, and not necessarily in respect to the respondent. The second type of 
question is thus less precise (and, if we assume full truthfulness of replies, theoretically less reliable), and it is 
not possible (or at least more problematic - it depends on the exact wording of the question, as it may be 
restricted to “firms similar to yours”) to use it to correlate corrupt behaviours with specific procedures, types 
of business, sectors etc. 
By contrast, the first type of question is in principle the best one: it is unambiguous, precise, specific. It lends 
itself perfectly to quantitative analysis of any kind. The problem, however, is that available evidence suggests 
it is rarely fully honestly or truthfully answered (for reasons that are easy to comprehend), and also that its 
very precision lends itself to answers that are not “technically” false but in fact “hide” the reality. The first 
problem is linked to fear: in situations where corruption is prevalent, respondents (business, citizens) will 
frequently (but not always) fear for their safety if they report information that may be seen to be critical of 
the regime, or damaging for power holders. Since not all respondents will have full confidence in the strict 
confidentiality of the survey (whatever the assurances enumerators give them), a proportion of them will not 
respond truly - and this proportion varies, which makes any assumption to correct this error highly 
problematic, at best. The second problem is linked to the diversity of corruption - direct bribes paid during an 
administrative procedure or inspection are not the only form corruption takes, far from it. People may give 
gifts or payments at other times, support a higher official’s child studying abroad, rely on friends or relatives’ 
support to influence administrative decisions, etc. All these are in fact corruption of the proper working of the 
law, regulations, administration - but are not “making a payment to the official”. Experience unfortunately 
suggests that most surveys do not take this issue adequately into account. And most reports analysing 
corruption-related questions tend to look for correlations and trends while taking all data at face value. 
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Formulation of questions, and truthfulness or accuracy of answers, are not the only issues affecting negatively 
data quality on corruption. The main problems that affect some, if not all, surveys are sample size and 
structure, and quality control and data cleaning. Since statistically representative surveys are a costly exercise, 
most such surveys are based on sample sizes that are set at the smallest possible size to produce statistically 
significant results on some key questions. That does not mean, however, because number of respondents may 
be lower for some questions, that the results are significant on all questions. And it is even less ensured that 
variations between different years or between countries can be measured accurately. In fact, such variations 
are often above the margin of error - and, contrary to a frequent situation with political polls, there are no 
additional measurements over several days or weeks to confirm or infirm the trends. Again, most analytical 
reports tend to avoid considering this issue too closely, and indeed it may not affect general conclusions 
(regressions over a number of countries, regional trends) too strongly, but it does preclude very precise 
comparisons between years or countries. 
Quality control and data cleaning are possibly even more serious issues. Many surveys covering corruption 
issues are implemented across several countries, some of them in most of the world, which is essential to 
allow for comparisons. At the same time, budget constraints generally mean that the resources available for 
quality control (of translations of questions, of enumerators’ training, of interview practices, of data entry and 
consolidation etc.) are limited. Practices also vary in terms of data cleaning (verification of outliers, possible 
exclusion of extreme outliers that cannot be explained by available knowledge or verification, etc.). This can 
result in aberrations being recorded as correct data, and this may be extremely difficult to spot. As a result, 
when data appears strongly at odds with “expert opinion”, i.e. knowledge of the country based on first-hand 
experience and feedback from a number of direct personal interactions, it is not always clear whether this is 
due to the data being right and the “expert opinion” being based on biased experience, or whether the “expert 
opinion” is rather correct and the data happens to be of poor quality. 
 
ii. Methodological and implementation limitations with available surveys 
We have made use, in the section on the practical experience of post-Soviet and post-Communist countries, 
of business surveys conducted by the World Bank Group. Having been directly involved in the preparation and 
implementation of 5 of these, and indirectly in the supervision or analysis of many others, we are well aware 
of both the strengths and the limitations of these surveys. In terms of data quality overall, these surveys have 
benefited from large sample sizes, and strong supervision (not only by the survey firms, but by the World Bank 
Group teams in country), and extensive efforts to clean data by verifying consistency and cross-checking or 
eliminating outliers. When it comes to corruption data, however, there have repeatedly been serious problems 
that the survey teams were able to observe as respondent data came in. Unaccountably (at first glance), the 
percentage of respondents answering that corrupt practices had taken place during inspections (or other 
regulatory procedures) could suddenly drop from one survey to the next, whereas first-hand observations and 
numerous off-the-record interviews suggested this was by no means the case in reality. When attempting to 
cross-check the data in Tajikistan (where such a drop occurred between the 2003 and 2006 surveys), and 
following additional phone interviews with several hundred respondents, it became clear that the apparent 
drop was illusory. Many respondents did not respond “yes” because corruption took place outside of the 
inspection procedure itself (they used relations, or money, or gifts to ensure positive regulatory results – but 
did so pre-emptively and not during a particular procedure). Others were simply not convinced by assurances 
of confidentiality, and feared to answer truthfully. We have similarly observed very low levels of answers on 
corruption-related questions in regimes that were strongly authoritarian. A further limitation of these surveys 
(and the reason we have not tried to use them to study other possible correlations) is that they cover only a 
limited set of countries (several post-Soviet republics, and Mongolia), with a limited number of years (frequent 
surveys for some countries, like Ukraine, but only a few for others, like Mongolia or Georgia).  
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By contrast, another group of surveys, called worldwide the “World Bank Enterprise Surveys686”, and known 
as Business Environment and Enterprise Performance Surveys (BEEPS) in Eastern Europe and Central Asia 
(where they are run jointly by the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development and the World Bank 
Group – the EBRD taking the lead687), offers global coverage (including a number of EU/OECD countries), and 
regular iterations. These surveys have been used for a very large number of research pieces688, including many 
focusing specifically on regulatory issues, and on corruption.689 Some research has in fact tried and use the 
large coverage of the Enterprise Surveys dataset to assess whether patterns of corruption under-reporting can 
be found, and indeed found under-reporting to be higher under more authoritarian regimes (Jensen, Li and 
Rahman 2007) – but most others have looked at corruption data as being reliable, and used it to investigate 
correlations with other variables. 
Some of these papers reach results that are “challenging” or even difficult to understand. Knack and Kisunko 
(2011) thus report at face-value changes in use of bribes, and end up with (relatively free) Kyrgyzstan having 
far higher levels than (far more authoritarian) Azerbaijan or Tajikistan – something that is clearly difficult to 
reconcile with first hand observations in these countries. The answers to different questions were also 
seemingly difficult to reconcile for some countries (e.g. Kosovo, where many respondents both answered that 
bribes were rare, and that corruption was a major problem), leading the authors to elaborate complex 
interpretative theories, without first considering whether data quality issues may play a role. For their part, 
Blagojevic and Damijan  conclude among other points that “results suggest that foreign owned firms are more 
likely to engage in informal payments” (p. 20), not considering whether they may not in fact just be more 
forthcoming with their answers (something that would be quite likely in our experience). They also write that 
most negative effects of corruption on firm performance “dissipate after 2004, indicating the general 
improvements in the business environment” (ibid.). This might be true but could also indicate a decrease in 
the level of corruption reporting by respondents (something we have repeatedly observed).  
To conclude on this issue, and demonstrate more clearly why we decided not to attempt any systematic 
statistical analysis (least of all on corruption, but not on other issues either), let us look more closely at some 
examples from Enterprise Surveys data. 
Enterprise Surveys have been conducted every few years since 2002, relying on face-to-face interviews of 
business operators in up to 135 different countries (the exact number can vary between different iterations). 
The methodology has been fully harmonised since 2005-06. The survey instrument covers a number of aspects 
of business operation - legal and regulatory environment, infrastructure, technology and skills, access to 
finance etc. The sections that are of interest to us here are the ones on “Corruption” and “Regulations and 
Taxes”. 
The WBG Enterprise Surveys (and EBRD-WBG BEEPS) have the advantage of covering a large sample of 
countries, including some developed (OECD, EU) ones, which allows to compare very different regulatory 
regimes. They have a range of questions covering corruption, but have no questions directly on inspections. 
They have questions on the regulatory environment e.g. licensing and construction permits (but these are 
rather bad proxies for inspections, as one part of the regulatory system is not always a predictor of another), 
and a question on “interactions with tax authorities” that includes tax inspections, but is not limited to them 
(visits to the tax authorities, e.g. to file or pay taxes, are also included). Thus, this survey can mostly be useful 
                                                           
686 See website: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/  
687 See website: http://ebrd-beeps.com/  
688 See databases of research done using these surveys – on World Bank website: http://www.enterprisesurveys.org/research - on 
EBRD website: http://ebrd-beeps.com/research/  
689 To name but a few examples: Knack and Kisunko 2011, Blagojevic and Damijan 2012, Denisova-Schmidt and Huber 2014 
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to provide data points on corruption for a large number of countries, though if no other data is available on a 
given country the “interactions with tax authorities” question can be used as an imperfect proxy. 
There are however very significant methodological issues with the Enterprise Surveys. The first is the extensive 
use of “qualitative”, “opinion” questions, asking respondents to rate the importance or severity of a constraint. 
We provide below examples of how such questions can provide results that simply do not reflect the real 
condition in a given country. The second is the relative weakness of the control on survey implementation, 
and also the lack of attention to whether questions are actually phrased in a way that can give meaningful 
results (i.e. if the questions simply make sense in a given country, or not). The third is that sample size is rather 
small, and that the sample does not include micro-businesses and individual entrepreneurs (which, typically, 
are quite affected by “petty corruption”) - thus, the statistical reliability of the data (in terms of providing a 
reliable picture of the whole economy of a country) is not fully assured. The table below illustrates the 
problems with corruption-related data in the Enterprise Surveys. 
 
Corruption data and its inconsistencies – WBG Enterprise Surveys / BEEPS 











































Armenia 2002 ... 34,0 ... ... 25,0 15,3 
Armenia 2005 ... 70,5 ... ... 25,9 21,4 
Armenia 2009 15,5 13,3 11,3 21,7 16,0 39,6 
Germany 2005 ... 14,8 ... ... ... 3,9 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2002 ... 79,1 ... ... 63,3 17,5 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2003 ... 49,5 25,0 56,3 77,4 50,5 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2005 ... 83,8 ... ... 68,3 34,3 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2009 42,5 39,0 25,7 56,3 47,8 58,9 
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Kosovo 2009 9,0 7,7 5,8 5,7 7,5 73,4 
Lithuania 2002 ... 29,1 ... ... 49,1 18,7 
Lithuania 2004 ... 3,8 8,2 5,6 ... 27,6 
Lithuania 2005 ... 35,4 ... ... 43,4 16,6 
Lithuania 2009 7,2 3,4 5,4 32,4 10,7 38,6 
Latvia 2002 ... 37,1 ... ... 48,4 15,3 
Latvia 2005 ... 30,0 ... ... 29,8 12,8 
Latvia 2009 8,9 4,4 0,0 13,2 13,4 33,9 
Slovenia 2002 ... 15,8 ... ... 15,0 4,9 
Slovenia 2005 ... 13,9 ... ... 12,2 4,8 
Slovenia 2009 2,3 0,0 0,0 3,6 5,8 9,8 
Tajikistan 2002 ... 84,4 ... ... 68,5 18,9 
Tajikistan 2003 ... 44,4 84,8 86,7 55,3 23,5 
Tajikistan 2005 ... 71,5 ... ... 51,1 20,9 
Tajikistan 2008 37,9 33,0 38,5 42,3 44,6 37,8 
Source – World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys for the years indicated 
 
 
Through this table and subsequent ones, we have tried to show some of the problems with corruption-related 
data in Enterprise Surveys. To this aim, we have taken a few countries from the former Soviet Union (on which 
other data sources and information are available so as to cross-check the survey data), a few recent EU 
Member States (as “transition” comparators), and some Western European countries for reference690. 
A number of data points appear to be particularly problematic, which we outline below. 
 
                                                           
690 Limiting ourselves to those available in the database, which does not cover all of Western Europe, and covers these countries in 
some years only, as they are only there as reference points and not as the survey’s main focus. 
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First, in Kosovo, nearly ¾ of respondents rate corruption “a major constraint” but less than 10% respond 
positively on any of the other corruption-related questions (which are “objective” questions, i.e. of the type 
“did something – like paying a bribe – take place or not”). This suggests that answers to the “major constraint” 
may not be fully meaningful. 
Second, in Germany, nearly 15% of respondents indicated that “giving gifts when meeting tax officials” was 
expected. This appears not to be supported by any other data, and is clearly not particularly consistent with 
what is usually known of the experience of firms in that country [note that the same indicator in Slovenia for 
that year was 0%]. It is unclear how reliable the answers are. 
Third, in many cases, variations from one year to the other appear difficult to reconcile with any plausible 
explanation. To the author’s best knowledge (with direct work experience in this field in these countries), 
there exists no particular set of reforms, changes or events which could explain these. For instance, the 
percentage of firms in Armenia reporting that they were expected to give gifts to tax officials first doubling 
(2002-2005) then decreasing 80%. This is compounded by internal inconsistency, as between 2005 and 2009 
the percentage of respondents rating corruption “a major constraint” nearly doubled (suggesting an opposite 
trend). The same indicator on gifts to tax officials in Kyrgyzstan decreasing nearly 40% from 2002 to 2003, then 
nearly doubling, then halving again. In addition, still in Kyrgyzstan, we see the indicator “corruption as a major 
constraint” fluctuating wildly (nearly tripling first, then 30% down, then again up 75%) [note: major political 
changes did take place in Kyrgyzstan in this period, but not in 2002-2003, and in any case changes in tax 
administration and public administration overall were far from radical]. Likewise, in Lithuania we observe 
variations by a factor of 10 on the “gifts to tax officials” indicator between two consecutive surveys, repeatedly 
– and “wild” (if not quite as large) swings on this same indicator in Tajikistan. 
In addition, internal inconsistencies are numerous – indicators on “gift to tax officials”, “gifts to public officials” 
and “corruption as a major constraint” frequently move in opposite directions from one survey to the next 
(particularly in Tajikistan). Furthermore, some of the trends, even not considering all of the above, appear not 
to reflect reality as experienced and reflected through in depth interviews, daily experience etc. in various 
countries – and likewise for the relative level of indicators across different countries. Indeed, data from the 
most recent survey suggests that corruption in administrative procedures is higher in Kyrgyzstan than in 
Tajikistan, whereas most other evidence (country-specific surveys, in depth interviews, etc.) suggest that 
corruption in Tajikistan is at least as high as in Kyrgyzstan (and probably higher). While this does not in and of 
itself prove that the data is incorrect, when combined with the above, it certainly suggests that it could be the 
case. In a similar fashion, absolute levels in percentage of firms expected to give gifts to get a license or permit, 
even though high in Tajikistan or Armenia, seems far lower than what most in depth interviews and direct 
experience would suggest. This, again, raises additional doubts – particularly when combined with all the 
issues outlined above. 
 
Taking a closer look at other modules of the Enterprise Surveys raises similar problems. These problems are 
worth considering because the Enterprise Surveys are, in fact, not worse than many other instruments 
routinely used for analytical reports, studies and papers – and possibly better than many. These flaws suggest 
that far too much confidence is routinely given to such quantitative data, resulting in researchers and analysis 






Regulatory issues data and its problems – WBG Enterprise Surveys 
Economy Year Senior 
management 
time spent 



















Percent of firms 
identifying tax 
administration 







permits as a 
major 
constraint 
Armenia 2002 1,9 ... ... ... 37,1 7,6 
Armenia 2005 3,1 2,8 ... ... 46,7 16,8 
Armenia 2009 10,3 2,1 20,0 26,3 21,1 5,6 
Germany 2005 1,2 1,3 ... ... 23,2 4,0 
Spain 2005 0,8 1,5 ... ... 12,8 12,9 
Estonia 2002 2,1 ... ... ... 5,1 11,8 
Estonia 2005 2,1 0,3 ... ... 3,6 3,6 
Estonia 2009 5,5 0,4 8,3 29,0 3,1 3,4 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2002 5,1 ... ... ... 23,7 9,4 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2003 6,6 16,6 43,9 115,6 52,5 13,4 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2005 5,1 3,5 ... ... 34,2 11,8 
Kyrgyz 
Republic 
2009 4,9 2,1 18,0 64,6 31,6 16,3 
Kosovo 2009 9,8 4,5 18,8 47,7 10,4 7,5 
Lithuania 2002 5,4 ... ... ... 22,7 9,4 
Lithuania 2004 25,9 9,5 55,5 63,4 36,8 13,4 
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Lithuania 2005 4,5 2,2 ... ... 15,0 9,3 
Lithuania 2009 9,3 0,8 65,5 44,6 28,0 23,4 
Latvia 2002 5,8 ... ... ... 28,4 9,8 
Latvia 2005 3,2 1,4 ... ... 27,9 8,4 
Latvia 2009 9,7 1,5 11,5 70,0 25,0 14,4 
Slovenia 2002 3,8 ... ... ... 7,1 2,4 
Slovenia 2005 2,4 0,4 ... ... 15,4 1,6 
Slovenia 2009 7,3 0,3 56,0 117,0 5,7 4,6 
Tajikistan 2002 5,8 ... ... ... 25,2 15,0 
Tajikistan 2003 1,5 6,2 15,3 17,2 9,5 9,0 
Tajikistan 2005 4,2 2,5 ... ... 22,9 14,3 
Tajikistan 2008 11,7 1,4 22,6 62,0 17,0 16,6 
Source – World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys for the years indicated 
 
As we can see looking at this table, data on administrative and regulatory procedures is quite problematic as 
well. We summarize below some of the main difficulties. 
First, one of the indicators is “days to obtain an operating license” – however there is no clear definition of 
what an “operating license” is. The Enterprise Survey has some of its origins in work on Latin America, and 
“operating licenses” are quite frequent in that region. There, they are an additional approval that is mostly 
given out by municipalities, and comes on top of the business registration (and of tax registration too). They 
are “universal” in the sense that they apply to all businesses, regardless of sector etc. The Enterprise Survey 
team decided that from 2005-06 they would have a fully harmonised (unified) methodology worldwide, and 
not only kept this indicator for all regions, but adopted guidelines that prohibit any clarification of indicators 
by enumerators, to avoid any variation between countries (at least this is the intent, if not the result). The 
problem (and this is not a minor one) is that “operating licenses” of this kind do not exist in all parts of the 
world (though they exist in much of Africa, in addition to Latin America). Notably, they rarely exist in Europe 
(both inside and outside of the EU), with the exception of Greece (where they are not fully universal, but close 
to it). Nor do they exist in the Former Soviet Union, for instance. This does not prevent the surveys from asking 
the questions, recording responses, and then does not prevent research articles or reports from analysing this 
data. It is likely that either translators in each country will give a different meaning (one that “seems to make 
sense”), or each respondent will answer based on whatever s/he assumes to be meant (probably taking 
whichever license he has recently obtained for a particular activity – but not all businesses obtain licenses, so 
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many respondents must answer based on their experience with other procedures). This introduces major 
scope for data errors. 
Second, several countries show massive increases in the “senior management time spent dealing with 
government regulation” over time, particularly in the 2009 survey. Again, this happens without any known 
event or change which could be a credible explanation. On the contrary, in most countries affected by this 
increase, important regulatory simplification reforms took place. Even assuming very imperfect 
implementation of these reforms, a radical worsening of this kind is surprising, and is more likely to indicate 
low reliability of the indicator. Indeed, the question is difficult to answer reliably for many respondents. It 
could also reflect the effects of an unreliably low sample size. For instance Armenia sees this indicator triple 
from 2005 to 2009, and Tajikistan is also close to tripling, as well as Latvia, Slovenia. In Lithuania, there is first 
an increase (by a factor of 5) from 2002 to 2004, then a decrease (by the same factor), then a doubling. Such 
variations suggest that the indicator is essentially random (i.e. respondents answer “whatever comes to 
mind”).  
Finally, “number of visits or required meetings with tax officials” is an indicator that could be useful for our 
purpose (as a partial proxy for “inspections”). Unfortunately, the quality of this indicator is doubtful. For 
Tajikistan, it shows a very rapid decrease that is not confirmed through any of the other available surveys 
(which have larger sample sizes and a narrower focus on the topic). In addition, the reported number of 
interactions in Tajikistan is several times lower than only the number of inspections (as measured by the more 
detailed World Bank Group surveys we presented earlier, which had a far larger sample size and more 
“intensive” quality control), without even counting the many visits to the tax authorities needed to file for 
many taxes there. In Kyrgzystan, the scope of the decrease appears far larger than what other available data, 
as well as the contents of reforms, would suggest.  
 
A final look at another part of the Enterprise Survey data (infrastructure, including access and quality) will 
allow us to further justify our refusal to engage in complex statistical analysis on the basis of any of this data, 
and to consider all “subjective” questions (asking respondents to rate the importance of a problem) with the 
utmost caution. Looking at the questions on infrastructure indeed allows to compare such ratings with easily 
observable, objective reality on infrastructure quality in different countries. 
 
Enterprise survey data on infrastructure – reality and opinion 




Percent of firms 
identifying 
electricity as a 
major 
constraint 
Percent of firms 
identifying 
transportation as a 
major constraint 
Armenia 2002 2,5 13,1 10,4 
Armenia 2005 2,5 3,1 10,2 
Armenia 2009 16,3 24,9 26,3 
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Germany 2005 3,2 1,0 1,6 
Spain 2005 9,3 8,3 10,8 
Kyrgyz Republic 2002 3,5 1,7 1,7 
Kyrgyz Republic 2003 22,1 4,0 3,0 
Kyrgyz Republic 2005 14,1 1,3 1,3 
Kyrgyz Republic 2009 25,2 58,0 30,9 
Slovenia 2002 9,6 0,8 0,0 
Slovenia 2005 12,7 2,3 0,8 
Slovenia 2009 60,8 23,3 12,3 
Tajikistan 2002 12,5 15,0 3,8 
Tajikistan 2003 11,6 22,1 5,2 
Tajikistan 2005 5,3 10,8 2,2 
Tajikistan 2008 28,3 39,2 22,9 
Source – World Bank Group Enterprise Surveys for the years indicated 
 
Once again, the data appears plagued by two combined problems: unreliability of data in terms of internal 
consistency (suggesting problems with data quality), and unreliability of “identification as a major constraint” 
questions as an indicator of the actual situation for businesses. Looking at a few examples makes it clear. 
As a first problem, we see wild swings in the days needed to obtain an electrical connection in Tajikistan from 
one year to the next, again not related to any known change in the system and practices, suggest that the 
number of respondents is too low, or some outliers or data entry errors cause the average (mean) value to 
increase or decrease without reflecting the “actual average” in reality. The massive increases in days needed 
for such a connection in Armenia and Slovenia also appear difficult to explain. Since systematic checks of 
outliers are not necessarily undertaken by contractors, these may be enumerators’ errors, data entry errors, 
or whatever else. 
A second illustration can be seen on transportation. In practical terms, transportation in Tajikistan is a major 
issue (lack of paved roads and/or horrendous conditions of said roads, very limited rail links to the outside, 
rare international flights etc.) – but only 2-5% of respondents in 2002-2005 rated it as a “major constraint”. 
While real improvements (however limited) took place after 2005, the percentage suddenly jumped by a factor 
of 10 (to nearly 23%). This suggests that people respond to such questions based on the salience of various 
issues for them at a given time, their expectations, their points of comparison (or lack thereof), possibly the 
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order of questions, etc. A roughly similar comment can be made for data on Kyrgyzstan and Armenia, which 
clearly understates the extent to which transportation is a problem in these countries. In the same vein, in 
2005, nearly 11% of respondents in Spain rated transportation a major constraint – which is far more than in 
landlocked Tajikistan and Kyrgyzstan, more even than in Armenia. While this may correspond in some cases 
to different propensities to trade beyond an enterprise’s home city (if no trade is undertaken beyond a few 
kilometres, transportation may indeed not be a “constraint”), it is nonetheless clear that these responses do 
not in any meaningful way reflect the objective situation in terms of quality of transport infrastructure, 
transportation times etc. As a result, such data is quite simply irrelevant when one tries to determine the 
“picture” for a given country in terms of constraints for economic development. 
 
Considering these major flaws in available data (and the Enterprise Surveys are most likely not worse than 
most other “global” datasets – the easy accessibility of the detailed data just makes it easy to point out the 
problems), we have decided not to attempt any statistical analysis – regressions and any other tools pointing 
to correlation (or lack thereof), and more complex tools to try and isolate specific factors and causal links. We 
simply believe that such analysis would be close to meaningless considering the unreliability of the data, 
whether caused by poor data quality (insufficient samples, lack of data verification and cleaning etc.), 
excessively complex questions (to which respondents cannot reliably answer because they assume a level of 
knowledge they do not have, e.g. when asked about percentage of their time spent on something in a given 
year), or “inherently unreliable” questions (where people are asked to rate “major constraint”, which will be 
answered based on salience of experience, which is not what is relevant to analyse the situation in the 
country). 
We have, rather, chosen to limit ourselves to observing aggregate, country-level trends. We believe that the 
results thus achieved are clearly limited in terms of establishing correlations or causations, but that they are 
more solid in the sense that they are not built on fragile data. We have indeed chosen to rely only on surveys 
where we had a reasonably high level of confidence in the data quality, and within these surveys only on 
questions where the objectivity and straightforwardness of questions minimized the risk of bias or error. We 
have also taken official (inspectorates, Eurostat etc.) data, again selecting only those sources and indicators 
that were most reliable. In the way we used this data, we have avoided attempting to conduct statistical 
correlation or other analysis, but rather looked at high level, aggregate comparisons. Because they all leaned 
in the same direction, and in spite of the limitations of the approach, we hope these case studies have shed 
some light on the relative effects of different inspections and enforcement approaches, and indicated some 






As suggested in our introduction, we have attempted throughout this research to try and bridge the gap 
between “theory” and “practice” perspectives, i.e. to bring together perspectives issued from decades of 
research on enforcement methods, compliance drivers and risk regulation – with knowledge, experience and 
data coming from practitioners of regulation and regulatory reform.  
We set out to investigate whether risk-based approaches to inspections, and more broadly what one could 
call “smarter” approaches to inspections and enforcement, appeared to live up to their promises – namely a 
“win-win” result of higher effectiveness (or at least constant effectiveness with reduced costs and burden), 
higher efficiency, and better economic results. In so doing, we also sought to validate the consideration of 
inspections as a specific and distinct object, to present some of the main variations in inspections practices, 
and to define more precisely what risk-based, “smarter” inspections consisted of – and what exactly was to 
be understood under the word “risk”. We also intended to look at the issue of trust (between market actors, 
in the regulatory system), and the extent to which different inspection methods may influence the trust level. 
Finally, we intended to look into the question of outcomes – how they are defined and measured, how 
differently formulated goals may influence actions and results, and what measurement challenges exist in 
order to assess the impact of inspection practices. 
 
5.1. Testing our hypotheses 
If we now consider our three main hypotheses, there are grounds to consider them validated to a significant 
extent. First, that inspections are a distinct object with their own range of effects, distinct from that of the 
regulations they aim at implementing, appears strongly demonstrated. This stems both by the historical 
perspective, which shows the specificity of the institutional development of inspections, independently from 
regulations, but also by the comparative perspectives, where jurisdictions with similar legislation (e.g. EU 
countries on food safety) have very different situations and results linked at least in part to different 
inspections and enforcement methods.  
Second, risk is an important instrument to define goals and indicators, allocate resources, select priorities, 
decide on proportionate enforcement measures – but it is also a word fraught with polysemy, and a 
phenomenon that gives rise to conflicting perceptions. The effective implementation of risk-based approaches 
in inspections and enforcement requires an adequate definition of risk (combining not only probability of 
hazard, but its potential magnitude), as well as data to ground planning and prioritization of actions. It also 
requires an enabling legal environment, which is sometimes problematic, and a political environment that 
likewise allows it, and does not impose a risk-averse approach. We have seen that, while there appears to be 
a strong justification for enabling risk-based discretion, forces that push towards risk-aversion are strong, and 
risk-assessment is sometimes difficult (uncertainty, lack of data), and/or conflicts with common perceptions. 
Third, to the extent that data is available and can be relied upon, and leaving aside for a moment the question 
of causality and attribution, there exists some preliminary evidence that risk-based inspections practices 
produce better outcomes than other approaches, and that lower inspection numbers and more supportive 
enforcement practices do not lead to worse compliance levels, but rather (if done in the context of better 
targeting, “smarter” enforcement, more guidance etc.) to better safety levels (at least in some cases). The 
difficulty, however, is that data is far from sufficient to deliver strong evidence and very robust findings. 
Detailed, firm-level data is difficult to access, unavailable in many cases, frequently unreliable. Aggregate data 
is not always of high quality, and presents attribution issues. In addition, the question of economic impact is 




5.2. The case for risk-based inspections 
Considering one of the most striking cases that we reviewed (occupational safety and health inspections and 
safety levels compared in Britain and Germany, and – with less detailed data – in France), it appears that the 
British HSE has long been conducting less inspections, putting more emphasis on risk-management and 
compliance-promotion, and achieved considerably better results than comparator countries. If comparing 
with Germany (where data is more detailed), Britain has been having consistently several times less frequent 
inspections and overall better outcomes (though Germany has been catching up). If comparing with France, 
safety in Britain is far higher, and so appears to be the overall trust in the system and trust between the 
different stakeholders (though this is based on non-quantitative evidence, the level of conflict around labour 
inspections in France is very high, with police protection regularly necessary, while effectiveness is clearly in 
question).  
Of course, none of these findings is fully “robust” – cases were not randomly selected but picked because of 
data availability and knowledge about the different systems, labour inspections in France (and to some extent 
in Germany) check also other issues than OSH, we did not consider other safety indicators than fatal accidents 
(because they are known to be less reliable and/or, for occupational diseases, have a very strong time-lag), 
and the differences in performance may have a variety of causes. In addition, data on the economic impact of 
inspections is limited, so we had to use the number of inspections as a simple proxy (though Britain also has 
inspections that are far more “supportive” of businesses, guidance-oriented, and not only less frequent, thus 
there is a strong likelihood that they indeed create far less economic burden). Overall, the case is strong in 
favour of more risk-based and “smarter” inspections, but it is not without flaws in terms of data. 
 
5.3. Challenges with data, and methods 
What can be hoped for is that, this research having established with some level of evidence that the inspection 
issue is worthy of specific study, and that certain aspects deserve particular attention (targeting and 
enforcement models, safety outcomes etc.), there could be successive research undertakings focusing on 
specific inspection functions and jurisdictions, and attempting to use firm-level data to investigate correlations 
and possible causations in a more quantitative way. There would, however, be significant challenges in strict 
data-based investigations. First, firm-level data may be impossible to obtain (confidentiality or faulty 
information systems), and/or may require significant resources to conduct ad hoc surveys. Second, as we have 
attempted to show, there may be substantial problems with the quality of data, and with the interpretation 
of answers to surveys.  
Overall, it is not certain that attempting to conduct such studies would be the best way to increase knowledge 
and understanding of the field. Were more governments to conduct representative business surveys assessing 
overall coverage and burden from inspections, as well as collecting some key “qualitative” data, and were 
more researchers to consolidated available data from inspectorates, our collective understanding of 
inspection activities would already greatly increase. If, in combination, more governments were to conduct 
surveys allowing to test the situation in terms of key public welfare outcomes (safety levels, prevalence of 
certain diseases, etc.), our knowledge of outcomes would be far greater than it is now. Even absent such 
additional resources and surveys, a deeper look at existing data sources (e.g. epidemiological) could allow to 
better assess the relative performance of different jurisdictions. Thus, rather than a focus on firm-level data 
research (which, as we have seen, seems to produce conflicting results, for a number of reasons), the field 
may be better served by more investigation of existing (consolidated) data at the level of entire jurisdictions 
and agencies, at least in a first phase. It is not clear, given the state of social sciences research and the issues 
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posed by data concerning complex social phenomena, that studies based on statistical analysis of correlations 
(and on testing causal models) would necessarily produce more useful results691. 
 
5.4. Limits and downsides of inspections 
We think that this research at least shows the relevance of investigations of inspection practices and their 
effects, purported and real, challenging assumptions and “established wisdom”. Indeed, the default 
assumption is still too often that more means better (and that stricter also means better). In reality, on the 
contrary, the effect of inspections is far from obvious. If we consider historical developments, the Netherlands 
set up a labour inspectorate only decades after France, Germany or Britain – it would be interesting to see 
whether the evolution of occupational-related deaths and injuries was markedly different or not. Indeed, 
available data suggests that improvements in such indicators took place regularly in the United States long 
before inspectorates were created. Likewise, major improvements occurred in food safety even at times when 
inspections were few and far between, conducted with methods and techniques that would not be considered 
adequate today. Improved technologies, better science, social movements, prevailing cultural norms etc. were 
all major drivers of these changes. How much of a role regulations and inspections play is still difficult to assess, 
but it may not be as much as some of their staunchest advocates claim.  
The string of factory disasters in Bangladesh (and other countries of Southern and South-East Asia), which had 
as its most salient tragedy the Rana Plaza collapse692 killing upwards of 1,100 people, illustrates the limits of 
inspections and enforcement. Even though the international outcry following it included many voices calling 
for more stringent inspections and enforcement, a closer investigation of the events leading to the building’s 
collapse suggested this was not as easy (or as certain to produce results) as it sounded.693 Indeed, inspectors 
had in fact responded to calls by workers that warned about the building being structurally unsafe, and 
ordered its closing, but their orders were simply disregarded by the owners. Thus, the disaster (and its causes) 
pointed to far more structural issues: weak rule of law (particularly for certain categories of powerful people), 
deep social inequality in terms of enforcement of legal rights, prevailing social norms among factory owners 
etc. Better targeted inspections and stronger powers for inspectors may be part of the solution, but they were 
(and are) far from certain to be sufficient. 
                                                           
691 From our perspective, the current (disputed) “replication crisis” in social sciences reflects a number of issues, including less-than-
optimal methods in a number of cases (bias against “null effect” reporting, excessively small samples, manipulation of samples to 
achieve statistical significance etc.), but is also likely to reflect the sheer complexity of the phenomena being studied, for which the 
variables measured may be inadequate proxies, and the difficulty to have reliable answers (or reliable interpretation of answers) on 
complex human behaviours and affects, when conducting surveys. We have already referred to the Open Science Collaboration (2015). 
Many other scholars have weighed in regarding replicability in psychology (and particularly social psychology). Pashler and 
Wagenmakers (2012) wrote that: “replicability problems will not be so easily overcome, as they reflect deep-seated human biases and 
well entrenched incentives that shape the behavior of individuals and institutions. Nevertheless, the problems are surely not 
insurmountable” (p. 529). Stroebe and Strack (2014) dispute the idea of a “crisis”. For them, “because experiments are typically 
conducted with the aim of testing a theoretical hypothesis, the important question is not whether the original finding can be duplicated 
but whether it constituted a rigorous test of the postulated mechanism” (p. 62). In other words, if the original experiment was a poor 
test of the theory, replicating it will not give further “proof” of the theory – and not replicating it will not invalidate the theory either. 
Gilbert et al. (2016) have also challenged the Open Science Collaboration paper and findings, and write that they “did not take into 
account the multiple sources of error in their data, used a relatively low-powered design that demonstrably underestimates the true 
rate of replication, and permitted considerable infidelities that almost certainly biased their replication studies toward failure”. Our 
tentative conclusion would be that, given the very high complexity of the interactions studied in the field of inspections, the very high 
chances for flaws in data or differences making replication impossible, the many ways in which design can have flaws that make the 
study inadequate to test the theory, this may simply not be the most productive approach, and a more modest approach using 
aggregate data and qualitative approaches may be more fruitful. 
692 See Wikipedia article: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2013_Savar_building_collapse for a summary and sources 
693 Source: unpublished World Bank Group assessment in which the author was involved. 
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Increased inspections and “tough” enforcement may thus be neither strictly necessary to secure safety 
improvements, nor always effective at doing so either. They may in addition be harmful, if misguided because 
of a political “knee-jerk” reaction to a (real or purported) scandal. A recent illustration of what has been called 
in the Netherlands the “risk regulation reflex” can be seen in the nail salon “scandal” and its aftermath in New 
York City.694 After the original reporting (by the New York Times) claimed rampant abuses, exploitation and 
unsafe working conditions, the City and the Governor responded with stepped up inspections and new 
regulations. These led to a significantly negative impact on businesses and their workers (closed salons, lost 
jobs), whereas further reporting a few months on showed the original report to have been nearly fully wrong 
(misrepresented facts, translation problems, exaggerations etc. led to its having little in common with reality). 
This is just an illustration of the fact that inspections are not a purely benign instrument – they can fail at their 
stated purpose, and they can also create actual harm. As such, their use needs to be carefully thought through. 
 
5.5. Inspections and trust 
To a significant extent, and this echoes one of our opening questions, an essential role of inspections and 
enforcement appears to create trust, and this may be the way in which their most positive effects are achieved 
– but even in this respect the risk of “overshooting” also exists. “Credible” inspections and enforcement are 
expected and requested by different groups of market participants and act for them as a guarantee that others 
will abide by the rules, and thus give them the appropriate assurance that they can engage in market 
interactions without excessive risk taking. In this respect, inspections and enforcement create a “floor” of 
confidence, and a risk-mitigation mechanism. They are also an important driver of compliance not only or even 
mostly through deterrence, but by reinforcing voluntary compliance: those who comply voluntarily have the 
confidence that the rules of the game are enforced and that those who are trying to undercut them through 
non-compliance do not have free rein. Credible inspections and enforcement reinforce the expectation of 
compliance, and thus increase trust among businesses (towards suppliers and buyers), workers (towards 
employers), consumers (towards sellers) etc. In an optimal situation, it reduces the reliance on litigation, 
reduces uncertainty, thus decreases costs and ends up having a positive economic and social impact. 
There are however limits to the use of inspections to create trust. One of the earliest uses of regulations and 
inspections, as we have seen, has been to establish and enforce weights and measures, which in turn enable 
trade by simplifying transactions and reducing the risk for buyers695. This has early on started to evolve towards 
regulations and inspections covering the quality of goods, such as we have seen with the French Inspection 
des Manufactures. Such “quality inspections” are not, however, without problems in a market economy 
context. Defining quality is a very difficult proposition, at least when it goes beyond the definition of what a 
particular name should correspond to, and attempts to step into coercing sellers to provide only “good quality” 
wares. For instance, defining what can be called “olive oil” and what should only be called “vegetable oil”, or 
what can be called “chocolate” and what should only be called “confectionary with cocoa” is a relatively 
narrow intervention, and can be grounded on clear norms, botanic and chemical definitions etc. By contrast, 
who is to determine (and how) whether garments, furniture or any other wares (or services) are of “adequate 
                                                           
694 See successive reporting by: the New York Times, exposing the “scandal” (May 2015) 
http://www.nytimes.com/2015/05/10/nyregion/at-nail-salons-in-nyc-manicurists-are-underpaid-and-unprotected.html?_r=0 – the 
New York Review of Books, exposing factual errors (July 2015) http://www.nybooks.com/daily/2015/07/25/nail-salons-new-york-
times-got-wrong/, and Reason followed by the New York Post fully deconstructing the original reporting, and showing the strong 
negative consequences it produced (October-November 2015) http://reason.com/blog/2015/10/27/new-york-times-nail-salon-
unvarnished - http://reason.com/blog/2015/11/10/new-york-times-nail-salons-ron-kim - http://nypost.com/2015/11/03/the-new-
york-times-refuses-to-face-facts-on-its-bogus-nail-salon-expose/  
695 This function is also important for other regulatory instruments such as licensing, certification or registration – cf. Kleiner 2006. 
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quality”? If such powers are given to inspectors, there is a real risk of abuse, decisions that are not grounded 
in clear requirements, excessive market restrictions, and plain and simple waste of resources.696  
 
5.6. Closing remarks and questions 
It is clear, thus, that this research’s conclusion opens more questions than it gives answers. We hope to have 
shown that inspection institutions and practices, and their evolution and variations, are important objects that 
deserve to be researched and considered independently rather than simply amalgamated into “regulation” or 
“law enforcement”. There is evidence that the effect of inspections is ambiguous and can be positive (on trust, 
on compliance, and to a somewhat unclear extent on safety and other public welfare outcomes), but also 
negative (on economic activity, employment, and also on trust and compliance if inspection practices are 
poor).  
There is also evidence that risk-based approaches to inspections planning and implementation, and to 
enforcement decisions, seem to produce better results both in terms of safety, compliance and other targeted 
outcomes – but also in economic terms. The role of “risk” appears particularly central, with risk-averse 
reactions tending to produce poor regulatory outcomes, but an adequate understanding and management of 
risk seeming essential to balance different priorities and improve results. As the instrument allowing to assess 
priorities and to decide on what action to take and which resources to allocate, risk can be seen as the 
“currency of regulation”697, i.e. the common unit that allows to “trade” between different priorities.  
Specifically, risk-focused and risk-proportionate inspections and enforcement, combined with an approach 
that seeks to promote compliance by drawing on all its drivers rather than a narrow deterrence angle, can 
result in significantly improved public welfare. It also appears that such approaches work best when they 
combine:  
- High level of professionalism and skills, not only in the narrow technical sense but encompassing a variety 
of competences (relations with businesses, risk management etc.);  
- Balanced risk assessment methodology combining intrinsic risk with compliance history and confidence in 
management – supported by data and information technology to effectively target inspections and 
manage follow-up actions; 
- Responsive and risk-proportionate enforcement, where the emphasis is on achieving increased 
compliance overall rather than symbolic punishment (even if the latter can be used in some cases); 
- Active efforts to promote compliance through clear and reliable guidance, advice etc.; 
- Transparency in methods, criteria, processes, decisions, combined with giving a real “voice” to duty 
holders, so as to maximize the sense of procedural justice and resulting legitimacy. 
Such approaches can only be fully established in a context of agreement about goals, i.e. consensus that the 
primary objective of inspections is to achieve reduced risks and/or improved public welfare (in particular 
through an increase in compliance with specific regulations, but not only). In the absence of such consensus, 
e.g. for instance when the primary objective is seen as identifying and punishing violations, this combination 
of elements will be impossible (even if, for instance, targeting of visits is “risk based”) and the results will 
unavoidably be different. Hodges (2015) has shown how there can be a very direct tension between achieving 
increased safety results and “punishing violations” (see e.g. the case of aviation safety pp. 326-329, where the 
                                                           
696 See e.g. the case of Lithuania’s Non-Food Products Inspectorate, which is forced by poorly-worded legislation and ingrained 
practices to conduct inspections upon consumer complaints, even when no legal norm has been infringed, i.e. pure “quality” 
inspections. These mostly relate to trivial issues, and have little results, but waste considerable resources for the inspectorate (and for 
businesses). See OECD (2015) pp. 132-134. 
697 This expression courtesy of Graham Russell, Director, UK Better Regulation Delivery Office 
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promotion of what is called as a “just culture” where reporting safety incidents is incentivized cannot, by 
definition, be done in a context of systematic punishment of violations). 
Finally, there is a complex set of activities that are directly connected to inspections and enforcement tasks 
and institutions, but are distinct from inspections stricto sensu, such as provision of information and guidance. 
We have deliberately included some coverage of these in this research, as it is indispensable to properly assess 
inspectorates’ activities and effectiveness, but a better word than “inspections and enforcement” may be 
needed to designate this field and this set of activities and institutions. In the United Kingdom, the expression 
“regulatory delivery”698 has been adopted for this purpose – which also includes other regulatory instruments 
such as permits or licenses. Researching not only how inspections and enforcement are organized and 
conducted, but also in what broader “regulatory delivery” system they fit, and how different “regulatory 
delivery” models perform, also seem like important areas of future research. 
Just as the field of inspections research as such, and particularly from a comparative context, is still relatively 
new (even though some very important works were written several decades ago, the “field” as such only 
emerged gradually over the last decade and a half699), policy interventions specifically targeting inspections 
are also relatively recent. Considering more thoroughly the different reform experiments700, the different 
practices and their impacts, is clearly needed. We hope to have provided here some first elements that allow 
to show the relevance of such research, and to point at some directions it could take.  
In addition, the question of methods to promote, support and verify compliance is important also for other 
areas of legislation – for instance the implementation of EU legislation by Member States701, but also the 
“delivery” of legislation and rules applying to private citizens. Just as this research has drawn considerably 
from research originally focused on interactions between “law enforcement” (judiciary and police) and 
citizens, there is considerable potential for findings from studies of regulatory inspections and enforcement 
having relevance in other fields. 
As a final word we hope that, in spite of its many limitations, this work will have shown the importance of 
challenging assumptions and beliefs when it comes to inspections and enforcement, and that there is a real 
possibility of “doing things better”, in a way that benefits all stakeholders. In this respect, spreading what we 
already know is maybe as important as conducting further research to increase our knowledge, or test its 
limits. 
  
                                                           
698 See the webpage of the UK’s Better Regulation Delivery Office - https://www.gov.uk/government/organisations/better-regulation-
delivery-office/about  
699 With “official recognition” internationally being achieved inter alia through the publication of the OECD’s Principles (2014) 
700 As presented e.g. in Blanc 2012 
701 See Voermans 2015 
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Note on sources 
 
To the extent possible, we have attempted to reference published sources to as to allow readers to cross-
check our statements or to look for further details and information. This we have done even in cases where 
we had first-hand information or data on the issue, always preferring to refer to the published version. In the 
course of our work on inspections, however, we have had many opportunities to obtain first-hand insights 
into structures, practices, approaches, mind-sets etc. that are not reflected in any publication. This was not, 
however, typically collected as part of “research field-work” but as part of our work as a project manager or 
technical expert for inspections reform projects implemented by the World Bank Group, or during discussions 
with colleagues working on inspections issues (as inspectors or reformers) in various countries, but always in 
a professional capacity. In some countries, in spite of not being present “on site”, we participated in online 
discussions and had access to unpublished reports. As a result of the vast number of these meetings and 
interactions, listing all of them or giving all of the dates would be not only tedious but impossible. We only, 
for the reader’s information, give a short summary of our main direct interactions with government officials 
in charge of inspections below, including countries, years of involvement or interaction, and short comments 
on the frequency, as well as on the profiles of officials involved. 
Country Dates Interactions 
Armenia 2008-2016 Frequent, on site and remote– political, senior management, operational  
Azerbaijan 2009-2010 Repeated, on site and remote– senior management 
Bangladesh 2013 Occasional – remote work with World Bank Group staff and experts 
Belarus 2009-2012 Occasional – remote work with World Bank Group staff and experts 
Bosnia 2008-2009 One-off on site visit (senior management) and remote exchanges 
Cambodia 2011-2013 Repeated, on site and remote – political, senior management, operational 
Colombia 2008 One-off on site visits – operational/management 
Côte d’Ivoire 2014-2016 Occasional, on site and remote – senior management, operational 
France 2012-2014 Occasional, on site – political and senior management 
Georgia 2014 One-off on site visit – senior management 
Greece 2014-2016 Frequent, on site and remote– political, senior management, operational 
Guinea 2012 One-off on site visit – senior management 
India 2013 Occasional – remote work with World Bank Group staff and experts 
Italy 2012-2016 Repeated, on site and remote – senior management 
Kenya 2010-2012 Repeated, on site and remote – senior management and operational 
Kyrgyzstan 2008-2016 Repeated, on site and remote – senior management and operational 
Latvia 2004-2008 Three visits (senior management and operational levels) + remote exchanges 
Liberia 2012-2014 Occasional – remote work with World Bank Group staff and experts 
Lithuania 2011-2016 Frequent, on site and remote – political, senior management, operational 
Mongolia 2008-2016 Frequent, on site and remote– political, senior management, operational 
Nepal 2013 Occasional – remote work with World Bank Group staff and experts 
Netherlands 2008-2016 Repeated, on site and remote– senior management, operational 
Peru 2011-2014 Occasional – remote work with World Bank Group staff and experts 
Poland 2008 One-off on site visit – operational/management 
Slovenia 2012-2014 Occasional remote – one-off on-site visit (senior management) 
Tajikistan 2004-2015 Frequent, on site and remote– political, senior management, operational 
Ukraine 2006-2010 Frequent, on site and remote– political, senior management, operational 
United Kingdom 2010-2016 Frequent remote, occasional on-site – senior management, operational 






Regulations edicted by governments to govern certain aspects of economic activities have existed for 
thousands of years, but have rapidly increased in number and expanded in scope and complexity over the past 
century and a half, with an acceleration in the last few decades. Given that these regulations generally have 
significant utilitarian goals (and often symbolic ones as well), it is not surprising that governments have also 
increasingly developed instruments to control and increase compliance with these rules: inspections and 
enforcement, generally conducted by specialized structures created (or transformed) for this purpose. Such 
regulatory inspections (and the institutions that conduct them) have not, however, appeared everywhere and 
in every area at the same time, nor have they developed in identical ways and at identical pace. There are 
considerable differences in history, structures, resources, and methods – both between countries, and within 
a given country between different regulatory domains. 
Whether, and to what extent, these efforts at making businesses or citizens comply with regulations have 
been successful is also a complex issue. In most countries, outcomes in terms of health and safety have 
improved, but it is hard to tell how much is owed to increasing prosperity, and how much to regulatory 
compliance – or how much compliance owes to increased resources, skills and a changing society, and how 
much to enforcement efforts. 
In recent years, following on concerns about “regulatory burden” and efforts to achieve “better” or “smarter” 
regulation, attention has also turned to inspections and enforcement. Government reform programmes have 
been launched, national and international institutions have developed guidance documents, and research has 
been done on whether, and how, inspections and enforcement could be made more effective, more efficient 
(less costly and/or burdensome), or both. Strong claims have been made that adopting risk-based approaches, 
i.e. focusing control efforts on establishments and issues presenting the highest risks, and taking enforcement 
decisions on the basis of risk, would reduce burden and costs, and increase effectiveness.  
In spite of this, there is so far no conclusive body of evidence on the extent to which these claims are realised, 
and also no universally accepted understanding of what these “smarter” inspections would entail. There have 
been, in recent years, some important efforts to compare inspection practices and risk-based regulation 
between different countries, but generally not trying to look at effectiveness issues. Conversely, studies that 
have tried to look at compliance or effectiveness effects have rarely taken a comparative perspective. 
Academic literature on compliance also often remains divided between conflicting perspectives, emphasizing 
e.g. deterrence or voluntary compliance as primary drivers. Even though a number of scholars have developed 
more balanced, complex models of compliance, these are not always widely used by either academics or 
practitioners of regulation. 
This research first considers the question of what exactly “smart inspection” practices, based on risk-based 
inspections, risk-proportionate enforcement, but also including efforts to promote compliance through other 
(“softer”) measures, consist of. It seeks to examine the history of their development, and considers their 
theoretical underpinnings, as well as their legitimacy to the extent that they rely on a specific way of openly 
embracing organized regulatory discretion. Finally, and possibly most importantly, it attempts to look at 
whether evidence can be found regarding the effectiveness of such “smarter” approaches, and how it 
compares to other inspection methods which are not (or less) risk-based, and take less of a responsive 




Consideration of the history of the development of inspection institutions and practices focuses on several 
cases – food safety and occupational safety and health (OSH) in Britain and the US, as well as France, Germany, 
the Netherlands, and the EU as a whole (for food safety).  
The cases were selected for a combination of reasons: food safety and OSH were among the very first 
regulatory areas where inspectorates were created, they remain among the most high-profile and strongly 
resourced ones, and the countries considered were generally among the first to set up such institutions, 
among the most important economies of the period considered, and/or offer interesting contrasts in terms of 
trajectories and approaches.  
This historical review leads to several findings, in particular that the creation and development of inspection 
structures and practices is generally linked more to risk perceptions than to scientific risk assessment, that 
path dependency plays an important role in determining today’s setups and approaches in various regulatory 
fields and countries, and that some countries (and the EU, in food safety) have increasingly embraced risk-
based approaches in inspections, while others remained (for a variety of reasons) more reluctant to do so. 
 
The literature review covered several aspects: general perspectives on regulation and regulatory instruments, 
as well as their economic consequences, explanatory models for regulatory compliance, perspectives on 
regulatory discretion, and risk-based regulation.  
Fundamental works on regulation and rules, including by the likes of Ogus, Diver or Baldwin, show the 
impossibility of achieving perfect rules, and the trade-offs that have to be accepted when chosing between 
more specifications-based or more outcomes-based norms, between more certainty and more flexibility. 
These lead to emphasize the importance of the enforcement stage.  
Research on the economic consequences of regulation is complex, and often inconclusive. Porter and others 
have shown that, in some cases at least, higher regulatory requirements can actually go along with increased 
competitiveness. Rodrik, Djankov and many others have, however, concluded that poorly administered 
regulations, burdensome procedures, arbitrary enforcement etc. could have significant negative 
consequences – showing once more the importance of how regulations are “delivered”. 
Very different models of regulatory compliance have been put forward – from those focusing on deterrence 
and rational calculations (Becker), to far more complex models emphasizing procedural justice and legitimacy, 
but incorporating several other factors (Tyler, Lind). Experimental results tend to produce diverging results in 
a number of cases, but the complementarity of compliance drivers seems to be the most convincing 
perspective: capacity to comply (knowledge, finances) is fundamental, social conformity and legitimacy are 
strong drivers, and deterrence (rational calculations) is a driver of generally lower strength than conformity 
and legitimacy but can play a strong role for some people or companies, and/or in some circumstances (as not 
all rules are viewed in the same way by all people). This shows the importance of a balanced approach to 
enforcement –  and a risk-focused one, to avoid pushing those who would willingly comply towards resistance, 
and to improve procedural justice as well (as criteria for decisions are made clearer). 
Perspectives on the legitimacy of executive and prosecutorial (and, by extension, regulatory) discretion are 
highly conflicting – and, in addition, differ according to legal traditions. At least in the Common Law and 
Roman-French traditions, however, there is overall a strong deference to the opportunity principle, which 
offers room for regulators to adopt a responsive approach to enforcement, in line with a broader risk-based 
framework. Thus, while such discretion is not unproblematic, there is at least a significant body of legal writing 
and case law to support it. 
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Finally, risk and regulation research points both at the relevance of the issue, and at the very different ways in 
which risk is defined and managed. While some authors (e.g. Black and Baldwin) also point out the challenges 
existing in terms of having sufficient information for proper risk-based planning, practice suggests that, for a 
number of inspection functions, this challenge should not be overstated.  
Overall, the literature review points both at the importance of the inspections and enforcement stage, at the 
need to have an approach that covers all compliance drivers in a balanced way, and at the crucial and complex 
role of discretion. It also shows that there are different understandings of risk, and that the meanings that 
have been used by some researchers differ significantly from what is commonly accepted e.g. by the OECD or 
government-level institutions – which may explain some apparently disappointing research findings. 
 
Case studies form the last part of the research, and allow to try and test the hypotheses and look for an answer 
to the research question. The first (and most detailed) case study looks at OSH inspections in Britain and 
Germany (building in part on previous research by Tilindyte). The second considers inspections in countries of 
the Former Soviet Union, how they compare to practices in OECD/EU countries, and what have been the 
results of efforts to reform them in a more risk-based direction. The last one looks in a shorter manner at a 
few EU countries and at some salient aspects of existing practices and reform efforts. The chapter then 
considers available data and whether it could allow to search for correlations between inspection practices 
and outcomes, and concludes that the quality of data would not allow for robust findings. 
The first case considers the evolution of OSH inspections in Britain in the past decade and a half, and compares 
the number of inspections, methods and outcomes with Germany. The case was selected because OSH is 
relatively unique among inspection functions in that at least one of the outcome indicators (fatal occupational 
accidents) has a high level of reliability and comparability. Harmonization of data by Eurostat makes it easy to 
compare. The case shows that British OSH inspections are strongly risk-focused, risk-proportionate and 
responsive in enforcement decisions, and also put a strong emphasis on guidance and compliance support. 
The data shows that whereas British OSH inspections are several times less frequent than German ones, 
outcomes are significantly better over the past 15 years and more. In addition, the frequency of inspections 
has gone down in both countries, but fatal accident rates have also gone down (more strongly so in Germany, 
where the level was far higher at the beginning). While this is not enough to prove that risk-based approaches 
caused this better performance, the case certainly suggests that they may have played a role, and in any case 
disproves the idea that more inspections would necessarily be correlated with better outcomes. 
The successive cases lead to the same findings. Data from surveys conducted by the World Bank Group in the 
Former Soviet Union shows typically very high levels of inspections coverage, without this resulting in any way 
in high levels of compliance or positive outcomes. Moreoever, reforms resulting in a very significant decrease 
in inspections numbers do not lead to any worsening of outcomes. On the contrary, countries that underwent 
significant reforms of inspections towards a more risk-based, compliance-promoting approach (e.g. Lithuania) 
also tend to have better outcomes. A brief consideration of OSH inspections in France reinforces the findings 
from the Britain-Germany comparison: France has vastly more frequent inspections than Britain, combined 
with a “zero tolerance” approach grounded in a view of compliance as purely deterrence-driven, and has 
outcomes that are significantly worse than the EU-28 average (whereas Britain has among the best, or the 
best results, depending on the year considered). Survey data on inspections in Italy shows that inspections 
there tend to target many times the same businesses, resulting in a high level of burden for around a third of 




In conclusion, and while the research has limitations that do not allow to produce decisive proof, there is a 
significant body of research and evidence that suggests that risk-focused inspections, risk-proportionate and 
responsive enforcement, and a balanced approach aiming at using all drivers of compliance does produce 
better results. In any case, the opposite idea to “smart inspections”, i.e. that any reduction in inspections 
numbers and reduced severity of enforcement would lead to lower compliance and worse results, appears to 
be clearly disproved. It is also clear that the issue lends itself to considerable follow-up research: deeper 
investigation of methods and outcomes, more systematic review of countries and regulatory areas, etc. 
Achieving more conclusive findings in terms of effectiveness of inspections and of specific approaches, 
however, may remain largely elusive given data limitations and the complexity of the phenomena studied. 
Focused experimental studies, if possible and adequately resourced, could alleviate the data quality problem 







Van de jacht op overtreders naar het beheersen van risico’s 
Achtergronden, uitdagingen en ontwikkelingen van toezicht en handhaving 
 
Overheidsregelgeving die aspecten van economische activiteiten regelt, bestaat al duizenden jaren. Het aantal 
regels is de laatste anderhalve eeuw echter snel toegenomen en de strekking en complexiteit ervan zijn 
veelomvattender, met een waarneembare tempoversnelling in de laatste decennia. Dit soort regels dient in 
het algemeen belangrijk geachte doelen vanuit een utilitaristisch en vaak ook symbolisch perspectief. Het is 
daarom niet verrassend dat overheden ook steeds meer instrumenten hebben ontwikkeld om naleving van 
deze regels te controleren en te vergroten. Toezicht en handhaving, in het algemeen uitgevoerd door 
gespecialiseerde structuren, zijn gecreëerd of aangepast voor dit doel. Inspecties en handhaving (en de 
instituties die ze uitvoeren) zijn echter niet overal en op elk gebied tot stand gekomen, noch hebben zij zich 
op identieke wijze en identieke snelheid ontwikkeld. Er zijn aanzienlijke verschillen in geschiedenis, structuren, 
middelen en methoden – zowel tussen landen als binnen een land tussen de verschillende domeinen van 
regelgeving.  
 
Of en in welke mate deze inspanningen om bedrijven en burgers te laten voldoen aan regelgeving succesvol 
geweest zijn, is een complexe kwestie. In de meeste landen zijn gezondheid en veiligheid verbeterd, maar het 
is moeilijk om te bepalen hoe veel daarvan te danken is aan toenemende welvaart en hoe veel aan naleving 
van regelgeving – of zelfs hoe veel van de regelnaleving te danken is aan toegenomen middelen, betere 
vaardigheden en een veranderende mentaliteit van de samenleving, en hoe veel aan 
handhavingsinspanningen zelf.  
 
Met de toename van het aantal regels bestaan er, de laatste decennia, ook toenemende zorgen over 
“regeldruk” en probeert men om “betere” of “slimmere” regelgeving te bereiken. Mede daardoor is recentelijk 
ook de aandacht voor toezicht en handhaving vergroot. Hervormingsprogramma’s zijn gelanceerd door 
overheden, nationale en internationale instituties hebben richtsnoeren ontwikkeld en onderzoek is uitgevoerd 
over of en hoe toezicht en handhaving effectiever of efficiënter (minder duur en/of belastend) gemaakt 
kunnen worden, of beiden. Er zijn ook stevige claims gemaakt voor een risicogestuurde aanpak, dat wil zeggen 
een aanpak waarbij de toezichtsinspanningen geconcentreerd worden op bedrijven en activiteiten met de 
hoogste risico’s, en waarbij handhavingsbeslissingen vervolgens genomen worden op basis van het risico, 
waardoor de lastendruk en kosten van regels verminderen en de effectiviteit van de regels wordt vergroot.  
 
Ondanks al deze inspanningen is er tot nu toe geen afdoende bewijsmateriaal om te kunnen bepalen in 
hoeverre die claims ook bewaarheid worden. Bij nadere beschouwing blijkt er zelfs geen alom geaccepteerd 
begrip van wat “slimmere” toezicht en handhaving precies inhouden. In de afgelopen jaren zijn er een aantal 
belangrijke initiatieven geweest om de praktijk van (al dan niet risicogestuurde) toezicht en handhaving te 
vergelijken tussen landen, maar in het algemeen werd hierbij niet gekeken naar effectiviteit. Omgekeerd 
hebben studies die hebben geprobeerd om te kijken naar de effecten van toezicht en handhaving zelden een 
(internationaal) vergelijkend perspectief. Academische literatuur over motieven voor regelnaleving kiest vaak 
voor een enkel perspectief, bijvoorbeeld door de nadruk te leggen op het effect van afschrikking of juist 
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vrijwillige naleving als primaire drijfveer. Ook al zijn door een aantal academici meer gebalanceerde, complexe 
modellen van motieven voor regelnaleving gemaakt, toch blijkt dat deze niet altijd worden gebruikt door zowel 
andere academici, als door beleidsmakers en -uitvoerders. 
 
Dit onderzoek beschouwt eerst de vraag wat “slimme” toezicht- en handhavingspraktijken, gebaseerd op 
risicogestuurde inspecties, risico-proportionele handhaving, maar ook inclusief inspanningen om naleving te 
bevorderen door andere (“zachtere”) maatregelen, inhouden. Het probeert als tweede de geschiedenis van 
die ontwikkelingen te onderzoeken en beschouwt hun theoretische onderbouwing, alsook hun legitimiteit 
voor zover ze vertrouwen op een specifieke manier van het openlijk omarmen van georganiseerde discretie in 
de uitvoering ervan. Tenslotte als derde, en misschien het belangrijkst, probeert het onderzoek te kijken naar 
de vraag of er bewijs kan worden gevonden voor een al dan niet hogere effectiviteit van zulke “slimmere” 
benaderingen, en hoe dat zich dan verhoudt tot andere (al dan niet klassiekere) inspectiemethoden die niet 
(of minder) risicogebaseerd zijn, en een minder responsieve aanpak hebben wat betreft handhaving.  
 
 
De analyse van de geschiedenis van de ontwikkeling van inspecties en handhavingspraktijken richt zich, in dit 
onderzoek, met name op twee verschillende casusdomeinen – voedselveiligheid en arbeidsveiligheid & 
arbeidsgezondheid – in de volgende landen: Groot-Brittannië en de VS (voor beide casusdomeinen) en 
Frankrijk, Duitsland, Nederland en de Europese Unie (voor voedselveiligheid). 
 
Deze domeinen en landen zijn geselecteerd vanwege een combinatie van redenen: voedselveiligheid en 
arbeidsveiligheid & arbeidsgezondheid behoorden tot de allereerste regelgevingsgebieden waarbij 
inspectiediensten werden gecreëerd. Zij blijven behoren tot de meest high-profile en van veel toezichts- en 
handhavingsmiddelen voorziene gebieden. De landen die beschouwd worden, behoren in het algemeen tot 
de eersten die zulke instituties opgezet hebben, behoren tot de meest belangrijke economieën van de 
betreffende periode, en/of bieden interessante contrasten in termen van trajecten en benaderingen. 
 
De historische analyse leidt tot verschillende bevindingen. Zo blijkt onder andere dat de opzet, inrichting en 
ontwikkeling van inspectiestructuren en -praktijken in het algemeen meer gekoppeld is aan risicopercepties 
dan aan wetenschappelijke risicobeoordeling. Ook padafhankelijkheid speelt een belangrijke rol bij het 
inrichten van arrangementen, opzetten instituties en ontwikkelen van benaderingen in verschillende 
regelgevingsdomeinen en landen. Daarnaast blijkt dat sommige landen (en de EU, voor voedselveiligheid) 
steeds meer een risicogestuurde benadering hebben omarmd ten behoeve van inspecties, terwijl anderen 
huiveriger lijken te zijn om dit te doen (om verschillende redenen).  
 
 
De in dit onderzoek uitgevoerde literatuuranalyse behandelt verschillende aspecten: een algemeen onderzoek 
naar regelgevingsinstrumenten en hun economische consequenties, onderzoek naar verklarende modellen 
voor naleving van regelgeving, en onderzoek naar perspectieven op de acceptatie van discretionaire ruimte 




Fundamenteel onderzoek naar regelgeving, van bijvoorbeeld Ogus, Diver of Baldwin, laat de onmogelijkheid 
zien om tot perfecte regels te komen. Het laat zien dat compromissen moeten worden gesloten, die 
geaccepteerd moeten worden wanneer bijvoorbeeld gekozen wordt tussen ‘middel’regelgeving en 
‘doel’regelgeving en in geval van een keuze tussen meer zekerheid of meer flexibiliteit. Deze bevindingen 
onderstrepen ook het belang van de toezichts- en handhavingsfase, waarin nog weer nadere keuzen worden 
gemaakt.  
 
Onderzoek naar de economische consequenties van regelgeving, zoals hier uitgeveoerd, is methodologisch 
ingewikkeld en de resultaten zijn vaak ook nog eens niet erg overtuigend. Porter et al. hebben laten zien dat, 
tenminste in sommige gevallen, strengere en gedetailleerdere, goed beheerde regels, niet zozeer 
marktwerking verkleind (door regelingslasten e.d.), maar dat dit soort regels ook hand in hand kan gaan met 
het verbeteren van de concurrentiepositie en daardoor economische groei. Rodrik, Djankov en vele anderen 
hebben echter geconcludeerd dat slecht beheerde regelgeving, belastende procedures, arbitraire handhaving 
etc. significante negatieve gevolgen kunnen hebben op economische ontwikkeling. Dat laatste laat nogmaals 
het belang zien van de wijze waarop regelgeving wordt “uitgevoerd”.  
 
Er zijn veel verschillende modellen over regelnaleving in de literatuur te vinden – van relatief simpele modellen 
die zich richten op de rationele berekening door bedrijven en personen van het effect van straf als gevolg van 
niet-naleving (Becker), tot veel complexere modellen die procedurele gerechtigheid en legitimiteit 
benadrukken, maar ook verschillende andere factoren opnemen (Tyler, Lind). Experimenten om de modellen 
te toetsen en te valideren leveren meestal uiteenlopende resultaten op. Meest overtuigend lijkt dat de inzet 
van onderling aanvullende prikkels tot naleving het meest effectief is.  Daaronder vallen voldoende toezichts- 
en handhavingscapaciteit (kennis, financiële middelen) en sociale conformiteit en legitimiteit zijn sterke 
aanjagers. Afschrikking is in het algemeen een minder sterke prikkel tot naleving dan conformiteit en 
legitimiteit maar het kan een belangrijke rol spelen voor sommige mensen of bedrijven en/of in sommige 
omstandigheden (omdat niet alle regels op dezelfde manier gezien worden door alle mensen). Dit laat het 
belang van een uitgebalanceerde benadering van handhaving zien: een risicogestuurde benadering is nodig 
om te voorkomen dat degenen die spontaan zouden naleven geduwd worden in de richting van weerstand, 
en aandacht voor procedurele gerechtigheid (waarbij criteria voor beslissingen duidelijker gemaakt worden) 
is nodig om de legitimiteit te verhogen.  
 
De perspectieven in de literatuur op de legitimiteit van discretie bij toezicht en handhaving zijn zeer 
conflicterend. Een deel van de verschillen hangt samen met juridische tradities. Ten minste in de Common 
Law en Romeins-Franse tradities is er globaal een groot respect voor het opportuniteitsbeginsel, dat ruimte 
biedt voor een ‘responsieve aanpak van handhaving’ gebaseerd op feitelijke risico’s.  
 
Tenslotte benoemt onderzoek naar risico’s en veiligheidsregelgeving de zeer verschillende manieren waarop 
risico gedefinieerd en gemanaged wordt. De consequenties daarvan voor toezicht en handhaving zijn niet 
altijd duidelijk. Auteurs als bijvoorbeeld Black en Baldwin wijzen op het theoretische probleem dat bij 
onduidelijkheid over definities het moeilijk is om een valide risicogebaseerde planning te maken. De praktijk 




Kortom, de literatuurreview wijst zowel op het belang van toezicht en handhaving, als op de noodzaak om een 
benadering te hebben die op een gebalanceerde manier met alle prikkels tot naleving rekening houdt, en op 
de cruciale en complexe rol van discretie bij de uitvoering. Het laat ook zien dat er verschillende definities zijn 
van risico, en dat de definities die gekozen zijn door sommige onderzoekers aanzienlijk verschillen van wat in 
het algemeen in de beleidspraktijk geaccepteerd is, bijvoorbeeld door de OECD of overheidsinstituties – wat 
mogelijk een aantal ogenschijnlijk teleurstellende onderzoeksbevindingen verklaart. 
 
 
Casestudies vormen het laatste gedeelte van het onderzoek, en maken het mogelijk om de hypothesen te 
toetsen en te zoeken naar een antwoord op de onderzoeksvraag. De eerste (en meest gedetailleerde) 
casestudy kijkt naar arbeidsveiligheid & arbeidsgezondheid inspecties in Groot-Brittannië en Duitsland 
(gedeeltelijk voortbouwend op eerder onderzoek van Tilindyte). De tweede casestudie beschouwt inspecties 
in landen in de voormalige Sovjet Unie, hoe deze zich verhouden tot praktijken in OECD/EU landen en wat de 
resultaten zijn van inspanningen om ze te hervormen naar een meer risico gebaseerde richting. De laatste 
casestudie kijkt op een meer metaniveau naar een aantal opvallende aspecten van bestaande praktijken en 
hervormingsinspanningen in een aantal EU-landen. De overkoepelende analyse zet vervolgens alle 
beschikbare data op een rij. De conclusie is dat de kwaliteit van de data robuuste conclusies over correlaties 
tussen toezicht- en handhavingspraktijken en de resultaten ervan niet mogelijk maken.  
 
De eerste casus beschouwt de evolutie van arbeidsveiligheid & arbeidsgezondheid inspecties in Groot-
Brittannië in de afgelopen vijftien jaar, en vergelijkt het aantal inspecties, de methoden en de resultaten met 
Duitsland. Deze casus is geselecteerd omdat arbeidsveiligheid & arbeidsgezondheid relatief uniek is onder 
inspectie functies omdat ten minste een van de outcome-indicatoren (dodelijke arbeidsongevallen) een hoge 
betrouwbaarheid heeft en goed te vergelijken is. Harmonisatie van data door Eurostat maakt het makkelijker 
om te vergelijken. De casus laat zien dat Britse arbeidsveiligheid & arbeidsgezondheid inspecties sterk risico 
gericht, risico-proportioneel en responsief in handhavingsbeslissingen. Ze leggen ook een sterke nadruk op 
advies en ondersteuning voor naleving. De data laten zien dat hoewel Britse arbeidsveiligheid & 
arbeidsgezondheid inspecties minder frequent zijn dan Duitse, de resultaten significant beter zijn in de 
afgelopen vijftien jaar. Daarnaast is de frequentie van inspecties gedaald in beide landen, maar de cijfers van 
dodelijke ongevallen zijn ook gedaald (waarbij de daling sterker was in Duitsland, waar de cijfers veel hoger 
waren in het begin). Hoewel dit niet genoeg is om te bewijzen dat risico gebaseerde benaderingen hebben 
geleid tot deze betere prestaties, suggereert de casus zeker dat zij mogelijk een rol gespeeld hebben. In ieder 
geval ontkracht de casus het idee dat meer inspecties noodzakelijk gecorreleerd zijn aan betere resultaten.  
 
De volgende casus leiden tot dezelfde bevindingen. Onderzoek uitgevoerd door de World Bank Group in de 
voormalige Sovjet Unie laat typisch erg hoge niveaus van inspectie-dekking zien, zonder dat dit op enige 
manier resulteert in hoge niveaus van naleving of positieve resultaten. Bovendien leiden hervormingen die tot 
zeer significante afname van de hoeveelheid inspecties zorgen niet tot enige verslechtering van resultaten. In 
tegendeel, landen die aanzienlijke hervormingen van inspecties ondergingen naar een meer risico gebaseerde 
aanpak gericht op de promotie van naleving (bijvoorbeeld Litouwen), hebben meestal ook betere resultaten. 
Een korte beschouwing van arbeidsveiligheid & arbeidsgezondheid inspecties in Frankrijk versterkt de 
bevindingen van de vergelijking tussen Groot-Brittannië en Duitsland: Frankrijk heeft vele malen frequentere 
inspecties dan Groot-Brittannië, gecombineerd met een “zero tolerance” aanpak, gegrond in een visie op 
naleving die volledig uitgaat van afschrikking, maar heeft resultaten die significant slechter zijn dan het 
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gemiddelde van de EU-28 (waar Groot-Brittannië telkens als beste of een van de beste scoort). Data over 
inspecties in Italië laten zien dat de inspecties zich daar meestal herhaaldelijk richten op dezelfde bedrijven, 
wat resulteert in een hoge mate van belasting voor ongeveer een derde van de bedrijven, met beperkte 
positieve effecten.  
 
 
Concluderend, met onderkenning dat het onderzoek beperkingen heeft die ervoor zorgen dat er geen 
doorslaggevend bewijs geleverd kan worden, kan worden gesteld dat er een omvangrijke hoeveelheid 
onderzoek en bewijs is dat suggereert dat risicogerichte inspecties, risicogebaseerde en responsieve 
handhaving en een gebalanceerde benadering gericht op het gebruiken van alle prikkels tot naleving tot betere 
resultaten nalevingsresultaten kan leiden. In ieder geval lijkt het tegenovergestelde idee van “slimme 
inspecties” door deze studie duidelijk te worden ontkracht, dat wil zeggen de ‘claim’ dat elke verlaging van 
aantal inspecties en verminderde striktheid van  handhaving zou leiden tot (rechtevenredige) verminderde 
naleving.  
 
De studie maakt daarmee ook direct duidelijk dat er vervolgonderzoek nodig is: verdiepend onderzoek naar 
methoden en resultaten, naar meer systematische vergelijking van landen en domeinen van regelgeving, 
enzovoorts. Het trekken van meer ferme conclusies over de effectiviteit van inspecties en van specifieke 
benaderingen, zal echter altijd moeilijk blijven, vanwege de beperkingen van de data die tenminste deels 
samenhangen met de complexiteit van relaties tussen toezicht en handhaving via de mate van naleving met 
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